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Abstract 
 
This Thesis examines the role that Automatic Number Plate Recognition surveillance plays 
within policing and public reassurance. The Thesis is improvement orientated, exploring how 
ANPR could become a more effective policing tool and highlights implications for future 
policies and practice. 
 
The first two chapters set the context for the research, explaining what ANPR is, its place 
within criminology and gaps in research addressed in the Thesis. The literature review calls 
for a better understanding of ANPR’s potential and role as an investigative tool and an 
examination of the public’s views about ANPR surveillance. In the third chapter, reference is 
made to available methods used to address such objectives. 
 
Chapters Four, Five and Six present the results emerging from the empirical work in this 
Thesis. Chapter Four is concerned with police perceptions regarding current ANPR practice. 
The thesis highlights the complexity of translating policy into practice in the current political 
and economic climate, where objectives and priorities dictated by the government are 
constantly shifting. Continuing its improvement orientation, Chapter Five covers public 
perceptions about ANPR and outlines ways to address the balance between privacy and 
security without endangering both. The potential impact of ANPR on crime and ways to 
measure it is the topic of Chapter Six, which argues that establishing a causal link between 
ANPR and crime is not a straightforward process. The concluding chapter talks about the 
implications of the study and any interesting future avenues for research. 
 
The emerging findings from this research sit uncomfortably with the opinions and predictions 
of both supporters and opponents of ANPR alike and shed light not only on the management 
and use of ANPR by the police in Britain, but also on many of the ethical issues raised by the 
emergence of new surveillance technologies. 
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‘Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither  
Liberty nor Safety.’1 
 
Chapter One 
ANPR in the Spotlight 
 
 
‘Britain is to become the first country in the world where movements of all vehicles on the roads are 
recorded. […] Using a network of cameras that can automatically read every passing number plate, 
the plan is to build a huge database of vehicle movements so that the police and security services can 
analyse any journey a driver has made over several years’2.  
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
This statement brings to mind almost inevitably images of a society under total surveillance, 
of ‘Orwellian nightmares’ and fears about a ‘Big Brother’ state3. While the government uses 
the language of safety and security, claiming that ANPR targets the wrongdoers and reduces 
crime, critics argue that the police use of ANPR surveillance may breach privacy and human 
rights laws4. Although it is easy to be carried away by the ‘apocalyptic vision’ of critics of 
new policing technologies or by the publicity of their effectiveness in reducing crime5, the 
truth is, however, that technologies like this are both a ‘burden and a blessing’6. Indeed 
surveillance has two ‘faces’7: it not only has the potential to be ‘protective and enabling’, but 
it can also be intrusive and deeply implicated in the structure of the ‘totalitarian rule’8.  
 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) is certainly one of the emerging enhanced 
technologies which enable the rapid recovery, matching, identification and real time tracking 
of vehicles and people through public space. Mass ‘dataveillance’ is now a reality, with large 
groups of people being monitored in the name of security to identify particular sub-
                                                 
1
 Quote first used by Benjamin Franklin in a letter written on 11th  November 1755, ‘Pennsylvania Assembly: 
Reply to the Governor’, printed in Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives, 1755-1756 
(Philadelphia, 1756), pp. 19-21. Quote taken from Labaree and Ketcham (Eds.) (1963: 242). 
2
 Connor (The Independent, 22nd December 2005). 
3
 Goold (2004: 5). 
4
 Macdonell (2006). See also the annual reports of the Chief Surveillance Commissioner (2006, 2007). 
5
 Chan (2003: 656). 
6
 Postman (1992: 4-5). 
7
 Lyon (1994: 201). 
8
 Norris and Armstrong (1999: 5). 
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populations of interest to the police and allied security organisations. Anonymous travel is 
quickly becoming a thing of the past, with an increased risk of losing any rights to ‘locational 
privacy’9. This raises questions like: Can we have privacy and security at the same time or is 
one sacrificed for the other? If we have to give up privacy for the sake of security, how 
effective are such surveillance technologies in providing this security? In other words, is 
ANPR worth the public money and the restrictions to one’s civil liberties? Indeed the 
potential, direction and the policy intent (deliberate or otherwise) appear to be pushing us 
towards a ‘Big Brother’ state. 
 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition was implemented by police forces in their efforts to 
control crime and maintain public order. ANPR is typically used in the hope that it will help 
to detect and deter document offences10 and acquisitive crime, as well as more serious 
incidents such as kidnapping, murder and terrorist attacks. It is also hoped that public 
confidence and reassurance will be improved. However, despite the wide use of ANPR 
technology in the UK, little is known about its effectiveness in addressing these aims or the 
extent to which it provides value for money. It is important that we become more aware of 
the full implications of these crime fighting tools, of the impact they can have on policing and 
crime, as well as their wider socio-political and ethical implications. 
 
Firstly, what exactly is ANPR and what does it do? Before looking in more detail at the 
background, scope and objectives of this Thesis, it might be useful at this stage to familiarise 
the reader with the topic of research. This introductory chapter commences by defining what 
is understood in this research by the term ANPR. This is followed by a discussion of the 
rationale for the study, including a brief account of the current state of research on ANPR and 
the research objectives of the Thesis. The chapter concludes with an overview of the Thesis’ 
structure. 
                                                 
9
 Blumberg and Eckersley (2009). See also Clarke and Wigan (2008) on the ‘deep’ privacy impact of ‘location 
technologies’. 
10
 Driving without valid insurance, MOT, licence are typically referred as ‘document’ offences. 
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1.2. What is ANPR? 
Before explaining the motivations and scope of this research, it is important to introduce the 
reader to the main concepts used throughout the thesis. ‘ANPR’ stands for Automatic 
Number Plate Recognition. Automatic number plate recognition is defined as a ‘surveillance 
capability that uses mobile and fixed road-side sensors to read vehicle number plates and 
instantaneously cross-match them with information and intelligence held on the Police 
National Computer and linked systems’11. The purpose is to identify stolen vehicles used in 
crime or which are in violation of some other law. 
 
Simply explained, ANPR ‘reads’ vehicle registration marks (VRM), commonly known as 
number plates, from digital images captured by ANPR cameras. Depending on the 
specifications of readers and cameras, ANPR can read up to 3,600 number plates per hour. 
The images captured include a ‘plate patch’ (the photograph of the number plate) and an 
overview image (which includes a photograph of the vehicle). The plate image is converted 
to text using optical character recognition (OCR) technology. Once the number plate is 
converted into text, the ANPR system stores it in a database. An electronic log of vehicle 
movements with date, time and location is created. While the system is only designed to read 
the plate, the software enables a search to be made for the plate in a variety of databases, 
providing feedback to the operator in seconds, if required12. 
 
1.2.1. The ANPR process: cameras, hotlists and hits 
ANPR systems can use existing CCTV cameras13, traffic cameras or cameras specifically 
designed for the task. While the police have focused on applications of ANPR based on these 
three platforms, less common types of systems are also used, such as portable, hand held and 
helicopter based ANPR. An illustration of common types of cameras used in conjunction 
with ANPR systems is presented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 below: 
 
                                                 
11
 NPIA (2009: 10). 
12
 ANPR is a tool with a multitude of applications, including operational policing, vehicle road tolling and 
traffic control, monitoring of shopping centres and private estates, control of parking and petrol stations 
forecourts, defence installations and high security applications. 
13CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) is a system in which a number of video cameras are connected in a closed 
circuit or loop, with images produced being sent to a central television monitor or recorder (Goold, 2004: 12). 
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Figure 1.1 ‘Fixed’ ANPR* 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 ‘Mobile’ ANPR: Spectrum van* 
 
 
 
*These pictures were released to the public domain or to the researcher who was given permission to 
use them for the purpose of the study 
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Although ANPR systems use CCTV cameras, this is not to say that CCTV is analogous to 
ANPR. The CCTV system usually captures and records moving images of pedestrians, bikes, 
cars etc, while ANPR captures only still images of the vehicle and its number plate and 
records the number plate data in the form of a text. Typical limitations encountered by the 
ANPR systems, which will be briefly explained next, suggest that ANPR works best with 
CCTV when different but complementary sets of cameras are used. 
 
Databases typically used by the police in connection with ANPR systems are also known as 
‘ANPR hotlists’. The most common ANPR hotlist is the Police National Computer (PNC). 
This includes vehicles that have been stolen or those linked to crime. However, other 
databases are also used to create ANPR hotlists including: 
• The Local Police Force Intelligence Systems hotlist which comprises vehicles of 
interest based on the local intelligence within a force; 
• The Counter Terrorism hotlist, which is compiled by the National Joint Unit (NJU) 
and consists of vehicles that are of interest to Force Special Branch and other 
government agencies in relation to terrorism; 
• The Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) hotlist which includes all vehicles 
without a valid excise licence or registered keeper and the Motor Insurance Database 
Application System (MIDAS) hotlist comprising all vehicles without a valid 
insurance policy. 
• Other In-force hotlists which are developed at force level and used more on an ad hoc 
basis to support targeted operations or to address specific crime problems in an area. 
 
ANPR systems produce two types of data, ‘read’ data and ‘hit’ data. ‘Read’ data contain all 
number plates identified and recorded by the system; ‘hit’ data contain number plates that 
have a hit against one of these databases (ANPR hits). 
 
Within policing, ANPR systems link to a central server called the Back Office Facility 
(BOF). The time, date, location and direction of travel of the vehicle, the image of the 
number plate (‘patch plate’) and in some cases the image of the vehicle and the driver are 
stored within the Back Office. The Back Office enables hit and read data to be searched for 
analysis. Systems are equipped to produce instantaneous warnings for ‘hit’ data/vehicles, 
which in turn assist the operators in their decisions and actions to take forward. 
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1.2.2. Technological limitations 
Although the ideas behind ANPR are simple, putting them into practice is more challenging. 
The main difficulty is to enable the capture of a clear image of the number plate, irrespective 
of light conditions, speed of the vehicle or the conditions of the number plate. It would be 
wrong to assume that all ANPR systems can be used in the same way or generate the same 
results. Some systems work with lower specs cameras producing lower quality images and 
less accurate reads. Newer ANPR cameras have enhanced specifications, with infrared 
capabilities to enable reading number plates and taking photographs in poor light conditions 
or at night.  It is believed that the overall read rates for ANPR are 90% to 94%, in ideal 
conditions and supported by high quality modern systems. However, additional factors such 
as tow-bars, increased reflective properties of the number plate’s lettering, dirt, cloned or fake 
number plates could lead to significant levels of misreads. The older ANPR systems have 
been notably unreliable (with performance rates between 60% and 80%), being heavily 
criticised for misreading number plates and generating ‘hits’ on innocent drivers. Although 
ANPR technology has developed considerably over the last few years, concerns about the 
accuracy and reliability of ANPR systems remain14. Media reports of misidentification 
coupled with fears of the loss of ‘locational privacy’15 have raised concerns amongst the 
public and this Thesis seeks to explore these issues. 
                                                 
14
 Parking Trend International (June 2008), available from: 
http://www.parkingandtraffic.co.uk/Measuring%20ANPR%20System%20Performance.pdf. For information 
about the congestion charging system in London, go to http://www.thisislondon.com/news. Last checked 
October 2009. 
15
 Blumberg and Eckersley (2009) define ‘locational privacy’ as the ability of an individual to move in public 
space with the expectation that under normal circumstances their location will not be systematically and secretly 
recorded for later use. 
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1.3. Why ANPR? Motivations and scope of the research 
This research is based on a collaborative studentship between the University of Huddersfield 
and West Yorkshire Police, which part-funded the study. West Yorkshire Police recognised a 
need for a more systematic examination of the use of ANPR technology particularly with 
regards to crime investigations and intelligence development, in order to tackle crime and 
disorder more efficiently. West Yorkshire Police facilitated the researcher with access to a 
number of data sources and key stakeholders in the ANPR arena both at local and national 
level. 
 
The research also stems from a general interest in criminology and a more specific concern 
for activities which come under the umbrella of surveillance technologies. While there is an 
abundance of literature on CCTV, there has been little academic attention afforded to the 
implications of advanced CCTV systems such as ANPR on policing, crime prevention, public 
reassurance and civil liberties. Research on ANPR identified at the time when this Thesis was 
started (April 2006) was limited to just few studies commissioned by the Home Office Police 
Studies Unit (PSU) with support from the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC)16. These were informally called the 
‘Laser’ evaluations (Laser 1-4), with only Laser 2 being released into the public domain 
(published by PA Consulting Group in 2002). More specifically, this body of literature 
looked primarily at the police use of ANPR technologies across England and Wales in the 
context of operational policing and ANPR-enabled intercept teams. 
 
While these studies provide valuable information on ANPR and add to our understanding of 
how ANPR works, they are limited in scope and quality. There is a paucity of research 
examining how the police have embraced this new surveillance technology, or whether 
ANPR is effective in reducing crime and fear of crime. According to the ANPR Strategy for 
the Police Service 2007/201017, one of the justifications for the use of ANPR is to increase 
public confidence, which is an area that has been completely overlooked by current research 
and academic papers. Given the extensive developments in surveillance technologies in the 
UK and fears about an emerging ‘Big Brother’ state on the one hand and extensive 
investment from the government in crime prevention measures such as ANPR on the other, 
                                                 
16
 For future reference, the acronyms ACPO, NPIA and Home Office PSU will be used. 
17
 ACPO (2007). 
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there is a clear need to investigate the effectiveness of ANPR as a policing tool, but also to 
explore the wider socio-ethical implications of using ANPR. The use of ANPR brings with it 
responsibility and accountability, as well as expectations of effectiveness and value for 
money.  
 
This is even more the case given that the investigative and intelligence use of ANPR are 
becoming increasingly important in the current political and national security context. The 
thinking behind policing strategies at a national level is to find more comprehensive ways to 
effectively address issues such as terrorism and serious and organised crime. This involves 
embedding ANPR into mainstream policing and using ANPR more as an aid to crime 
investigations and a means to developing intelligence, which – as will be argued throughout 
the Thesis – is ANPR’s ‘Achilles’ heel’. 
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1.4. Research objectives 
This Thesis seeks to redress some of these gaps in research and knowledge with regards to 
ANPR. Drawing on three years of field research with the police and the public (that included 
the capture of primary data through participant observation, interviews, electronic and postal 
surveys, focus groups), crime data analysis and secondary analysis of police records, this 
Thesis presents the findings of an extensive study of ANPR and its role within policing and 
public reassurance. 
 
The primary objective of this Thesis is to explore the advantages and limitations to ANPR as 
perceived by the police and the public with a view to inform future development and policies 
and improve ANPR’s effectiveness in reducing crime and reassuring the public. The Thesis is 
not an impact evaluation of ANPR. More specifically, this Thesis’ objectives are to: 
• Explore the criminological theory behind the use of ANPR; 
• Examine common practice in the police use of ANPR in the UK; 
• Explore ANPR’s potential as an investigative and intelligence policing tool; 
• Investigate the extent to which opportunities presented by ANPR are fully exploited; 
• Explore ANPR’s impact on crime; 
• Explore the public’s view with regards to ANPR surveillance; 
• Suggest recommendations regarding the police use of ANPR and implications for 
future policy and practice; 
• Identify future avenues of research. 
 
Research of this nature is important in the context of police effectiveness and accountability. 
A better understanding of how ANPR works and how it is perceived would be of obvious 
interest to the police and other agencies with policy remit involved in the development and 
future funding of ANPR. This research is important for not only will it explore how police 
practice could be improved, but it will also flag up some of the issues surrounding the 
measurement of ANPR’s impact on crime. 
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1.5. Structure of the Thesis 
In this concluding section, a brief outline of the remaining chapters is provided. The first 
major question that this Thesis addresses is how ANPR fits within broader crime theories. 
ANPR, like CCTV, is a surveillance technology with a rationale based, on the one hand, on a 
situational approach to crime and contemporary opportunity theories, and on the other hand 
on principles of the ‘Panopticon’ and modern control theories. Thus Chapter Two places 
ANPR within a wider surveillance and crime prevention context and explores the 
criminological theories which might explain how ANPR can reduce crime, issues largely 
overlooked by the academic literature. The chapter moves on to highlight the deficiencies of 
the literature and concludes with a list of research questions, some of which this Thesis seeks 
to address. 
 
Chapter Three describes the research methodology and justifies the selection of certain 
methods over others. It also describes the stages involved in the research and highlights a 
number of issues relating to the research process, research facilitation and field-based 
research in a police environment.  
 
Chapters Four, Five and Six include the empirical results of the research. Chapter Four 
presents police perceptions, knowledge and experience about ANPR, exploring the balance 
between ANPR’s potential and use as an investigative and intelligence tool. The main 
impediments to ANPR’s effectiveness are highlighted here with the view to identify areas 
where further work or guidance might be required to optimise the benefits of ANPR in all 
areas of policing. 
 
Chapter Five turns its attention to how the public respond to the introduction of ANPR in the 
UK and how they perceive its role as a crime prevention tool. This chapter examines in detail 
the public’s view on the police use of ANPR surveillance, a process which was both 
literature-led and informed by field research (public opinion survey and focus groups). 
 
Chapter Six explores the extent to which traditional ways of measuring an intervention’s 
impact on crime could be applicable to new surveillance technologies such as ANPR. The 
chapter presents the findings of a study exploring changes in police recorded crime following 
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the introduction of ANPR and highlights the main challenges to the process of measuring 
ANPR’s impact on crime. 
 
The final chapter of the thesis, Chapter Seven, draws together the lessons from the earlier 
chapters and describes the theoretical, methodological and practical contribution of the study. 
The chapter also outlines the implications of the study, research limitations and any 
interesting future avenues for research. 
 
 23
Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In order to fully understand ANPR and its impact on policing, the theoretical background to 
ANPR and its development as a policing tool are first discussed. Where does ANPR fit into 
the world of surveillance and the area of policing and of crime detection? Why might we 
think that ANPR works? To answer such questions we need to explore the theoretical 
justifications for surveillance technologies, tracing for example their roots in opportunity or 
crime theories. The rise of surveillance technologies has implications both for criminology 
and wider society and these are discussed in this chapter. This chapter places ANPR within 
the wider sociological and criminological context and reviews the literature on this subject. 
The chapter concludes with a list of important questions for further investigation, some of 
which this thesis seeks to address. 
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2.2. Surveillance: from Sun Tzu’s spies to CCTV and beyond 
In a broad sense, surveillance means ‘watching over’ someone or something18. Surveillance is 
an old phenomenon, an intrinsic part of human interaction. When Sun Tzu wrote ‘The Art of 
War’ 2500 years ago, he discussed the role of spies in the battle against enemies. Since then, 
surveillance has evolved to the point where it involves the systematic monitoring and 
recording of behaviour, movement or affairs of people for security or social control purposes. 
Surveillance nowadays is so pervasive, it has almost become routine: 
 
‘We live in a surveillance society. It is pointless to talk about surveillance society in the future 
tense. In all rich countries of the world everyday life is suffused with surveillance encounters, 
not merely from dawn to dusk but 24/7. It is not just that CCTV may capture our image 
several hundred times a day or that check-out clerks want to see our loyalty cards in the 
supermarket. It is that these systems represent a basic, complex infrastructure which assumes 
that gathering and processing personal data is vital to contemporary living.’19 
 
 
While some forms of surveillance have always existed, the development of information 
technologies and advanced electronics has brought surveillance to a completely new and 
extended level of operation. This new surveillance assisted by information and computer 
technology (‘surveillance technology’) is fast, varied, controlled, coordinated and in some 
cases automated. Examples of everyday surveillance include visual (e.g. CCTV) and aural 
surveillance (e.g. audio bugs, microphones, telephone taps), electronic surveillance of people 
and their goods (offender tagging, in-car satellite tracking devices, radio frequency 
identification in clothes) or the surveillance of individuals through the ‘traces’ they leave 
behind on a daily basis, also called ‘data trail’ or ‘dataveillance’20 (e.g. identity cards and 
passports, credit and debit cards, loyalty cards, cell phones, e-mail and the internet). 
 
The increase in the use of surveillance technologies over the last fifty years has been 
phenomenal21. Amongst these, the most striking example is the development of CCTV in the 
                                                 
18
 Definition provided by Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, available from: http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/surveillance. The word ‘surveillance’, of French origin, comes from ‘surveiller’ which 
means ‘to watch over’. 
19
 Ball and Wood (ed.) (2006: 1). 
20
 Clarke (1988). 
21
 Chan (2003). See also Graham (1998); Lyon (2001), Marx (2001, 2002) and Nunn (2001). 
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United Kingdom, where the spread of this surveillance technology has surpassed any other 
country in the world. The history and development of CCTV falls beyond the remit of this 
thesis, however, the underlying theoretical concepts and evidence of effectiveness will be 
highlighted in this chapter, as ANPR, like CCTV, is a surveillance technology with a 
rationale based, on the one hand, on a situational approach to crime and contemporary 
rational actor theories, and on the other hand on principles of the ‘Panopticon’ and modern 
control theories. It is, however, important to highlight that it is the increase in the use of 
CCTV that influenced the development and rise of more sophisticated and advanced 
surveillance systems such as ANPR and facial recognition for example22.  
 
As surveillance is an implicit characteristic of modernity23, surveillance methodologies adapt, 
spread and develop accordingly. Technologies which were originally developed and used by 
the military have extended into the private sector and the law enforcement arena. Modern 
surveillance technologies are highly sophisticated, globally widespread and under constant 
scientific development. A wide range of surveillance technologies has evolved, including 
digitised, algorithmic surveillance (e.g. ‘smart CCTV’ enabled with facial, movement or 
number plate recognition technologies), monitoring and tracking using detection sensors (e.g. 
heat, light, motion, sound and smell) and the increased use of biometrics and advanced 
computer techniques (e.g. finger and hand print recognition, iris scanning, DNA tests)24.  
 
‘Algorithmic surveillance’ involves the use of automatic step-by-step instructions, also 
known as algorithms25. Algorithms link together to create software which is used to exploit 
raw data, generating systems that can basically classify and store simple data, or more 
complex systems that compare and match the data, even predicting and reacting to events26. 
Surveillance technologies are indeed becoming more sophisticated and complex, with more 
digital and algorithmic features. One such example is the development of Automatic Number 
Plate Recognition Systems (ANPR). The introductory chapter explained that ANPR systems 
are equipped to read vehicle number plates, match them against a variety of databases and 
                                                 
22
 Goold (2004: 18-19). 
23
 Ball and Wood (ed.) (2006: 1). 
24
 Marx (2001: 1). 
25
 The term ‘algorithmic surveillance’ was first used by Norris and Armstrong (1999), but the origins of the 
word ‘algorithm’ can be traced back to the 9th Century Muslim mathematician Muhammed ibn Musa al-
Khwarizmi (Graham and Wood, 2003: 253). 
26
 Graham and Wood (2003); Introna and Wood (2004). 
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produce automatic warnings for vehicles of interest to the police. ANPR is a form of 
algorithmic surveillance as it can classify and store, compare and match, predict and react.  
 27
 
2.3. Sociological perspectives: ANPR in a wider surveillance context 
Sociological explanations for video surveillance (particularly CCTV) often invoke the 
metaphor of the ‘Panopticon’, the image of a ‘maximum surveillance society’ or of a ‘Big 
Brother’ state27. The Panopticon was an architectural design of a prison developed by Jeremy 
Bentham in the late eighteen century (1791) in which prisoners were to be held in cells 
around the edge of a circular building for the purpose of being observed from a centrally 
elevated watch-tower. The scenario implied that all prisoners were subject to surveillance by 
an observer, while the observer remained unseen by those being observed. The purpose of the 
panopticon was not only to facilitate the supervision of prisoners from a centralised location, 
but also to create obedience and conformity through the fear and uncertainty of being 
watched; an ‘expression of power’ which aimed to cultivate self-discipline and self-control28. 
Bentham argued that his design of the Panopticon could be applied beyond prisons, to any 
place where people are kept under supervision (e.g. work, hospitals). 
 
Over one hundred and fifty years later, the French philosopher Michel Foucault drew on 
Bentham’s ideas, including his own design of the Panopticon. In his book ‘Surveiller et 
punir: Naissance de la prison’ (1977), Foucault used the Panopticon as a symbol of all new 
surveillance techniques introduced in the early nineteen century which enabled a small 
number of people to control and observe (‘surveille’) a large mass of people. According to 
Foucault, the power generated by this architecture had influenced not only the prison, but 
other social institutions, such as hospitals, schools, military barracks and factories29. He 
predicted that in the future the principles of the Panopticon will expand to non-institutional 
spaces and populations30. 
 
2.3.1. Does ANPR bring us closer to a total surveillance society? 
Although the rise of surveillance technologies invoke images of a ‘Big Brother’ state31, we 
should be cautious before automatically applying Foucault’s concepts to CCTV and ANPR. 
The spread of such systems does not in itself mean that a totalitarian state is about to appear. 
                                                 
27
 The ‘Panopticon’ is a concept developed by Jeremy Bentham. See his ‘Writings’ in Bozovic (ed.) (1995).  
28
 Hier et al. (2006: 231). 
29
 Norris and Armstrong (1999: 6). 
30
 Smart (1985). 
31
 As Goold (2004: 5) argues, ‘it is rare to find a critical discussion of policing and electronic surveillance that 
does not at some point either invoke the image of “Big Brother” or rely on metaphors drawn directly from the 
world of Nineteen Eighty-Four. 
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Some will argue that the disciplinary potential of Foucault’s Panopticon or Orwell’s ‘Big 
Brother’ is at its peak only when combined with ‘techniques of behaviour modification, 
indoctrination and socialisation’32. Others stress that for CCTV surveillance to be ‘total’, it 
has to have the power to observe (anybody, anywhere, anytime) and classify individuals; 
people need to be aware of being watched and there has to be a certainty of response from 
authorities to acts of non-conformity33. 
 
ANPR is certainly an enhanced technology enabling the rapid recovery, matching, 
identification and real time tracking of vehicles through public space. However, whilst the 
Orwellian nightmare of a ‘maximum surveillance society’ remains, we should not yet be 
resigned to technological determinism. This thesis will argue that at present there are 
significant technical, operational, governance and institutional problems which hamper its 
realisation. The potential, however, is ever-present in the technology. Being digital and 
automated, ANPR systems have an increased capacity to store and analyse data; an increased 
ability to identify suspects without having to watch for behavioural patterns. In most cases, 
the population subject to CCTV surveillance (open street systems) is unknown to the 
observers so they cannot systematically identify and classify people in public space34. Most 
CCTV systems cannot (yet) routinely link a person’s image to a database. CCTV cameras can 
be linked to facial recognition software and match facial features against a database of known 
suspects or offenders, but these systems are still in their infancy35. While the population 
subject to typical CCTV surveillance is largely anonymous, non-documented, non-classified 
(and thus less likely to induce anticipatory conformity)36, most of those watched by ANPR 
cameras are already known to those who are watching. ANPR cameras are linked to 
databases comprising information on the entire registered driving population. However, stand 
alone ANPR systems have their disadvantages over CCTV. Firstly, they are limited to the 
driving population; they cannot ‘watch’ everything and everybody. Not only is ANPR limited 
to cars, but the information on the known driver of the car of interest can be inaccurate, as the 
driver may not be the registered keeper of the vehicle or the databases used in connection 
with ANPR may not be up to date at the time when the system cross-checks the information 
regarding the vehicle registration number. 
                                                 
32
 Norris and Armstrong (1999: 6). 
33
 Norris and McCahill (2006: 115). 
34
 Norris and Armstrong (1999: 91-2). 
35
 In the UK, The London Borough of Newham has a facial recognition system built into their CCTV systems. 
The system is piloted in two other British cities, Birmingham and Manchester (Meek, 2002). 
36
 Norris and Armstrong (1999: 94). 
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ANPR systems can match, analyse and disseminate personal data at high speeds. As will be 
argued throughout the thesis, the development of a national ANPR centre, where all ANPR 
related intelligence are to be stored, is the proof that the information gathered by ANPR could 
be networked and shared and there is the potential for any driver in the UK to be under 
surveillance at some point in time. These are some of the reasons why ANPR could bring us 
closer to a ‘maximum surveillance society’37. 
 
One of the main limitations, however, both with regards to CCTV and ANPR systems, is the 
extent to which these surveillance systems generate an ‘authoritative reaction to non-
conformity’38. Studies about CCTV surveillance indicate that this is affected by poor 
integration, which generally means that the majority of systems are not monitored on a 
regular basis and that CCTV staff have other responsibilities or do not watch all the cameras 
all the time39. This thesis will argue that this is the case with ANPR surveillance. An uneven 
balance between resources available and the amount of hits generated by the systems can 
result in low response rates, hence affecting the response to ‘non conformity’. For an 
illustration of differences between CCTV and ANPR, see Table 2.1 below: 
 
                                                 
37
 New sophisticated technologies close this gap even further. The face recognition technology developed by 
NEC enables cameras to identify drivers and passengers in their cars by taking a picture of the driver and 
compare with photos from the driver licence database to find a match. These cameras can be linked to ANPR 
systems which conduct further checks on the person and their driver licence. The system has been already used 
by border police in places like Hong Kong. The British Police are currently at the testing stage of this 
technology. Story available from: http://www.autoexpress.co.uk/news/autoexpressnews. 
38
 Dandeker (1990: 40-1). 
39
 Norris and Armstrong (1999). 
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Table 2.1 Characteristics of ANPR and CCTV 
 
ANPR CCTV 
Digital Mostly analogue* 
Algorithmic and automated Manual* 
Increased capacity of storage & analysis Limited storage of data* 
One moment in time Continuous recording 
Fast Slow* 
Automatic recognition and tracking Manual tracking* 
Identities** Images of people, cars, places 
Known population** Anonymous 
Tracking of vehicles Tracking of vehicles and people 
Low coverage, limited to roads Extensive coverage, incl. pedestrian areas 
Driving population Everybody 
No need to monitor behaviour Constant need to monitor behaviour 
Reduced number of operators; reduced 
‘operator’ bias (automatic detection of suspects) 
High number of operators; highly skilled; danger 
of ‘operator’ bias (operator decides on 
suspicious behaviour) 
 
* However, more digital CCTV systems are currently installed. Digital CCTV is more effective 
and more reliable. The data are digitally recorded and stored instead of being recorded onto video 
tapes, hence there is scope for increased storage, speed in processing and analysing the data. 
** Certainty about identities is highly dependent on the accuracy of the read and the information 
stored on databases used in connection with ANPR systems. 
 
 31
 
2.4. Criminological perspectives: ANPR in a wider crime prevention context 
From a criminological point of view, surveillance technologies are concerned with the 
prevention, detection and, ultimately the reduction of crime. This section will review 
different forms of crime reduction and appropriate criminological theories in an attempt to 
explain the rationale for the police use of ANPR. 
 
While crime reduction refers to ‘any activity to decrease the frequency and/or seriousness of 
criminal and related events’, crime prevention refers to the methods used to intervene in the 
‘causes of crime and disorder events to reduce the risk of their occurrence and the potential 
seriousness of their consequences’40. Some criminologists talk about ‘primary’, ‘secondary’ 
and ‘tertiary’ crime prevention, where ‘primary’ refers to the prevention of the crime event, 
‘secondary’ to the prevention of criminality amongst those at risk of becoming offenders and 
‘tertiary’ refers to the prevention of continued criminal behaviour amongst those already 
offending41. Others distinguish between ‘situational’, ‘community’ and ‘developmental’ 
crime prevention42. Some criminologists have gone even further, identifying eleven types of 
preventative intervention, each of which addressing more immediate or more remote causes 
of crime43. 
 
‘The potential scope of prevention is vast and the means of capturing it highly various. This 
presents a challenge for the practitioner attempting to reduce crime, for the crime scientist 
trying to develop effective means of reducing crime and for the criminologist attempting 
critically to make sense of policies and practices defining crime problems and responding to 
them.’44 
 
At the broadest level, however, there are two main approaches to explaining criminal 
behaviour – the dispositional and situational approaches - each with different implications for 
crime prevention45. 
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 Ekblom (2005: 204). 
41
 Brantingham and Faust (1976). 
42
 Tonry and Farrington (1995). 
43
 Ekblom’s (2005). For a good description of different types of crime prevention and theories supporting these 
approaches, see also Tilley (ed.) (2005) and Maguire, Morgan and Reiner (ed.) (2002). 
44
 Tilley (2005b: 4-5). 
45
 Sutherland (1947). 
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Dispositional prevention, which is sometimes referred to as ‘social prevention’, seeks to 
change offenders’ fundamental criminality by eliminating or ameliorating the ‘root’ causes of 
crime which are believed to be the reason for ‘criminal dispositions’. Crime is a result of 
inherited personality traits and upbringing or deprivation resulting from socio-economic and 
cultural disparities such as unemployment, poverty and social disorganisation. For advocates 
of dispositional prevention, the only way to affect crime is to address these causes, rather 
than the situations in which crime occurs46. However, dispositional theories have been 
criticised for focusing solely on the offender without considering differences in motivation 
for committing different types of crimes47 or for mistaking correlations between various 
factors with the causes of crime and criminal behaviour. The effectiveness of dispositional 
crime prevention interventions has been questioned mainly because of the difficulty in 
evaluating such a broad range of inputs in terms of a long-term outcome and the poor quality 
of evaluations of community prevention strategies48. 
 
2.4.1. Principles of situational prevention 
An increasing awareness of the limitations of strategies based only on dispositional factors 
encouraged academics to consider other explanations for crime. While proponents of ‘social 
crime prevention’ focussed on the dispositional determinants of crime (‘why?’) and measures 
designed to reduce criminal motivation, in the last three to four decades criminologists have 
turned their attention to the situational determinants of crime (‘where?’, ‘when?’, ‘who?’, 
‘what?’ and ‘how?’) and proposed preventive measures to reduce the opportunities for crime. 
Crime and the current dynamics/situations of crime became the object of interest. Situational 
crime prevention thus focuses on reducing the opportunities for crime - rather than changing 
the characteristics of offenders - and modifying the environment or situation in which a crime 
usually occurs49. 
 
Support for a situational approach to crime prevention was provided by a study investigating 
rates of suicide in England and Wales during the 1960’s and early 1970’s50. It found that 
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 Clarke (1980: 137-146); Clarke and Mayhew (1988: 82). 
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 Clarke (1980: 137). 
48
 Tonry and Farrington (1995). It is argued that programmes to provide ‘treatment’ for offenders and reform 
their behaviour have not been particularly successful. Criminologists such as David Matza (1964) have argued 
that offenders may even be encouraged by a society which appears to appreciate, if not actually condone, their 
actions. 
49
 Poyner (1983: 5). 
50
 Clarke and Mayhew (1988). 
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suicide rates declined significantly following the change from coal gas (toxic) to North Sea 
gas (less toxic). This change in the opportunity to commit suicide led to an immediate and 
lasting reduction in the number of suicides. It was argued that if such a situational change 
could affect the acts of desperate people considering suicide, then the role of opportunity 
must be much more powerful for less deeply-motivated deviance, such as theft and violence. 
However, the development of this approach needs to be understood in the context of the 
political programmes with which it is aligned and in particular the work of Ron Clarke and 
the Home Office Research and Planning Unit in the late 1970s and early 1980s51. Situational 
crime prevention became a popular approach as it used economic language such as rewards, 
risks, demand and supply which fitted well with the ideology of the Conservative government 
at the time. Not only were the ‘situational’ interventions typically short-term and relatively 
inexpensive compared to ‘social’ programmes, but it was strongly believed that they provided 
practical solutions, rather than simply postulating as to why crime is committed. This was 
attractive to practitioners who had to implement such theories on the ground52. 
  
2.4.2. Techniques of situational crime prevention 
As situational crime prevention has evolved over the last decades, the number of techniques 
has increased as well – from the original twelve proposed by Clarke in 1993, to Clarke and 
Homel’s sixteen in 199753 and the twenty-five proposed by Cornish and Clarke ten years later 
(2003)54. ‘Opportunity reduction’ is now about: 
• Increasing the effort involved in crime (‘target-hardening’); 
• Increasing the risks of detection (screening and surveillance); 
• Reducing the rewards of crime (devaluing or removing the target); 
• Reducing provocations and 
• Removing excuses for committing crimes55. 
 
These interventions work on the premise that offenders make calculated decisions about the 
most suitable targets to select. Therefore, altering the target (installing a burglar alarm or 
CCTV), or portraying the message that the target may have been altered (installing a dummy 
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 Garland (2000). 
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 Clarke and Homel (1997) added the category ‘removing the excuses of crime’. 
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burglar alarm or installing CCTV in some shops and not others) should render that target less 
suitable, as perceived by the potential offender. For a classification of the latest collection of 
crime reduction techniques, see Table 2.2 below. This classification was devised by Cornish 
and Clarke in 2003, but for the purpose of this Thesis, the table has been adapted to include, 
where appropriate, where ANPR might act as a situational crime prevention technique.  
 
 35
Table 2.2 ANPR, amongst other situational crime prevention strategies* 
 
Increase the effort Increase the risks Reduce the rewards Reduce provocations Remove excuses 
1. Harden Targets 
• immobilisers in cars 
• anti-robbery screens 
• steering column 
locks 
• tamper-proof 
packaging 
6. Extend 
guardianship  
• cocooning 
• neighbourhood watch 
• go out in group at night 
• leave signs of occupancy 
• carry cell phone 
11. Conceal targets 
• gender-neutral 
phone directories 
• off-street parking 
• unmarked armoured 
trucks 
16. Reduce 
frustration and stress 
• efficient queuing 
• soothing 
lighting/music 
• expanded seating 
• polite service 
21. Set rules 
• rental 
agreements 
• hotel 
registration 
• harassment 
codes 
2. Control access to 
facilities 
• alley-gating 
• entry phones 
• electronic  card 
access 
• baggage screening 
• ANPR 
7. Assist natural surveillance  
• improved street lighting 
• defensible space design 
• neighbourhood watch 
hotlines 
12. Remove targets 
• removable car 
radios 
• pre-paid public 
phone cards 
• women’s shelters 
17. Avoid disputes 
• fixed cab fares 
• reduce crowding in 
pubs 
• separate seating for 
rival soccer fans 
22. Post 
instructions 
• 'No parking' 
• 'Private 
property' 
extinguish camp 
fires 
3. Screen exits 
• tickets needed for 
exit 
• electronic 
merchandise tags 
• export documents 
8. Reduce anonymity 
• taxi driver ID's 
• 'how's my driving?' signs 
• School uniforms 
• ANPR 
13. Identify property  
• property marking 
• vehicle licensing 
and parts marking 
• cattle branding 
• ANPR 
18. Reduce emotional 
arousal  
• controls on violent 
porn 
• prohibit paedophiles 
working with children 
• enforce good 
behaviour on soccer 
field 
• prohibit racial slurs 
23. Alert conscience  
• roadside speed 
display signs 
• 'shoplifting is 
stealing' 
• signature for 
customs 
declarations 
• ANPR signs 
4. Deflect offenders 
• street closures in 
red light district 
• separate toilets for 
women 
• disperse pubs 
9. Utilise place managers  
• train employees to 
prevent crime 
• support whistle blowers 
• CCTV for double-deck 
buses 
• reward vigilance 
• 2 clerks for convenience 
stores 
14. Disrupt markets 
• checks on pawn 
brokers 
• licensed street 
vendors 
• controls on 
classified ads 
19. Neutralise peer 
pressure 
• 'idiots drink and drive' 
• 'it's ok to say no' 
• Disperse 
troublemakers at 
school 
24. Assist 
compliance 
• litter bins 
• public 
lavatories 
• easy library 
checkout 
5. Control 
tools/weapons 
‘smart guns’ 
• toughened beer 
glasses 
• photos on credit 
cards 
10. Strengthen formal 
surveillance  
• speed cameras 
• red-light cameras 
• burglar alarms 
• CCTV in town centres 
• security guards 
• ANPR cameras and 
police response/presence 
15. Deny benefits 
• ink merchandise 
tags 
• graffiti cleaning 
• disabling stolen cell 
phones 
• disabling engine 
power stolen 
vehicles 
20. Discourage imitation  
• rapid vandalism 
repair 
• V-chips in TV's 
• censor details of 
modus operandi 
25. Control drugs 
/alcohol 
• breathalysers in 
pubs 
• alcohol-free 
events 
• server 
intervention 
programmes 
 
*Adapted from Cornish and Clarke (2003: 90); Clarke and Eck (2003). 
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2.4.3. ANPR: a situational crime prevention measure and beyond 
Among these inter-related and sometimes overlapping ‘opportunity reduction’ strategies56, 
ANPR is a formal surveillance system which fits well within those situational measures 
focusing on increasing the risk of detection or the perceived risk of detection. Within this 
framework, ANPR has the potential to increase the perceived effort by controlling access to 
facilities (e.g. ANPR private systems which automatically check vehicles entering a facility); 
increase the risks of detection by increasing the risk of offender identification (ANPR can 
reduce anonymity) and enhanced formal surveillance (through the presence of ANPR 
cameras and visible police presence on the road); although ANPR can also ‘alert the 
conscience’ of offenders through visible ANPR signs such as ‘This area/petrol station is 
covered by ANPR cameras which will record your number plate’. 
 
Although situational prevention is the most common measure aiming to reduce opportunities 
for crime, it is important to recognise that there are other ‘opportunity reducing’ approaches 
to crime such as crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) and problem-
oriented policing (POP) - most recently known as intelligence-led policing. CPTED is 
concerned with the relationship between people and the environment they inhabit. The 
concept was developed by C. Ray Jeffrey in 197157, influenced by the work of Jane Jacobs 
(1962) and Oscar Newman (1972) on defensible space, natural surveillance, territoriality and 
the role of the environment in crime prevention. CPTED focuses on designing (or altering 
post-design) the features of the environment (i.e. housing estates, shopping centres etc) in an 
attempt to physically increase the difficulty in committing a crime and create an environment 
in which a potential offender’s perception of the risk of committing a crime is high. Problem 
oriented policing (developed by Herman Goldstein in 197958) and intelligence-led policing 
(mentioned for the first time by Smith in 199459) are concepts describing a proactive 
approach to policing and crime prevention, in which the police find ‘ways of removing the 
opportunities giving rise to crime problems that they repeatedly have to deal with, rather than 
responding in a reactive fashion to each individual incident’60. 
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ANPR is a surveillance technology falling within the remit of situational prevention, hence 
this thesis focuses on the situational crime prevention approach and how opportunity theories 
supporting this approach can be used to provide a rationale for the use of ANPR as a crime 
prevention tool. However, ANPR’s potential to track suspects’ movements and create 
offender profiles - where the aim is not to protect a physical location/target against a 
particular crime, but to collect information on possibly dangerous populations – takes ANPR 
beyond typical situational prevention, covering aspects of the intelligence-led policing 
approach. ANPR has the potential to generate useful intelligence to create profiles of 
offenders and their movement which could be used by the police in a proactive way to deploy 
their resources, detect and prevent crime in a more efficient way. 
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2.5. Why might we think ANPR works? Theoretical justifications 
How do theories help us understand crime prevention measures such as CCTV and ANPR? It 
is often argued that many situational crime prevention measures have been driven by 
practical considerations rather than with reference to the theoretical framework within which 
they are set61. If one takes the example of CCTV, there is arguably a general theoretical 
weakness in both its development and its evaluation. Possibly because CCTV has been 
primarily politically driven, relatively little attention has been paid to the theoretical basis on 
which CCTV is premised. Rather it has been viewed as a technical solution to an empirical 
problem. Crime prevention measures, inter alia, are never, however, implemented or 
evaluated in a theoretical vacuum – although theory is sometimes hidden beneath ‘common 
sense’ knowledge or underlying assumptions about why they would work. 
 
The theoretical basis for situational prevention was developed retrospectively to provide a 
framework for research and future developments and to counter some of these critics, 
particularly with regards to displacement62. The development of the rational choice 
perspective63, supplemented by routine activity theory64 and crime pattern theory65 provided 
situational prevention with a stronger theoretical base. These theories are usually called 
‘opportunity’ theories because they give an important role to situational factors in crime and 
opportunity. They are also called ‘crime’ theories because they seek to explain the occurrence 
of crime, not the development of criminality66. David Garland67 has also called them 
‘criminologies of everyday life’ because they treat the occurrence of crime as theoretically 
unproblematic, resulting from normal human impulses of greed and selfishness. Although 
different in scope and focus, these theories share the belief that opportunity generates crime 
and that crime is a normal phenomenon, as opposed to something unusual which has to be 
explained: 
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‘Crime becomes a risk to be calculated (by the offender and the potential victim) or as an 
accident to be avoided, rather than a moral aberration which needs to be specifically 
explained.’68 
 
This chapter does not discuss these theories in detail, but rather highlights some of the 
assumptions that are particularly relevant in explaining the relationship between ANPR and 
crime. 
 
2.5.1. Rational choice theory and ANPR: perceived risk of offending and decision 
making 
The rational choice perspective is the main theoretical foundation on which situational crime 
prevention stands. Rational choice theory is influenced by economic thinking; specifically the 
notion that the potential offender is perceived as a self-maximising decision maker who 
carefully calculates the advantages and disadvantages of offending69. The costs of committing 
a crime are weighed up against the benefits of committing a crime, therefore crime is viewed 
in terms of supply and demand and being a criminal is viewed as an occupational option. 
Unsurprisingly, because of its association with economics, the rational choice model was 
criticised for failing to contextualise offending and not paying enough attention to the 
development and importance of criminal behaviour70. Not all offenders act rationally and not 
all crimes are rational71 – the rational choice would focus too much on predatory property 
crime, organised crime or white collar crime (i.e. economically motivated crimes) and not 
take into account passionate, violent or reckless crimes, for example. Some critics point to the 
fact that the rational choice perspective is too policy orientated, in other words too concerned 
with preventing crime. These critiques have influenced the ongoing development and 
refinement of the rational choice perspective and the application of situational crime 
prevention, extending its remit from property crime into impulsive or ‘expressive’ crime, for 
example drug addiction72, serial murder73 and child sexual abuse74. 
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The rational choice perspective should be viewed as a theory for practice, reactive rather than 
proactive, influenced by the present developments of situational crime prevention, changing 
in order to overcome its limitations, particularly the critiques of its minimalist view of the 
offender75.  
 
Rational choice theory potentially helps to explain the impact that ANPR might have on 
crime in terms of the extent to which ANPR is able to affect the rational decisions and 
motivation of potential offenders to chose to commit a crime through increasing what they 
perceive to be the risk involved in committing that crime. On the basis of this theory, one can 
hypothesise that the introduction of ANPR may have two ‘positive’ effects and two 
‘negative’ effects: 
• (+) A reduction in certain types of crime along routes/areas covered by ANPR 
cameras; 
• (+) A reduction in certain types of crime in the vicinity of areas/routes covered by 
ANPR cameras (diffusion of benefits); 
• (-) An increase in certain types of crime committed to avoid detection by ANPR 
(‘counter-measures’) 
• (-) Displacement of crime (change of location or time of crime, target, method or type 
of crime or a combination of these). 
 
Firstly, ANPR can reduce crime by increasing the chances of offender detection or offenders’ 
perception of risk of detection.  The use of the media to highlight successful cases could give 
a false but raised perception of risk, even if real detection rates are not changing. This may 
deter potential offenders from committing the crime, at least in the area covered by ANPR.  
That is why situational prevention is sometimes referred to as ’perceptional’ crime 
prevention, because of the power of perceptions and anticipatory effects76. However, for 
ANPR to be an effective deterrent, the offender obviously has to be aware of it in the first 
place. At present, the extent to which offenders are aware of ANPR and its potential is largely 
unknown; so too, therefore, is the extent to which it acts as a deterrent. 
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Secondly, ANPR can generate crime, as the rational offender will use other illegal means in 
order to decrease the risks of being caught. This is usually referred as ‘counter-measures’. 
As ANPR increases the risk of offending, criminals adapt and find ways of evading the 
system. Once again, this is highly dependent on offenders’ knowledge of ANPR and its 
capabilities. For example, knowing that ANPR can read number plates and identify vehicles’ 
owners, criminals might steal a car to commit a crime instead of using their own; use ‘pool’ 
cars77; make use of false identities to register cars; utilise measures to render the number plate 
unreadable (e.g. specialist paint, sprays and other blocks) or steal, falsify and clone number 
plates. ‘Offender adaptability’ is often cited as a limitation to situational crime prevention and 
environmental criminology in general. Reliance upon ‘physical’ barriers (e.g. a camera, a 
lock, an alarm etc) fails to acknowledge that criminals are able to adapt their methods to 
overcome the barriers which face them78. 
 
Thirdly, if criminals perceive the avoidance techniques to be too demanding (in terms of risk 
and effort), they might decide to avoid the cameras altogether, by committing the crimes 
somewhere else or at a different time, or just by changing the target, method and type of 
offence. This phenomenon is also known as ‘displacement’. Displacement is probably the 
main criticism with regards to situational crime prevention and the rational choice 
perspective. It is argued that the ‘more professional the crime and the criminal, the greater 
the probability of displacement’, therefore ‘those most likely to conform to a rational choice 
model of behaviour – the self-maximising professional criminals – are exactly the group of 
offenders most likely to be displaced’79. Felson and Clarke80 identified five main types of 
displacement: 
• ‘Geographical’ (change of crime location); 
• ‘Temporal’ (change of time); 
• ‘Target’ (crime directed away from one target/victim to another); 
• ‘Tactical’ (change of method of committing crime or ‘modus operandi’) and 
• ‘Crime type’ (one type of crime substituted for another). 
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It is argued that a sixth type of displacement might occur, a ‘perpetrator’ displacement. As 
the offenders who typically commit certain offences are either arrested or decode to desist 
from it, other offenders take their place81.  
 
Conversely, a ‘diffusion of benefits’82 beyond the targeted location and time or the targeted 
individuals and crimes might occur. In this case, the crime reduction effects may be felt 
outside the area covered by ANPR or beyond offences targeted by ANPR. Although it has 
proven difficult to accurately assess displacement or diffusion of benefits, this does not mean 
that they do not exist. Evidence of displacement and/or diffusion of benefits, in particular 
spatial displacement, was found in a number of studies looking at changes in crime rates for 
example in areas targeted by burglary initiatives or CCTV. For example, Chaiken et al. 
(1974) found a reduction in robberies on buses at the same time as an increase of robberies in 
the subway. Allat (1984) identified a decrease in burglaries on a ‘target hardened’ housing 
estate at the same time as an increase in burglaries on a nearby estate. Barr and Pease (1990) 
found spatial displacement of approximately one quarter of the burglaries prevented. Brown 
(1995) and Tilley (1993) found evidence of displacement after the introduction of CCTV. 
Assessing the impact of burglary schemes, Bowers et al. (2003) found evidence of some 
geographical displacement and diffusion of benefits of burglary into surrounding areas83.  
 
It is important that the possibility of both ‘malign’ and ‘benign’ displacement is taken into 
account when evaluating ANPR so that the wider implications can be assessed. This is 
closely related to the construct validity of such an evaluation84 and the extent to which ANPR 
would be considered successful in changing what it was intended to change. The level or type 
of displacement generated by ANPR is unknown and this thesis will highlight the difficulties 
of measuring the potential displacement effects of ANPR. 
 
2.5.2. Routine activity theory and ANPR: the presence of a capable guardian 
Similar to the rational choice perspective, routine activity approach85 seeks to explain the 
supply of criminal opportunities, focusing on criminal events rather than inclinations. The 
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spatial dimension of crime is very important and crime tends to be explained without 
reference to criminal motivation. The theory of human ecology86 was the basis for routine 
activity theory, with crime been viewed as part of the broad ecology of everyday life.  
 
The theory was developed as a ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ theory of how crime rates emerge. On a 
‘micro’ level, the routine activity theory states that crimes occur when a motivated offender 
converges with a suitable target (e.g. person, object, place) in the absence  of a capable 
guardian to control the conduct of the offender or protect the target (e.g. police patrols, 
neighbours or friends, CCTV)87. On a broader/‘macro’ level, this theory considers how 
certain features of the larger society and the routine activities of everyday life create more 
opportunities for criminal activities88 and can make such convergences possible. For 
example, more vehicles on the road could be seen as an opportunity for potential offenders to 
commit more vehicle crime and an increased mobility and flexibility when it comes to crime 
locations and targets (taken in account that transportation in modern societies is increasingly 
dependent on the use of vehicles). 
 
It could be argued that ANPR may reduce crime by impinging on any of the elements 
identified by routine activities theory. However, there is no clear empirical evidence showing 
which of these elements (if any) is affected by ANPR and it is difficult to see how ANPR 
could affect the motivation to offend or the existence of suitable targets/victims. ANPR could 
however perform part of the function of ‘increased guardianship’. Thus ANPR could reduce 
crime along guarded routes, and - as discussed above - possibly produce some kind of 
displacement effect (to non guarded areas/routes) and either result in higher detection, arrest 
and conviction rates or in the deterrence of potential offenders enough to negate this. 
However, ANPR’s potential to impact on crime in a particular area is not clear. Thus 
measuring ANPR’s impact on crime in an area is implicitly difficult. ANPR does not protect 
an area in the same way as CCTV does. By monitoring vehicles moving through an area, it 
has the potential to identify vehicles which are believed to have been involved in crime, but 
not to stop criminals committing these crimes. Its potential is in the disruption of criminal 
activity only where a vehicle is involved. 
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As with the rational choice theory, the original routine activity model was criticised for the 
lack of ‘generalisibility’, especially as it applied only to ‘direct-contact’ predatory offences 
(involving direct physical contact). The initial routine activity approach implied a decisional 
offender without making clear the decision process and only the micro and macro levels were 
considered and nothing in between. To strengthen the theory and make it more ‘general’, 
elements of the routine activity approach were combined with the geography of crime, 
situational prevention and models of offender choices. Routine activity thinking today is used 
to explain other non-predatory/property crimes, such as serial murders and sexual abuses89 
and helps, for example, towards understanding the ‘geography’ of co-offending90. The initial 
routine activity approach failed to acknowledge the dual role of control in the ‘chemistry’ of 
crime. In an attempt to incorporate aspects of Hirschi’s control theory, the concept of 
‘handler’ was included as a fourth element in the routine activity model91. The handler 
component involves a two-step process. The guardian is responsible for supervising the likely 
target and the ‘intimate handler’ is responsible for supervising the likely offender. The 
individual is susceptible to informal social control at these two levels by virtue of his/her 
bonds to society. First, social bonds are developed in society. Second, someone with a 
relationship to the potential offender exercises control over that person to adhere to the social 
bonds (e.g. parent, friend, colleague). Thus the offender would have to escape the (intimate) 
handler, then would have to find a target with no capable guardian. Another change was that 
the term ‘motivated offender’ was swapped for ‘likely offender’, reflecting the rational 
choice concept within the framework of the routine activity theory92. 
 
The ongoing development of rational choice and routine activity theories led to a growing 
recognition that they were not isolated approaches and that combining elements of the two 
theories would provide useful explanations for certain crime events. This culminated with the 
development of a third ‘opportunity’ theory, the crime pattern theory. 
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2.5.3. Crime pattern theory and ANPR: ‘non-random’ criminality 
Crime pattern theory is another opportunity theory which suggests that not only is crime a 
normal phenomenon, but also that it does not occur randomly in time or space or society93. It 
fits well with the routine activity approach: 
 
‘Offenders do not inhabit a world in which offending and non offending are straightforwardly 
dichotomised. Offending, therefore, fits in with other routines as opportunities, needs or 
temptations present themselves and routines themselves can include both deviant and non-
deviant behaviour’94 
 
According to pattern theory, crimes are complex and patterned. Crimes do not occur 
randomly or uniformly over time or space. Places are linked with desirable targets and the 
situation or environment in which they are found. There are three main components to crime 
pattern theory: nodes, paths and edges95. Nodes describe where offenders and victims travel 
to and from and the idea of personal activity nodes is closely linked to the routine activities 
theory. The nodes are linked to paths and crime events may occur within and around these 
nodes. Nodes and paths are important on the road network, as routes where ANPR cameras 
are installed may correspond to the paths between nodes. The ‘edges’ are the boundaries 
around nodes where people live, work and/or routinely active in.  
 
Thus, pattern theory suggests that crimes are likely to cluster around offenders’ activity and 
awareness spaces. Offenders are just like everybody else (not ‘abnormal’), spending much of 
their time travelling between their ‘living’ places (home) and ‘attending’ places (for leisure, 
school, work), choosing their targets from within their activity and awareness space. For an 
illustration of this theory, see Figure 2.1 below. 
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Figure 2.1 Brantingham’s Crime Pattern Theory (1984, 1993) 
S8
Crime usually happens where an offender’s activity 
space intersects a target area 
Adapted from Rossmo (2000)
 
 
Several research studies support the assumption that crimes cluster around offenders’ activity 
and awareness spaces. Research on burglary concluded that offenders generally select a target 
because they are passing it or have passed it in the past, as part of their everyday activities: 
 
‘… much travel associated with crime is not primarily driven by plans to offend but appears 
to be much more dependent upon opportunities presenting themselves during normal 
routines’96. 
 
Other research indicates that offenders’ selection of an area is based upon cognitive images of 
particular neighbourhoods that they acquire over time97. Another study where burglars were 
interviewed in order to see how they select their targets from all available properties 
concluded that offenders selected their targets within their travel path to work or leisure 
activities98. A similar study where interviews with burglars were conducted indicated that 
drug dealing locations might draw offenders to an area to purchase drugs, area which then 
becomes target to other predatory crimes99. Although limited, this evidence supports the 
hypothesis that places attract offenders for one purpose, offenders who then participate in 
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other crimes. However, offenders do not always provide accurate accounts of their own 
decision making100. It is important to acknowledge the limitations to these studies, as most of 
them involved interviewing either a sample of subjects in custody or persistent adult 
offenders, so the results are only indicative.  
 
So why is crime pattern theory relevant to ANPR? Motor vehicles are not only a target for 
acquisitive property crime (e.g. when they are stolen or have property stolen from them) and 
a means for offenders to travel to and escape from scenes of crime (transportation to/from 
crime), but most commonly are just their means of transportation in everyday life (‘non-
crime’ transportation). The fact that criminals are mobile reinforces the importance of place 
and movement for criminologists. Following explanations of pattern theory and routine 
activity theory, we can argue that ANPR has the potential to ‘work’ because most offenders, 
like most people, are mobile and use cars as part of their everyday life. They go shopping, 
they park their cars, they fuel their cars, they stop at petrol stations. Every time they use the 
roads the risk of their journey being recorded increases considerably. Number plates provide 
a means of linking vehicles with the personal details of their owners (and to a certain extent, 
of their drivers) and can be used to identify potential offenders and crimes. ANPR can link 
these criminals to these vehicles, as well as linking vehicles to crime scenes. 
 
ANPR therefore has the potential to make offenders vulnerable to police interventions 
through the identification of their vehicles when travelling on public roads. As will be argued 
next, this vulnerability can also be increased because (serious) offenders are more likely to 
drive untaxed and uninsured vehicles – actions which are easily detectable by ANPR. In the 
UK, the level of vehicle documentation offences is significant. Approximately 5.5% of cars 
on the road do not have a valid vehicle excise licence101; approximately 1.9 million cars do 
not have a registered keeper with the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA), and 
there is anecdotal evidence from the police that the information on registered keepers is 
inaccurate for at least 10% of cases. About 5% of British drivers do not have valid insurance 
for their vehicle and accidents involving uninsured motorists cost up to £500 million a year, 
which ultimately adds approximately £30 a year to each motorist’s premium102. 
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ANPR’s potential extends so that, even if offenders are not caught immediately, the systems 
will continue to detect their presence, gather information and increase offenders’ risk every 
time they use their cars on the road. Pattern theory argues that crimes cluster around places 
where people travel to and from. ANPR has the potential to map and profile offenders’ 
activities and assist police forces in their intelligence gathering and predictions, deployment 
and offender detection. For an illustration of the link between vehicles, offenders and ANPR, 
see Figure 2.2 below. 
 
Figure 2.2 Motor vehicles and ANPR 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This section of the literature review indicated how opportunity theories might provide some 
support for the implementation of ANPR as a crime prevention tool and the hypothesis that 
ANPR could impact on crime by deterring/de-motivating potential offenders (through 
offenders’ knowledge of and perceptions about ANPR and its capabilities), or more likely by 
increasing the risks of potential offenders of being identified and detected (through the 
monitoring and response to ANPR hits in real time, targeted policing using ANPR 
intelligence proactively and through post-incident and offender profiling analysis). 
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2.5.4. Offender self-selection and ANPR: from motor offences to serious crime  
Another theoretical approach which merits consideration here is the offender-self selection 
approach, or self selection policing103. While opportunity based theories are concerned with 
preventing crime104, self-selection policing take the idea of opportunity further, using 
opportunity against serious offenders in order to identify them, rather than trying to prevent 
them from offending in the first place. Thus the main idea behind self-selection is detection 
rather than prevention; more specifically, detection of serious offenders through targeting of 
minor offences105; the argument that ‘people who do big bad things also do little bad 
things’106. 
 
The ‘offender self-selection’ concept is based on a Home Office study107 on illegal parking in 
disabled bays, which indicated a link between traffic offending and general criminality. The 
authors found that one in five vehicles parking illegally warranted immediate police attention 
for serious criminality. The findings were reinforced by those of another Home Office 
study108 which established a link between drink driving, disqualified and dangerous driving 
and wider criminality. Further evidence suggests that, by scrutinising people for committing 
minor offences such as traffic offences, serious offenders can be detected. For example, the 
‘Yorkshire Ripper’, the American serial rapist ‘Son of Sam’ and the ‘Washington Sniper’ 
were all caught by the police for minor traffic offences109. So the principle of self-selection 
could be relevant to the police use of ANPR because of the evidence pointing to a correlation 
between driving offences and wider criminality, ANPR’s extended ability to identify motor 
offences could arguably lead to the identification of more serious offences, although this 
hypothesis would need to be further tested. 
 
The limitation to this approach is the probability of significant numbers of false positives 
cases (i.e. the number of people who are not of interest to the police), also the fact that the 
probability of a serious offender also being a minor offender is not necessarily higher than an 
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average citizen110. The number of potential minor offences which could act as markers for 
serious offender identification is still unknown and more research is needed to discover the 
most reliable ones. Thus the principle of self-selection should be employed with caution. 
Regardless of these limitations, it should be acknowledged, however, that this approach 
brings useful information to both criminological theory and practice. With particular use to 
police practice, the approach provides some evidence that offences are heterogeneous - 
despite the police’s tendency to over-estimate offence homogeneity; and is a relatively ethical 
and productive way to target offenders. In light of this, more consideration should be given 
by both criminological theorists and researchers to acknowledge and further explore the self-
selection perspective111. 
 
While the self-selection approach is about the ‘here and now’ of criminality and identifying 
current offences, new approaches in criminology are moving towards a focus on preventing 
crime by identifying ‘risk’, which is the subject of the next section. 
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2.6. Wider implications of ANPR surveillance: new penology, social control and ‘risk 
society’ 
It could be argued that the development of opportunity theories contributed, to a certain 
extent, to a general pattern of movement towards ‘new penology’112 and risk management. 
Surveillance discourse has become increasingly bound up with the mediation of ‘risk’; a 
trend towards ‘risk management’ where surveillance technologies, data collection and the 
prediction of future threats are seen as the solution to insecurity113. It is argued that the 
emergence of ‘new surveillance technologies’ goes beyond the disciplinary power associated 
with the Panopticon, and gives rise to new forms of social control: 
 
‘Surveillance is no longer about the observation of particular individuals whose identity is 
known beforehand; rather, it is about the surveillance of geographical places, time periods 
and categories of person’114. 
 
New surveillance technologies like ANPR can be seen as part of a trend towards a new 
penology based on actuarialism115. Actuarialism is defined as ‘an approach to crime control 
and management which dispenses with concerns about the meaning or motives behind 
offending and replaces these with an emphasis on technologies of risk minimisation and the 
elimination of potential threats to social order’116. According to the proponents of new 
penology, actuarial control policies focus on the effective control of selected risk groups and 
system management, rather than the rehabilitation or punishment of individual offenders.  
 
The implications for criminology are significant: while the old penology is about identifying 
the individual offender to assign blame and guilt and impose punishment and treatment, the 
new penology is about ‘identifying, classifying and managing groups assorted by levels of 
dangerousness’117. The new technologically driven (crime) control strategies are not only 
reacting to past criminal events, but are rather future oriented and driven by the logic of risk 
minimisation. A shift towards the management of risk (through enhanced surveillance, 
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intelligence gathering, data collection and dissemination) has become an important function 
of the modern police:  
 
‘In risk society, policing is not just a matter of repressive, punitive, deterrent measures to 
control those who are morally wrong. It is also a matter of surveillance, of producing 
knowledge of populations that is useful for administering them. The focus is on knowledge 
that allows selection of thresholds that define acceptable risks and on forms of inclusion and 
exclusion based on this knowledge.’118  
 
In light of preventative crime reduction strategies focussing on ‘opportunity reduction’, 
‘situational prevention’ and the new approach to ‘risk management’, ANPR can be placed 
somewhere between the old and new penology perspectives. From the new penology point of 
view, technologies like CCTV and ANPR have an appeal because it is believed that, on the 
one hand, they can increase the likelihood of the ‘rational’ offender being caught and 
therefore increase the ‘cost’ to the offender; on the other hand, their display demonstrates that 
‘something is being done about crime’. From the perspective of the ‘old penology’, CCTV 
and ANPR can be ‘disciplinary’ because not only do they enable the ‘capture, censure and 
normalization of particular offenders’, but they can promote ‘habituated anticipatory 
conformity’ by a population that thinks it is permanently under surveillance119. 
 
The theoretical assumptions highlighted in this chapter indicate that ANPR has the potential 
to ‘capture’ and ‘censure’ offenders and, to a certain extent, these claims are backed up by 
existing research. ANPR’s impact on criminal behaviour and its potential to induce 
‘conformity’ is less clear, however, and there is still much to be done to test such 
assumptions. As highlighted earlier in this chapter, there have been claims that ANPR could 
bring us closer to a ‘maximum surveillance society’. However, the current potential of these 
technologies cannot justify these claims. CCTV and ANPR do not yet have the disciplinary 
potential of the panopticon or the power to cultivate such anticipatory conformity. Although 
they might have the power to observe, this is limited in space and time. Their ‘power’ is 
dependent on the reliability of technology and systems data used in conjunction with these 
technologies, the availability of resources and, most importantly, the level of knowledge and 
awareness of those under surveillance. 
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The potential danger lies, however, in the expansion of blameworthiness to the entire 
population. One of the main shifts from the old to the new penology is the change in focus 
from individualisation to generalised suspicion. According to the new penology, populations 
are seen as particular bearers of risks and surveillance systems gather information on the 
whole population rather than on suspects or known offenders. Everybody is a suspect or 
assumed guilty until proven otherwise. And this is the case with ANPR surveillance, as it 
collects and stores information on the entire driving population without any evidence of 
offending. Furthermore, ANPR systems can collect information on individuals on the basis of 
possible association with known offenders or suspects; hence interest and suspicion are 
attached to individuals without them even being aware of it or without having done anything 
wrong120. 
 
The generalisation of suspicion to the entire population is to a certain extent a consequence of 
the latest major terrorist attacks on the Western World (e.g. New York and Washington 
11/09/2001, Madrid 11/03/2004; London 07/07/2005). In the wake of these events, the use of 
surveillance for the purpose of monitoring of populations and public spaces has considerably 
increased121. Consequently, significant changes in surveillance regulations have occurred and 
anti-terrorist legislation has been enacted, expanding the authority of law enforcement 
agencies and giving them unprecedented access to information about the populace through 
the use of surveillance tools122. In the aftermath of these events, there has been an increased 
interest in strengthening security and developing technologies to identify potential terrorists, 
particularly at ports and airports and ANPR has been embedded in the policies and strategies 
aimed to deal with such events. 
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2.7. The development of ANPR in the UK: from risk management and terrorism to 
crime prevention and back 
 
2.7.1. The ‘Ring of Steel’ 
Unsurprisingly, terrorism was the drive behind the initial development of ANPR in the UK. 
ANPR was first used by the British Police in the 1990s, as part of the so called ‘Ring of 
Steel’. The ring of steel is the popular name for the security and surveillance cordon 
surrounding the City of London, which was installed in order to combat terrorism, in 
particular as a response to attacks linked to the Irish Republican cause123. The system consists 
of over 1,500 surveillance cameras and ANPR systems have been linked to many of these 
cameras fitted at the eight official entrances to the Square Mile, transforming London into 
‘the most surveilled space in the UK and perhaps the world’124. In the first three years of 
operation as part of the Ring of Steel, ANPR systems scanned seventy five million vehicles 
as they passed through the Entry Points to the City of London. As a result, twelve hundred 
people were arrested, some of them in connection to crimes as serious as murder, sexual 
assault and armed robbery125. 
 
2.7.2. Police reform and ANPR 
The development of ANPR must also be viewed in the context of increasing expectations and 
pressure for reform within the police service itself. The government’s call for reforms to the 
police was set against a background of ongoing changes126 within the Police Service in 
Britain and a number of reports aiming at increasing the criminal justice system’s 
effectiveness in dealing with crime. 
 
In the White paper, ‘Building Communities, Beating Crime: A better police service for the 
21st century’127, the government stressed the need for continued improvements in policing to 
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help build safer, secure and stable communities. The aim was not only to prevent and reduce 
crime, but also to increase public confidence in the criminal justice system. In ‘Cutting 
Crime, Delivering Justice: A Strategic Plan for Criminal Justice 2004-08’128, the government 
called for more offences to be brought to justice, as well as the need to share information 
within the Criminal Justice System in order to increase its effectiveness in dealing with 
crime. A significant role was attributed to ANPR as a new technological policing tool, in 
particular in relation to detection and conviction targets and the issue of illegal motorists in 
Britain. The government’s response to the publication of the ‘Greenaway Report’ was to 
highlight the need to tackle vehicle crime more effectively and in particular to address the 
problem of uninsured driving129. 
 
New legislation enacted in July 2005130 formally allowed the Police to seize and destroy 
vehicles driven illegally, to link the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) and the 
Motor Insurance Databases in order to identify uninsured vehicles on the road, and to issue 
fixed penalties for people who ignore reminders about their insurance. In brief, the police 
were given extended powers to use new technologies in order to enhance their effectiveness 
in dealing with crime. 
 
2.7.3. Project ‘Laser’ 
Although installed first and foremost as part of the police’s anti-terrorist strategy, ANPR has 
since expanded its use to daily policing operations and a much wider category of crime. As a 
result of ANPR technological advances and a reduction in costs, the police have started to use 
ANPR to target a wider area of criminality, in particular volume crime such as vehicle theft, 
burglary and drug offences.  
 
Recognising ANPR’s potential to impact on criminality, the Home Office released funding in 
2002 which provided each police force in England and Wales with an ANPR mobile unit (the 
‘Spectrum’ Van) and supporting infrastructure (the Back Office Facility). A sample of nine 
police forces were selected to deploy their mobile ANPR equipment as part of an integrated 
pilot scheme, known as ‘Project Laser’, which was initially funded for a period of six months. 
These forces increased their use of ANPR in conjunction with Dedicated Intercept Teams – 
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including police officers deployed specifically to respond to hits generated by ANPR 
systems. The dedicated teams aimed to intercept and stop vehicles identified by ANPR and 
take appropriate measures. 
 
The aim of the pilot ‘Laser’ was to collect evidence to evaluate the effectiveness of ANPR 
intercept teams with a view to inform a potential national roll-out. As the results from the 
initial pilot (‘Laser 1’) exceeded expectations, the Home Office decided to commission a 
second stage of the project, ‘Laser 2’. Following a submission to HM Treasury, conditional 
approval was given to the Home Office to test a cost recovery system for dedicated ANPR-
enabled intercept teams. This process allowed police to target vehicle documentation offences 
and crime in general with the activity part-funded through receipts from the fixed penalties 
issued by these teams131. In 2003, the project extended to twenty three forces, allowing 
ANPR activity to be partly funded by hypothecated fixed penalty revenue. 
 
The evaluation of projects ‘Laser 1’ and ‘Laser 2’132 indicated that, compared to conventional 
policing, police forces using ANPR technology produced higher arrest rates and more 
offences brought to justice (OBTJ)133. Based on this success, in 2004 the HM Treasury 
allocated extended funding for a full roll-out of the ANPR technology to all forces across 
England and Wales, what was seen as the last phase of the project (‘Laser 3’). At the same 
time, the Home Office decided to invest more capital funding (£32.5m) for further ANPR 
development and integration at local, regional and national level, including the roll out of the 
Back Office Facility (BOF) and the development of the National ANPR Data Centre 
(NADC). 
 
2.7.4. The rationale for a national ANPR data centre (NADC) 
The development of the NADC was influenced by the Bichard Inquiry recommendations 
which highlighted the need for better information sharing between agencies within the 
Criminal Justice System134 and more specifically by the recommendations from the ‘Laser’ 
evaluations indicating the need to develop a mechanism enabling ANPR information sharing 
between forces at a national level. It was expected that this data warehouse, later called the 
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National ANPR Data Centre or NADC, would hold all vehicle intelligence and enable all 
ANPR hits to be read in real time by all users nationally. The benefit was seen in the 
extended ability to store ANPR reads and hits for future reference helpful in major crime 
investigations and terrorism enquiries.  
 
Given these considerations, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) used part of the 
funding provided by the Police Studies Unit (PSU) to progress the development of an ANPR 
national infrastructure comprising the NADC and a matching force Back Office Facility 
(otherwise known as the BOF II). This was supposed to enable forces in England and Wales 
to store and analyse all ANPR reads within their force and link with other forces’ back office 
and the NADC. The PSU funding was also allocated to individual forces to develop or 
expand their local ANPR infrastructure, including the installation of ANPR cameras at 
strategic sites135. 
 
2.7.5. ANPR strategy for the police service 
Notwithstanding its difficulties, ANPR has come a long way since the development of Project 
‘Spectrum’ in 2002. ‘Denying criminals the use of the road’ was the slogan used by the 
ANPR Strategy for the Police Service which was launched in 2005 by ACPO. The 2005 
ANPR Strategy provided a framework for the development and use of ANPR in the years to 
come. According to this strategy, the primary justifications for using ANPR were: 
• To reduce crime 
• To increase number of offences brought to justice 
• To gather information regarding ‘suspicious’ activity and 
• To enhance intelligence in accordance with NIM principles 
Secondary aims were: 
• To promote public reassurance 
• To increase police visibility 
• To deter terrorism 
• Increase road safety by removing unsafe vehicles and drivers from the road 
• To increase the percentage of stop/searches that lead to an arrest and 
• To increase the likelihood of positive criminal justice outcomes (charges/guilty 
pleas/convictions). 
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The latest ANPR Strategy for the Police Service 2007/2010 brings more emphasis on serious 
crime and ‘terrorism’, an increase in public safety and confidence in the police and more 
efficient use of police resources, which were not previously included as primary aims in 
relation to the police use of ANPR. These changes could be a result of shifting priorities at 
government level and trying to ensure ANPR’s sustainability in terms of future investments. 
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2.8. Why might we think ANPR works? ‘Evidence-based’ justifications 
However, is ANPR effective in achieving these aims? The primary objective of ANPR is to 
reduce crime, but is this supported by research evidence as to its effectiveness? As with 
CCTV, a great deal of money and faith has been invested in ANPR technology, but how far 
has this faith been justified by the results? Is ANPR being implemented on the assumption 
that CCTV ‘works’? This section explores what is known about the effectiveness of ANPR in 
terms of research literature. By identifying limitations within the existing literature, research 
implications and further questions will be addressed. An outline of research on evidence of 
CCTV’s effectiveness in reducing crime is presented first. 
2.8.1. Because CCTV works? 
Proponents of the effectiveness of camera surveillance technologies, particularly CCTV, 
argue that potential offenders will be deterred by the threat of being seen and caught, thus 
contributing to a reduction in crime. Indeed, CCTV has become one of the most important 
crime reduction strategies and ‘the most heavily funded non-criminal justice crime prevention 
measure’136. But how effective is CCTV in deterring and ultimately reducing crime? The 
effectiveness of CCTV is a contested subject. Some argue that there is little evidence to 
suggest that CCTV is ‘anything more than an expensive placebo for the public fear of 
crime’137. Although the number of studies looking at CCTV’s effectiveness has increased 
during the last decade, reliable evidence that CCTV reduces crime continues to be thin on the 
ground. 
 
Evaluations of CCTV schemes138 seem to indicate that CCTV has a crime reduction effect, 
but the evidence is still limited and inconclusive. There is however consensus regarding 
CCTV’s ability to reduce premeditative/property crime and its lack of impact on crimes of 
passion, public order problems or violent crimes, results which fit, to a certain extent, with 
the rational actor model presented above. 
 
Welsh and Farrington’s review (2002) of twenty two British and American studies of CCTV 
indicated that cameras can be effective if used in specific environments (e.g. car parks), for 
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specific types of crime (e.g. theft of motor vehicle) and when combined with other 
preventative measures (e.g. improved lighting, fencing, publicity/notices about CCTV, 
increased security personnel etc). 
 
The most comprehensive evaluation of CCTV undertaken by Martin Gill and Angela Spriggs 
for the Home Office in 2005 reinforces these arguments, pointing out that certain types of 
offences are more affected than others. Their meta-analysis of fourteen individual CCTV 
sites in the UK found that the cameras had ‘no overall effect on all relevant crime viewed 
collectively’139, although there was evidence of better outcomes for vehicle crime in seven 
out of the fourteen sites. Even where there was evidence of ‘success’, there were still 
questions whether the effect was 100% down to CCTV and not to other intervening variables. 
For example, the decrease in vehicle crime in one site could have influenced by changes to 
parking regulations, or the reduction in burglary rates in one site could have been a result of 
displacement in an area adjacent to the target area140. 
 
Evidence of offender deterrence is even more limited. Exploring offenders’ perceptions of 
CCTV and their perceived risk, Short and Ditton (1998) found some positive results 
indicating that some crimes might have been stopped because of offenders being deterred 
from committing offences. More recent evidence141 suggests that generally offenders do not 
perceive CCTV as a threat, unless if they have been caught on camera. But more research is 
needed in this area to draw more valid conclusions about CCTV’s deterrent effect. 
 
2.8.2. What do we know about the impact of ANPR? 
What about ANPR? Police officers and ministers alike believe in ANPR’s potential and 
benefits in the fight against crime and terrorism: 
 
‘Although it is only one policing tool, ANPR has uses in a range of areas, including tackling 
volume crime, serious & organised crime, counterterrorism, and in intelligence gathering. It 
has also proven a great asset in tackling the ‘underclass’ of vehicles that are incorrectly 
registered, untaxed and uninsured’142.  
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But are these beliefs well founded? Is there valid evidence supporting the effectiveness of 
ANPR in preventing, responding to, and reducing crime? Following the theoretical 
framework for ANPR discussed earlier in this chapter, we have seen that ANPR has the 
potential to reduce crime by increasing the risks of identification and detection of potential 
offenders or by deterring/de-motivating potential offenders from committing crime, at least in 
areas covered by ANPR. 
 
2.8.3. The impact on the Criminal Justice System: ANPR-enabled intercept teams 
Evidence about the effects of ANPR in the Criminal Justice System, including evidence of its 
impact on response times, rates of detection apprehension is more comprehensive than the 
evidence about ANPR’s impact on crime. The question of the effectiveness of ANPR has 
been addressed in four independent evaluations (‘Laser’)143. These studies looked primarily at 
ANPR’s effectiveness in the context of operational policing and ANPR-enabled intercept 
teams. 
 
The most significant emerging finding was that ANPR had a positive effect on the police’s 
ability to identify offenders and disrupt their activities. ANPR outcomes were impressive in 
terms of the arrest capabilities of intercept teams and their ability to increase the number of 
Offences Brought to Justice (OBTJ). OBTJ represents a measure of effectiveness of the 
Criminal Justice System, in particular the police and the courts’ effectiveness in dealing with 
crime. It was concluded that ANPR teams produced an average of six to seven times the 
national average arrest rate per officer and two to three times the number of OBTJ compared 
to conventional policing - which was believed to have improved the cost effectiveness of 
ANPR as well144. ANPR’s potential to speed up the Criminal Justice Process was also 
highlighted, for example it was estimated that the time taken for ANPR arrests to reach 
conclusion was on average lower than for arrests resulting from normal policing methods. 
Anecdotal evidence suggested that the time taken to clear up an offence was also reduced, as 
ANPR was believed to increase the likelihood of offenders pleading guilty once they have 
been told they’ve been caught on camera145. 
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The ‘Laser 4’ evaluation indicated that the use of dedicated ANPR vehicle intercept teams by 
all forces in England and Wales and of ANPR fixed site infrastructure has resulted in a 
considerable number of arrests (20,592 individuals), some of which included Prolific or 
Priority Offenders (PPO). The study found that ANPR helped towards the reduction of 
vehicle theft (through the identification and recovery of 2,021 stolen vehicles) and of motor 
offences (through the identification of 52,037 vehicle related document/motor offences and 
the seizure of vehicles as a result of the detection of these offences, i.e. 41,268). For a 
summary of results emerging from the four ‘Laser’ evaluations, see Table 2.3 below: 
 
Table 2.3 A summary of results of Project ‘Laser’ (2002-2007)* 
 
Project/Year/Number of forces Arrests Document 
Offences 
Vehicle 
Seizures 
Offences brought 
to justice per 
FTE** 
Laser 1/2002/9 forces 3,071 n/a n/a n/a*** 
Laser 2/2003-04/27 forces 13,499 30,620 n/a 21 
Laser 3/ 2005-06/43 forces 18,643 40,704 20,744 29 
Laser 4/2006/07/44 forces 20,592 52,037 41,263 21 
*Source: PA Consulting Group (2007: 13) 
**FTE stands for full time equivalent 
***The ANPR arrests were followed through the criminal justice system in Laser 2-4 
 
2.8.4. ANPR’s benefits beyond intercept capability: intelligence and crime 
investigations 
The existing evaluations tend to show that ANPR is most useful in tackling volume crime and 
when used to respond to criminality in real time through intercept capability. However, 
ANPR’s potential is much greater than this. The massive recording and storing of data means 
that analysis helpful to a variety of situations can be facilitated, from proactive intelligence-
led operations to post-incident investigations. Analysis of ANPR data can identify past, 
present and possibly future patterns of behaviour or possible threats. If properly linked to a 
force intelligence system, ANPR data can be analysed to provide vehicle patterns and 
geographical profiling, which would bring valuable information into an investigation and 
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helping towards the identification and arrest of suspects. By conducting location time 
analysis, sequential pattern analysis, convoy analysis and post-incident analysis, investigating 
officers could research and identify the movements of a vehicle, potential suspect(s) and 
accomplices, victims and witnesses146.  
 
ANPR is believed to improve the quality of investigations and save time, a crucial element in 
an inquiry, particularly when investigating serious crimes. ANPR systems have already led to 
significant breakthroughs in major investigations, for example the investigation into the fatal 
shooting of British Police Constable Sharon Beshenivski, who was shot dead in 2005 during 
a robbery in Bradford, Northern England. The CCTV network was linked in to the West 
Yorkshire Police’s ANPR system in Bradford North (also known as the ‘Big Fish’), which 
was a crucial element in the identification of suspects. 
 
As indicated above, the ‘Laser’ evaluations (particularly Laser 1-3) focused on ANPR’s 
effectiveness as an intercept tool. However, new developments in the national infrastructure 
increased the scope and range of ANPR use beyond roads policing. The investigative and 
intelligence use of ANPR are becoming increasingly important in the current political and 
national security context. The thinking behind policing strategies at a national level is to find 
more comprehensive ways to effectively address terrorism and serious and organised crime. 
This involves embedding ANPR into mainstream policing and using it more as an aid to 
crime investigations and as a means of developing intelligence. The latest evaluation (Laser 
4) aimed to identify some of these benefits in terms of intelligence and investigation. By 
including the results of a ‘Thematic Review of the use of ANPR within Police Forces’, the 
study concluded that ANPR has the potential to provide significant benefits to the 
intelligence and investigative police functions by: 
• Increasing the efficiency of surveillance; 
• Improving intelligence products; 
• Providing information on witnesses and suspects linked to major investigations and 
• Providing intelligence for proactive operations to disrupt organised criminal activity. 
 
However, the study was limited by the small number of respondent forces (N=8) and the lack 
of evidence supporting these claims. 
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2.9. Research limitations and implications: some useful questions for further 
investigations 
Existing research highlights the multiple ANPR benefits to the police service, but it is, to a 
certain extent, limited in both scope and quality. The ‘Laser’ studies have demonstrated a 
number of ANPR benefits, although at times conclusions have been too easily drawn from 
anecdotal evidence. The potential benefits were not always evaluated, rather they were 
suggested as possible outcomes. There has been too much focus on results generated from the 
use of ANPR with dedicated intercept teams - and most quantified benefits relate to such use. 
Thus the intelligence and investigation benefits of ANPR are not proven to the same extent as 
the intercept benefits. There are also issues regarding the validity of the results, in particular 
the correctness of inferences about cause and effect, i.e. whether ANPR really did cause a 
change in the outcome147. The use of control groups appears inadequate and most results are 
inappropriately presented (e.g. number of offences, detections, rather than percentages), 
which sometimes are misleading or confusing when it comes to force size, population, crime 
type etc. These limitations call into question the validity of these studies. 
 
Moreover, the investigative use of ANPR data has been largely overlooked and under-
researched. ANPR systems can produce enormous amounts of data which can be difficult to 
process and analyse and there is a gap in research and knowledge about how can this data be 
utilised to enhance intelligence policing and overall police effectiveness. 
 
Although existing evaluations add to our understanding of how ANPR works, there is limited 
evidence regarding ANPR’s impact on crime, fear of crime and public reassurance. Not only 
are the evaluations looking at ANPR’s effectiveness limited, but also there is no other 
academic study examining these aspects. The ‘Laser’ studies indicate that ANPR is useful 
with regards to motor offences or some aspects of volume crime, but they fail to indicate how 
ANPR works in a wider area of criminality. According to the latest ANPR Strategy for the 
Police Service148, the primary justification for the use of ANPR is to reduce crime, yet there 
is no clear evidence as to whether it does so. Another important ANPR objective is to 
increase public confidence, which is an area that has been completely overlooked by current 
research.  
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 65
Given the extensive developments in surveillance technologies in the UK, there is a clear 
need in future evaluations of ANPR to investigate its wider socio-political and ethical 
implications, in particular what the public considers to be legitimate levels of surveillance 
and any concerns they hold about the potential impact on civil liberties. 
 
In light of these considerations, it is possible to identify three issues which need further 
investigation: 
1. Better awareness and an increased understanding of ANPR’s role as an investigative 
policing tool;  
2. A better understanding of the public’s perceptions about ANPR and the wider social 
and ethical implications; 
3. A robust evaluation of ANPR’s impact on crime. 
 
While it is quite straightforward to identify gaps in research and knowledge about ANPR, it 
does not necessarily mean these could easily be addressed. The thesis mainly sought to 
explore the advantages and limitations to ANPR as perceived by the police and the public 
with a view to inform practice and policies with regards to ANPR (key areas 1 and 2). 
However, as will be argued later, numerous issues limited the extent to which an impact 
evaluation could be conducted (key area 3). There are currently no clear or consistent 
mechanisms in place to monitor ANPR’s outcomes through the criminal justice system or to 
quantify and investigate the use of ANPR as an intelligence and investigative tool; nor to 
assess the impact and effectiveness of the newly expanded infrastructure. Although some 
analysis will be conducted to explore ANPR’s impact on crime rates, the difficulty of 
measuring and controlling for all other relevant variables will limit the validity of the results.  
 
Thus this thesis does not seek to address all the gaps in research or to undertake an impact 
evaluation of ANPR. It rather seeks to explore the advantages and limitations to ANPR as 
perceived by the police and the public with a view to inform future developments and 
policies. Table 2.4 below highlights key research questions covering these issues. The table 
includes research questions which have been addressed in previous research, as well as 
questions which need further exploration. 
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Table 2.4 Key ANPR Research Questions* 
 
Question Existing 
Evidence 
Thesis 
objective 
1. How does ANPR fit within broader crime theories? No Yes 
2. What is common practice in the police use of ANPR? Yes** Yes 
3. (How) does ANPR contribute to criminal investigations and 
intelligence development? 
Yes** Yes 
4. What are the perceived advantages and limitations of ANPR within 
policing (the practitioners’ views)? 
Yes** Yes 
5. What are the public’s views regarding the police use of ANPR 
surveillance? 
No Yes 
6. What policies/practices should be put in place to improve ANPR’s 
effectiveness within policing and public reassurance? 
Yes** Yes 
7. How far is it possible to measure ANPR’s impact on crime? No Yes 
8. Does ANPR reduce crime and the fear of crime? No No 
9. Does ANPR displace crime? No No 
10. To what extent does ANPR act as a deterrent to crime? No No 
11. How do offenders respond to ANPR? No No 
*Questions in bold font are addressed in current thesis. The remaining questions are in need of further 
research, but are not addressed in current thesis 
** Partially addressed by previous research  
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2.10. Conclusion 
This literature review has placed ANPR within a wider surveillance and crime prevention 
context and has explored the criminological theories which might explain how ANPR can 
‘work’ – issues previously ignored by the academic literature. The review also outlined issues 
related to previous research and knowledge about ANPR’s effectiveness as a policing tool. It 
has revealed gaps in our understanding of the role that ANPR plays and could play in the 
fight against crime, and set out which of these this thesis seeks to address. The following 
chapter highlights the methods used to answer these research questions and talks about the 
rationale behind the research approach used in this study. 
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Chapter Three 
Methodology 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes the methods adopted in this research and explains why certain 
methods were preferred over others. It also highlights a number of issues relating to the 
research process, research facilitation and field-based research in a police environment. 
Where appropriate, more details about the use of these methods are presented in the ‘results’ 
chapters (Chapters Four, Five and Six). 
 
The following methods were found to be most appropriate for this research: 
• Participant observation 
• Face to face interviews, self-completion questionnaires and focus groups with the 
police and agencies with national policy remit 
• Quasi-experiments using police recorded crime data 
• Postal Survey and Focus Groups with the public 
• Triangulation of research findings. 
 
Table 3.1 below outlines the research objectives and methods used in the current study: 
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Table 3.1 ANPR’s role within policing and public reassurance: a multi-method research strategy 
 
Research 
phase 
Timeline Research Objective Method 
Phase 1 Apr ’06 - Feb ‘07 
• Explore the theoretical justifications for the use of ANPR as a crime 
prevention tool 
• Identify the opportunities presented by ANPR 
• Literature review 
• Participant observation 
Phase 2 Mar ’07 - Nov ‘07 
• Examine common practice in the police use of ANPR in the UK 
• Explore ANPR’s potential to contribute to criminal investigations and 
intelligence development 
• Investigate the extent to which opportunities presented by ANPR data are 
fully exploited 
• Review of police literature 
• Participant observation 
• Interviews 
• Electronic survey 
Phase 3 Dec ’07 - Apr ‘08 • Explore the public’s view with regards to ANPR surveillance 
• Explore the wider social and ethical implications of ANPR 
• Literature review 
• Public opinion survey 
• Public focus groups 
Phase 4 Jun ’08 – Apr ‘09 
• Further examine ANPR’s advantages and limitations within policing (in 
line with objectives from Phase 2) 
• Provide (interim) recommendations about how ANPR can be used more 
effectively  
• Research synthesis of findings from 
Phases 2 and 3 (triangulation) 
• Follow up Interviews 
• Thematic focus groups 
• Follow up electronic survey 
Phase 5 May ‘09 
• Explore ANPR’s impact on crime 
• Identify the main limitations in measuring ANPR’s effectiveness in 
reducing crime 
• Police crime analysis 
• Quasi-experiment 
Phase 6 Jun ’09 - Jul ‘09 
• Identify implications of the findings for future policy and practice 
• Provide recommendations regarding the police use of ANPR and how it 
can be used more effectively 
• Identify future avenues for research 
• Research synthesis (triangulation) 
• Distillation of policy recommendations 
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As shown in Table 3.1 above, the research forming the basis of this PhD spans six distinct but 
interdependent phases over a period of three years: 
• The first phase was primarily concerned with the review of the literature on the 
subject, research scoping and design and research enabling; 
• The second phase entailed the exploration of the police use of ANPR both locally 
(West Yorkshire) and nationally, with particular emphasis on the potential and use of 
ANPR as an investigative tool; 
• The third phase explored the public’s views about ANPR; 
• The fourth phase involved triangulation of findings from previous research stages 
(interim findings) to inform policy and practice at a local and national level. This 
stage also comprised a follow up survey with police forces in the UK (interviews and 
self-completion questionnaires) to explore any further developments and changes in 
perceptions about ANPR; 
• The fifth phase considered the feasibility of measuring ANPR’s impact on crime; 
• The final (sixth) phase involved the research synthesis, exploring the action 
implications of the research findings through further interaction with ANPR key 
stakeholders.  
 
These stages of research involved a variety of research processes and methods which will be 
explained next. 
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3.2. Phase one: research scoping and design 
The first phase of the study was mainly a scoping and consultation phase involving 
undertaking a number of actions in support of research, as well as developing a conceptual 
framework for the study. The end of this first phase saw the research proposal submitted and 
approved by the University’s Research Degrees Committee. 
 
This thesis is a collaborative research study between the University of Huddersfield and West 
Yorkshire Police. Having invested in ANPR, a number of senior police officers from West 
Yorkshire Police were interested in finding out more about ANPR’s potential to enhance 
police effectiveness, particularly with regards to intelligence gathering and criminal 
investigations. Consolidating partnerships and negotiating access was therefore an essential 
element in ensuring the feasibility of the study, particularly in terms of data collection and 
collaboration. 
 
Acquiring access to data and respondents was an important step in enabling the research149. 
This was very much dependent on security checks with the police and compliance with Police 
and University regulations and ethics. Following a vetting process and further negotiations 
with relevant stakeholders from West Yorkshire Police, the researcher was granted access to 
police data and personnel. Forms and agreements were signed to place the collaboration on a 
more formal footing. Having acquired the necessary ‘legitimacy’ with the police enabled the 
researcher to network with police officers and police staff beyond West Yorkshire Police. 
Contact was established with the National ANPR Steering Group and the leading authorities 
for ANPR, ACPO and NPIA. Networking was thus essential in enabling interviews and 
further data collection at a local and national level.  
 
To achieve the research objectives, the study used multiple methods that sought to 
incorporate both fixed (i.e. experimental and non-experimental strategies using surveys and 
statistics) and flexible elements (i.e. case study approach using observation, interviews, 
surveys and focus groups) which evolved during the three years of its undertaking. It was 
believed that a combination of research strategies (using qualitative and quantitative 
                                                 
149
 Previous studies highlight the importance of access and knowledge when researching the police (Leishman et 
al., 1996; Goold, 2004; Gill and Spriggs, 2005). 
 72
methods) would provide a better understanding of the issue under investigation and more 
informative, complete and balanced research results150, while overcoming weaknesses that 
typically arise with the use of one strategy151. 
 
Therefore, the use of qualitative methods such as observation, interviews and focus groups 
intended to overcome some of the limitations of the quantitative methods in explaining any 
underlying principles, while quantitative methods such as self-completion questionnaires 
were used to improve the validity of the study, particularly the ability to generalise the 
emerging findings (external validity) or to validate and test the content of a research tool 
before dissemination to a wider sample of population (content validity). 
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 Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003); Johnson et al. (2007); Creswell and Plano Clark (2007). 
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 Jick (1979). 
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3.3. Phase two: exploring ANPR’s role and use within policing 
The second phase of the research was mainly concerned with the exploration of the police use 
of ANPR, with a particular focus on ANPR’s input in intelligence gathering and the crime 
investigation process. Specific objectives were to: 
• Explore the context and purposes for which the police used ANPR; 
• Explore awareness of and knowledge about ANPR’s role and potential in all areas of 
policing; 
• Gather views about the advantages and limitations to the use of ANPR in general and 
crime investigations in particular; 
• Identify examples of ANPR successes; 
• Highlight areas in need of further improvement to optimise the benefits of ANPR. 
 
This research stage used a combination of research methods, mostly qualitative in nature, 
involving a significant number of hours spent in the ‘field’ engaged in meetings, observation, 
interviewing and data collection at a local, regional and national level. 
 
It was felt that, in order to provide a greater insight into how the police use ANPR and 
perceive its role in enhancing police effectiveness, it was important to extend the scope of 
analysis beyond West Yorkshire. At a national level, a series of semi-structured face to face 
interviews were conducted with relevant police officers and staff from police forces in the 
UK, ACPO and NPIA. At a local level, semi-structured interviews with ANPR practitioners, 
the ANPR force manager, force analysts and relevant stakeholders within West Yorkshire 
Police were undertaken. ANPR’s ‘historical’ use and post-investigative potential was further 
investigated through interviews with senior investigating officers and an electronic survey 
with police officers and police staff from West Yorkshire Police. In addition, a systematic 
review of all police literature and documents on this subject was conducted in order to 
corroborate and strengthen the evidence gathered throughout. 
 
3.3.1. Informal observation 
The researcher spent a substantial number of hours shadowing practitioners in a variety of 
settings, ranging from observing daily operational ANPR use to participating in ANPR 
meetings and workshops at a local, regional and national level. A daily fieldwork diary was 
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kept by the researcher in order to record her main observations and thoughts and to identify 
further actions and questions emerging from the time spent on the field. These observations 
enabled the researcher to gain a further understanding of ANPR, but at this stage it also 
reinforced the literature review findings highlighting gaps in research and knowledge about 
ANPR. 
 
Spending time with participants prior to having them engaged in ‘formal’ interviews and 
focus groups proved to be a bonus as it enhanced their willingness and openness to 
participate in the research, particularly as the police tend to be sceptical of ‘outsiders’ or 
‘students’. Being aware of the possible biases that could be introduced in the observational 
process, the researcher tried to discount them as much as possible by having an open mind, 
paying equal attention to situations and people which were not ‘central’ to the observation or 
not and trying to keep the right balance between subjectivity and objectivity when recording 
her personal impressions and comments. 
 
3.3.2. Interviews 
Observation was a key factor in identifying relevant individuals for interviewing and focus 
groups.  In total, 33 interviews with 38 respondents from 20 police forces and one agency 
with national policy remit (i.e. NPIA) were conducted during this phase. Officers ranging 
from the rank of Police Constable to Chief Constable were interviewed to gain an 
understanding of ANPR at an operational and strategic level. The interviews conducted 
during this exploratory phase sought to provide a greater understanding of the police use of 
ANPR in general and in crime investigations in particular. 
 
Respondents were selected purposively, based on their role in relation to ANPR at a national 
and local level. ACPO were very helpful with selecting and contacting representatives from 
each police force. Other respondents were identified through snowball sampling, using 
existing contacts with the police. An invitation to interview was sent by e-mail to the selected 
sample of respondents, introducing the researcher, explaining the purpose and nature of the 
research (e.g. selection, confidentiality, duration of interview, recording procedures etc). A 
brief description of the project and its background, research objectives, employed methods 
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and intended outcomes, together with a consent form were sent to potential respondents at the 
same time. A copy of relevant documents is available in Appendix 1. 
 
A questionnaire was developed and piloted prior to starting the main set of interviews to 
ensure the design was appropriate and to test if the duration of the interview was in line with 
the terms described to respondents in the invitation. The pilot highlighted a number of 
problems with the questionnaire, particularly with regards to the wider applicability and 
relevance of the questions and the time necessary to complete it. Hence it was decided to 
adopt a more ‘open’ approach to interviewing, reducing the number of questions and adapting 
their content accordingly, while keeping in line with the study’s main objectives. The 
interview schedule reproduced in Appendix 1 does not, therefore, contain the questions asked 
in the pilot exercise; the schedule is not a reflection of all questions or probes used during 
each interview, it is an indication of possible questions asked and themes explored during 
these interviews. 
 
Prior to each interview, respondents were reassured that their answers would be treated in the 
strictest confidence and anything they might mention ‘off the record’ would not be included 
in the study. In line with appropriate ethical regulations, the names of participants and police 
forces involved in the research were kept confidential and no sensitive information on police 
procedures and tactics was disclosed. Quotes from interviews used in this thesis are fully 
anonymised152. Police forces were randomly allocated a number from 1 to 28 (e.g. F1, F2 etc) 
and interviewees’ names were kept anonymous (e.g. Police Officer, ACPO/NPIA 
Representative, Member of the National ANPR Steering Group). 
 
The researcher’s prior experience of interviewing offenders, prison and probation staff, police 
officers, support workers and various stakeholders in the Criminal Justice arena proved useful 
in this part of the research. This experience, coupled with adequate preparation and 
background research, enabled the researcher to acknowledge and anticipate potential 
limitations. Police specific terms and non-sensitive questions were used so that interviewees 
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 The information acquired outside these formal interviews (i.e. through discussions with police officers and 
staff while ‘on the job’) was not used to generate quotes. Near-contemporaneous notes were kept and used to 
open lines of enquiry for the formal interviews and later on fill in ‘gaps’ from these interviews. 
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would feel at ease and comfortable answering these questions. Leading questions were 
avoided to reduce potential interviewer bias. Although the researcher appeared welcoming 
and reinforcing to all respondents, at all times she sought to be neutral and avoided leading 
the discussion or sharing respondents’ views. A full record of the interviews was kept 
through notes and tape or digital recording. 
 
3.3.3. Electronic survey 
The ‘electronic’ survey undertaken in October 2007 was informed by the initial set of 
interviews and sought to explore ways in which ANPR was perceived by West Yorkshire 
Police, with particular emphasis on the views and opinions of police officers and police staff 
involved with ANPR in the investigation process.  
 
A self-completion questionnaire was found most appropriate to explore these objectives, 
given the wide range and number of police officers and staff within West Yorkshire. 
Considering potential limitations linked to the use of self-completion questionnaires (e.g. 
reduced control over the question order, individual context and respondents’ understanding of 
questions), careful consideration was put into the design and preparation of the survey. The 
majority of questions used in this survey followed those from the interviews, with appropriate 
amendments to cater for West Yorkshire Police’s use of ANPR. Questions were 
predominantly closed with predetermined response sets. Some open questions were included 
to ensure the questionnaire would capture more specific in-depth information.  
 
Given the commonly acknowledged low response rate typical to self-completion 
questionnaires153, the researcher took extra care in designing the questionnaire, making it 
clear and easy to complete in order to increase the response rate. A draft questionnaire was 
pre-tested informally with a small number of officers and staff from West Yorkshire Police. 
This piloting exercise enabled the researcher to test the content of the questionnaire and best 
ways for dissemination and completion, as well as to identify potential respondents. The 
sample of respondents was selected purposively to include all staff believed to be in a 
position to use ANPR in their field of work. A sample of 594 police officers and staff were 
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sent the questionnaire for completion by e-mail through the police’s internal e-mail system – 
a restricted access network owned and managed by West Yorkshire Police. 
 
To further increase the response rate, the questionnaire was accompanied by a letter sent by 
the researcher on behalf of a senior police officer to encourage participation, as well as to 
explain the scope and purpose of the research and the potential benefits for the police. 
Respondents were reassured that the questionnaire was completely anonymous and their 
answers could not be traced back to them. A database was set up on a secure server 
facilitating the storage of the emerging data. The database comprised SPSS (Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences) and Microsoft Office Excel files which were populated by 
the data coming through. These files were used for the quantitative statistical analysis, which 
was complemented by thematic analysis of results emerging from open question.  
 
The questionnaire achieved a response rate of 24.7% (that is 147 officers and staff within 
West Yorkshire Police). This was an encouraging response rate for an electronic survey154, 
particularly given the limited time for completion (two weeks) and other potential limitations 
such as holidays and absence from work, respondents’ access to a police terminal, work 
commitments etc. It was considered that the sample of respondents was sufficiently 
representative of the wider population (i.e. those police officers and staff potentially using 
ANPR in their field of work) to produce valuable results which would be used for three main 
purposes: 
• To complement previous research findings identified through interviews; 
• To inform future West Yorkshire Police strategies and developments regarding ANPR 
by identifying advantages, limitations and best areas for improvement and 
• To inform future research procedures such as the thematic focus groups employed in 
the later stages of the research.  
 
                                                 
154
 There is evidence suggesting that e-mail surveys have lower response rates than postal or paper surveys 
(Kaplowitz, Hadlock and Levine, 2004; Schaefer and Dillman, 1998). 
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3.4. Phase three: exploring the public perceptions of ANPR 
This phase aimed to explore the ethical aspects of the police use of ANPR, in particular the 
public’s view on and acceptance of ANPR surveillance. More specifically, the public opinion 
study aimed to explore: 
• Public awareness of ANPR 
• Perceived role of ANPR and its effectiveness 
• Level of support for ANPR in Leeds after its installation 
• Concerns about ANPR 
• Confidence in the police use of surveillance technologies, in particular ANPR 
• Perceptions of anti-social behaviour, crime and victimisation amongst residents of 
Leeds 
• Socio-demographic or experience-related factors which might influence people’s 
views about ANPR and the police. 
 
3.4.1. The survey strategy 
In order to address these objectives, a research strategy involving a public opinion survey 
(using self completion questionnaires) and focus groups was used. The study commenced in 
February 2008 with the distribution of a postal survey to a representative sample from Leeds 
population. This was followed by focus group sessions conducted in April 2008 with a 
smaller sample of residents, the undertaking of which was dependent on the completion and 
results of the postal survey. 
 
3.4.2. Sampling 
In order for the results of the study to have adequate external validity, it was important that 
respondents were sampled in an appropriate manner155. In the present study it was decided 
that the population from which the sample of respondents was to be drawn would comprise 
all residents in the Leeds Metropolitan District (LMD). LMD is the second largest in England 
and the largest settlement in West Yorkshire with a population of 715,402 spread over thirty-
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 Robson (2002); Kemper, Stringfield and Teddlie (2003). Researchers typically try to demonstrate that the 
findings from a sample in a particular situation at a particular time are representative or typical of the wider 
population to which they belong and apply more generally. 
 79
three wards156. Leeds was selected because of practical considerations (e.g. excellent contacts 
with the police and the local authority), but also because of the introduction of a new ANPR 
system in Leeds City Centre, the largest in West Yorkshire, which coincided with the 
timescale of the research. The names and addresses for the population residing within the 
boundaries of Leeds districts were selected using Quick Address Pro incorporated with GIS 
software157. These included 337,682 households. The data were cleaned to comprise 
residential addresses only. 
 
A probability simple random sampling design was used, thus each resident of the population 
of interest had an equal non zero chance (probability) of being selected for the sample158. 
This was considered appropriate in order to establish valid comparisons and to allow 
generalisation from the sample to the population of interest; objectives which would have not 
been possible with non-probability sampling. Non-probability or purposive sampling was 
mainly used for the qualitative methods (interviews and focus groups), where there was less 
emphasis on formal comparisons and participants were selected because of the relevance and 
specificity of their knowledge and role with regards to the topic under investigation.   
 
However, the accuracy and validity of a sample is not solely dependent on how the sample is 
selected. Although probability sampling allows generalisations from sample to population, 
these generalisations are probabilistic. The size of the sample also plays an important role in 
ensuring the validity of the conclusions drawn from the exercise; up to a point, the larger the 
sample, the lower likely error in generalising159. 
 
To ensure that the survey would generate a sample on which valid statistical tests could be 
performed, the sample size for the postal questionnaire was calculated using a sample size 
formula. The sample size was calculated taking into account the total population in the target 
area (i.e. 715,402), the confidence interval (standard error at +/-4%), the confidence level 
(percentage reflecting how sure one can be of the answer, i.e. 95%), variability (the likely 
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 Nachmias and Nachmias (1997); Arber (2001); Robson (2002); Maxwell and Loomis (2003); Kemper, 
Stringfield and Teddlie (2003); Kraska and Neuman (2008). 
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 Robson (2002: 161, 261). 
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spread of responses, i.e. 50:50, 60:40, 70:30) and a response rate of 15%. According to the 
Home Office160 guidelines regarding the police use of surveys to measure user satisfaction, 
the key requirement is to generate survey results with confidence intervals no wider than +/-
4% at 95% confidence. It is believed that the most cautious assumption in calculating sample 
sizes would be for maximum variability (50:50). 
 
However, the generalisibility of the results is not solely dependent on the sampling type and 
sample size, but also depends on whether respondents are typical of recipients of the survey. 
This is explained in the results presented in Chapter Seven of the thesis. 
 
Once the size of population to be surveyed was decided, a random selection using Excel 
generated the final sample for the postal survey, which was 8,310 contact details (names and 
addresses) of Leeds residents.  
 
3.4.3. The postal questionnaire 
A self-completion questionnaire was considered the most appropriate tool to collect data from 
such a large sample of respondents161. A low response rate was identified as the main 
potential limitation to this self-completion survey. To counter this threat, special 
consideration was put into the planning, design and distribution of the questionnaire. Thus a 
first draft of the questionnaire was developed following an extensive literature review which 
served to define and refine the study parameters. The process comprised an assessment of 
existing research (i.e. studies looking at public attitudes towards surveillance, police cameras, 
and in particular CCTV) and a review of methodological considerations and 
recommendations regarding similar surveys. Questions which were considered relevant were 
adopted and adapted to the current survey for comparison purposes. The rationale behind the 
content of some questions was closely related to ‘opportunity’ theories mentioned previously. 
The questions were also influenced by the context in which the survey was to take place and 
usual practice with regards to ANPR and crime prevention within West Yorkshire. 
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 Self-administered questionnaires are generally considered less time consuming and more cost effective than 
telephone or face to face interviews (Oppenheim, 1992; Robson, 2002: 234, 237; Gilbert, 2001; Nardi, 2006). A 
notable advantage of self-completion surveys is that they allow anonymity which can increase openness and 
might encourage respondents to participate, particularly when sensitive topics are involved. 
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Taking into account the complexity and novelty of the research topic, questions were kept 
simple and straightforward and closed questions with predetermined response sets were 
predominantly used. A few open ended questions were included to ensure the questionnaire 
would capture more specific in-depth data regarding respondents’ views and concerns about 
ANPR. A 5-point Likert scale162 was employed for most closed questions, ranging from 
‘Strongly agree’ to ‘Strongly disagree’, with a neutral central position.  
 
To enhance the content validity of the survey, the draft questionnaire went through a pre-
testing and piloting process163. The questionnaire was sent by e-mail to all research students 
and staff attached to one of the main Schools within the University of Huddersfield (non-
probability purposive sampling). They were reassured of the confidentiality of their answers 
and were encouraged to raise any issues about the topic, content and structure of the 
questionnaire. The pilot generated a good response (50 replies) and useful suggestions. These 
were taken into consideration and the questionnaire was amended accordingly. Both the pre-
testing and piloting established that questions were clear, meaningful and appeared to 
measure what they were designed to measure, thus increasing confidence in the reliability and 
content validity of the survey. A final version of the questionnaire was produced and printed 
for distribution (see Appendix 1). 
 
The questionnaire was accompanied by an introductory letter which was carefully designed to 
draw the attention of potential respondents and enhance the response rate. The covering letter 
highlighted a prize draw164 for those who would complete the questionnaire and explained the 
nature and purpose of the survey. A brief description of the research topic was also provided. 
The letter made explicit reference to the sample selection process, confidentiality of 
responses and procedures regarding questionnaire completion, prize draw and postal 
arrangements. To further increase the response rate a pre-paid envelope was provided with 
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the survey. A separate prize draw entry form containing a Data Protection statement was 
included to reassure respondents about the confidentiality of their details. A copy of the 
covering letter and entry form is included in Appendix 1. 
 
The survey was distributed in February 2008 by post to a sample of 8,300 households in 
Leeds, achieving a response rate of 19% (i.e. 1,573 valid returns by the specified date), 
therefore producing a significant number of responses which were used for statistical 
analysis. Respondents’ demographics were compared to those of the population of Leeds as a 
whole (2001 Census) to assess the extent to which the sample population was representative 
of the wider population. This is discussed in the chapter presenting the results from the 
survey (Chapter Five). 
 
Data from all valid questionnaires (returned by the time specified in the survey) were coded, 
inputted and analysed using SPSS. The numerical data were analysed using descriptive 
statistics (frequencies, cross-tabulations and correlations), while a coding frame and thematic 
analysis were used for the qualitative data. Significance tests were carried out across a wide 
range of comparisons and, unless otherwise mentioned, these were based on the chi-square 
statistic using a 0.01 significance level. More details about the analysis of the results and 
emerging findings are presented in Chapter Five of this thesis. 
 
3.4.4. Focus Groups 
Findings from the postal survey were explored in depth via group discussions with a small 
sample of residents from Leeds. While self-completion questionnaires were mainly used to 
obtain quantitative information and identify how many people held a certain opinion, focus 
groups were thought to be more appropriate for exploring the reasons behind these 
opinions165. Three focus groups with a total of thirty respondents were conducted. 
 
To address the gap in responses from the postal survey and to enrich the results generated by 
the discussions with mixed groups, it was decided to organise a homogeneous group with 
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young people with the view to consider any emerging differences and access opinions that 
might otherwise not have been heard166. 
 
As non-attendance is a common cause of failure in focus group research, particular care was 
put into the organisation of the group sessions (recruitment of participants, location and 
timing of sessions, incentives etc). As in the case of the public opinion survey, the researcher 
obtained the full support of West Yorkshire Police to undertake the research. Leeds City 
Council offered additional help with the recruitment and facilitation of the group sessions. 
Young people were recruited with the assistance of West Yorkshire Youth Association 
(WYYA)167. Respondents for the heterogeneous (mixed) groups were recruited with the 
assistance of an independent research company, QA Research, which used the Citizens’ Panel 
for Leeds to select eligible respondents168. Recruitment criteria for the latter were set to 
ensure a good spread of respondents, taking into account respondents’ age, gender, ethnic 
background and area of residence. Prior to the sessions, respondents were informed about the 
purpose and beneficiaries of the research, time, location and duration of the sessions. They 
were told that the sessions would be audio-recorded (subject to their consent) and transcribed 
and the content of discussions would be securely stored and kept confidential and used only 
for research purposes. 
 
A focus group script was developed to provide a guide for the sessions. The topic guide 
covered similar issues to the postal survey, but with particular emphasis on respondents’ 
views regarding ANPR positives vs. negatives, safety vs. privacy, discrimination and covert 
vs. overt surveillance – issues which could not be easily captured in the postal questionnaire. 
While respondents from the postal survey were presented with a letter explaining the topic of 
research before they were asked about their views, participants to the group sessions were 
gradually introduced to the topic in order to capture their initial reactions and explore whether 
more knowledge or information about the subject would influence their perceptions. For 
                                                 
166
 Results from the survey indicate that young people were slightly under-represented of the wider population. 
167
 West Yorkshire Youth Association (WYYA) aims to create opportunities for children and young people to 
make positive changes in their lives. 
168
 QA Research manages and consults the Leeds Citizens Panel on behalf of Leeds City Council (LCC). The 
panel consists of 2007 Leeds local authority residents recruited to be demographically representative of the 
wider population of Leeds. They are sent regular postal surveys and occasionally invited to attend qualitative 
research exercises to inform the policy decision making processes in LCC. 
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further comparison purposes, one group was offered extra information about ANPR. A copy 
of the script for the group sessions is included in Appendix 1. 
 
All group sessions took place as planned, with encouraging results in terms of attendance, 
discussion and feedback. The sessions were held in the evening at the Town Hall, which is a 
central and easily accessible location in Leeds169. For ethical reasons, young people were 
accompanied by a programme coordinator from the West Yorkshire Youth Association. 
Sessions were relaxed and comfortable but efficiently moderated to encourage people to fully 
express their views, drawing out reticent participants, while addressing dominant ones. The 
group discussions lasted an average of 60 minutes and they were all recorded, transcribed and 
analysed using the main emerging themes. The findings were reviewed with those from the 
public opinion survey for triangulation purposes to draw out common themes and areas of 
difference.  
 
                                                 
169
 QA Research assisted with the moderation of the focus groups. Their input did not bias the results of the 
research as they were not involved in the analysis and reporting of the results. 
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3.5. Phase four: interim findings and follow up survey 
This research phase involved the use of the following methods: 
• ‘Interim’ triangulation/synthesis of findings from Phases Two and Three; 
• Thematic focus groups with officers and staff from West Yorkshire Police; 
• Follow up electronic survey with representatives from police forces in the UK. 
 
3.5.1. ‘Interim’ triangulation 
Findings emerging from the first set of interviews, participant observation and public opinion 
study were reviewed at this point in order to provide the police with interim findings and 
inform policy and practice with regards to ANPR at local and national level. This early 
reflection on the findings had the additional advantage of informing the subsequent research 
stages and choice of methods. 
 
3.5.2. Thematic focus groups 
Three thematic focus groups with thirty one officers and staff from West Yorkshire Police 
were organised within this timeframe. These were informed by findings from the previous 
phases of research and were used to further explore ANPR’s role in intelligence gathering, 
crime investigations and response to criminality, as well as to identify the best way to 
improve the police use of ANPR within West Yorkshire and maximise its benefits. 
Respondents were chosen purposively from West Yorkshire Police’s employees who were 
thought to be using or would benefit from using ANPR as part of their role. The sampling 
criteria aimed to get respondents from each department or division within West Yorkshire 
Police with different roles and ranks within the force (e.g. managerial, operational, strategic, 
research, investigations). An invitation to the group sessions was sent out to this sample, 
explaining the purpose and nature of the sessions. A focus group script was developed to 
provide a guide for the sessions (see Appendix 1). Given the thematic nature of the groups 
(i.e. ‘response’, ‘intelligence’ and ‘crime investigations’), the script was amended for each 
session accordingly. All sessions took place on West Yorkshire Police premises and were 
facilitated with the support of experienced moderators from the force, lasting an average of 
150 minutes. For confidentiality purposes, not all sessions were recorded (in these cases, 
notes were taken instead). The notes and transcriptions of recordings were analysed manually 
using the main emerging themes. 
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3.5.3. Follow-up interviews 
Fifteen follow up interviews were conducted during this phase. Eight out of these were 
undertaken with key stakeholders from West Yorkshire Police to further explore the role of 
ANPR within policing at local level. These interviews incorporated results emerging from 
earlier interviews, the electronic survey and the focus groups in order to inform the ANPR 
force strategy and future developments in West Yorkshire. 
 
Seven interviews with members of the National ANPR Steering Group were conducted to 
discuss the interim results from the study and explore current and future developments with 
regards to ANPR at national level. 
 
3.5.4. Follow up electronic survey 
This research phase concluded with a follow up survey (electronic self-completion 
questionnaire) exploring the police’s views on a more current local and national ANPR 
picture (see Appendix 1 for a copy of the introductory letter and the questionnaire). The 
questionnaire was sent to representatives from fifty-two police forces in England, Wales and 
Scotland, twenty of which have replied and completed the questionnaire by the established 
time limit. 
 
The focus groups, interviews and the survey were complemented by research notes taken 
during ongoing research observation and a series of meetings and forums in which the 
researcher was involved during this research phase. 
 
3.5.5. Analysis of results 
The results were generated by using a mixture of qualitative (drawing out themes) and 
quantitative (i.e. percentage of each response) analysis. The qualitative data generated by 
participant observation, semi-structured interviews, focus groups and self-completion 
questionnaires were coded and analysed both manually and with the assistance of specialist 
software packages such as NVivo. NVivo was used to organise text under main themes and 
identify commonalities and differences between respondents, groups of respondents or 
methods used. It should be noted, however, that NVivo is a helpful tool once all the data is 
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inputted, but it does not perform the analysis, it is a time consuming process. The researcher 
has to be skilled in using both manual and software enabled coding in order to analyse 
complex data coming from different sources. As indicated before, the quantitative data 
produced by the self-completion questionnaires were analysed using Excel and SPSS. More 
information on how the results were generated is presented in the relevant results chapter, i.e. 
Chapter Six. 
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3.6. Phase five: issues in measuring ANPR’s impact on crime 
One of the objectives of this research was to explore the mechanisms whereby ANPR might 
impact on crime and police effectiveness and the conditions needed for ANPR to reach its 
potential in producing these outcomes170. In that respect, this study falls more within the 
realm of process or formative evaluation rather than an outcome or impact evaluation of 
ANPR. However, some basic quantitative analysis was incorporated into the study to explore 
the extent to which traditional ways of measuring an intervention’s impact on crime could be 
applicable to ANPR. This analysis171 looked at changes in police recorded crime following 
the introduction of ANPR and aimed to identify main challenges to the process of measuring 
ANPR’s impact on crime which future evaluators should take into account. 
 
3.6.1. Choice of research design and intrinsic limitations 
As the main focus of this analysis was concerned with the exploration of the quantitative 
impact of ANPR on crime, it is worth outlining here some of the methodological approaches 
which are typically used to answer such outcome questions (‘did it work?’) and discuss the 
main limitations to the approach adopted in the current study. The ‘ideal’ impact evaluation 
of a crime prevention initiative is expected to have a high degree of internal, construct and 
statistical conclusion validity172. The internal validity refers to the correctness of inferences 
about cause and effect’173, in other words how well the research demonstrated that the 
intervention had an effect on the outcome. Construct validity refers to the adequacy of the 
operational definition and measurement of the theoretical constructs underlying the 
intervention and the outcome174, while statistical validity is concerned with whether the cause 
(i.e. the intervention) and the effect (i.e. the outcome) are related. There are two main types 
of evaluation designs that could potentially achieve an appropriate level of validity: the 
randomised experimental and quasi-experimental designs. 
 
                                                 
170
 Pawson and Tilley (1997). 
171
 The analysis was explanatory to the extent to which it tried to measure ANPR’s impact on crime, but did not 
necessarily outline a direct causal relationship between ANPR and crime. 
172
 Welsh and Farrington (2002). 
173
 Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002: 34). 
174
 Farrington (2003: 54). 
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3.6.2. Randomised control trials (RCT) 
The randomised controlled trial (RCT) is considered the ‘gold standard’ in evaluation 
designs175. In this case, offenders or places are allocated at random either to the intervention 
group or to a control group who will either receive a different intervention or treatment as 
usual. This approach minimises the chances that the treated and comparison groups differ in 
significant ways and that one group is biased from the outset to do better or worse. Hence the 
subsequent differences between the groups are more likely to be attributable to the 
intervention. To maintain the validity of a randomised experiment, a sufficiently large 
number of target groups need to be randomly assigned to ensure that the treatment group is 
equivalent to the control group on all extraneous variables (within the limits of statistical 
fluctuation)176. It is evident that a RCT approach would not have been feasible in this case, as 
ANPR was not introduced in a sufficiently large number of areas, nor was the introduction 
based on random assignment of control groups/areas. 
 
3.6.3. Quasi-experiments 
As noted above, with area-based studies, there are not usually sufficient areas to conduct an 
RCT. The ‘next best’ design for area-based studies (similar to the current study) involves 
before and after measures in experimental and comparable control conditions – the quasi-
experimental evaluation design177 (see Figure 3.1 below). In this instance, groups (in this 
case, areas) exposed to the intervention are matched with groups given no intervention or 
some other intervention in order to estimate the ‘counterfactual inference’, i.e. what would 
have happened to the target/experimental group if the intervention had not been applied to 
them? 
 
                                                 
175
 Farrington (1983), Welsh and Farrington (2002). 
176
 Farrington (1997) mentions minimum fifty target groups necessary for the research to be valid. 
177
 The term quasi-experiment was introduced by Campbell and Stanley (1963).The minimum interpretable 
design believed to be most adequate to draw conclusions about crime prevention measures is considered to be 
Level 3 of the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale (SMS) of quasi-experimental analysis (Sherman et al., 1998, 
2002). The SMS was largely based on the ideas of Cook and Campbell (1979) and was influenced by the 
methodological quality scale developed by Brounstein et al. (1997) in the National Structured Evaluation of 
Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Intervention. 
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Figure 3.1 The quasi-experimental design 
 
 
 
However, the ability of this type of design to rule out threats to validity is very dependent on 
the closeness of the match and the ability to control for all the variables which might 
theoretically be expected to impact upon the outcome measure(s). The control group (e.g. 
area) is generally used in order to exclude as much as possible other plausible alternative 
explanations of the effect, which means that the geographical areas used as a control need to 
be free of the intervention and similar in nature, size, layout and crime problems to the target 
area. This influences the internal validity of a study which – as argued before - refers to the 
correctness of inferences about cause and effect. 
 
Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002: 55) identified a variety of threats to internal validity, 
such as: 
• ‘Selection’ (when the effect reflects pre-existing differences between experimental 
and control conditions); 
• ‘History’ (when the effect is caused by some event occurring at the same time as the 
intervention); 
• ‘Maturation’ (when the effect reflects a continuation of pre-existing trends); 
*Conventions devised by Campbell and Stanley (1963) 
N.B. The dashed line indicates non-random assignment to comparison group 
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 91
• ‘Instrumentation’ and ‘testing’ (when the effect is caused by the method of measuring 
the outcome or changes to it); 
• ‘Regression to the mean’ (when an intervention is applied to high crime or low crime 
areas, as natural fluctuation will cause a change in scores in the post-test which could 
be mistakenly interpreted as an effect of the intervention); 
• ‘Differential attrition’ (when differential loss of units from experimental compared to 
control conditions cause the effect) or 
• ‘Causal order’ (when it is unclear whether the intervention preceded the outcome). 
 
It is widely recognised that a randomised experiment has the highest possible internal validity 
because it can rule out these threats178, but a randomised method of assignment is not always 
relevant or feasible, as was the case in the current study. 
 
The selection of the methodology was based upon several factors generally relating to the 
type of data available for analysis and the difficulties of measuring and attributing changes in 
crime levels to an intervention such as ANPR. In real world research, experiments are very 
difficult to conduct: it is rare that control groups do not receive any treatment, whether it is 
the treatment whose effect is intended to be measured, or any other treatment that is different 
from the experimental intervention. Indeed it was impossible to find two entirely comparable 
areas for the purpose of the analysis in the current study. It is probable that other policing 
operations (including ANPR) might have been implemented in the ‘non-ANPR’ areas, hence 
the possibility of ‘contaminated’ control areas could not be excluded. There was no consistent 
approach to ANPR in West Yorkshire and the information regarding which areas have 
received which ANPR intervention was not available. These factors had an impact on the 
internal and construct validity of the study. 
 
3.6.4. Internal validity issues: selection, history and maturation 
Changes in crime rates over time may be due to factors other than the introduction of ANPR. 
There are three main threats to the internal validity of the findings within this research: 
selection, history and maturation. As argued above, the ‘selection’ of the control group was 
                                                 
178
 Farrington (2003: 53). 
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not entirely appropriate, as pre-existing differences between the experimental and control 
conditions were identified. The ‘history’ effect is another threat.  It is argued that some event 
other than ANPR possibly occurred during the period under study and might have influenced 
the outcome measure (in this case, the crime rates). Crime rates could have been influenced 
by factors (other than ANPR) such as: 
• Concurrent policing initiatives (e.g. the introduction of PCSOs, NPTs, ‘Designing Out 
Crime’ initiatives) or changes in policing tactics; 
• Economic and social factors which could be local specific or national/international, 
such as the current recession (e.g. higher prices for petrol and vehicles; high 
unemployment rates), changes in urban landscape (e.g. city centre regeneration 
schemes; new housing developments) or big sporting events (e.g. Football World 
Cup, Olympic Games); 
• Improved security measures and vehicle design, which is believed to have fuelled the 
development of new types of crime and modus operandi, having an impact on the 
recording rates for theft of motor vehicles and 
• Local and national changes in recording mechanisms and counting rules for certain 
types of offences. 
 
‘Maturation’ could be considered as another threat to validity as the emerging ‘effect’ reflects 
a continuation of pre-existing trends for the crimes under investigation. 
 
3.6.5. Construct validity issues: police crime data 
The main threats to construct validity relate to the extent to which the introduction of ANPR 
reduced the type of crime expected to be reduced (i.e. theft of motor vehicles). The main 
threat here is regarding the use of police recorded crime data, its validity and adequacy in 
reflecting true crime rates. 
 
Although police recorded crime statistics provide a good measure of trends in well-reported 
crimes, they do not include crimes that have not been reported to the police or that the police 
decide not to record179. It is well recognised that police recorded crime data is generally 
                                                 
179
 Information from Home Office RDS website: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/recordedcrime1.html. 
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subject to under-reporting; the latest British Crime Survey 2007/08180, for example, indicates 
that as many as 58% of crimes are not reported to the police. However, unlike the majority of 
crimes, police recorded data for theft of motor vehicles is less likely to be under-reported181, 
mainly because people tend to report this crime for insurance purposes. Indeed the 2007/08 
British Crime Survey data indicates that theft of motor vehicles are most likely to be reported 
(93%), while reporting rates for violent crimes (including domestic violence) are relatively 
low (35%). 
 
The quality of the data is another issue. For example, the accuracy of the data regarding 
incidents of theft of number plate is questionable. Consultation with West Yorkshire Police 
reveals that the way offences are recorded is not consistent, particularly as theft of number 
plate offences do not necessarily appear as a Home Office category. As for the theft of motor 
vehicle offence, the police argue that certain changes in policing tactics or in offending 
patterns have influenced the way that this offence is recorded. For example it is believed that 
the introduction of new security measures for motor vehicles has fuelled the ‘Hanoi’ style 
burglaries outbreak. Because the new vehicle designs have become more resilient to theft 
(e.g. the need for a key to start a vehicle), offenders have decided to break into people’s 
homes to steal the keys before making off in their vehicle. This is what the police call ‘Hanoi’ 
burglary. When this happens, the crime is typically recorded as burglary so the theft or the 
taking without the owner’s consent (TWOC) of a vehicle is not recorded as such, unless the 
suspect denies the burglary (only in these circumstances the police have to record a separate 
vehicle crime to the burglary).The current study has not attempted to model the data for these 
changes, thus these limitations need to be taken into account. 
 
3.6.6. The ‘displacement’ issue 
Construct validity in ‘evaluations’ of crime prevention interventions is also about 
investigating the displacement or the diffusion of benefits182. The possible displacement 
effects have not been measured on this occasion. One of the reasons is that it was difficult to 
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 Kershaw, Nicholas and Walker (ed.) (2008). 
181
 O’Brien (1985), Dodd et al. (2004) and Webb (2005) argue that vehicle theft recorded data is particularly 
accurate compared to other types of crime.  
182
 Clarke and Weisburd (1994). 
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identify a relevant buffer zone183 around the ‘ANPR target area’. ANPR involves cars and 
roads, not people and designated areas, as in the case of CCTV, hence vicinity and 
comparability have different meanings when measuring ANPR’s impact on crime. Probably 
the buffer area would need to consider a road rather than an area defined by squares 
meters/kilometres. Limitations regarding the recording of the location of crime should also be 
considered. The location of the event’s occurrence is not always accurate; it is usually 
assigned to the nearest landmark or street intersection184. The majority of police operational 
gazetteers do not contain non-postal spatial references. This means that the geo-references for 
non-postal offences may be inaccurate due to police practices of using postal addresses and 
removing the house or business’s reference. Therefore, because of the non-residential nature 
of the location of theft of motor vehicle or theft of number plate (i.e. not necessarily at a 
postal address but on the street outside the postal address), careful attention needs to be paid 
when geo-coding these offences. 
 
Similarly, when measuring temporal displacement, it is advisable to use the average between 
the earliest and latest time of offence as recorded on the police’s crime information systems, 
rather than using the time when the crime was recorded (as some offences take a long time 
before they get recorded). However, this should be less of an issue if the same type of data 
was used for both the experimental (e.g. the peak time for theft of motor vehicle before 
ANPR) and control timeframe (after ANPR). 
 
For clarity of understanding of results emerging from the analysis conducted during this 
research phase, a more detailed account of the summary statistics used and the statistical 
significance on tests on changes is presented in Chapter Six. 
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 Usually the term used to define an area of a certain distance radius (e.g. 100 metres, 1 mile) from the edge of 
the target area or up to any natural boundaries (e.g. railways) which prevent displacement. 
184
 Hirschfield (2005: 645). The location of the crimes is also dependent upon the accuracy of police gazetteers 
derived from the Ordnance Survey (OS) ADDRESS-POINT gazetteer. This is a dataset that uniquely defines 
and locates residential, business and public postal addresses in Great Britain. It is created by matching 
information from Ordnance Survey digital map databases with more than 27 million addresses recorded in the 
Royal Mail® Postcode Address File (PAF®). 
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3.7. Phase six: synthesis of research findings and distillation of policy 
recommendations 
The last phase of the study was reflective in nature and implied weighing up the emerging 
findings and considering the implications of the research in terms of policy and practice. This 
research stage involved a final consultation with relevant stakeholders in the ANPR arena, 
with particular emphasis on the future direction of ANPR within policing. 
 
3.7.1. Triangulation 
Findings emerging from interviews, focus groups, self-completion questionnaires and 
observation were reviewed for triangulation and synthesis purposes185. The aim was to reflect 
on the findings to further validate the results emerging from the previous research stages and 
to deepen and widen our understanding of the issues surrounding ANPR surveillance both 
from the perspective of the police and the public. This final reflection on the findings 
highlighted any regularities and contradictions in the research data. The ultimate goal was to 
make sense of the evidence to spell out implications for policy and practice. 
 
3.7.2. Distillation of policy recommendations 
Although, to a certain extent, each research stage explored the main impediments to the use 
of ANPR and sought advice with regards to the best ways to improve ANPR’s effectiveness, 
the last phase of the research was much focused on the ‘improvement’ aspect and perceived 
necessary changes to policy and practice with regards to ANPR. To achieve this, the 
researcher organised a series of meetings to discuss the research findings and outline her 
recommendations. 
 
Twelve formal meetings were held involving nine officers and staff from West Yorkshire 
Police, as well as representatives from NPIA, ACPO and HMIC. The aim was to evaluate the 
feasibility of change and produce realistic recommendations in line with local and, to a 
certain extent, national strategies, policies and priorities.  
 
                                                 
185
 Triangulation enables the researcher to get a clearer picture of the social reality being studied by viewing it 
from several different perspectives (Webb et al., 1966; Denzin, 1970; Jupp et al., 2000; Altrichter et al., 1993; 
O’Donoghue and Punch, 2003). 
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Given that the interpretation of the results emerging from this study is closely linked to the 
methodological approaches used, for clarity of understanding, more information about the 
methodology used in these research phases is presented in the results chapters. 
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3.8. Ethical considerations 
The research was carried out in accordance with standard ethical procedures, in particular 
those set out in the British Psychological Society’s Ethical Principles for Conducting 
Research with Human Participants186 and the British Society of Criminology’s Code of 
Ethics for Researchers in the Field of Criminology187. These revolved mainly around 
obtaining informed consent from all participants; informing participants that they can 
withdraw from the research at any point they wish; handling any material with the strictest 
confidence and anonymity and reporting on the subject matter in a responsible manner. No 
particular health and safety or sensitivity issues were identified with regards to access to 
participants, from the police (and organisations with policy remit) and the general public. 
 
The researcher has approached the University of Huddersfield’s Research Ethics Panel 
(SREP) and has obtained full ethical approval for the proposed research. The ethics 
application set out the precise manner in which the research would be carried out. 
Information about the researcher, her supervisors, the aims and objectives of the study and a 
brief overview of the research methodology was provided. Copies of consent forms, invite 
letters and indicative questionnaires to be used for interviews, focus groups and surveys 
accompanied the form for approval. This was done to ensure that respondents were not 
subject to any unnecessary intrusions into privacy, sensitivities, leading questions, labelling 
and stigma. Risk analysis and management forms were also attached to the application. A 
copy of the relevant form is available in the Appendix 1. 
 
Throughout the duration of the study the researcher ensured that all data were collected, 
stored and analysed subject to the conditions of the Data Protection Act 1998, Human Rights 
Act 1998, Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 and other relevant procedures regarding the 
use of confidential and strictly confidential information and information sharing. Where 
necessary, a Data Processing Agreement was put in place to set out the terms and conditions 
under which confidential police data was disclosed to the researcher and to ensure 
compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998. This was particularly relevant to the use of 
police recorded crime data, restricted documents and other information from the police. The 
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 BPS (2009). 
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 BSC (2006). 
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data were securely stored (encrypted and password protected), analysed and destroyed subject 
to the conditions of the data sharing protocols agreed with the Data Protection Officer of each 
individual police force. It was agreed that at the completion of the research all police data 
would be destroyed to comply with this protocol. Other data were to be stored securely for 
five years and then would be destroyed. 
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3.9. Conclusion 
This chapter has described the stages involved in the research and justified the selection of 
the methods used, their advantages and limitations. 
 
All together, the ‘research journey’ had its undulations along the way, restrictive and 
challenging at times, but very rewarding at other times. Some objectives proved to be harder 
to attain that initially thought; some questions remained unanswerable; some data proved to 
be unfit for purpose; some unexpected findings generated new interesting questions. An 
account of the journey and the various changes made along the way is provided where 
appropriate, which will help to clarify and situate the research. 
 
Chapters Four, Five and Six present the findings generated by the analysis of the data 
gathered through the methods described in this chapter. The next chapter is based on police 
perceptions and experience of ANPR and provides an account of the processes underpinning 
the development of ANPR in the UK and common practice in the police use of ANPR at 
local and national level. Particular emphasis is placed on the investigative use of ANPR. 
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Chapter Four: Results (I) 
Present and future challenges in meeting ANPR’s potential within policing: 
the Police’s view 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The literature review highlighted the need for further research in order to enhance our 
understanding of ANPR’s role and potential within policing and generally, in the fight against 
crime. Several questions were raised regarding gaps in research and knowledge about ANPR 
and it was indicated which of these gaps will be addressed by the current thesis and which 
need further exploration. Improvement and change are central elements to this Thesis. It was 
highlighted the need to identify the main barriers to the effectiveness of ANPR in crime 
investigations and generally as a policing tool, with the aim to produce systematic knowledge 
which would inform the implementation and development of ANPR. In light of this, the 
current chapter explore police perceptions, knowledge and experience regarding the current 
practice with regards to ANPR.  
 
Although the chapter has particular emphasis on the investigative use of ANPR, advantages 
and limitations of ANPR in all areas of policing will be highlighted. The chapter presents 
results emerging from the empirical work in this Thesis, based on the analysis of the 
following methods: 
• 48 interviews conducted with 53 representatives from 28 police forces in the UK 
(53.8% response rate)188 and 2 agencies with national policy remit, ACPO and NPIA; 
• One electronic survey conducted with 147 officers and staff from West Yorkshire 
Police (24.7% response rate); 
• Thematic focus groups with 31 officers and staff from West Yorkshire Police; 
• One electronic survey with 20 representatives from 20 police forces in the UK189 
(38.5% response rate); 
• Observational notes; 
• Police documents; 
                                                 
188
 Out of the 52 police forces in the UK.  
189
 As indicated in Chapter Three of the Thesis, this survey targeted further developments and updates at a 
national level, two years after the initial survey (i.e. the interviews). 
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• 12 formal meetings with 9 strategic officers and staff from West Yorkshire Police, 
ACPO, NPIA and HMIC. 
 
In total, 260 respondents were consulted via interviews, self-completion questionnaires and 
focus groups. 
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4.2. Common practice in the police use of ANPR in the UK 
For clarity of understanding of ANPR’s potential and use within British policing, this chapter 
starts by briefly introducing the reader to the main processes underpinning the development 
of ANPR and common practice in the police use of ANPR at national level. As part of the 
empirical work in this Thesis, police officers and staff were asked a number of questions 
about their role in relation to ANPR and details about the development and use of ANPR 
within their force and the link to national developments. A specific objective here was to 
identify processes in the development of ANPR at national and force level, believed to have 
had the greatest impact on ANPR’s effectiveness as a policing tool. 
 
It is important to reiterate that the results portraying national developments with regards to 
ANPR emerge from two main surveys: 
• The first survey was conducted in 2007 entailing 33 interviews with representatives 
from 20 police forces. Interviews with two agencies with national policy remit (NPIA 
and ACPO) were also conducted to capture strategic views with regards to national 
developments in the ANPR arena. 
• The second survey was conducted in 2009 and entailed an electronic questionnaire 
which was completed by 20 police forces in the UK. This survey explored views on 
the current ANPR use and infrastructure. 
 
The surveys were similar as they had a common ground (ANPR), but not directly 
comparable, as the later survey was quantitative in nature. Of the twenty-eight respondent 
forces, twelve responded to both surveys. Where appropriate and where information was 
available, changes in views between the timeframes coinciding with the two surveys are 
highlighted. 
 
It should be noted that the current research was conducted in a dynamic environment with the 
infrastructure, policy and operational oversight of ANPR rapidly changing locally and 
nationally. Though conceived over thirty years ago, ANPR has seen major developments over 
the last six to ten years. As will be argued next, these developments were perceived by those 
questioned as part of the empirical work of this Thesis to have had a significant impact on the 
overall success of the national ANPR project and the implementation of ANPR at force level. 
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4.2.1. The journey to ANPR 
When asked about the development of ANPR within their force, officers spoke 
enthusiastically about the ‘ANPR journey’ they had experienced - from an idea, a project, a 
camera and a couple of police officers involved, to a more complex infrastructure, a national 
ANPR data centre and the contested ‘Big Brother’ of the British roads. It emerged that whilst 
ANPR was introduced as a national initiative, police forces were given local discretion in its 
implementation. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the development and use of ANPR revolved (and still does) around funding. 
Lack of funding for the initial national testing of the ANPR project was the drive behind 
testing a cost recovery scheme for dedicated ANPR enabled intercept teams. This meant that 
ANPR enforcement was intended to be part-funded through receipts from fixed penalty 
issued for vehicle documentation offences by the ANPR intercept teams190. It appears that 
this particular development had an impact on the way ANPR would be perceived from that 
point onwards. ANPR was labelled as a ‘motor offence’ policing tool, a ‘traffic’ tool. 
Respondents highlight that, although the main purpose of ANPR intercept teams was to 
address criminality, not to create revenue, early ANPR enforcement focused mainly on 
documentation offences. As a result, early ANPR successes were linked to the effectiveness 
of ANPR intercept teams to issue fixed penalty notices and the value of this cost recovery 
element. 
 
Ultimately, the revenue generated fell some way short of the actual costs, thus the 
hypothecation discontinued in March 2006. However, the overall success of ANPR-enabled 
intercept teams and the recognised potential of ANPR in intelligence gathering and crime 
investigations, led to additional government funding between 2005 and 2007. The objective 
of this capital investment was to expand the national infrastructure beyond Spectrum vans 
and intercept teams, in particular to enhance the intelligence and investigative capability of 
ANPR. A National ANPR Data Centre (NADC) 191 and a Force Back Office Facility (BOF) 
were developed to provide a more effective way to exchange information between forces 
                                                 
190
 This coincided with the introduction of four new fixed penalties, three of which were relevant to the ANPR 
teams, i.e. driving without insurance, driving without MOT certificate (where required) and not displaying a 
vehicle excise licence. 
191
 The rationale for and characteristics of the NADC were described in Chapter Two of the Thesis.  
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across England and Wales. At local level, forces were provided with additional funding to 
develop their local infrastructure and improve the ANPR coverage, especially fixed sites. 
 
The BOF was initially developed to allow the storage of ANPR data within a police force. 
The facility went through a series of developments aiming to improve the technology and to 
enable direct linkage and compatibility between forces’ BOFs and the NADC - a centralised 
database of vehicle reads in England and Wales which would enhance the intelligence and 
investigative benefits of ANPR. 
 
Whilst a centralised database has now materialised, technical issues have impeded the 
effectiveness of the search facilities of the NADC. Searches are therefore being developed at 
three levels: 
• Level 1 investigation (counter-terrorism and major crime), allowing full NADC 
search; 
• Level 2 investigation (cross-border crime), allowing BOF to BOF searches between 
different forces; 
• Level 3 investigation (local crime), allowing searches of the local force BOF. 
 
The national ANPR leaders argue that, in due course, the three different levels of search will 
have a layer of analytical tools which are expected to enhance the investigative use of ANPR 
data across all levels. 
 
These are some of the ideas behind the development of the NADC – a very optimistic project, 
ahead of its time, fighting its way through numerous problems since its installation as a pilot 
in 1999. But NADC has remained behind in its timetable to implementation and there are still 
questions about when or whether it can actually deliver: 
 
‘We now have about half the country feeding data into it [NADC], it is going to be another 
couple of months before all country feeds in and it’s only at that point that we really start to 
get our idea of its usefulness on serious and organised crime and counter terrorism. It 
remains to be proved […] Clearly there are financial issues about its sustainability, but I 
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think it will prove itself very quickly and these issues will disappear. But as long as we 
haven’t got all forces feeding in and interrogate it, it remains a concept.’ 
(ACPO Representative, National ANPR Steering Group) 
 
To overcome some of these problems, in April 2007, the responsibility for the national 
coordination and development for ANPR moved from ACPO and the Home Office PSU to 
NPIA. The NPIA has assumed policy and operational oversight for ANPR and is at present 
responsible for supporting the development of a national programme aiming to enhance the 
effectiveness of ANPR, particularly in light of the newly expanded infrastructure across 
England and Wales. This change is perceived by senior police officers as an opportunity to 
review the ANPR strategy and address some of the issues limiting the effective development 
and use of ANPR at local and national level: 
 
‘We moved from being an enterprise opportunity business to one that is much more mature, 
much more mainstream, bigger - which requires systems and processes and programs which 
go with bigger organisations […] I think we made the important national transition now and 
those systems and processes and program management structures that NPIA will bring will 
allow us to be much more able to drive home the local changes in a much more forceful 
manner.’ 
(ACPO representative, National ANPR Steering Group) 
 
4.2.2. Balancing national and local ANPR developments 
National developments are hindered not only by technological limitations but also by 
competing local priorities. Whilst national ANPR developments have been all conceived, 
they have not always translated practically at the local level. The development of the NADC 
has indeed opened opportunities to use ANPR beyond Level 1 criminality (local) and address 
Level 2 and Level 3 criminal issues (at cross border, national or international level). The 
police are aware of this potential, realising the value of the NADC in providing intelligence 
on criminals operating across geographic boundaries. However, whilst this is beneficial, the 
approach is perceived at times to be in conflict with the development of ANPR to meet local 
force priorities, which vary from one force to another. 
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Police forces are typically assessed against individual performance targets with funding and 
resources focused on achieving these targets. This is not an issue specific to ANPR, it is 
‘target’ culture governing police forces and the public sector generally. Whilst overarching 
and sustained crime prevention measures are more likely to be successful, police 
commanders will not necessarily commit resources and funding towards them if immediate 
benefits in meeting targets are not apparent. Police officers generally viewed the national 
approach as unrealistic and at times holding back local benefits, a belief that undermined 
their confidence in the national approach to ANPR and further developments. 
 
Respondents believe that national ANPR strategies have failed to anticipate problems arising 
with the newly expanded infrastructure, particularly at local level (e.g. incompatible 
technology and infrastructure, the Back Office technology) which then have impacted on the 
effectiveness of ANPR at national level (e.g. the NADC). 
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4.3. Scoping the police use of ANPR and the types of ANPR systems 
The police forces respondent to the 2009 electronic survey indicated they used ANPR on a 
regular basis, whether for real time response to hits through intercept capability (60% of the 
20 respondent forces) or for intelligence gathering for historic searches (post-incident 
investigation) and intelligence-led operations (25% and 15% respectively). Some forces, 
however, did not use ANPR for any of the above actions, just storing the ANPR data on the 
Back Office. 
 
Chapter One explained that ANPR can work with mobile (vehicle based) and purpose built 
fixed cameras/sites, as well as with existing CCTV systems. The police have focused on 
applications of ANPR based on these three main platforms but, although less common, other 
type of systems are also used, such as ANPR laptops, hand held and helicopter based ANPR. 
Results indicate that all respondent forces used both fixed (including ANPR integrated with 
Local Authority or other CCTV) and mobile systems. Just over half of these (58%) 
mentioned the use of other ANPR systems, in particular portable or re-deployable ANPR 
(e.g. laptops, flight cases, covert cameras). 
 
Given the significant capital funding invested in the expansion of the national ANPR 
infrastructure, the number of fixed sites developed by police forces has increased 
considerably. In addition, there has been an increase in partnerships with the Local 
Authorities to allow the use of CCTV infrastructure for ANPR. Results indicate that a high 
percentage of respondent forces (70%) have developed partnerships with third parties, mostly 
with the Local Authority, but also with other agencies such as the Driver and Vehicle 
Licensing Agency (DVLA), the Highways Agency, Traffic England and Traffic Wales. Some 
police forces have also succeeded establishing partnerships with the Private Sector (e.g. 
petrol stations, industrial estates, supermarkets and shopping centres). 
 
Fixed ANPR sites are being complemented by roll out of mobile ANPR systems in both 
Roads Policing and dedicated ANPR unit vehicles (used in conjunction with ANPR Intercept 
Teams). Mobile ANPR allows rapid deployment for data collection and intercept in high 
crime or high security risk areas. These units are connected to the central ANPR computer 
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that ensures that data collected is immediately available for analysis and that police units 
connected to the ANPR systems can be alerted to vehicles of interest within seconds. 
 
When asked about the advantages and disadvantages of different ANPR systems used, police 
officers argue that fixed sites are beneficial as they provide wider coverage than mobile 
ANPR and 24/7 intelligence gathering capability. However, fixed sites can be extremely 
expensive and difficult to run from a technical point of view (e.g. installation, power supply 
and communication links, maintenance and repair) as well as from an operational point of 
view (increased number of hits, increased demand on command, control and intercept 
resources). Fixed sites are limited to one location, while mobile ANPR cameras can be 
deployed to specific locations very quickly, enabling a more flexible and targeted 
deployment, in line with changing crime patterns in a force area. Fixed sites are believed to 
be more appropriate for major arterial routes, mobile ANPR systems for local areas. 
 
Mobile systems have their share of criticism – some of the interviewed police officers 
working with ANPR seem to be frustrated by technical problems with cameras in traffic cars 
or ANPR vans. Evidence gathered through participant observation confirms this, indicating 
that police officers working on the ground with ANPR technology encounter difficulties in 
setting up the system to work effectively. On more than one occasion, the cameras proved to 
be hard to set to produce accurate reads, the supporting back office facility was unreliable or 
there was slow response from communications department – all crucial elements in ensuring 
a fast, effective real time response to ANPR hits. Respondents also highlight that the 
installation of ANPR cameras on law enforcement vehicles requires careful consideration of 
the type, quality and position of the cameras, particularly as the environment in which it is 
used is less stable and predictable (e.g. moving vehicle, queuing traffic, light conditions, 
presence of pedestrians etc). Flexible systems that can be configured with different adjustable 
cameras seem to be the ideal setting, but of course quality comes to a price.  
 
Although less frequently used, other types of ANPR are thought to have their advantages. 
Airborne ANPR is perceived as very effective at gathering vehicle intelligence in hard to 
reach locations. Hand-held ANPR is appreciated for its ability to read vehicle registration 
numbers and associated intelligence without involving control rooms, while portable ANPR 
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(fly-cases) is seen as effective in gathering information for covert or targeted operations at 
any location. 
 
Even though the use of ANPR in conjunction with local authority CCTV is highly 
appreciated, particularly in terms of extended coverage and value for money, respondents talk 
about a conflict of interests which has an impact on ANPR’s effectiveness in policing the 
roads. Because the cameras are owned by the local council - which have their own 
responsibilities for crime and disorder – the use of ANPR through CCTV is not always a 
priority. The way the CCTV cameras are placed (e.g. too high or overlooking the pedestrian 
areas, wrong angle or direction) also impacts on the effectiveness of ANPR systems in 
capturing vehicles’ number plates or images of the vehicle and its occupants. 
 
4.3.1. Private ANPR systems, information sharing and legal implications 
Recognising the potential of tapping into existing private CCTV in strategic locations such as 
shopping centres and petrol stations, some police forces have established partnerships with 
private third parties. These developments are at an early stage, but the police strongly believe 
that there are numerous advantages to be gained. Installing ANPR in petrol stations is 
perceived as a good opportunity to identify vehicles of interest to the police. This is in line 
with the routine activities theory (people who commit crime use vehicles, like everybody 
else, vehicles need petrol) and the self-selection assumptions (people who commit minor 
crimes, e.g. making off without payment, are more likely to commit serious crimes) 
highlighted in the literature review. 
 
However, integrating police-owned ANPR systems with other CCTV systems (particularly 
private) is not a straightforward process, raising issues about the suitability of the legislation 
covering the information sharing of vehicle movement data between third party agencies and 
the police. A review of relevant police documents with this regard highlights that, in January 
2007, the Home Office put forward legislative proposals relating the use of ANPR. In the 
absence of case law (as ANPR has not been challenged), Counsel’s opinion was sought 
regarding the implications of the current legislation that each organisation relied upon to 
collect vehicle movement data and use it for their own purpose. The legal consultation 
indicated that at present the police use of ANPR technology and data generated by these 
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systems do not raise any legislative concerns, as it complies with current legislation. Sharing 
of information gathered by ANPR systems is allowed within the police service if it is for the 
purpose of prevention and detection of crime, in the same way that other information and 
intelligence is utilised within policing. The storage of data is permitted but must be cognisant 
of the restrictions set by the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998, 
particularly the requirement to use and store data in a proportionate and non-excessive way. 
Each data owner is responsible for justifying the reasons for the storage of data. The police 
use of ANPR must also comply with the requirements of the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000 for covert ANPR operations or when ANPR is used directly against a 
specific target192. 
 
However, the review highlighted that the legislation was less clear with regards to the use of 
ANPR by agencies other than the police, particularly those not specified in the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, i.e. private organisations. To comply with the law, these organisations 
collect ANPR data in an anonymous format (so it is not regarded as personal data under the 
Data Protection Act 1998) however, the powers and reasons for collecting the data are 
unclear in many cases. The review concluded, therefore, that new legislation is required 
regarding the sharing of vehicle movement data between third party agencies and the police, 
particularly data that was not originally captured for policing purposes. These 
recommendations highlighted that, for ANPR to be effective in the detection and prevention 
of crime, an appropriate legislative framework should be secured both for the use of vehicle 
identification technologies such as ANPR and for the collection, use, analysis, storage and 
inter-agency sharing of ANPR generated data. In order to secure a statutory footing for the 
development of the national inter-agency ANPR infrastructure, the Home Office was 
expected to put new legislative proposals before the parliament. It is unknown at this stage 
whether these proposals have been enacted. 
 
For a summary of the perceived benefits and limitations of different ANPR systems, see 
Table 4.1 below. These are specific to each system, although some characteristics are likely 
to overlap. 
                                                 
192
 Otherwise ANPR systems are exempt from the requirements of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
2000.  
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Table 4.1 Perceived advantages and disadvantages of different types of ANPR systems 
 
ANPR System Advantages Disadvantages 
Fixed or stand-
alone ANPR 
Could be used 24/7 
More accurate reading 
Extended coverage 
Can be cost effective if modern 
technology is used such as wireless and 
partnerships are used to share the costs 
Very useful on arterial routes, ‘rat runs’* 
and motorways 
Limited to a fixed location 
Cannot follow crime trends/hot spots 
Expensive to move to another location – 
but, if sighted correctly, then there should 
be no need to move unless development in 
that area changes road layout or flow of 
traffic 
Expensive to maintain and repair 
Needs a clear strategy on deployment, 
response etc. 
ANPR linked to 
CCTV (Local 
Authority, 
private) 
Could be used 24/7 
Extended camera coverage, with limited 
additional costs 
Vehicle tracking 
Use of car parks, shopping centres and 
petrol stations 
Improved probability of getting 
photograph of the driver 
Urban environment, less specific to 
travelling criminality 
If no appropriate agreements in place, 
conflict of interest between local authority 
and policing objectives 
Inefficient positioning of cameras (too 
high, focused on pedestrian area etc) 
Lack of appropriate legislation 
Mobile ANPR 
(fitted cars, 
Spectrum van etc) 
As and when needed 
Can be deployed at specific locations 
Can be moved without cost to follow a 
hot spot or a problem in an area 
Response real time 
Provides officers the ability to identify a 
vehicle which has matched against a 
hotlist which they may not otherwise 
have stopped 
Can receive hits from the fixed ANPR 
cameras and respond in real time 
Prone to damage 
Less reliable at reading number plates 
Linked to cars which inherently break 
down, need servicing etc 
Reliant on officers on the ground to set up 
and monitor the system 
Disadvantages most likely to be down to 
operator error which could be overcome 
by the correct training and selection of 
officers 
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Table 4.1 (cont.) Perceived advantages and disadvantages of different types of ANPR systems 
 
Other 
ANPR 
Portable 
As and when needed (less frequent) 
Easy set up 
Any location 
Independent of vehicle 
Targeted/covert deployment 
Similar advantages to the mobile 
systems mentioned above 
Difficult to handle in vehicles, e.g. 
wiring of laptops 
Similar disadvantages as those 
mentioned for mobile ANPR (see above) 
Hand-held 
Early stages of implementation 
Ability to read number plates and 
associated intelligence without 
involving control rooms 
Do not necessarily have to be able to 
read but could just receive and have 
the ability to check vehicles against 
not only PNC, but ANPR hotlists 
Useful for surveillance officers to 
receive alerts 
Security issues regarding data retention 
and handling (not advisable to store data 
on them and any details of hits) 
‘More of a gimmick than a really 
reliable product for actual reading’ 
Nearly as quick to type in the numbers 
Helicopter 
Access to areas hard to reach by police 
officers or vehicles 
Very limited use 
Expensive and resource intensive 
Connectivity not always live with the 
data 
 
*’Rat runs’ is a term used by the police to describe offenders’ set ways of travelling to and from 
crime, back routes or escape routes they use. 
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4.3.2. Types of ‘ANPR crimes’ 
As indicated in Chapter One, ANPR systems read number plates and create an electronic log 
of vehicle movements with date, time and location. While the system is only able to read the 
plate, the software enables to cross-check the number plate against a variety of databases 
(otherwise known as ANPR hotlists) and automatically produce warnings for vehicles of 
interest (also known as ANPR hits). For future reference, the information produced by the 
ANPR software in combination with these databases – ‘data’ which is usually stored in the 
Back Office facility - is usually referred as ANPR intelligence. 
 
In order to establish the nature of incidents for which the police use ANPR, respondents were 
asked to identify the most common types of crimes or incidents generated through the use of 
ANPR within their force. Given that the Police National Computer is the most common 
database used in conjunction with ANPR, it is not surprising that the types of ANPR hits 
most frequently mentioned by officers are in relation to theft of motor vehicles. Next most 
common ANPR ‘hits’ generating police response are linked to vehicle documentation 
offences (e.g. no insurance, tax, MOT), drugs offences and driving whilst disqualified 
offences. Some forces indicate that they use ANPR for more targeted operations, for example 
to address gang crime or certain types of burglary in an area. The type of ANPR ‘crimes’ also 
depends on the type of area an individual force operates. If a policing area is low crime, then 
the arrests rates resulting from ANPR are much lower. Therefore, to make most out of the 
ANPR technology, some forces use ANPR more for traffic offences than crime. Other forces 
concentrate on crime types specific to their area: 
 
‘We have a vibrant night life in the area which attracts drug dealing. Drug dealing is 
changing and also becoming more violent and ANPR is useful to try to tackle that’ 
(Police officer, F9)  
 
However, there is a consensus amongst respondents that the use of ANPR does not narrow 
down to a particular crime, as it generates lots of opportunities and can cover anything from 
traffic offences to more serious crimes. The nature of the ANPR incidents, particularly theft 
of motor vehicles and documentation offences, reflects what ANPR was initially designed to 
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address, but also indicates that ANPR has changed focus and expanded its use, covering a 
wide range of crimes and police departments. 
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4.4. ANPR as an intercept tool 
As the ANPR technology is improving in terms of accuracy of reads and the types of cameras 
or platforms on which it can be used, the police’s range of capability is increasing as well. 
However, one of the main challenges for the police is to match these technological advances 
to current police practice in terms of its ability to use ANPR effectively and respond to 
ANPR ‘crimes’ or ‘hits’. The use of ANPR falls within two main types: ‘real time’ ANPR 
use, which generally supports the interception of vehicles whilst they are still being driven on 
the road, and ‘historical’ ANPR use, where ANPR data is gathered and analysed to assist 
with proactive and reactive criminal investigations. 
 
ANPR’s impact on response policing and real time intercept is a benefit frequently mentioned 
by respondents in the current study. This is mainly due to ANPR’s ability to process and 
identify large numbers of vehicles in a fast and automated way, which in turn, makes officers 
more effective in their stops. ANPR is perceived as another ‘pair of eyes’ that ‘never gets 
tired or distracted’, bringing to officers’ attention less obvious vehicles to stop and identify 
crimes that might otherwise have gone unnoticed. The following quote reflects typical views 
on this matter: 
 
‘... ANPR cameras are amazing […] You got a car you’re looking for, you put it on a hotlist, 
you load it and the ANPR system picks it up […] A tenth of the vehicles that pass you, you 
would go off and stop without the use of ANPR because they are more obvious; the other nine 
tenths you would not give a second glance to it and it is only the ANPR technology that picks 
them up.’ 
(Police Officer, F22) 
 
However, this is not to say that ANPR replaces officers’ judgement, rather it is an aid and 
addition to their existing skills: 
 
‘We don’t say that ANPR is a “be all” or an “end all” tool. It is a good reason to stop 
somebody. How you then deal with the people you stopped makes a difference to whether that 
is an arrest or not.’ 
(Police Officer, F23) 
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ANPR is seen as a useful response tool not only because it helps to ‘legitimise’ a stop, but 
also because it provides officers with additional knowledge about the vehicle they are about 
to stop, so they can risk assess the situation and make more informed decisions about what 
questions to ask and how to go about dealing with the suspect/s. The intercept of suspects on 
the road becomes more effective and less disruptive to the public. However, this is not as 
straightforward as it might seem. There are crucial limitations which affect the effectiveness 
and ‘smoothness’ of this process. As will be argued next, the relevance and accuracy of the 
information used in conjunction with ANPR systems enable officers to make the distinction 
between offenders and law abiding citizens and, ultimately, make an informed decision about 
their stop. 
 
4.4.1. Responding to ANPR ‘crimes’: an ongoing challenge 
Response to ANPR hits is currently a problem. Results from this study suggest that response 
to ANPR hits is not consistent across the twenty-eight forces participant in the research. 
Many officers in the interviews stated that the use of all available ANPR hotlists coupled 
with the extended fixed infrastructure generate too many ANPR hits193 which cannot be 
addressed in real time by intercept officers. Such an increase in demand requires significant 
changes to the response approach to ANPR hits. As a result, many forces appear to have 
filtered off certain types of hotlists (particularly the vehicle documentation offences hotlists 
which generate too many hits) and have prioritised the use of others, in line with operational 
objectives, resources available or the severity of crimes. Like with all crimes, the more 
serious the crime, the more resources and finance go into it and the more likely the response 
to it. This renders the response more effective, but it also means that, by targeting only 
serious crimes, there are missed opportunities of identifying other serious criminals who 
might not be linked to high priority databases, but to minor offences databases, such as those 
entailing information on uninsured and untaxed vehicles and no keeper. 
 
                                                 
193
 The number of ANPR hits has considerably increased after the expansion of the ANPR fixed infrastructure. 
For example the average monthly number of hits generated by fixed ANPR systems within the City of London 
Police increased from around 10,000 to over 50,000 after the delivery of additional fixed site cameras and the 
use of an increased number of hotlists (Home Office PSU, 2007). 
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A part from resources, a major problem closely linked to the effectiveness of the response to 
ANPR hits is the quality of the information placed on the ANPR hotlists194, in other words, 
‘ANPR intelligence’. There is a consensus amongst police officers that the quality of ANPR 
intelligence influences the extent to which a hit is actionable and effectively dealt with. The 
outcome is only as good as the intelligence that feeds the systems: ‘rubbish in, rubbish out’, 
officers argue. This appears to be an ongoing issue for all police forces in the UK, with 
officers highlighting a high percentage of the information on hotlists being inaccurate. In this 
instance, ‘inaccurate’ means either out of date or irrelevant information placed on the ANPR 
hotlists. 
 
The hotlists with most out of date ANPR information are believed to be those belonging to 
the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA), in particular the ‘no tax’ and ‘no keeper’ 
hotlists. Previous research (‘Laser’ studies) provides an indication of out of date ANPR 
information during the early ANPR trials, with 58% of hits inaccurate195. This means that, the 
information available on these databases at the time of the ANPR ‘hit’ was out of date, which 
of course means that the vehicle linked to it was no longer of interest to the police. Similar 
‘inaccuracies’ were identified with regards to the Police National Computer (PNC) and the 
Force Intelligence hotlists, with 21% and 16% inaccurate hits respectively. This is confirmed 
by research conducted by the Central Motorway Police Group (CMPG) indicating that 25% 
out of 292 PNC information markers identified by ANPR over a 10 hour period were 
inaccurate or irrelevant for ANPR intercept196. The quality of information placed on ANPR 
in-force hotlists is also questionable. This seems to have an impact on intercept officers’ trust 
in the system and motivation to work with ANPR technology: 
 
‘Some intelligence is very good but it does not necessarily mean is good ANPR intelligence. 
You need intelligence that you can act upon, react, something that you can built your decision 
on in an instant. Do I stop the vehicle? Do I arrest the person? Is it dangerous? Or is it just to 
make a note of the car being seen in the area? 
(Police Officer, F12) 
                                                 
194
 A detailed descriptions of ANPR ‘hotlists’ was provided in Chapter One of the Thesis. 
195
 Home Office PSU (2007). Despite the changes that DVLA have implemented in the last few years in order to 
address the accuracy of their hotlists, there is some indication that there are no significant improvements. The 
accuracy of these databases is still poor, with an average of 41% inaccurate hits. 
196
 Home Office PSU (2007). 
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Poor ANPR intelligence clearly has a negative impact on police practice and effectiveness. It 
results in wasted police resources and unnecessary risks for both the police and the general 
public, who may end up being stopped for no reason. Information collected on vehicles is 
constantly changing, as vehicles are sold or recovered or no longer used by criminals. Crime 
is changing. Therefore, some intelligence on vehicles or criminals linked to these vehicles 
will always be out of date. But this can be addressed by more frequent updates and regular 
weeding, improvements in data processing and appropriate research capability. Further 
research is needed to measure the nature and extent of the inaccuracies on ANPR hotlists and 
to identify best ways to improve the quality of intelligence placed on these hotlists. 
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4.5. ANPR as an investigative tool 
While the police use of ‘real time’ intercept operations and their effectiveness have been 
evidenced in the ‘Laser’ evaluations, there is a gap in research and knowledge about the 
potential role and use as an investigative policing tool. Many forces still view ANPR as a 
high profile intercept tool, but there is a consensus that its potential goes beyond this remit. 
The latest developments in ANPR infrastructure across the UK provide far-reaching scope for 
ANPR’s use in intelligence gathering and the investigation of serious crimes. 
 
The results presented in this section are based on interviews, self-completion questionnaires, 
focus groups and documentary analysis – methods which have been outlined at the beginning 
of this chapter and detailed elsewhere (Chapter Three). Some differences between the 
analysis based on data collected in 2006/2007 and data collected in 2009 have been noted.  
While the earlier surveys indicate very limited use of ANPR in post-incident investigations, 
results emerging from the 2009 survey highlight that there is currently wider use and 
recognition of ANPR’s potential to add to criminal investigations and help towards the 
detection of serious offenders. Gathering ANPR data for post-incident investigations is 
indicated as the second most common police action after response to hits in real time through 
intercept capability. The majority of survey respondents (70%) say that they use ANPR in 
post incident investigations on a daily basis. Four of the twenty forces indicated that they 
would use ANPR in crime investigations on a weekly basis and only two forces admitted to 
use ANPR monthly or occasionally. This shows that some progress has been made in this 
area compared to 2006/2007, when results from the first set of interviews indicated that the 
use of ANPR in crime investigations was very much ad-hoc and limited to a small number of 
officers with access to the system at the time. 
 
There is an indication that senior investigating officers’ awareness and use of ANPR have 
improved mainly as a result of a wider access to the Back Office Facility (BOF) and better 
access to knowledge about ANPR’s potential benefits in the investigation of serious crimes. 
There is evidence suggesting that more police officers have now access to BOF - hence to 
ANPR intelligence - although the extent to which they use it is not clear. There is a common 
belief amongst respondents that because intelligence and investigative officers have access to 
ANPR intelligence, they implicitly make use of it in both proactive and reactive 
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investigations. But it appears that this is not always the case. There is an indication that many 
forces have given their divisional intelligence units and crime investigation departments 
access to the ANPR information, but the extent to which these officers use it is still unknown. 
 
The dissemination of the Investigator’s Guide to ANPR197 and the updated Murder 
Investigation Manual (MIM)198 aimed to improve knowledge about ANPR’s potential to help 
with enquiries and investigations of serious crime, particularly amongst Senior Investigating 
Officers (SIOs), Crime Managers and Intelligence Managers within a police force. The 
Guidance stressed the need for investigators to understand how ANPR can be used to develop 
intelligence to support reactive and proactive investigations, improve police activity and 
ultimately prevent crime. The latest edition of the Murder Investigation Manual (2006) refers 
to ANPR as another source of investigative opportunities for SIOs. ANPR is included as a 
potential passive data generator and as a method to be used to identify witnesses or suspects. 
The guidance appears to have been successful in getting the message across, as research 
findings confirm that there has been some improvement in knowledge about ANPR and its 
potential and, as a result, senior investigating officers have started to consider using ANPR 
more on a regular basis: 
 
‘This is the biggest growth area that we have at the moment. We probably have 300 ANPR 
vehicle enquiries a week, calls for searches within our force and from all over the country. 
We use it a lot and had some very good successes.’ 
(Police Officer, F17) 
 
Officers’ level of awareness about ANPR’s investigative potential is also believed to have 
been influenced by the level of promotion of ANPR within a force. However, respondents 
mention their frustration when it comes to passing on the message about ANPR’s potential 
benefits within policing. Common practice is that officers who project manage ANPR at 
force level make presentations at relevant courses or before senior officers in order to raise 
awareness about ANPR. But this is not a structured or consistent approach to promote ANPR 
                                                 
197
 ACPO (2006a). 
198
 ACPO (2006b). 
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at all levels within a force, which ultimately has an impact on officers’ awareness about 
ANPR developments and updates. 
 
It appears that investigating officers are now more willing to use ANPR because of the wider 
coverage of ANPR fixed cameras and the improvements to the Back Office. Respondents 
argue that the Criminal Investigations Department’s (CID) interest in ANPR increased since 
the DVLA ‘White List’ facility has been made available. This is a list of all vehicles 
registered in the UK providing a vehicle classification, model type and colour, which is 
perceived to have unprecedented benefits in investigations in that enquiries for vehicles can 
be progressed without the need for a vehicle registration number, as was the case in the past. 
 
It appears that in those forces where the investigative side of ANPR has become a big area of 
development senior investigating officers adopt ANPR as an imperative line of enquiry in the 
same way as with CCTV, telephony and DNA. Nevertheless, officers indicate that the extent 
to which ANPR is used in an investigation is, after all, dependent on the amount of resources 
that senior investigative officers want to put into an investigation: 
 
‘… all we can get them [the investigation team] is a list of registration numbers, somebody 
then has to find out who the owners are, interview them or possible suspects and so on. And it 
is all hugely intensive work.’ 
(Police officer, F1) 
 
4.5.1. Opportunities provided by the use of ANPR in post incident investigations 
Post incident or reactive investigations typically start with the discovery of a crime and seek 
to bring the offender to justice by uncovering material that identifies suspects and provides 
sufficient evidence to enable a court to determine guilt199. In order to identify opportunities 
presented by ANPR in the investigation process, respondents were asked to give examples of 
criminal investigations where ANPR had an input. They highlighted numerous successful 
scenarios where ANPR was utilised to investigate serious crimes such as fatal traffic 
collisions, murder, kidnapping and terrorism. Given the confidentiality nature of some 
investigations, not all cases are disclosed here but they all fall within the remit of three main 
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analytical approaches used by officers to assist in reactive investigations involving a vehicle. 
These are post incident analysis, convoy analysis and vehicle pattern analysis. Along with 
other analytical techniques such as geographical profiling, location time analysis and 
sequential time analysis, these products have been designed to assist police officers in both 
proactive and reactive investigations. Some of these products are already available for 
searches at national level through the ANPR Data Centre and at force level via the Back 
Office Facility, others are in the process of being developed and tested by police forces in 
Britain. 
 
The potential of these analytical tools was highlighted in the Investigator’s Guide to ANPR: 
• Vehicle Pattern Analysis is presented as a useful tool to extract ANPR data on 
vehicles of interest, with particular emphasis on identifying patterns of movement; 
• Geographical Profiling offers the potential to identify general patterns of travel and 
specific locations or journeys of interest to the police by representing ANPR data on a 
map; 
• Location Time Analysis is designed to highlight inconsistencies in ANPR data so that 
‘ghost’ plates or rung and stolen vehicles could be identified; 
• Sequential Pattern Analysis facilitates the identification of behavioural patterns of a 
vehicle of interest and could flag up unusual changes in travelling patterns; 
• Post-incident Analysis facilitates the research of ANPR data between certain times 
and specific ANPR cameras to identify potential suspects or witnesses; 
• Convoy Analysis enables the identification of vehicle of interest travelling within 
defined time parameters of each other in the same area and direction, so there is the 
potential to identify additional suspects/accomplices or witnesses200.  
 
Results from the current research indicate that investigating officers typically search through 
ANPR data in order to identify vehicles within time parameters near to the location of an 
offence to narrow down potential suspects and witnesses (through post incident analysis). 
The same type of analysis is conducted in order to verify a suspect’s alibis and assist 
detectives in the interviewing process. It appears that, depending on the type and scope of the 
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investigation, investigating officers can use one or more types of analysis to assist in their 
queries, for example post incident analysis combined with convoy analysis and vehicle 
pattern analysis. Evidence emerging from the current study suggests that the use of ANPR 
intelligence in this way has contributed to the success of numerous serious crime 
investigations. One clear example is the investigation into the fatal shooting of a West 
Yorkshire Police Constable, Sharon Beshenivski. 
 
4.5.2. Operation Geneva 
Police Constable Sharon Beshenivski was shot dead when attending a robbery in Bradford 
Northern England in November 2005. Her colleague, Police Constable Teresa Milburn was 
also shot, but survived. Robbers escaped with little more than five thousand pounds. A long 
and comprehensive investigation followed, Operation Geneva, which resulted in six people 
receiving considerable jail terms. 
 
Operation Geneva is considered one of the most high profile police investigations in recent 
years. The operation comprised a dedicated team of detectives and support staff under the 
direction of a Detective Superintendent from West Yorkshire Police. As the senior 
investigating officer (SIO) for this operation, he was interviewed for the purpose of this study 
and expressed his views on the proceedings of the investigation. He indicated that the 
Operation Geneva team worked methodically and with determination to identify and convict 
all those involved in the incident. As part of the investigation process, thousands of hours of 
CCTV footage from around the country have been examined and re-examined as the full 
circumstances and the roles of those involved became clearer. Detectives have checked both 
council-owned and private CCTV from Leeds and Bradford. They have managed to track 
through CCTV three vehicles involved in the robbery, a silver Toyota 4x4, a black Mercedes 
SLK 200 and a Toyota Corolla which travelled in convoy from Leeds to Bradford on the day 
of the incident. The CCTV network was linked in to West Yorkshire Police’s ANPR system 
in Bradford City Centre (also known as the Big Fish201). Some weeks into the investigation, 
detectives became interested in a fourth car involved in the robbery, an Audi A6. They found 
that the Audi had been flagged on the Big Fish ANPR system five days before the robbery 
                                                 
201
 The Big Fish ANPR system in Bradford is linked to a series of fixed CCTV cameras within the city centre, 
aiming to capture details of every vehicle entering the City Centre. 
 124
and images of the vehicle were captured on CCTV. The police say that this car drove around 
the area where the robbery took place on a reconnaissance exercise. 
 
The SIO argues that the CCTV and ANPR played a major role in the presentation used by the 
prosecution in the trial. The images202 generated by the ANPR system were pivotal in 
identifying the suspect vehicles and the exact times they were driven to and from Bradford. 
However, the CCTV and ANPR work was only one aspect of the investigation and many 
other investigative opportunities have been completed to ensure the capture and collation of 
all potential evidence. ANPR and CCTV intelligence was used in conjunction with telephony 
intelligence and other forensic evidence gathered by West Yorkshire Police. Additional 
support from other forces has also been received, especially the Metropolitan Police Service, 
Heddlu Gwent Police, West Midlands Police and Leicestershire Police. Therefore, when 
asked about ANPR’s role within the investigation, the SIO from West Yorkshire Police 
argues: 
 
‘ANPR becomes powerful when combined with other investigative tools such as CCTV, 
mobile phones and forensics […] It is the combination of all methods used that made the 
investigation successful. That is why it is hard to assign importance to each element; they are 
all equally important!’ 
 
It appears that in the case of Operation Geneva the police have used vehicle pattern analysis 
and post-incident analysis to identify the cars involved in the incident, but also convoy 
analysis to identify other vehicles linked to suspects. The ability to identify vehicles 
associated with the main suspect vehicle and potential accomplices is perceived as one of the 
biggest advantages generated by analysis of ANPR intelligence. In this case, ANPR helped in 
identifying other suspect cars which otherwise might have not been discovered. These 
vehicles were used for recognition purposes, days before the crime took place, which proved 
that there was a conspiracy, a premeditated crime. In this way ANPR supported further 
evidence leading to new suspects, even months after the incident. ‘We had no idea that there 
was more than one car involved in this’, argue the leading detectives for Operation Geneva. 
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This intelligence proved to be crucial in the investigation process. Having located and seized 
the vehicles involved in the incident enabled the collection of additional forensic evidence 
which linked the vehicle to the suspects. 
 
4.5.3. ANPR’s input in other major crime investigations 
ANPR’s ability to quickly identify the movements of a suspect vehicle to enable the 
extraction of other evidence (e.g. DNA, fingerprints, CCTV) is perceived by many detectives 
as a substantial ANPR benefit. Time is crucial in an investigation, either proactive or post-
incident. The more time goes by, the less likely the chances to find the victim, prevent the 
crime or recover forensic/other evidence to link suspects to crimes and crime scenes. 
Respondents provided examples of investigations where ANPR proved to be good at quickly 
identifying suspect vehicles and track them down to enable the recovery of necessary 
additional evidence. Within Operation Geneva, detectives used the intelligence gathered from 
ANPR to inform a more comprehensive and specific search of CCTV.  
 
This is mirrored in Operation Olive, which was the investigation into the road death of a 
person in Essex. On this occasion, four ‘cruiser cars’ were seen racing together in the 
Southend area, which later resulted in the death of a person when a car crashed in Benfleet. A 
search of the ANPR Back Office was able to place three of the cars together when they 
entered and left Southend, with corresponding pictures of these vehicles. This gave accurate 
timelines to the investigation and showed other routes for consideration in the CCTV 
strategy. Similarly, the investigation into an armed robbery in Loughton, by checking ANPR, 
officers were able to not only identify a car involved in the robbery, but also link it travelling 
in convoy with another suspect vehicle. Pictures of both vehicles helped the investigating 
officers by giving timelines for CCTV coverage along the street where the robbery took 
place. In particular, one of the vehicles was seen a week earlier ‘scoping’ the route prior to 
the robbery. Suspects were arrested and charged. 
 
Another relevant example is Operation Orchard, which was a murder investigation in the 
City of London, where ANPR was used to identify two of the vehicles used by three of the 
suspects. This facilitated early seizure of these vehicles and the recovery of forensic evidence 
linking at least one of the suspects to both the victim and the crime scene. Long term use of 
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ANPR data was deployed throughout the enquiry to assist in keeping ‘tabs’ on the defendants 
whilst on bail, which proved especially useful when a sub-operation was opened involving 
witness intimidation. Six men were sentenced for a total of 23 years, including a life sentence 
for murder. 
 
As the passing of time is one the biggest disadvantages in an ongoing investigation, ANPR’s 
ability to ‘kick-start’ an investigation or offer new lines of enquiry is highly appreciated. 
There are examples of investigations where ANPR was not only used to identify suspects and 
witnesses, but also victims and to prevent further crimes from being committed. Such an 
example is the investigation into the disappearance of a young girl in London where ANPR 
(in conjunction with other technologies, i.e. telephony) has helped towards identifying the 
location where the girl was held and prevented a potential rape or murder which could have 
followed her abduction. Similarly, by using convoy analysis following the unsuccessful bomb 
attack on the Tiger Tiger night club in London, near the Picadilly Circus area, the police were 
able to identify the second, still outstanding Mercedes within the critical time period which 
allowed for the safe disposal of the second device at Hyde Park Corner NCP.  
 
‘… what ANPR does, it gives you a good start for your enquiry. It is giving us the clue as to 
what the “needle in the haystack” looks like to be able to start the search from somewhere. It 
makes the search less time consuming and more productive and focused […] In a murder 
enquiry it gives you a number of potential avenues you can follow.’ 
(Police Officer, F25) 
 
ANPR brings forward queries which would have not been possible before, search parameters 
that previously did not exist, such as the vehicle registration mark (VRM), otherwise known 
as number plate, or the make and model of a vehicle or the exact time and location of a 
vehicle. Detectives appreciate the ability to obtain the information about the time and location 
of a vehicle without relying on police officers, witnesses or chance. Their opinions on 
ANPR’s benefits in post-incident investigations are reflected in the following quotes: 
 
‘Before ANPR, we just did not have that data. This is extra evidence. Before you would have 
looked at different evidence, witnesses etc. ANPR is another tool that you can use to try to 
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narrow down the number of vehicles that you are interested in. This information was not 
available in the past…’ 
(Police Officer, F3) 
 
‘As a SIO [Senior Investigating Officer], if you had a suspect vehicle, you would ask for stop 
checks of that vehicle, see if it has been seen by anyone. And people get missed […] Now you 
have got this whole coverage of cameras which potentially may have recorded that 
registration/vehicle to a certain point in time. So for a SIO in a post incident investigation, 
trying to build a pattern of movement of a suspect, this is extremely helpful. So post-incident 
is superb, if the facilities are there.’ 
(Police Officer, F14) 
 
Detectives argue that by using ANPR intelligence, the investigation process shortens and as it 
is time saving, but it could also save money in an investigation. Because of its computerised 
and automatic nature, ANPR has the potential to make the investigation more efficient in 
terms of time and numbers, more cost effective: 
 
‘As far as post investigation goes, it is priceless. You just cannot calculate the benefits or how 
much money you save on resources […]Because even if it does not give you the result as 
such, it will give you come information, an area, somewhere else to look. It will always give 
you a little bit more. ’ 
(Police Officer, F2) 
 
Talking about ANPR’s role in a rape investigation, a senior police officer from West 
Yorkshire Police argues: 
 
‘In the first week we had ANPR in Bradford, we arrested a man within six hours of 
committing a rape on a women that he was a stranger to, so very little chance of physical 
identification. We had DNA, but there was no previous conviction. We would have been 
hunting him for weeks or months maybe. We found him within 6 hours because of ANPR. The 
victim said “he came down that street about 3pm and there was a black car”. That’s all we 
had. But within 10 minutes of research, we found the car, got the man, got the forensic 
evidence (e.g. victim’s clothing fibres on the car seat, seamen etc), everything. He got 15 
years for rape and we were happy that we took a rapist off the street and saved the taxpayers 
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of West Yorkshire money. Rape investigations costs can range from £20,000 to £50,000. That 
money could be spent for something else.’ 
 
ANPR’s advantages go beyond offenders and suspects. The identification of witnesses is a 
very important part in the criminal investigation process. Respondents provided numerous 
examples where ANPR was used to gather information on potential witnesses to serious 
incidents. ANPR is generally used to identify who would have driven past the scene within a 
certain time frame. Further research is usually undertaken to narrow down the sample of both 
suspects and witnesses. The above sections provided examples where ANPR evidence was 
crucial in identifying witnesses which proved essential in securing a conviction. 
 
ANPR is also appreciated as it can corroborate or negate existing evidence in an ongoing 
investigation, for example with regards to the movement of suspects, the time and location of 
sightings. Respondents indicate that there are cases where ANPR can back up information 
gathered by intelligence teams or it can bring out new or different information which could 
be crucial in an investigation. Examples provided by respondents point towards ANPR’s 
ability to provide helpful intelligence towards negating or checking an alibi. This is another 
advantage which is highly appreciated by police investigators, particularly detectives 
involved in the interviewing process. Examples are provided when ANPR provided evidence 
towards negating an alibi and having suspects confess their crimes: 
 
‘It breaks an alibi […] By being able to show that someone is lying it helps the interview; it 
gives you confidence and destroys theirs.’ 
(Police officer, F10) 
 
Operation Piper is a good example where ANPR was used in this way. Operation Piper 
concerned the brutal murder of Annie Garbutt, 74 years old, found in Mirfield, West 
Yorkshire, in May 2007. At Leeds Crown Court in May 2008, Joanne Hussey was found 
guilty of the murder of her grandmother, Annie Garbutt. When interviewed, Joanne said that 
at the time of the incident she was at home, sleeping. However, ANPR intelligence helped 
towards negating her alibi. Her car was picked up by ANPR on more than one occasion in 
relevant locations at relevant times, which linked her to the crime scene. Another example 
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highlighting this particular ANPR advantage is the investigation into the murder of Hannah 
Phillips, who was reported missing from Rayleigh, Essex on approximately April 12, 2007. 
On April 23, Hannah’s handbag was found on the beach at Jaywick, near Clacton, 60 miles 
away from her home. The assumption was that she committed suicide. As a direct result of 
intelligence provided by ANPR, officers of the Rayleigh major investigation team were able 
to link the suspects to the Clacton area at the time. They were able to prove that the 
granddaughter’s boyfriend had driven through that part of the coast in the small hours of the 
morning into town and out a half an hour later. This resulted in sufficient evidence to put to 
the suspects resulting in a confession of murder.  
 
Detectives argue that ANPR can be used in conjunction with other intelligence to ascertain 
movements of targets and vehicles. There are cases where ANPR was used to profile a 
suspect’s movement not only in reactive, but also proactive investigations. In proactive 
investigations, the analysis of spatial and temporal data provided by ANPR hits combined 
with existing intelligence enable investigating officers to make predictions regarding the 
likely whereabouts and lifestyle of suspects. ANPR appear to have been useful in offender 
profiling prior to an operation and there have been a number of significant examples where 
ANPR has assisted investigations whereby targets have been known to use the main arterial 
roads coming in and exiting a particular force area (for example as part of intelligence 
gathering for serious drug trafficking and series of robberies across regions). This approach is 
useful as it allows preparations and appropriate response to be mounted, resulting in positive 
outcomes in terms of arrests of serious offenders and an effective use of police resources. An 
example of this approach was an investigation into three linked armed robberies having taken 
place in three different locations in Kent. Investigators from Kent Police analysed the 
intelligence from the ANPR cameras in the vicinity of each of the robberies and discovered 
that of the 40,000 vehicles recorded overall only two were captured in the vicinity of all three 
robberies. Through further investigation, one of these vehicles was found to be directly 
involved in the crimes. 
 
Similarly, in post incident investigations, it appears that ANPR has the potential to help 
towards creating the geographical profiling of suspects. This is particularly relevant to 
multiple linked offences, where the examination of time and place is crucial in understanding 
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criminal behaviour. A relevant example is Operation Sumac, a 2006 investigation into the 
murder of five women working as prostitutes in the red light district of Ipswich, Suffolk. 
ANPR was used on this occasion in conjunction with CCTV footage to identify the suspect’s 
movements in and out of the red light district around the times relevant to the investigation. 
On this occasion, ANPR intercept teams were deployed to Suffolk following the murder of 
the five women, forming a ring around the area where it was believed the victims were 
picked up by a vehicle. This ring made it impossible to enter or exit the area in a vehicle 
without passing a static ANPR. This enabled the gathering of intelligence on vehicle 
movement in and around the area, information which was retrospectively checked to try and 
identify an offender or potential witnesses frequenting the area. 
 
Interviewed detectives confirm that these are the biggest opportunities offered by ANPR in 
the investigation of serious crime. They offered numerous examples of investigations where 
ANPR was recognised to have had an invaluable input. As one police officer stated, ‘ANPR is 
an investigative tool, once you’ve used it, you use it all the time.’ Another officer states ‘... 
there are so many examples that it becomes everyday practice for us.’ 
 
4.5.4. Perceived limitations to the effective use of ANPR in post-incident investigations 
Although the majority of those interviewed (85%) agree that ANPR is a great investigative 
tool, they also highlight some of the limitations relating to the use of ANPR in the crime 
investigation process. There is a consensus amongst detectives that ANPR, as any other 
investigative tool, if used on its own has limited value. Only when combined with other 
intelligence, ANPR can reach its potential. This is mainly because ANPR’s main limitation is 
its focus on number plates and vehicles rather than individuals. ANPR can typically identify 
and locate vehicles and link them to crime scenes, but more research and intelligence 
gathering is necessary in order to link a suspect to this vehicle, to get more weight in an 
interview and the overall investigation. 
 
The need to use ANPR intelligence in combination with other evidential sources is also 
related to the technological weaknesses of ANPR. Officers indicate that ANPR, as any 
technological evidence, is not 100% accurate. One can argue that, just because a vehicle has 
not been captured by an ANPR camera, it does not mean that the vehicle was not in a 
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particular location at a given time. As previously argued, ANPR reads could be influenced by 
poor lighting and weather conditions, obstructed vehicles and volume traffic, speed of 
vehicles, obstructed or tampered with number plates. 
 
One of the limitations mentioned by investigating officers relates to the mechanisms enabling 
links between police forces’ ANPR Back Offices and the lack of straightforward information 
sharing processes203. Speaking of cross-border investigations, detectives highlight their 
frustration of having to break down the investigation for each force area, a very time 
consuming process when limited time is available during an investigation, when there is 
pressure to deliver results. There is hope that the National ANPR Data Centre will facilitate 
cross-border investigations and searches beyond forces’ own area. Similarly, the limited 
access to ANPR data other than those of the police (e.g. Highways Agency, private sector) is 
seen as a missed opportunity and an impediment to the effective use of ANPR in an 
investigation. 
 
Other limitations have been identified in relation to the coverage and set up of ANPR 
cameras. Poor or inadequate coverage of cameras can definitely hinder an investigation. In 
Bradford, West Yorkshire, for example, the Big Fish ANPR system covers all vehicles 
coming into, but not leaving Bradford. As a result, detectives have to compensate by using 
CCTV for any vehicles of interest, which increase the investigation time. So the benefits 
initially gained by using ANPR are weighted down by these impediments – although senior 
investigating officers admit that there are cases where the usefulness of ANPR outweighs its 
limitations. 
 
There is a consensus amongst respondents from focus groups and interviews that an 
important factor that affects the extent to which investigators use ANPR is a poor 
understanding of ANPR technology and its capabilities. Without knowing what ANPR can do 
and cannot do, its advantages and limitations, detectives are more likely to use more 
established and familiar techniques in the investigation process. 
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Not only are officers largely unaware what ANPR can or cannot bring to their area of work, 
but there is also a mindset within roads policing that ANPR is an intercept tool rather than a 
‘crime’ tool. Unsurprisingly, because is seen more as a traffic policing tool, there is less 
interest from crime and intelligence departments. Some respondents believe that it is time to 
make a decision to move ANPR firmly away from the roads policing environment to the 
crime or intelligence business area: 
 
‘Roads policing have taken ANPR as far as they could with the resources and knowledge they 
have got […] Given all the limitations in terms of intelligence and resources, they have done 
a great job in securing all the arrests and disrupting criminals on the road. But to fully 
realise ANPR’s benefits in the future, the ownership has to be handed over to crime and 
intelligence […] It is a natural progression, it’s taking it to another level and hand it to the 
people who have the right resources and skills to take it to that level.’ 
(NPIA Representative, National ANPR Steering Group)  
 
Investigators and analysts appear to know little about ANPR in terms of how the data can be 
interrogated and used in more advanced investigations. Some senior investigating officers are 
confused about ANPR’s capabilities and recognise that they lack the basic knowledge that 
they need in order to use ANPR in an investigation. Gaps in the knowledge include: knowing 
the location of cameras and their specifications; how to access the Back Office and how to 
make most of the data; if the system supports 14/7 usage; if the ANPR data collected by 
organisations other than the police could be used in investigations; regulations on handling 
and presenting ANPR evidence etc. 
 
If detectives do not know what exactly ANPR can and cannot do, how can they judge 
whether it can be of use, how can they know what to ask of it? This lack of knowledge about 
ANPR’s capabilities and limitations appears to influence officers’ opinions about what they 
would like the system to provide them with. As there is little awareness, there is little interest 
and use. This links in with lack of training of officers from all relevant departments, not just 
traffic. The presentations provided by ANPR managers to intelligence development courses 
are useful but not sufficient to raise awareness of ANPR amongst police investigators. 
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Training needs to be more streamlined and applied to existing officers using ANPR 
technology or working with ANPR data, not just new recruits. 
 
4.5.5. The use of ANPR intelligence as evidence in prosecutions 
There is an indication that the use of ANPR intelligence as evidence in Court follows the 
national guidelines regarding disclosure and CCTV evidential procedures and regulations. 
ANPR evidence is typically presented as an image of a vehicle and therefore treated in the 
same way as CCTV evidence. The exhibit also includes the registration mark and the time 
and location of the picture. When using ANPR evidence in courts, forces appear to apply for 
PII, which stands for Public Interest Immunity. PII is a branch of the law of evidence dealing 
with claims arising from public interest grounds to exemption from the normal processes of 
disclosure204. This means that, when presenting ANPR evidence, the police generally do not 
disclose or disclose sensibly. This is reflected in the following quote: 
 
‘… if we submitted a file we would put on sensitive material and specify that ANPR was used 
and that we held information on that vehicle. That will then go to the CPS and we will apply 
for PII and we would say that it was a police tactic and it would frustrate the police’s efforts 
if that information was released to open court. The judge will then make a decision on how 
relevant that information was and he or she felt that it would frustrate counter terrorism and 
policing tactics, then he or she would apply PII ruling out disclosure in an open court.’ 
(Police Officer, F10) 
 
Respondents indicate that they had a lot of cases go through court but the ANPR evidence has 
not been challenged just yet. This is perceived as being an advantage, as ANPR has its flaws 
which could weaken the evidence. By providing a plate patch image one cannot a hundred 
percent say that the plate was on the car driven by that person, hence ANPR evidence will 
only be seen as supportive evidence and never be used as primary evidence in a case in court. 
However, as ANPR is developing and more cases use ANPR evidence, there is an 
expectation that defence solicitors and barristers will start challenging ANPR, not necessarily 
the evidence (e.g. the quality of the exhibit, the link between the suspect and the car etc), but 
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could be just the process of gathering that evidence (e.g. the signage of fixed and mobile 
ANPR cameras etc). The argument is that, if ANPR data is used for intelligence purposes, it 
does not have to be 100% accurate, because more research and analysis is done around it and 
other information is included in order to create the bigger picture. However, if the data is 
produced for evidential purposes, then the integrity has to be complete. Given the expansion 
of ANPR cameras and the Back Office search facility amongst all forces in the UK, it is 
important to make sure that forces use a consistent and strictly regulated approach in 
producing ANPR evidence. ‘If you want to use the evidence correctly, then you need all the 
checks being evidenced that they have been carried out on these systems, regardless if the 
checks produce positive or negative results’ argues a police officer (F24). 
 
There are national standards205 that have been developed in order to regulate the use of 
ANPR across forces and deal with some of the issues with ANPR as evidential. But the 
national lead for ANPR has his concerns: 
 
‘… the national standards clearly say that an ANPR camera must work to a nationally agreed 
time stamp/clock and must have its national positional coordinates stacked onto it, so any 
read from that camera must have a proper standard of time and location with it. Many of the 
cameras still don’t and those things have to be sorted. But again the systems and processes 
we are now bringing in will give us much greater ability to do that. Forces have the guidance 
on how to use it, but don’t necessarily follow the guidance, so then it becomes an issue of an 
auditing regime to make sure it is implemented and standards agreed.’ 
(ACPO Representative, National ANPR Steering Group) 
 
As argued above, the use of ANPR evidence in post-incident investigations is perceived to 
have its flaws, in particular with regards to ANPR’s ability to link a vehicle to an individual 
at a given place and time. ANPR can prove that a vehicle was at a certain location at a certain 
time and that is indisputable; it is photographic evidence and it is all digitally logged and 
stored. But one cannot prove who was driving that vehicle and that is disputable evidence. 
With live operations, when intercept vehicles respond to a hit, it is different; the vehicle is 
normally stopped with the person sitting in the driving seat behind the wheel, so there is 
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nothing to dispute. The officer can provide the evidence about who was driving the vehicle at 
the time. But in post-incident investigations, the situation changes, it is all in the past and the 
ANPR intelligence cannot be verified other than by checking available additional pictures of 
the vehicle at the relevant place and time. 
 
4.5.6. Good evidence vs. loss of privacy 
This brings up another emerging argument which is that ANPR good evidence is dependent 
on the quality of cameras and their ability to take clear pictures of occupants of the suspect 
vehicle. Many officers stated that the chances of identifying the driver and passengers of a 
vehicle are very small and there is a need to improve the quality of images captured by 
ANPR cameras or possibly increase the use of these cameras alongside Digital Video 
Recording (DVR). But this poses a dilemma between the effectiveness of ANPR as an 
evidential tool and ensuring people’s privacy when travelling in their vehicles. 
 
ANPR was designed to capture vehicles’ number plates, and from that perspective, the laws 
and guidelines regulating its use are appropriate, as number plates are publicly displaced and 
not considered private space. But if ANPR’s purpose changes or adapts and cameras are 
designed and used to identify people in vehicles or if used in conjunction with facial 
recognition software, then it raises important ethical issues which need to be addressed. 
Higher spec cameras and systems could be more effective but also more intrusive. Similarly, 
the extensive use and analysis of ANPR data in conjunction with other police intelligence (or 
information gathered from third party agencies) could raise issues around the infringement of 
civil liberties particularly of those individuals whose vehicles do not generate ANPR hits, 
hence are, for what we know, law abiding citizens. As will be argued next, using ANPR data 
in this way brings the potential to improve police effectiveness and prevent crime. There is, 
of course, the potential to solve undetected crime or identify unknown criminals, but there is 
also the potential to impact on innocent people’s privacy rights, so where do we need to draw 
the boundaries? 
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4.6. ANPR’s potential to generate strategic intelligence in crime investigations 
With the development of the National Intelligence Model (NIM), the police have started to 
look beyond reactive investigations and move towards targeting active criminals on the basis 
of intelligence. The National Intelligence Model (NIM) is an intelligence led business model 
utilised by police forces in the UK to gather and manage information in order to enhance 
police activity. The model requires that information is fully researched, developed and 
analysed to provide intelligence that helps drive the decision making process, guide 
investigations and influence deployments in the law enforcement effort. The ACPO ANPR 
Strategy for the Police Service206 advocates integrating ANPR into mainstream policing and 
fully embedding ANPR into the NIM by developing local, cross-border and national 
intelligence applications alongside other criminal intelligence analysis.  
 
Intelligence usually means making inferences from large amounts of data. As argued before, 
the data produced by ANPR systems can be used to inform intelligence processes, operational 
policing and investigations. Historical ANPR data can be searched to identify specific 
information necessary in a post-incident investigation, but it can also be analysed proactively 
to create the profile of a target (i.e. a suspect, related suspects or a criminal network) or the 
profile of a problem (crime patterns). The retrieval of ANPR data within predetermined 
search parameters is very useful for investigations – and the sections above highlighted some 
of the benefits arising from the use of ANPR in this way – but the data need to be further 
analysed to enable an intelligence-led approach and enhance police activity in all areas. 
Results emerging from this study indicate that ANPR’s potential to generate strategic 
intelligence does not match current police practice. 
 
Interestingly, 75% of the twenty police forces surveyed in 2009 pointed to the investigative 
potential of ANPR data as the main benefit of ANPR, particularly in terms of intelligence 
gathering and intelligence-led policing. Respondents seem to believe that by exploring ANPR 
data there is the potential for the police to: 
• Work ‘smarter’, so they could make more effective use of resources through targeted 
operations, proactive deployment and response to ANPR hits; 
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• Aid surveillance and intelligence gathering on strategic routes for counter-terrorism 
and serious crime or help towards early intervention on tackling threats; 
• Understand crime patterns and trends and enable offender profiling, which would help 
them to stay one step ahead of criminals and 
• Build the bigger picture of criminality, which would enhance effectiveness in all areas 
of policing. 
 
4.6.1. Missed opportunities 
The majority of respondents (75%) could see the benefits of using ANPR proactively, yet this 
is the area least developed. There is some evidence suggesting that forces have started to 
proactively analyse ANPR intelligence to support the production of NIM products (as part of 
the tactical tasking and coordination process), particularly to identify target vehicles and 
conduct more informed operations – in terms of the optimal location and time for intercepting 
these vehicles. However, despite all progress in this area, ANPR still appears to operate in 
isolation of the full intelligence picture. ANPR is typically not linked to in-force crime or 
intelligence systems, which makes the analysis and layering of data more difficult to achieve. 
To address this issue, some forces have purchased or developed analytical solutions to enable 
the integration of ANPR intelligence with other sources of intelligence for analysis – 
although the extent to which this type of approach could be currently replicated by other 
police forces is limited. 
 
There is also the issue around information sharing. This is likely to be due to a typical 
resistance to change within policing and reluctance to share information (between 
departments and divisions within a force or with other police forces). ANPR is about vehicles 
which are mobile; vehicles cross divisions, police forces; crime does. If relevant departments 
are not working together, then there are missed opportunities, particularly if patterns of crime 
are changing in the current climate of increased number of vehicles on the road and increased 
commuting distances. As argued in the literature review, there is a belief that offenders tend 
to travel short distances to commit their crimes (‘least effort principle’), although it appears 
that ANPR could challenge the existing evidence about travelling criminality. Back Office 
searches indicate that offenders appear to travel further and beyond force boundaries and 
further than previously believed. Are offenders more likely to be ‘commuters’ than 
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‘marauders’?207 Is criminal behaviour more organised and planned than we think? Are 
criminals travelling further to commit crimes and avoid detection? ANPR could be used to 
enrich our understanding of travelling patterns and criminal behaviour. 
 
ANPR provides useful information regarding the presence of a vehicle, both in time and 
space. At present ANPR is typically analysed in isolation of the full intelligence picture. The 
intelligence that could be provided by ANPR is not fully realised mainly due to the lack of 
integration within other core data capture systems such as crime, incident, warrants, 
intelligence data recording or partnership data. If these other legacy systems provide datasets 
that could be collated into a single data warehouse then where the number plate or details of a 
vehicle are captured, the links between disparate data sources can start to be fully examined. 
This data warehouse could provide a repository to facilitate both data collection and analysis, 
with the key benefit of having information in a single location as opposed to data recorded in 
unrelated and potentially incompatible formats throughout the organisation. With the data 
warehouse providing the mechanism to extract, transform and load data into a corporate 
standard, an over-arching search tool could then perform queries on various sources on 
information for use within further analytical products. With the ability to link a spatial 
occurrence from one dataset to another, the inclusion of ANPR data would provide a 
potential link between seemingly separate incidents.  For instance, an ANPR record may not 
trigger a ‘hit’ from the link to national systems, but bringing the data into a warehouse might 
reveal the vehicle was seen acting suspiciously near a spate of burglary dwellings (link to the 
crime data), or that the vehicle had been causing nuisance through inconsiderate parking 
(incident data) or even that a vehicle with a similar vehicle registration mark had been seen 
close to an operational address of interest to the counter terrorism unit (link to intelligence 
data). 
 
With the ANPR providing a record of a vehicle location, and with the other key datasets also 
recording the geographic location of crimes or other police and partnership data, the police 
analyst will have the ability to utilise a Geographical Information System (GIS) to start to 
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spatially analyse the relationship between different sources of information. The number plate 
becomes the unique key to unlock further information and to start to derive evaluated 
inferences to start to make either tactical or strategic decisions from the intelligence presented 
when linked to other key sources of police data. On a national level (as criminality is not 
limited by Police geographical boundaries) the information added to PNC is limited in its 
scope as it relies upon the individual police forces to ensure that the data is added manually 
and accurately. A more sustainable method of including information to PNC automatically 
via individual Police data warehouses, based upon the collation of intelligence gathered from 
the amalgamation of various data, would help spread the intelligent picture beyond the scope 
of the single police service. Thus a bigger intelligence picture could be developed, linking 
locations, activities, vehicles and people. Such a complex analysis could be used to estimate 
future movements of vehicles associated with criminality or could identify situational 
features common to problem areas and help design appropriate crime prevention techniques. 
A better understanding of crime and criminality would help towards developing and applying 
more appropriate enforcement or crime prevention strategies at local, regional and national 
level. 
 
But how feasible is such an approach? Results from the current study indicate that officers 
are aware of the need for more in depth analysis of ANPR data and information sharing, but a 
majority (70%) highlight the impediments to such an approach. They argue that there is still a 
common belief that ANPR is an individual tool, mainly related to traffic and operational 
support. This means that the analysis tends to be left to one person, generally from 
operational support. Although there is the will to do it, the road policing department does not 
usually have the appropriate intelligence capability and resources. Conversely, there is poor 
commitment and little buy in from both the intelligence department and divisions. 
 
There is usually a limited number of dedicated analysts for ANPR intelligence, which is not 
surprising, given the call and need for resources within each policing area. Not all forces have 
succeeded to secure research and analyst capabilities for ANPR. Hence ANPR intelligence 
tends to be ‘second-handed’ and ignored. The ANPR intelligence is usually dealt with by 
analysts and intelligence unit staff who have access to the ANPR data through the Back 
Office facility (BOF). But, as argued before, access does not necessarily imply that they 
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actually utilise the BOF or use ANPR data proactively. Statistical analysis of these searches 
indicates that a very small number of ANPR users that have access to the Back Office 
account for the majority of searches related to ANPR. Force analysts have other 
responsibilities and ANPR is not seen as a priority. When ANPR is on the analysts’ or 
detectives’ agenda, it is likely to be used for searches on target vehicles, rather than 
conducting more in depth analysis looking for trends, patterns or relationships between data. 
Their lack of time coupled with a limited awareness and knowledge about how to exploit 
ANPR data limits the extent to which ANPR data is analysed in this way. The police are 
talking about plans to analyse the ANPR data extensively, integrate it with other existing 
intelligence, although there are currently few forces that can provide examples showing 
success in doing this.  
 
The intelligence limitations are also exacerbated by a perceived lack of flexibility around IT 
issues which incurs massive ongoing revenue costs for ANPR and limits its capability to link 
ANPR data with existing in-force crime and intelligence systems and analytical packages.  A 
comprehensive intelligence led approach to policing would be ideal, where all intelligence, 
including ANPR intelligence, would be carefully analysed in order to identify common 
patterns, enable inferences and an understanding of the bigger picture of crime and 
criminality at local level, potentially at a regional and national level. This is one of the 
missing links within intelligence led policing nowadays. As one of the officers argued, ‘The 
biggest impediment to ANPR is our lack of imagination’. 
 
However, establishing such links is expensive and resource-intensive. It will take resources 
and time to the put the right mechanisms and infrastructures in place to enable such extensive 
analysis and the transformation of all crime and disorder information available into valuable 
intelligence which would eventually lead to more informed police operations and effective 
crime prevention strategies. Crime is sophisticated and ANPR is just another tool providing 
extra information. Analysts have to do all the work to establish links, track back through data, 
so they need time. There are obviously resource implications. It will need dedication from 
senior police officers and belief from those working with ANPR technology and ANPR data.  
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There is an indication that the effectiveness of ANPR as an investigative tool is highly 
dependent on the mind set of police officers using it. There is a need for a cultural change; a 
change in the way data is submitted on systems; a change in the way police conduct their 
investigations and the need to move from reactive to proactive deployment; a change in the 
way data is analysed to produce valuable intelligence. 
 
‘… We just started using ANPR that way. But we are fighting against the established ways of 
operating – detectives and their check lists and how to go about in their investigations. 
You’re talking about effectively fitting into tasking where it hasn’t been done before. I 
wouldn’t say it is meeting resistance because people think it’s rubbish; it’s just that it’s not 
the way that we go about our business. It’s about cultural changes. It’s about people thinking 
that this is the right thing to use.’ 
(Police Officer, F5) 
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4.7. Other factors impeding the effectiveness of ANPR as a policing tool 
A part from ANPR’s role and input in crime investigations and intelligence development, 
respondents’ views were sought on a variety of issues to assess whether they felt that ANPR 
was a benefit to policing in general and to explore the reasons behind their judgement. 
Overall, respondents expressed their desire to be able to use ANPR more effectively and 
pointed out that, in practice ANPR is not exploited to its full potential and will not be unless 
some of its most significant limitations are addressed. 
 
The biggest impediments to ANPR in general were believed to be closely linked to the 
management, practice and culture of the police. These cluster around following themes: 
• ANPR, a low priority 
• Lack of knowledge and performance management 
• Resistance to change 
• ANPR, the victim of its own success? 
• Unreliable registration system 
• Political issues: the government, the police and the citizen 
 
4.7.1. ANPR, a low priority 
Much of the criticism expressed by police officers and staff related to their belief that ANPR 
is not seen as a priority at force level, or at least not given the same priority as other policing 
tools. Whilst there is evidence that some forces have improved and managed to incorporate 
ANPR into mainstream policing, most did not accord ANPR the same priority level as other 
policing tools and have problems securing the appropriate funding for ANPR. The majority 
(85%) of those speaking on behalf of the twenty police forces participating in the 2009 
survey mentioned the lack of appropriate resources as the first biggest impediment to the 
effective use of ANPR - resources to enable the inputting and cleaning of intelligence used in 
conjunction with ANPR systems, the effective monitoring and response to ANPR hits in real 
time and the proactive work and investigative use of ANPR data. This is confirmed by results 
from interviews and focus groups. There are too few people doing too many things and this is 
believed to be one of the main reasons why ANPR is not entirely effective. 
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Thus ANPR appears to struggle to compete with other force priorities for funding. Chief 
Officers and divisional commanders are, not surprisingly, sceptical about prioritising ANPR 
over other initiatives and investing their local budgets for ANPR without clear evidence of its 
effectiveness. Lack of support at senior level obviously has an impact on the amount of 
funding dedicated to ANPR at force level. Funding is typically restricted, particularly revenue 
funding towards maintaining, using and enhancing ANPR. 
 
It appears that one of the reasons for lack of support from the management team and local 
commanders is the belief that ANPR is a resource intensive tool. ANPR is indeed expensive 
to buy, run and use effectively. As previously indicated, ANPR has the potential to be time 
and resource saving, but only if appropriate resources are dedicated to it in the first place. 
Hence in order to save, there is a need to invest, but the investment needs to come first. 
Officers using the technology on a regular basis believe it is worth the expenditure because 
they can see the ANPR benefits, but without a valid cost analysis and proof of outcomes, 
senior management and local commanders remain unconvinced about ANPR’s value and less 
likely to support significant investment towards it. But as with any crime prevention strategy, 
ANPR cannot ‘work’ without the appropriate time, people and money invested in it. 
 
The problem here lies in the implementation processes and development of ANPR both at 
force and national level. As argued at the beginning of this chapter, ANPR was one of those 
crime prevention tools that were ‘forced’ by the government upon police forces around the 
country, being praised for its effectiveness within policing. The government provided all 
forces with ANPR technology but no guidance regarding the best ways to develop it and 
make the most out of it. Police forces have embraced the technology with much enthusiasm, 
but wrongly assumed that, once the technology in place, there was no need for further 
investment or commitment. Once the initial ‘craze’ about ANPR passed, it appears that the 
belief in it diminished, particularly at senior officer level. The police realised that ANPR 
brought with it significant revenue or running costs, which ‘slowed down’ its development 
and overall effectiveness and with it senior officers’ enthusiasm to support the technology 
and invest in it. Even some of those officers working with ANPR on the ground have ceased 
to believe in its potential to deliver, after many unsuccessful attempts to gain support from 
management, to make things ‘work’. Lack of support could also be the result of the fact that 
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ANPR was labelled as a ‘motor offence’ policing tool, a ‘traffic’ tool. Lower rank officers 
complain about the lack of support from middle/upper management. 
 
‘If you just leave it on an ad-hoc basis with the wrong officers and if you don’t invest in the 
intelligence side, it will just go to waste. The only time it might come back to light is if we 
have a terrorist offence down in London and they will check all cameras and ANPR will be 
great again for 2 minutes […] ANPR won’t be used to its potential unless you’ve got senior 
officers who understand it, who put time and investment in it, officers on the street using it 
and in the back offices doing intelligence work…’ 
(Police Officer, F27) 
 
Lack of commitment to ANPR from senior officers and the implicit lack of funding have a 
direct impact on the quality and use of ANPR intelligence and the ability to respond to ANPR 
hits. The importance of having good quality intelligence inputted onto the ANPR systems has 
been previously highlighted. There was consensus that poor or irrelevant intelligence hinders 
ANPR’s effectiveness in terms of operational response to hits and police stops. It appears 
that, because of the lack of direction from senior management, officers working with the 
technology on the ground submit intelligence on suspects but not necessarily their vehicles, 
missing an important possible link between criminals, vehicles and crimes. 
 
Police officers on the beat and neighbourhood policing officers have an advantaged position 
to collect vehicle intelligence through their routine and consistent engagement with the local 
community. Previous research has indicated that neighbourhood officers can make a valuable 
contribution towards enhancing community intelligence208. With their knowledge-based 
expertise about the location of suspects, associates and their vehicles, neighbourhood policing 
officers could provide valuable situational intelligence for ANPR. The information they 
provide on vehicles and people linked to these vehicles could corroborate or even contradict 
existing intelligence. The lack of knowledge on situational details and context (which could 
be provided by experienced officers performing response and community policing tasks) and 
the lack of information sharing between relevant departments hinders the effectiveness of 
ANPR and policing in general. Previous research has argued that the unsystematic ways in 
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which the police access and make use of intelligence data could have an impact on the 
effectiveness of policing at ground level: 
 
‘… as the internal division of policing labour becomes increasingly complex and organised 
around a multiplicity of specialist roles, the problem that arises is how potentially relevant 
situational intelligence is communicated across and between specialist units who are focused 
upon particular problems. It appears probable that a “horizontal entropy” will occur to 
undermine the operational effectiveness of such arrangements by constraining the “richness” 
of intelligence that is shared. In effect, certain parts of the organizational system will know 
certain key things, but other components that need to know these same things, will not. As a 
result, we will see an increasing number of problems for the police, where intelligence was 
present in their systems, but not available in a timely fashion to officers who needed it to 
inform their operational interventions “on the ground”.’ 
(Roberts and Innes, 2009: 353) 
 
Low prioritisation has a direct impact on the operational side of ANPR. Not all cameras are 
monitored, thus response to hits is limited. While the number of cameras has increased, the 
intercept capability has typically stayed the same in most forces. Some senior officers argue 
that this is because ANPR is no longer about the interception of hits, but the intelligence 
gathering and the investigative use of data. However, this does not reflect practice. There is a 
general feeling that there is lots of intelligence gathering for no specific reason and that 
something should be done with the data, either by responding to it in real time or using it 
proactively in investigations. There is no clear direction on how this transition should be 
managed; what resources should be committed to response or intelligence; what are the exact 
objectives of gathering the ANPR data and what are the expected outcomes. It appears that 
there is still an ad hoc approach at force level, with no coordinated response to ANPR. There 
is a sense of uncertainty about whose responsibility it is to pick up a hit and deal with it. 
ANPR is entirely at the discretion of each divisional commander who chooses to use it as 
they like. Some would not even consider using ANPR, as they believe it generates more work 
and puts a strain on available resources. Others use it on and off to make up numbers and 
targets. In other words, there is an inconsistent approach to response to hits across police 
forces. Some forces appear to have developed a very effective intercept capability responding 
to hits generated by both mobile and fixed ANPR systems, while others have devolved their 
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ANPR teams and stopped any response to hits altogether, just storing the data on the Back 
Office. 
 
4.7.2. Lack of knowledge, performance management and evaluation 
Lack of commitment from officers, rank and file, goes hand in hand with the level of 
knowledge and understanding of ANPR. As previously indicated, there is limited awareness 
of ANPR at all levels (rank and file) and branches of the police service. This is more apparent 
amongst detectives and analysts who appear to know little in terms of how the data can be 
interrogated and used in investigations and intelligence development. Without the appropriate 
knowledge about ANPR, both in terms of its potential and its effectiveness, there is no 
motivation and drive to prioritise or use ANPR. Knowledge about ANPR’s effectiveness is an 
additional motivational factor, both for senior management and for those officers working 
with the technology on the ground (operational) or in an analytical environment. 
 
Many police officers argue that people would believe in ANPR more if ‘it proved itself’ and 
there would be more support from divisional commanders and chief police officers. But there 
is no benefit assessment of ANPR at force level. There is a common belief that policing 
outcomes generated by the use of ANPR combined with intercept capability are still greater 
than traditional policing on the street. ANPR’s input on the number of arrests and offences 
brought to justice is the most frequent example provided by interviewed officers – and this 
was evidenced by the ‘Laser’ evaluations. Other examples relate to the recovery of 
substantial assets and the removal of unworthy vehicles from the road. The problem, 
however, is that the police do not typically performance manage ANPR or if they do, they do 
not cover all areas of policing. The police tend to come up with statistics regarding the 
number of ANPR reads, hits, stops and arrests, but generally only with regards to the mobile 
systems and the use of dedicated ANPR teams. Results from the twenty police forces 
participating in the 2009 survey indicate that the fixed systems are not currently performance 
managed. 
 
However, measuring ANPR’s benefits in all areas of policing is not a straightforward 
process. Not only there are no mechanisms in place to do it, but it is hard to single out 
ANPR’s specific benefits, as ANPR is typically used in conjunction with other policing tools, 
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both in operational/response policing situations and in crime investigations and intelligence 
development. Respondents indicate that they are still exploring ways to measure ANPR 
outcomes. Some highlight that it is a difficult thing to actually monitor ANPR’s effectiveness 
because, generally, somebody who might have been arrested as a result of ANPR activation, 
a lot of time they are actually charged with a different offence. Trying to track these 
offenders through is not an easy process, they argue. 
 
Measuring ANPR’s input in crime investigations and intelligence development is difficult, if 
not impossible at this stage. For example, ANPR’s input in the investigation into the murder 
of PC Sharon Beshenivsky. How was that measured? There is an effect of ANPR on crime 
and behaviour, because ultimately offenders were arrested and sentenced to prison, but it is 
an indirect effect; it provides just one form of intelligence or evidence among many others in 
the wider investigation. In an operational setting, it is easy when you stop a car and you arrest 
somebody to measure the performance, but measuring intelligence is not a straightforward 
process. One officer (F2) argues: ‘As far as post investigation goes it is priceless. You just 
cannot calculate how much money you save on resources…’ Another indicates: 
 
‘The first problem that we need to overcome is the actual collection of the figures. It is very 
difficult to collect ANPR “results”. The problem is that ANPR is not a stand-alone tool any 
more than fingerprints, DNA etc stand alone. It can push you in the right direction, it can give 
you the introduction in a crime investigation and a good starting point in an interview, but it 
is never used on its own, it’s not a stand-alone tool.’ 
(Police Officer, F25) 
 
Furthermore, no rigorous cost benefit analysis has been undertaken at force level, therefore 
beliefs about ANPR’s cost effectiveness are merely based on officers’ views and experience 
of ANPR. Interviewed police officers indicated that they believed the benefits of ANPR to 
outweigh its cost, both in terms of operational policing and crime investigations. One police 
officer (F6) used an interesting analogy, stating that ANPR ‘takes road policing from the 
hunter gatherer system into the industrial age in a trice’. However, the lack of valid evidence 
regarding the cost effectiveness of ANPR has led other respondents to appear sceptical about 
its worth: 
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‘I don’t believe that ANPR is cost effective at the moment. We have a lot of equipment that we 
are not responding to. To make it cost effective we need the research and response capability. 
And then we will start to see benefit for what we are doing.’ 
(Police Officer, F1) 
 
Finally, there is no assessment of ANPR’s impact on crime. Respondents perceived ANPR as 
a potential deterrent to crime and a good way to disrupt criminal activity. Where the 
deployment of ANPR is highly visible and is targeting an area, it is believed to have a 
‘knock-on’ effect on crime levels. These claims are supported to some extent by statistical 
reports provided by force analysts showing that crime levels have reduced after ANPR 
operations in an area targeting specific crime and disorder problems: 
 
 
‘We have numerous examples of dedicated operations we ran for a few days in an area and 
found out that there was an impact on crime in the surrounding area, not just because of 
stops, but because people became aware that there was a police operation in the area. They 
tend to have an impact on criminal behaviour in the vicinity. When we did the post crime 
analysis after the operation, what surprised us was for the time we were doing the operation, 
half a mile/a mile around the area we disrupted criminal activity to almost a halt; when we 
left they actually rushed to catch up on their crimes.’ 
(Police Officer, F14) 
 
When the resulting benefits from such ANPR operations are widely publicised it is believed 
they serve to increase public confidence and deter the offender from committing crimes in 
areas where there is visible ANPR deployment and police presence. Respondents believe that, 
because ANPR cannot ‘discriminate’ or ‘cherry-pick’, the public are likely to be reassured 
that the police are targeting and stopping offenders rather than law abiding citizens. 
 
But no formal evaluation yet exists assessing the benefits delivered by the ANPR systems 
following the completion of each implementation project amongst forces in the UK. The 
Home Office collected statistics regarding ANPR’s contribution to arrests and offences 
brought to justice in order to inform the ‘Laser’ evaluations, but this is no longer the case, as 
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the evaluations have come to an end in 2006. This decision was welcomed by most officers 
working with ANPR on the ground, as it has reduced the need to complete lengthy forms, but 
it also left at gap in gathering information about ANPR’s benefits or failures and ultimately 
assessing its worth. 
 
4.7.3. Resistance to change 
An indirect impediment to ANPR’s effectiveness is the typical organisational resistance to 
change within policing. As argued above, there is resistance from local commanders to 
embrace ANPR, as ANPR is perceived as too resource intensive and involves changing ways 
police operate to address new crimes and more crimes. To a certain extent, this is 
understandable, as the police are still driven by Home Office targets, priority policing areas 
and various initiatives and police commanders are under pressure to meet them. If ANPR is 
not seen as contributing to this, then commanders will not consider it as a priority. The 
National ANPR Coordinator (NPIA) states in this regard: 
 
‘… you can understand it, when there are only limited resources, that they [the police] won’t 
start embracing something new, which from the outset, is actually quite resource intensive: 
you need police officers to be there and react to ANPR to get the results back. And many 
times, Chief Officers have said to me “What would you like me to stop doing to enable me to 
start doing ANPR?” Well, they do not realise yet that the business benefits of ANPR are 
significant. But you won’t realise the business benefits unless you actually put the resources 
there in the first place […] I can understand why some commanders are more reluctant than 
others. It is a result of the fact that, firstly, they are probably not aware as fully as they ought 
to be and, secondly, they are not being coerced by the HMIC and the Home Office in using 
the technology more effectively. That is my view.’ 
 
As for the lower ranks, although many officers are keen to use the technology regardless of 
its limitations, there are others who are simply reluctant to learn and work with new 
technologies such as ANPR, preferring to use more traditional ways of policing. Some 
respondents highlight that people who have more years in the job or who have come to an 
end of their service have their mind set against it, as they think they know their job and they 
do not need a computer to tell them how to do it. It appears that ANPR highlighted a group of 
individuals who are ‘technophobic’ and would do anything to avoid using ANPR. This is 
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why it is important for the system to be user friendly and ‘bobby proof’, so police officers 
embrace it more easily. There is also resistance from IT to change existing infrastructures to 
enable new avenues for analysis, coupled with resistance from crime and intelligence 
departments which are reluctant to take risks and unexplored avenues: 
 
‘The real barriers to ANPR are not the technology or the costs, as ever it is culture! It’s 
whether people choose to use it, to believe in it, whether they see the opportunities, whether 
they know how to use it. It is not perfect, but it can do a lot more than people are currently 
using it for. And it will be able to do a lot more in the future.’ 
(ACPO Representative, ANPR National Steering Group) 
 
4.7.4. The victim of its own success? 
An important question raised by the development of ANPR within policing is whether ANPR 
has brought about any undesirable or unexpected consequences which impacted on police 
practice. Many officers interviewed felt that ANPR is the victim of its own success. The more 
effective ANPR is, the more crimes are identified, the more work is generated. Firstly, this 
puts a strain on resources, already stretched to maximum, challenging existing police 
practice. Secondly, it impacts on officers’ attitudes towards ANPR and their commitment to 
use the technology effectively: 
 
‘The use of ANPR involves additional man hours processing arrests and completing checks 
via radio/operators, custody sergeants etc. Frequently these practical necessities are 
overlooked in the processing of individuals arrested or reported and massive queues develop. 
We are the authors of our own downfall through over efficiency.’ 
(Police Officer, F27) 
 
‘The sergeants in custody are very busy anyway and there are more people brought in from 
ANPR stops. It increases the number of detained people coming into custody. And I think 
there is resistance there because they are busy anyway and they just think that there is too 
much work. Some senior officers will say they don’t want any more cameras on their BCU 
because it generates more work. This is where there is a negative side to it.’ 
(Police Officer, F4) 
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ANPR can also have a negative impact on officers’ understanding of their responsibility and 
input in ensuring effective police practice. Many respondents highlight that with ANPR, there 
is an expectation that it can do everything. There is an argument that ANPR can make people 
lazy, as some officers tend to rely too much on the technology and not make use of their other 
policing skills. ‘ANPR can be regarded as the panacea for all ills, which is unrealistic. It 
needs to be regarded as a tool, not a cure’, argues a police officer (F6). Officers need to 
understand that all ANPR does is identify to a police officer a vehicle of interest and this is 
where it stops. Given the poor intelligence used in conjunction with ANPR and technical 
limitations to the system, it is then down to the officer on the ground to decide whether the 
ANPR hit is worth investigating and use their questioning and policing skills to develop that 
into an effective result. One officer highlights the importance of having experienced and 
skilled officers working with ANPR technology: 
 
‘ANPR is like a fishing rod, it allows you to catch your bait, it gives you something, you catch 
it and then you start interrogating it. After that your policing skill are kicking in. When you 
pick your team, you need the officers who know how to “dig” and go that extra mile looking 
into the suspect. And if you don’t have that sort of officer, you don’t get the results just from 
the ANPR hit. So whilst I do not think ANPR itself actually brings bad practice, the only thing 
I could say is that, if an officer becomes too reliant on it they are not going to perform.’ 
(Police Officer, F27) 
 
Some officers, however, were more positive regarding the extra work generated by ANPR: 
 
‘… even if it is more work, it’s fine. Because it is our business to stop criminals, that’s what 
we are about after all. But we also have to respond to the public’s needs, if there is a 
domestic incident, a lost child, a car accident, we also have to respond to that. It has given us 
more work, but also the ability to know more about criminals, information that we did not 
have before and can be extremely useful in linking incidents with crime trends and getting 
more clever about the way we operate and prevent more crimes.’ 
(Police Officer, F8) 
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4.7.5. Counter-measures 
In addition to the challenges presented by the police, ANPR’s effectiveness is obstructed by 
measures taken by offenders to avoid detection. This is in line with the theoretical 
assumptions presented in the literature review, e.g. the rational choice theory. Respondents 
indicate that there appears to be an increased offender awareness of ANPR which is believed 
to have generated some forms of offender adaptation and displacement and the development 
of counter-measures, such as changing or stealing number plates,  using other means of 
transport (e.g. trains, motorbikes, hire vehicles) or avoiding roads which are believed to be 
covered by ANPR cameras. 
 
Police officers indicate that there is anecdotal evidence pointing towards a sharp increase in 
hire cars being used for some serious criminal offences. They speak of change of policing 
tactics to keep up with these criminals, for example, getting involved with hire companies to 
detect them and provide examples where the partnership was successful and good results 
have been produced, arresting and sentencing serious criminals. 
 
‘The more serious the criminals – the career criminals – the more conscious of ANPR. These 
criminals never use their own car, never stole a car, they go “safe” and rent a car just to do 
their crime for one day and change. We didn’t see this 10 years ago for example […] While 
there is nothing wrong with that car, as it will always have insurance, tax and everything that 
ANPR could eventually detect and flag up […] There are always going to be ways to tamper 
with number plates or change them, to borrow somebody else’s car and dealing with it, 
having a pool car that’s having 5 or 6 people that use the same car. The thing that we know is 
that they will always use a vehicle. […] they will always try to find ways to beat us, but we 
are working towards countering their counter measures.’ 
(Police Officer, F2) 
 
4.7.6. Unreliable registration system 
It was previously argued that a major impediment attached to ANPR is the fact that the 
system identifies vehicle number plates or vehicles rather than individuals. This limitation is 
exacerbated by a poor vehicle registration system which impacts on the reliability of vehicle 
registration marks as well. Motor vehicles are usually identified by a number plate displaying 
a vehicle registration mark (VRM) at the front and rear of the vehicle. All number plates must 
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meet the Road Vehicles (Display of Regulation Marks) Regulations 2001 and the current 
British Standards209. The police say that analysis of the Back Office ANPR data indicates that 
around 12% of VRMs are misread by ANPR cameras. Police officers believe that one of the 
reasons behind these misreads is that some motorists are using non-compliant VRMs with 
modified characters or fonts for aesthetic reasons or, as argued above, they tamper with the 
plates in order to avoid fines or detection from the police. VRMs as they stand are viewed as 
too vulnerable to traffic or weather conditions and, most importantly, to criminals who alter 
the number plates to avoid capture. This is believed to impact on the effectiveness of ANPR 
to read a number plate and correctly identify the vehicle displaying the number plate. 
 
Officers indicate that there is a need for more research and development to improve the 
identification of vehicles through number plates in conjunction with other technologies. 
Respondents mentioned the development of tamper proof number plates, so when you try to 
remove the number plate from the vehicle, it shatters into pieces, and so cannot be reused. It 
appears that DVLA has approved these tamper proof number plates, but they are not 
mandatory, which further frustrates the police. A member of the National ANPR Steering 
Group argues: 
 
‘… it would be very easy to say all new vehicles from the first of January must have these 
number plates fitted and all other cars must have their number plates by a certain date and it 
will be tested by the MOT to see if they are there. So literally, within 3 years, you’ll have 
every single vehicle with a tamper proof number plate. And the cost is not great. Normal 
plates are about £15, these would cost £20. Even the Motor Insurance Bureau would be 
happy to make some concessions on the motor insurance if people did it, so the cost would be 
neutral.’ 
 
Other respondents mention a trial conducted by the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 
(DVLA) which aimed to improve the accuracy of reads by using ANPR technology in 
conjunction with EVI (Electronic Vehicle Identification) technology210. The trial produced a 
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 Between April and June 2006 DVLA conducted a trial of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) for cars and 
motorcycles in order to determine if RFID used in conjunction with ANPR could be cost effective to detect 
stolen or cloned vehicles, Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) evasion and vehicles involved in crime. There is an 
European working group trying to develop EVI (e.g. chipped number plates, chipped windscreens or chips fitted 
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very high read rate of over 98% and indicated that EVI was one solution which could be used 
to overcome problems associated with ANPR such as damaged, dirty or misrepresented 
plates or poor weather conditions and visibility. Although the use of EVI (either separately 
installed to the vehicle or to the number plate) has shown to enhance the effectiveness and 
accuracy of number plate recognition systems, a number of drawbacks were identified. For 
example, fitting the electronic tag to vehicles would require primary legislation and 
significant extra costs, while the security of the tag would be questionable. However, the 
mandatory fitting of tags to number plates would involve mandatory use of theft resistant 
number plates, development of theft resistant number plates for motorcycles and significant 
costs estimated at around £3.5 billion per annum. Unsurprisingly, the scheme was scrapped 
and number plates went back to where they started. 
 
Respondents were very frustrated at this outcome, as they believe it is worth investing in theft 
or tamper proof number plates. Long term this would not only enhance the police use of 
ANPR and its effectiveness in detecting criminals, but could also increase the chances of 
identifying drivers evading tax, speeding fines etc and implicitly increasing revenue for the 
DVLA. Many respondents indicate that ANPR is only as good as the registration system for 
vehicles in the UK. The following quote reflects a poor and inefficient registration system: 
 
‘… in London there is about 48% conviction rate for speed cameras or 48 per cent effective 
process rate for the speed camera notifications and that is great against the 20 something per 
cent clear up rate. But that means that over half of drivers for some reason can evade 
detection and that is because their vehicles are not registered properly, they nicked somebody 
else’s number plate or the vehicle is sold on … there are all sorts of reasons why we might 
not be getting a hit and of course criminals are always trying to find ways of evading 
detection. We are not sure if it is already specific to ANPR, but in terms of speed cameras, 
they are doing all sorts of things to evade them, like putting reflective coatings on their 
number plates etc.’ 
(Police Officer, F5) 
                                                                                                                                                        
in the vehicle’s electronic control unit). They are working towards having Pan European agreement on this, so 
these chips could be built in manufactured vehicles. But being Pan-European is very difficult to get everybody 
to agree, particularly if not all car manufacturers agree with the proposal. Germany decided to go against the 
agreement and, because they are such big car manufacturers in Europe, it was decided that the gap would be too 
big to continue with the proposal. 
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Other respondents expressed their concerns and frustration regarding the security of the 
manufacturer regulation supply of number plates. DVLA have a register of number plate 
suppliers and they have the responsibility to make sure the number plates are made to a 
certain standard. But there are around 40,000 suppliers and not all comply with all 
regulations, for example they will produce number plates that do not reflect in the dark. The 
police argue that it is hard to identify how big the problem is. They carried out some policing 
operations with fifteen forces involved, but the results were inconclusive, so they could not 
produce the evidence for the Department for Transport (DfT) to say that this is not fit for 
purpose. Unless the number of suppliers is reduced and better regulated, then it is going to be 
hard for the police to work effectively. Respondents believe that if tamper proof number 
plates were made mandatory and the number of suppliers were reduced to no more than five 
or six, policing would become easier and more efficient.  
 
It is believed that the more successful ANPR becomes, the greater the problem of non-
compliance is likely to be. The national ANPR leaders cite an example of collaborative work 
with the DVLA with regards to personalised number plates and express their frustration 
regarding the feedback from DVLA: 
 
‘… we [the police] have agreed with the DVLA that when police officers find a number plate 
which is not right, they will complete this form, photograph it and get the owner of the vehicle 
and the police officer sign it and send it to DVLA to count as a first warning. And the next 
time, they should revoke the number plate. I think in the last 8 or 9 months we submitted to 
DVLA 6 to 7,000 forms and they have revoked 2 number plates. We actually told them that at 
this rate it is not worth the effort.’ 
(NPIA Representative, National ANPR Steering Group)  
 
More support from the DVLA and the DfT appears to be a must in order to improve the 
registration system in the UK. A better registration system, coupled with more advanced 
ANPR technology is more likely to increase ANPR’s accuracy which is crucial to identify the 
offenders and protect the law-abiding citizens. 
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4.7.7. Political issues: the government, the police and the citizen 
Other issues identified as limiting the effectiveness of ANPR are less specific to local 
policing and more about the way ANPR is overseen and driven at national level, particularly 
with regards to the Home Office’s role and regulations and controls regarding the use of 
ANPR in the UK. The legal status of ANPR surveillance in the UK and any concerns about 
human rights and privacy issues which the use of these cameras raises are relevant issues 
here. 
 
Firstly, respondents share their frustration regarding the ability of governmental departments 
to share information and to find the right balance between a lawful and efficient approach to 
using ANPR: 
 
‘I think there are major issues within the government departments not actually agreeing with 
each other. The Home Office brought in this system which they put substantial money into it 
and … credit to them for that. But then you’ve got Department for Transport (DfT) that are 
being awkward about the Highways cameras being plugged into the system. You’ve got 
Transport for London (TfL) being awkward about the congestion charge and ANPR being 
plugged into the system. You’ve got Data Protection and regulations stopping people sharing 
data and you’ve got commercial data (petrol forecourts for example) being stopped from 
being brought into the thing [ANPR system]. It’s a hassle. […] There are different legal 
systems, England and Scotland for example which create a problem regarding data sharing 
[…] So there are lots of political issues.’ 
(Police Officer, F3) 
 
While grateful for the government’s initial investment in ANPR, respondents criticised the 
lack of consistency in supporting ANPR over the years. The police would prefer the Home 
Office to have a more active role that they had to date and produce an ANPR Strategy. 
 
‘The Home Office had been an intermittent partner in this. On occasions, they have promoted 
ANPR quite actively, on others they haven’t. Funding has been good at times, not so good at 
others. It doesn’t seem to be a clear long term strategy from the Home Office. It very much 
changes from year to year. […]  I can see no great problem with the police service leading 
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the operational side of ANPR and NPIA the delivery side; there just needs to be more 
coherent and consistent government policy to support us.’ 
(ACPO Representative, National ANPR Steering Group) 
 
Members of the national ANPR leading team believe that the HMIC have not been as 
supportive as they should have been. As the government spent in total around £40m on 
ANPR in the last few years, there was an expectation that the inspectorates would take the 
responsibility to make sure that this investment was actually being used properly by the 
police service. The ANPR leaders are frustrated that the HMIC has not fully engaged with or 
endorsed ANPR. The lack of a clear government agenda for ANPR, coupled with little 
‘enforcement’ from the HMIC and the Home Office to use the technology more effectively 
and limited knowledge about ANPR and its potential could explain why some police 
commanders are reluctant to develop and use ANPR within their force. 
 
As with any form of ‘mass surveillance’, ANPR is also limited by its potential to infringe 
people’s privacy and, without the right legal framework in place, to undermine police 
investigations and prosecutions. There are issues around the legal status of ANPR and 
concerns about the legitimacy and proportionality of its use by the police. However, as with 
most surveillance technologies, ANPR has been developed and implemented faster than the 
legislation regulating and controlling its use. There are aspects that are still vague in 
particular with regards to the purpose of collecting information on entire driving populations 
or ways to notify the public of being under ANPR surveillance. The Surveillance 
Commissioner211 has warned that ANPR could be operating illegally, as the boundary 
between overt and covert ANPR is still unclear and, as a result, ANPR cameras could be 
categorised as covert surveillance under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
(RIPA). He argued that the questionable legal status of the covert cameras could impact on 
prosecutions and could have an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings. The 
commissioners advised that new legislation may be required to provide a framework for the 
latest ANPR developments. Similarly, the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) is 
examining a complaint by Privacy International over the retention period of ANPR data, who 
described it as ‘unnecessary and disproportionate’. While the police argue that the retention 
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 Office of Surveillance Commissioners (2006, 2007). 
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of data has ‘intelligence gathering’ value and is useful for national security, the ICO argues 
that the prolonged retention of ANPR data needs to be clearly justified based on continuing 
value not on the ‘mere chance it may come in useful’212. Finding the right balance between 
privacy and security is the key to ensuring that ANPR is effective in protecting both the 
safety and the freedom of citizens. 
 
The police confirm that some of the criticism surrounding ANPR is indeed sensible, although 
they argue that the way the English Law works can be contradictory: 
 
‘… maybe it is our fault, as we haven’t been very clever ourselves in relation to the police use 
of ANPR. When you site a camera, have you really thought what user specification for that 
camera would be? Because we go and put a camera up for speeding, next to a camera up for 
a red light, a camera up for congestion charging. Highways Authority have put one up for 
congestion in order to work out at the traffic light phasing. We will put our one up for ANPR, 
the Local Authority will put one up because they have a responsibility under Crime and 
Disorder Strategy and then local businesses will put loads of cameras up around their 
building because they don’t trust us to do the job for them and quite rightly so. I mean you 
look round you and it is absolutely stunning, so the Surveillance Commissioner has got a 
point maybe we ought to be working harder at this duality of purpose. I mean if you’re 
looking at the motorway system you have the Highways cameras, don’t put a CCTV camera 
next to ANPR, link your highway camera to the ANPR! There is no “joined-up-ness”! We put 
rules that stop passing information to each other, what’s that all about? And then we all 
interpret the law in different ways.’ 
(Police Officer, F5) 
 
When asked their opinion about the formal and informal controls regarding the use of ANPR 
in the UK, the ANPR leaders at national level are confident that, although there are concerns 
that need to be addressed, ANPR is subject to controls and regulations and complies with the 
Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA), the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
(Human Rights Act 1998) and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). 
They argue that they have undertaken work to provide national guidelines on how to interpret 
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basis of data protection breaches, while the Surveillance Commissioner deals with issues of criminality and 
RIPA. 
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the law and to ensure that forces around the country comply with these guidelines. But 
officers appear frustrated by the Information Commissioner or Surveillance Commissioner’s 
Offices as they tend to criticise police practice but offer little guidance on what is expected to 
be right. There is a difference between what a regulation says and the interpretation of what it 
means. Without clear guidance from the Commissioners’ Office, the police have a difficult 
time to ‘legalise’ the use of ANPR. In light of this, they state: 
 
‘… we’ve issued those types of interpretation of what we think the Data Protection principles 
mean, but that doesn’t mean we are right and until the Information Commissioner makes a 
ruling either in favour or to the contrary because somebody has contested it or it ends up in 
Court, it remains a matter of interpretation. That is how the English Law works […] But the 
Information Commissioner has actually not issued any guidance. One of the frustrations we 
do have both with the Surveillance Commissioner and the Information Commissioner is that 
they will criticise, but they won’t issues interpretations. They will tell us they think we’re 
wrong, but they won’t tell us what they think it’s right. And that is actually quite difficult to 
work with.’ 
(ACPO Representative, National ANPR Steering Group) 
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4.8. An obsolete technology? 
Respondents to the interviews were also asked their opinions about ANPR’s role within 
policing in the coming years and their thoughts about ANPR’s worth or place in light of new 
technological developments. 
 
In terms of technological advancements, it is commonly believed that, as long as vehicles are 
marked by number plates, ANPR technology will not become obsolete. There is, however, a 
consensus that the most likely move forward is the use of electronic vehicle identification 
(EVI) chips, either in combination with ANPR technology or on its own right – in a more 
distant future, as vehicles might move away from number plates for recognition purposes. 
This means that rather than having an infrared camera reading a plate, there will be a 
proximity reader, an EVI pole on the side of the road which will read the chip in the car, 
compare it with the ANPR read of the number plate and the camera which will take an 
overview picture of the car and its occupants. In this case, the actual identification of the 
vehicle will be done by the EVI GPS technology. However, respondents consider that, given 
the massive number of vehicles on the UK roads (estimated by DVLA at around 33.4 
million), at least for another decade ANPR will work alongside rather than be replaced by 
new technologies. As one respondent (F22) states: ‘… realistically, EVI tagging is going to 
happen with new cars and it’s going to take a good 10 to 15 years to get through the system.’ 
 
The electronic recognition is a developing technology, but as with most crime prevention 
technologies, there are flaws and impediments which the police, the technology providers and 
the car manufacturers are trying to address. It was argued above that the electronic tagging 
has been previously tested in combination with number plates but, due to its limitations, was 
withdrawn at the time. Number plates can be easily removed, so counter-measures are likely 
to render electronic number plates inefficient. Knowing how criminals operate, adapt and 
develop technologies to counteract the counter-measures, the police and manufacturers have a 
difficult task to stay a step ahead. Technologies advance, so do criminals. ‘The minute we 
upgrade what we do, there will be some development on how to get round it’, argues a police 
officer (F22). 
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4.9. What next? 
In terms of the police use of ANPR in the next few years, respondents believed that the 
national ANPR focus is going to move away from intercept teams and response more towards 
intelligence gathering and post-incident investigations. This appears to be due to current 
interests in national security and counter-terrorism and the disparity between the increasing 
number of cameras and available resources to respond to ANPR hits. The national objective 
is to have a strategic road network to be able to track suspects and develop intelligence for 
the investigation of serious crime and terrorism, to monitor cross border criminality and to 
promote sharing of intelligence between forces. Once the national ANPR centre is fully 
functional, the police expect they will become more effective at linking ANPR information 
between forces and be able to track vehicles linked to crimes more effectively around the 
country, which is perceived as a bonus for investigative purposes and intelligence 
development for national security. 
 
There is hope amongst the ANPR leaders at national level that the Assisted Implementation 
Programme supported by NPIA will help police forces around the country to bring ANPR 
into mainstream policing. They consider that the most important development in the ANPR 
world in the last couple of years has been bringing the NPIA on board and having them 
committed to allocate mainstream resources to ANPR. An interview with one of the ANPR 
leaders (July 2008) reveals that ACPO were pleased to pass on some of the work to NPIA: 
 
‘We’ve come so far, we cannot go much further without a big agency supporting us. Hence in 
the next two to three years will see more growth than we’ve seen before. I am quite optimistic 
about this and overall I think we have achieved two thirds of what we’ve set out to do and we 
can achieve the rest in the next few years. Equally I am not deluded enough to think it is 
perfect. It is a work in progress and will be for some time to come and will continue to 
change.’ 
(ACPO Representative, National ANPR Steering Group) 
 
The national ANPR picture is expected to change once the national ANPR centre delivers a 
national capability. With the NADC fully operational and an increase in the analytical use of 
ANPR, the ANPR leaders believe that the issue of inconsistent government support will be 
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addressed. Once the value of the national product has been proven (as opposed to the local, 
isolated product), there is hope that it would be easier to win mainstream government 
support. It is also expected that, as the infrastructure becomes more complete and effective, 
more government agencies such as the Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), HM 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and Security Services will start to buy into the use of ANPR, 
which would see ANPR as more of a national rather than a police asset. 
 
The private sector appears to be the unknown development. Police officers working with the 
technology call for a partnership with the private sector, in order to enhance detection and 
police activity. National ANPR leaders would like to see more involvement from the private 
sector, but they are sceptical whether that will be the case or not. They argue that there is 
work undertaken in this area, to identify mutual benefits and find the most appropriate ways 
to share and use this data213. But at the moment the link with the private sector is quite 
limited. They use ANPR independently of government agencies and there is little join-up, 
mainly because it is still unclear what would be the benefits for the private sector. The police 
are fully aware of the benefits emerging from ANPR use in garage forecourts and 
supermarkets, two places most people (including criminals) go to: 
 
‘Every vehicle has to go to a garage forecourt, so they might not pass one of our cameras on 
the route, but at some point they will stop at a garage forecourt for petrol. Here they will get 
out of the car, so there is more of a chance to have a CCTV picture of the driver as well […] 
potentially credit card details and transactions. So particularly for dealing with reactive 
investigations, the private sector could give us far more information than we collect from a 
road side camera.’ 
(ACPO Representative, National ANPR Steering Group) 
 
Similarly, there is still uncertainty about the size of the strategic camera network in the UK, 
as the police have been unable to share ANPR data with the Highways Agency. It appears 
that there are a lot of ANPR cameras out on the major road network that do not provide data 
to the police, which creates duplication of work and unnecessary expenditure which could be 
used to enhance the use of the system and its effectiveness as a crime prevention tool: 
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 163
 
‘Progress [in sharing data with the Highways Agency] for all sorts of political reasons has 
been very slow and I am not even sure whether that position is going to change or not. The 
alternative is we end up building a network alongside the Highways Agency network, but it is 
a huge waste of public money […] Unfortunately that might be the route we have to take 
because of the politics.’ 
(ACPO Representative, National ANPR Steering Group) 
 
This is likely to have a negative impact on future ANPR developments at national level and 
on public reassurance as there would be some doubt over the cost benefits of ANPR. The 
public’s support for the government’s use of such surveillance technologies would be further 
undermined if ANPR changed focus from crime prevention to revenue collection. To justify 
the extensive investments in the technology, the government might decide to use ANPR for 
revenue under the umbrella of taxation, ‘traffic management’ or ‘green’ policies.  
 
This was an issue raised by officers at force level. Respondents feared that ANPR might be 
used for the ‘wrong’ reasons, for example congestion charging schemes, like the one in 
London. The police think the government will be interested in using the infrastructure to 
change the road taxation system, to make drivers pay for what they drive, rather than for a 
fixed road tax. Vehicles will eventually be chipped so they can be tracked on the road. If the 
government decides to change the way the road taxes are used, then they would use the data 
collected by the ANPR cameras to estimate how far people are travelling on the road and 
make people pay accordingly. 
 
‘What I hope they don’t do is ANPR being used for congestion charging outside London, as it 
will bring the whole ANPR system into disrepute. It’s not what ANPR cameras are about – 
they are there to target criminals, not to tax the public for road tolls!’ 
(Police Officer, F22) 
 
‘Unfortunately in the future it might start to get used for road tolling […] They already have 
VOSA looking at using it this way, to charge heavy goods vehicles between certain locations. 
I think that could be the future, toll charging.’ 
(Police Officer, F12) 
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The police point to another potential scenario, where all the speed cameras around the UK 
would be fitted with ANPR systems for speed enforcement. There is consensus amongst 
respondents that this would not be an appropriate development, particularly as the public 
have mixed views regarding the use of speed cameras214. Overall, the police can see the 
potential benefits from using ANPR in conjunction with tolling or speed enforcement only 
from the point of view of securing and sustaining the cost of the infrastructure, but they tend 
to disagree with the use of ANPR for such purposes, arguing that ANPR should stay within 
the crime enforcement arena. 
 
It is strongly believed that using ANPR beyond its crime remit would de-motivate officers 
working with the technology on the ground and alienate the public. With ever changing 
purposes, multiple sites developed, vehicles fitted with tracking/identification devices and the 
system linked to speed cameras, ANPR has the real potential to become Big Brother of the 
roads. So what would the public make of such a scenario? The following chapter aims to 
answer some of these questions, by exploring the public’s view regarding the police use of 
ANPR technology. 
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 There is an extensive debate around the use of speed cameras and their effectiveness, which is beyond the 
scope of the current thesis. It should be noted here that previous research indicates that the public support the 
use of speed cameras (see for example the evaluation conducted by the DfT in 2005), but they are also reticent 
about the duality of purpose, revenue vs. road safety. 
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4.10. Recommendations 
This chapter has highlighted perceived benefits and limitations to ANPR, both in terms of its 
effectiveness as policing tool and wider socio-political implications of ANPR surveillance. 
The purpose of identifying impediments to the effective and efficient use of ANPR was not to 
dismiss ANPR as a potentially successful crime prevention strategy, but to draw attention to 
its weaknesses in order to try to address them. The thesis proposed to identify these 
limitations in order to provide suggestions for improving current practice and inform future 
policies with regards to ANPR. 
 
Therefore, as well as being asked about their knowledge and views regarding ANPR’s 
potential, its benefits and limitations, participants in this study were also encouraged to think 
of best ways to improve the police use of ANPR technology. Their comments were analysed 
and ten main recommendations emerged. These recommendations are closely linked to the 
limitations highlighted within this chapter and generally relate to how ANPR can be 
improved through: 
• A well coordinated and more accountable approach at national and force level; 
• Mainstreamed funding and training; 
• Greater awareness and knowledge about ANPR technology and its potential; 
• Evidence of (cost) effectiveness and  
• Shared responsibilities and stronger partnerships at force level. 
 
4.10.1. Mainstreaming ANPR within policing 
ANPR’s effectiveness appears to be closely related to the way ANPR is incorporated in 
governmental plans and crime prevention strategies. It is believed that more commitment 
from the Home Office and a long term strategy for ANPR would provide more direction to 
police forces and partners, and more accountability to ensure that the ANPR strategy is 
delivered. The police think that this would encourage senior officers to embrace ANPR as a 
mainstream policing tool and would translate into forces’ policing strategy and priorities. 
 
At a local level, the police believe that a key to the effectiveness of ANPR is linking it with 
strategic objectives at force and Basic Command Unit (BCU) or Crime and Disorder 
Partnership (CDRP) level. As such, ANPR would be incorporated within tactical/operational 
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systems and processes of daily policing by linking the Force ANPR Strategy to the Force 
Policing Strategy. This chapter indicated that ANPR typically falls under priorities linked to 
Roads Policing. However, as ANPR’s remit goes beyond roads policing, this should be 
mirrored in other aspects of policing like intelligence and investigation, where understanding 
and use is under-developed. In light of this, it is believed that the ANPR Force Strategy 
should clearly define how ANPR can address the strategic aims and objectives at force and 
divisional/district level and the contribution of ANPR to delivering specific targets included 
in the Annual Police Authority Policing Plan (PAPP) and Local Area Agreement Plan 
(LAAP) should be more explicitly stated. 
 
There is a belief that, once mainstreamed into planning, ANPR will be mainstreamed into 
budgeting. There is evidence that inconsistent and/or insufficient levels of funding for ANPR 
is one of the main impediments to its effectiveness. In light of this, there is a need to make 
more explicit within the budget planning processes of police forces on what are present and 
future intended investments in ANPR. The funding should include costs for equipment and 
people specifically dedicated to ANPR (necessary for monitoring and response, investigative 
use of ANPR data and intelligence development) as well as ‘opportunity’ costs (e.g. specific 
operations). 
 
4.10.2. Measuring ANPR’s effectiveness 
This chapter argued that ANPR is not routinely and effectively performance managed at force 
level. It appears that police officers at senior level are less likely to commit to ANPR without 
having evidence about its benefits and impact on policing objectives within the force. It is 
believed that producing evidence of ANPR’s worth would not only improve senior officers’ 
commitment to ANPR, but would also enhance the motivation of officers working with the 
technology on the ground to use it appropriately. 
 
Therefore ANPR’s development and use should be subject to performance management and 
evaluation. An effective performance management process for ANPR at force level should be 
developed. There is a need to assess the cost effectiveness of individual ANPR initiatives, as 
well as ANPR’s benefits in addressing policing targets. Where limitations and ineffective 
processes are identified, a gap analysis would be beneficial. These ‘active’/ongoing 
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performance management processes would assist current and future strategic and 
tactical/operational decisions with regards to ANPR and would aim to improve its 
effectiveness during its implementation, rather than retrospectively, once it was found to be 
ineffective. 
 
At national level, it is argued that the government should evaluate ANPR’s use by police 
forces (and partners) through HMIC reviews and Home Office and independent academic 
evaluations. These would assess whether ANPR is a cost-effective policing tool and whether 
forces comply with formal and informal controls regulating ANPR. 
 
4.10.3. Improving knowledge and understanding of ANPR 
The results presented in this chapter indicate that there is very limited knowledge of ANPR 
amongst police officers and staff at all levels. This has an impact on officers’ perceptions of 
ANPR and the way they use it at a strategic and operational level, and on their belief in and 
commitment to ANPR. The lack of knowledge covers three main areas. Firstly, with ANPR 
being a new and advanced technology, there is limited knowledge about how it works and 
how to use it, being perceived more of a ‘techie’ policing tool used by specialist departments 
within the police. Secondly, there is limited awareness and understanding of ANPR’s 
capability (what it can do) and potential benefits in all areas of policing (how to get the most 
out of it), in particular in intelligence development and investigations. Thirdly, as argued 
above, there is a lack of knowledge regarding ANPR’s impact on policing and cost 
effectiveness. 
 
Therefore it is believed that ANPR would benefit from more efficient marketing and 
mainstreamed training. Respondents believe that there is a clear need for awareness raising 
and benefits realisation of ANPR. At force level, publicity about ANPR should be improved, 
with regular messages about its use, the existing infrastructure and latest developments, 
ANPR’s potential and benefits both in terms of policing outcomes and cost-efficiency. 
Stronger and consistent marketing coupled with basic training at force level should aim to 
raise general awareness amongst officers about ANPR. This should target student officers 
and detectives, as well as relevant existing officers and staff within the force. Officers think 
that at national level, ANPR should be integrated within intelligence, crime and operational 
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training and NPIA should consider including ANPR within the relevant accredited 
professional development courses they provide215. 
 
4.10.4. Improving ANPR intelligence (‘hotlists’) 
Results indicate that vehicle intelligence is generally poor. This has been shown to have an 
impact at all policing levels, both in terms of operational effectiveness and officers’ belief in 
ANPR. It is argued that, at national level, Police National Computer (PNC) representatives 
should work with ANPR stakeholders to develop more effective and efficient ways to deal 
with the data quality issues. There is a belief that the quality of intelligence would improve if 
the HMIC, NPIA and ACPO provided guidance on minimum standards with regards to the 
ANPR hotlists. 
 
At force level, vehicle related intelligence should be dealt with through a business and quality 
control system through which the quality of information on ANPR hotlists would be 
systematically monitored and reviewed. Any identified inaccurate information should be 
further analysed to identify main types of errors and possible reasons behind them. For 
improvement purposes, the results should feedback to those inputting and providing the 
intelligence on the ANPR hotlists (including the PNC). It is believed that the quality of 
ANPR intelligence could be improved not only by improving accuracy, but also by 
developing more time efficient recording processes, for example developing more 
automated/computerised ways of recording the information (through Back Office interface, 
Blackberry devices etc) which would not only free the time of officers on the ground, but 
would create automatic links to the force intelligence system. 
 
Results presented in this chapter indicate that many officers submit intelligence but very few 
flag up vehicles linked to criminals, missing an important link between criminals, vehicles 
and crimes. Hence it is argued that the intelligence on suspects should be linked to that on 
vehicles they use and all vehicle related intelligence should be placed on PNC. This chapter 
has shown that neighbourhood policing officers could have a valuable input regarding ANPR 
                                                 
215
 For example this is where senior police officers could be made aware of how to use ANPR for policing of 
sporting events like football matches and how to incorporate ANPR to monitor risk supporters etc. 
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intelligence. Therefore, there is a need for ANPR intelligence to be linked into tasking 
Neighbourhood Policing Teams. 
 
4.10.5. Improving the investigative use of ANPR intelligence 
Results in the current study suggest that ANPR’s potential to generate strategic intelligence 
does not match current police practice. ANPR typically operates in isolation of the full 
intelligence picture and is not linked to in-force crime or intelligence systems. This limitation 
is exacerbated by a lack of ‘proactive’ thinking amongst officers and limited information 
sharing. It is believed that the investigative use of ANPR would be improved if forces were 
investing in the research and analytical side of ANPR, including human input supported by 
the right IT tools. There is a need to standardise systems to enable information sharing 
between departments within a police force and between police forces. It emerges that the 
potential benefit can only be fully realised once the police service has started to collate 
disparate data sources into a comprehensive data warehouse. ANPR data would then provide 
an essential element to the overall rich picture and would help towards a better understanding 
of the movements of suspects and vehicles to aid in either immediate tactical solutions or 
longer term strategic intelligence assessments at local, regional and national level. Once the 
systems are in place, effective management and analysis of the data is needed in order to run 
proper National Intelligence Model (NIM) focused investigations into serious and priority 
crimes216. 
 
On a national level (as criminality is not limited by police geographical boundaries) the 
information added to the Police National Computer (PNC) is limited in its scope, as it relies 
upon the individual Police Forces to ensure that the data are added manually and accurately. 
A more reliable method of including information to PNC automatically via individual Police 
data warehouses, based upon the collation of intelligence gathered from the amalgamation of 
various data, is believed to help spread the intelligent picture beyond the scope of the single 
police service. Researchers and analysts from different forces should come together to assist 
in the product development (i.e. ANPR end user driven rather than software/provider driven) 
and to share best practice and ways to improve analysis of ANPR which would potentially 
                                                 
216
 ANPR needs to be integrated into all force’s tasking processes and used proactively to meet force policing 
objectives. 
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impact on the effectiveness of detecting crime at force level as well as cross-border 
criminality. It is, however, important to mention here that these recommendations are made 
bearing in mind the many examples of cost overruns and failure to get things on time and 
meet original specs of government IT projects (e.g. courts databases). It is easy to make a 
recommendation about IT, but carrying it out is another matter. 
 
4.10.6. Changing responsibility from operational delivery to business development 
ANPR tends to sit within Operational Planning Area because of its historical development as 
an operational tool (used within traffic policing with intercept teams). Results suggest that its 
future would be better secured if it were to be owned by the Corporate Development Area of 
the force. This means ANPR should sit within business development areas of the force, e.g. 
intelligence analysis, corporate development, criminal investigation etc. It is argued that 
ANPR would benefit from the work of a ‘Think Tank’ group of people within the force 
which would be looking beyond ANPR’s current use and conception and explore the future 
capabilities and potential of ANPR. This could be part of the ANPR steering group for the 
force, or separate, part of a research and development function within the force. 
 
4.10.7. Merging ANPR and CCTV 
Whilst the technologies of CCTV and ANPR have emerged separately, there are areas of 
overlap, complementary aspects and potential synergy. In developing future strategies, there 
would appear to be benefits in bringing together the two technologies and a potential 
harmonisation in national infrastructure and investments. 
 
4.10.8. Working in partnership 
It is believed that ANPR’s effectiveness would be improved if it were actively developed 
within existing partnership structures at local force level. ANPR would be developed as a key 
partnership tool within the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP)217 and delegated to Crime and 
                                                 
217
 A Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) is a non statutory partnership that brings together at a local level the 
different parts of the public sector as well as the private, business, community and voluntary sectors so that 
different initiatives and services support each other and work together (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, available from: 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/localgovernment/performanceframeworkpartnerships/localstrategicpartnerships
/.  Last checked April 2009. 
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Disorder Partnerships218 to take the strategic lead on ANPR. By working under the umbrella 
of the LSP in partnership with CDRPs, the Integrated Offender Management (IOM)219, the 
Highways Agency, the DVLA etc, the police and partners would become more effective in 
using ANPR and ultimately tackle crime and disorder at local level. Such partnership work is 
expected to generate benefits such as: 
• Shared costs and more consistency in investing in ANPR (which will involve reduced 
costs for individual partners, particularly in times of financial constraints and 
competing claims for investments) and overall improved cost efficiency220; 
• Improved and extended infrastructure, particularly if ANPR is linked to CCTV; 
• More effective offender management services, particularly in relation to monitoring 
and tracking upon release; 
• Better ways to tackle environmental crime such as illegal waste disposal (e.g. fly 
tipping); 
• ANPR expanded beyond known benefits by bringing together people and 
organisations with different perspectives and enabling creative thinking around 
potential uses of ANPR which, coupled with sustainable investment, would more 
rapidly and effectively drive ANPR’s development. 
• A more holistic approach to community safety. 
 
Moreover, results emerging from the current study indicate that public-private partnerships 
between the police and private corporations such as supermarkets, shopping centres and 
petrol forecourts would be very beneficial to the police, both in terms of camera coverage and 
the potential to gather valuable additional information in crime investigations. However, it 
was argued that establishing such partnerships would need to be justified and endorsed by 
appropriate regulations to ensure the legality and proportionality of information sharing and 
compliance with data protection principles. The Home Office is believed to be best placed to 
                                                 
218
 Crime and Disorder Partnerships include statutory, voluntary and private organisations with an aim to 
develop and implement strategies for tackling crime and disorder on a local level. 
219
 Launched in 2008 by the Home Office and Ministry of Justice, the IOM targets offenders in the community 
who present the highest risks to their communities, especially those short sentence offenders released from 
prison under no statutory supervision. Information available in the Integrated Offender Management 
Government Policy Statement (Home Office and the Ministry of Justice, 2009). 
220
 For example, by sharing the existing infrastructure with the Local Authority and the Police, Highways 
Agency can use ANPR data to save costs around traffic surveys. 
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address the legislative challenges linked to the development of ANPR, partnership work and 
data protection issues. 
 
4.10.9. Improving the vehicle registration system 
There is a consensus amongst respondents that ANPR’s reliance on number plates is one of 
its major weaknesses. Hence it is believed that ANPR’s effectiveness could be improved if 
DVLA, vehicle manufacturers and number plate suppliers would consider enhancing the 
vehicle registration system and developing more secure/tamper proof number plates. The 
proliferation of security measures such as non removable number plates or tamper-proof 
screws fitted to registration plates would be an effective step taken towards reducing the 
number of theft of number plates. The police also argue that reducing the number of suppliers 
of number plates in the UK would enable more effective regulation and control. 
 
4.10.10. Developing an automated system for document offences non compliance 
Police officers believe that it would be helpful if the DVLA and the police would develop a 
penalty system for dealing with minor offences detectable by ANPR such as lack of 
insurance, tax and MOT and failing to display a legitimate set of number plates. Such system 
would involve sending automated warning letters (not fixed penalty notices) to the owners of 
the vehicles informing them that their vehicle has been sighted by police (ANPR) cameras 
and are in breach of law. The vehicle owners would be asked to deal with these 
contraventions in a defined period of time. Careful consideration would be given to those 
who have been mistaken for illegal drivers due to ANPR technological errors. If such an error 
occurred and the owner of the vehicle was not the same as the addressee, then the owner 
would be asked to inform the DVLA (free hotline) and possibly produce evidence to enable 
the error to be corrected. It is believed that with such a system in place, police would save 
some of their monitoring and intercepting costs (hence resources would be allocated towards 
more serious crime and criminal investigations) and would become more effective in tackling 
vehicle crime and criminality in general. The system would also enable the identification of 
vehicles wrongly registered, possibly stolen and cloned plates or ‘ghost’ vehicles. 
 
Links between the police, the DVLA, the Motor Insurance Bureau (MIB) and relevant 
stakeholders are already in place and working. Such a system would not require extensive 
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developments and similar schemes have been previously introduced and proved to be 
effective221. However, it would be advisable to consult with the public prior to introducing 
such a scheme and develop a national publicity and awareness campaign sending strong 
messages about the purpose of the scheme and its expected benefits.  
 
                                                 
221
 See for example the Home Office’s vehicle crime reduction toolkits at: 
http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/toolkits/vc00.htm. The Secure Your Motor campaign was 
developed in an attempt to reduce vehicle crime and was linked to the government’s vehicle crime reduction 
action team (VCRAT) which was established to improve car security. The campaign included TV, radio and the 
internet adverts, posters at petrol stations and parking meters. 
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4.11. Concluding remarks 
It is important to highlight that the research presented in this chapter was undertaken against 
a backdrop of ongoing developments within the ANPR arena. As such, this chapter 
highlighted issues regarding the use of ANPR within forces as ‘work in progress’ and some 
of the emerging recommendations might be already under consideration both at a local and 
national level. 
 
While this chapter highlighted the main ANPR benefits and limitations as perceived by the 
police, the following focuses on the public’s perceptions about ANPR. 
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Chapter Five: Results (II) 
ANPR under Scrutiny: the Public’s View 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters highlighted the wider social and ethical implications of ANPR and 
brought to our attention concerns about human rights and privacy issues which the use of 
these cameras raises. It was argued that with ANPR surveillance there is an increased risk of 
losing the rights to ‘locational privacy’222. It was also indicated that what makes ANPR 
effective in one area (e.g. crime investigations) could make it ineffective in another area (e.g. 
civil rights) and vice versa. The dilemma between privacy and security was highlighted. 
Indeed, the development of ANPR had already generated debates around the invasion of 
privacy or breaches of Human Rights and Data Protection regulations. These concerns have 
been expressed in the media, by interest groups and the Information Commissioner’s 
Office223. It is now important to turn our attention to what the public think about these issues. 
In a society accustomed to surveillance and the ‘war’ on terrorism, one might expect that a 
few more cameras, whether they are called CCTV or ANPR, whatever their purposes might 
be, would not arouse the public’s concern. To what extent is that true though? 
 
The literature review revealed that there is no study investigating the extent to which the 
public are aware of this technology and the extent to which they accept it or feel reassured as 
a result of its use by the police. While the previous chapter explored the role of ANPR within 
policing as viewed by police officers and police staff, this chapter turns its attention to how 
the public respond to the introduction of ANPR in the UK and how they perceive its role as a 
crime prevention tool. 
 
With this in mind, this chapter presents results emerging from the empirical work in this 
Thesis, which are based on a public opinion study. The study aimed to fill a gap in our 
                                                 
222
 Blumberg and Eckersley (2009); Clarke and Wigan (2008). 
223
 The Office of Surveillance Commissioner (2006, 2007). See also Richard Ford’s (2006) story in The Times 
(‘Numberplate Cameras May Break Privacy Law’) and Simon Davies (2008), director of Privacy International, 
commenting on the ‘unnecessary and disproportionate’ police powers through the use of ANPR databases in 
‘Privacy fears over car database’, story from BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/uk_news/7615892.stm. 
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understanding of the public’s view of ANPR cameras and surveillance issues in general. 
Although research into public attitudes towards police use of CCTV is not new, this is the 
first major study exploring public views specifically with regards to ANPR. Thus, to widen 
our understanding of what the public thinks of such cameras, some of the findings presented 
in this chapter are compared – where possible - with findings from other surveys on public 
attitudes towards CCTV, such as those undertaken by Honess and Charman (1992), Bennett 
and Gelsthorpe (1996), Ditton (2000), Skinns (2000), Dixon et al. (2003), Spriggs et al. 
(2005) and Gill (2007)224. 
 
The study was conducted between February and April 2008 and reports on the views of 1573 
respondents to a postal survey. This was supplemented with a series of focus groups 
including 30 participants. All respondents were residents in Leeds, West Yorkshire, England. 
Specific objectives of the study were to examine awareness of ANPR, perceptions about 
ANPR’s benefits and limitations and overall public support for the introduction of ANPR 
cameras in the Leeds area, as well as to provide recommendations on how to improve public 
confidence in the police use of ANPR surveillance. The study paid particular attention to the 
relationship between privacy and security, exploring what the public considers to be 
legitimate levels of surveillance and any concerns they hold about ANPR’s impact on civil 
liberties. Additional factors were explored, such as the socio-demographic characteristics of 
respondents and levels of victimisation, as well as perceptions of crime and anti-social 
behaviour in the neighbourhood. The aim was to determine which groups were more likely to 
be ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ ANPR and why. 
 
                                                 
224
 It should be noted, however, that this comparison is limited because of differences in sampling and 
methodology and the context and timeframe of research. 
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5.2. Some methodological considerations 
Although a detailed discussion of the methodology for this public opinion study can be found 
in Chapter Three, some key issues are reiterated here in order to improve understanding of 
the ways in which the results are reported. The postal survey used a self-completion 
questionnaire (see Appendix 1) with a combination of closed and open questions that 
measured a number of variables related to the research objectives. The focus groups were 
conducted subsequently in order to clarify and explore in more depth interesting issues 
identified in the survey. The focus group sessions encouraged participants to elaborate their 
understanding and views regarding the police use of ANPR in Leeds. 
 
The response rate for the postal survey was 19.5%. While the sample population for the 
postal survey was generated by a random sampling method, participants for the focus groups 
were recruited purposively, with the assistance of the Local Authority. 
 
The results from the public opinion survey are mainly presented in the form of descriptive 
statistics produced using SPSS, which were used to identify frequencies of opinions and to 
explore any statistically significant associations within the data. Cramer’s V correlation was 
used to measure strength of relationships between variables (Phi correlation for two by two 
cross-tabulations), where the higher the correlation, the stronger the relationship225. As most 
variables were nominal, only the strength of the relationship was discussed226. The Pearson 
Chi-square test was used to test the significance of these relationships, usually measured at 
the p<0.05 level. For clarity of presentation, most outcome variables that were originally 
measured on a 5-point scale were categorised into two or three variables. For example, 
respondents who ‘strongly agreed’ or ‘agreed’ with a particular statement were considered to 
‘agree’ (or ‘think’, ‘believe’, ‘consider’ etc) and those who ‘strongly disagreed’ or 
‘disagreed’ were considered to ‘disagree’ with the statement. The ‘neither agree nor disagree’ 
answer was also included where appropriate, to indicate neutrality or uncertainty about an 
issue. Where appropriate, for statistical validity purposes, the variables were re-coded into 
                                                 
225
 It is generally considered that a correlation greater than 0.5 is large, 0.5-0.3 is moderate, 0.3-0.1 is small and 
anything smaller than 0.1 is insubstantial. For more information on statistical significance and correlations, see 
Morgan, Griego and Gloeckner (2001); de Vaus (2001, 2002); Norusis (2003). 
226
 Direction of relationship is measured when working with ordinal and interval variables. A relationship can be 
either positive or negative. 
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three categories (from five), in order to ensure a minimum frequency of at least five 
responses in each cell. 
 
Thematic coding and qualitative analysis and were also carried out on the data generated 
from open questions in the postal survey and the open discussion in the focus groups. 
Quotations were used to illustrate the main concepts from the survey and the focus groups. 
 
The following sections present and discuss the results from both the postal survey and the 
focus groups under common themes. The characteristics of respondents, their geographical 
spread and the extent to which they represent the wider population of Leeds is also discussed. 
Awareness of ANPR prior to the study and views and concerns about ANPR are then 
assessed. The chapter concludes by highlighting any emerging issues, offering a critical 
analysis of the results in the context of both the current Chapter and the Thesis. 
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5.3. Respondents’ profile 
 
5.3.1. The postal survey 
A total of 1573 Leeds residents aged 17 and over completed and returned the questionnaire 
by the cut off date. In order to monitor differences in opinion about ANPR between groups of 
people227, respondents were asked questions regarding their socio-demographic 
characteristics, such as gender, age, ethnicity, employment status, housing tenure, driving and 
vehicle ownership. The frequency results show that the sample population comprised a 
slightly higher proportion of females (53%) than males (47%), characteristics in line with the 
population of Leeds as a whole228. The largest group represented in the sample were people 
aged 45 to 64, which accounted for 37% of respondents, a considerable overrepresentation in 
comparison with 2001 Census figures for Leeds (22%). The large majority of respondents 
indicated they were White or White British (91.2%), while there was a slight under-
representation of Asians within the survey sample compared with the Asian population of 
Leeds. Respondents who were retired were over-represented within the sample (41.6%), 
compared with the population of Leeds (13.2%). As explained in Chapter Three, this is a 
common ‘feature’ of postal surveys, as older or retired people tend to be more responsive. 
Almost two thirds of respondents (64.7%) stated they were drivers who owned their motor 
vehicle, while 27.5% did not drive at all. Given the nature of ANPR surveillance and its 
potential to target drivers and driving offences, acquiring information about driving and 
vehicle ownership was thought to be important to get a clearer picture of people’s views 
about ANPR surveillance, its impact on crime and motor offences or other concerns drivers 
or vehicle owners might have regarding the police use of this technology. A comparison 
between the demographics of the sample for this survey and the population of Leeds is 
outlined in Table 5.1, Appendix 2. 
 
                                                 
227
 Previous studies have shown that views about CCTV differ across demographic groups, for example females 
and the elderly tend to be more supportive of CCTV (Honess and Charman, 1992; Bennett and Gelsthorpe, 1996 
and Dixon et al., 2003).  
228
 Figures from the 2001 Census of Population for Leeds indicate 51.6% females and 48.3% males. 
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5.3.2. Respondents’ postcodes and ACORN 
As the provision of an address and postcode was not compulsory for the postal survey229, not 
all respondents could be geographically distributed or their postcode associated with an 
ACORN230 category or group. However, results indicate that those who provided their details 
(correct address or postcode) (78%; N=1156) were proportionately spread across the thirty-
three wards in the district of Leeds. 
 
Respondents’ postcodes were also linked to the ACORN classification according to their 
residential area231. Respondents’ residential areas were spread across all ACORN categories, 
with the highest proportion living in ‘Comfortably Off’ (N=436; 27.7%) and ‘Hard Pressed’ 
(N=313; 19.9%) ACORN areas; which is line with the population of Leeds as a whole. 
However, those living in ‘Urban Prosperity’ ACORN area (5.6%) were under-represented 
(compared to the population of Leeds, 13.3%), in particular those living in the ‘Aspiring 
singles’ and ‘Educated urbanities’ ACORN areas (1.4%, compared to Leeds, 5.3% and 1.1.% 
compared to 4% respectively). For more details on the geographical spread of respondents, 
see Tables 5.2 - 5.3 and Figure 5.1, Appendix 2. 
 
High or low response rates to the survey could have been influenced by a wide range of 
factors, varying from the methods used (as explained in Chapter Three) to the personal 
characteristics and beliefs of the sample population (i.e. time available; hesitation and fear of 
scams; the level of confidence in the police; willingness to express views about an issue etc). 
Some studies indicate that there are certain personal and household characteristics usually 
associated with a higher or lower response rate on surveys232, for example females and older 
people tend to be more responsive, while lower response rates come from households in 
inner-city areas, single personal households and where the head of household was not born in 
                                                 
229
 The survey was designed to be confidential. Those who chose to provide their address details have done so 
because of their choice to be included in the prize draw. 
230
 ACORN is a geo-demographic tool used to identify and understand the UK population. ACORN categorises 
all 1.9 million UK postcodes, which have been described using over 125 demographic statistics within the UK 
and 287 lifestyle variables. Information from CACI’s website: ‘What is ACORN?’ available from: 
http://www.caci.co.uk/acorn/ 
231
 It should be noted, however, that ACORN treats the whole postcode as a unit, so results should be interpreted 
with care. 
232
 DWP (2002). This is also generally reflected in results of the British Crime Survey studies. 
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the UK – which could explain the under-representation of respondents in the current study 
living in ‘Educated Urbanities’, ‘Aspiring Singles’ and ‘Asian Communities’ ACORN areas. 
 
This section indicated that the sample of respondents to the postal survey were reasonably but 
not entirely representative of the wider population of Leeds. This should be considered when 
interpreting the results of the survey, particularly with regards to the generalisibility of 
findings. 
 
5.3.3. The focus groups 
Three focus groups were conducted in April 2008, with a total of 30 participants (all Leeds 
residents). Two out of the three groups comprised samples of people of different age, sex, 
area and ethnic backgrounds (equally represented within groups). One group was deliberately 
restricted to young people in order to address the gap in responses from the postal survey and 
to access opinions that might otherwise not have been heard. Children and young people are 
not often included in public consultations on policing or government matters, but surprisingly 
for their age they had thoughtful opinions on the police use of ANPR surveillance in the 
name of crime prevention and reduction. Their opinion sometimes differed from those of 
adults and these differences will be highlighted later. Details of all attendees are provided in 
Table 5.4, Appendix 2. 
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5.4. Perceptions and experience of crime and anti-social behaviour (ASB) 
Respondents from the postal survey were also asked about their experience of crime or anti-
social behaviour as a victim. Overall, 15.4% (N=242) of those who have answered the 
question233 reported being a victim of at least one incident within the twelve months prior to 
the survey (February 2008). The survey measured the level of reported victimisation in order 
to assess whether being a victim of crime or anti-social behaviour influences people’s 
perceptions of ANPR, police surveillance and the police in general. 
 
Perceptions of crime and anti-social behaviour in the neighbourhood were also gathered in 
order to establish whether perceptions about ANPR are linked to those about crime and ASB 
in the neighbourhood. Results from the postal survey indicate that respondents were more 
likely to perceive anti-social behaviour as a common characteristic of their neighbourhood 
than crime. Just over a third of respondents (36.5%) strongly agree or agree that crime is 
commonplace in their neighbourhood, while 44% strongly agree or agree that anti-social 
behaviour is commonplace in their neighbourhood. Their answers are based on either their 
knowledge of crimes or/and anti-social behaviour incidents - as the majority of respondents 
(64%) state they are aware of these incidents taking place in their neighbourhood over the last 
twelve months – or simply their assumption regarding the likelihood of crime and anti-social 
behaviour in their neighbourhood. For more information on reported victimisation by socio-
demographic characteristics, see Table 5.6, Appendix 2. 
 
The following sections will indicate, where appropriate, to what extent demographics or 
factors relating to respondents’ views or experience of crime and anti-social behaviour affect 
expectations of and support for ANPR.  
 
                                                 
233
 Respondents who have not answered the question (missing answers) were not taken into account; if they 
were, victimisation would be 18.1%. 
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5.5. Awareness of ANPR prior to the survey 
Previous studies have indicated that public attitudes to crime and the criminal justice system 
vary according to the degree of knowledge about these issues234. It is therefore important to 
explore whether the public know about ANPR and whether there is a relationship between 
knowledge and views about ANPR. 
 
When asked if they were aware of ANPR, two thirds of respondents from the postal survey 
(66.6%) indicated that they knew about it before receiving the questionnaire. In common with 
other studies looking at public awareness of CCTV235, findings here indicate a gender 
difference in awareness with men more likely to say they were aware of ANPR than women 
(74% compared to 61%)236. This could be a result of men being more sceptical about the 
police and having greater concerns over ANPR’s impact on their privacy (and implicitly 
more interested in surveillance or measures which might impact on their civil liberties) than 
women do. The analysis also revealed a fairly weak but statistically significant correlation 
between awareness of ANPR and age237, for example younger respondents (17-24 years old) 
were less likely to know about ANPR than respondents in the other age groups. No 
relationship was found between awareness of ANPR and respondents’ area of residence or 
the number of local authority and police CCTV and ANPR cameras in their neighbourhood. 
 
The extent of knowledge and understanding of ANPR, however, was not tested in the 
questionnaire, so it is unclear what exactly people knew about ANPR before the survey or 
whether their views have been influenced by media stories238 or by the introductory letter sent 
out with the survey which provided information on ANPR (i.e. what it is, how it works, how 
and what do the police us it for). The focus groups aimed to address this potential limitation 
and knowledge of ANPR was explored further. Unlike the postal survey, respondents’ 
awareness of ANPR was tested ‘cold’ during the group sessions (i.e. no information was 
provided prior to the discussion). Similar to the survey, most respondents from the focus 
groups seemed to be aware of ANPR, although this appeared to be different according to 
                                                 
234
 Roberts (1992 and 2002), Hough (1996), Hutton (2005). 
235
 Honess and Charman (1992), Dixon et al. (2003). 
236
 The relationship between gender and awareness of ANPR was weak but statistically significant (p ‹ .01; 
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groups: young people were more familiar with the concept, while the mixed groups seemed 
to have slightly more knowledge regarding ANPR applications, mainly relating to its use for 
documentation offences (no insurance, tax etc). The majority of respondents (85%) from the 
focus groups referred to the media as the main source of their information about ANPR. 
 
Even though the public appear to be aware of ANPR, their understanding regarding the type 
of cameras involved, the crimes targeted by ANPR or the consequences of ANPR 
surveillance is limited. People seem generally confused about the type and range of cameras 
available and still do not know how to differentiate between different surveillance systems. 
This might have an impact on their views regarding ANPR’s effectiveness in tackling crime 
or any concerns they might have about the police use of this surveillance technology. If they 
do not really know what it does, how can they have an informed opinion about it? The 
public’s views about ANPR, its effectiveness in dealing with crime and its perceived impact 
on civil liberties will be discussed next. 
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5.6. ANPR’s perceived and expected benefits 
Respondents to the postal questionnaire were asked to state whether they agreed or disagreed 
with various claims about ANPR’s potential to impact on crime rates, feelings of safety, 
reassurance of victims and road safety, criminal behaviour, police practice and effectiveness 
or ANPR’s impact on civil liberties. These quantitative results were complemented by 
qualitative data emerging from open questions in the postal questionnaire and the group 
discussions, where participants were encouraged to freely express their views about all issues 
surrounding ANPR. In effect, the focus groups added value to the results from the survey, as 
the discussion brought to light views or concerns which might have remained unknown or 
unclear after the public consultation through the survey. Emerging results from the 
quantitative and qualitative research cluster around the following themes: 
• ANPR’s perceived and expected benefits 
• Perceived concerns about ANPR 
• ANPR, public reassurance and trust in authority 
• Overall support for ANPR in Leeds 
 
5.6.1. Perceptions about ANPR’s impact on crime and community safety 
This study investigated whether public perceptions regarding ANPR’s effectiveness are 
supportive of a reduction in crime. Respondents from the postal survey were presented with a 
list of statements regarding ANPR’s potential impact on crime rates, criminal behaviour, 
policing and on their feelings of safety and reassurance. They were asked to rate how much 
they agreed or disagreed with these statements on a 5-point scale ranging from strongly agree 
to strongly disagree and including a neutral option. Results indicate that the majority of 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the police use of ANPR cameras on the streets of 
Leeds would be a benefit to the community. Most notably, over 90% of respondents 
considered that ANPR would enhance police practice and effectiveness in that the police 
would be better equipped to track and identify criminals that use the roads and helpful 
evidence for criminal investigations and convictions would be provided. This indicates that 
the value of ANPR is judged mainly in terms of better identification and detection of 
offenders, a finding concurring with the theoretical assumptions about ANPR’s effectiveness 
underlined in the previous chapters. 
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There seems to be general agreement that crime would be reduced (74.4%) and feelings of 
safety will improve (73.2%) as a result of the police use of ANPR. When these perceptions 
were correlated with the level of awareness of ANPR prior to the survey, no relationship was 
found. This could indicate that respondents’ views about ANPR’s effectiveness in reducing 
crime and fear of crime or improving police detections are based on general assumptions 
about the impact of ANPR rather than more precise information reflecting ANPR outcomes. 
This is not surprising, as research into attitudes towards CCTV, for example, indicates that 
the public tend to think of CCTV as an effective crime prevention method, even though there 
is limited evidence supporting these beliefs. Moreover, when public perceptions before and 
after the installation of CCTV systems are measured, it appears that CCTV is more appealing 
in theory than in practice, as support for CCTV reduces after its installation. For example, 
there is evidence of significant change in public perceptions regarding CCTV’s effectiveness 
in reducing crime after its installation – from 79% in the ‘pre-installation’ study to 48% in the 
‘post-installation’ study239. 
 
As shown in Table 5.7 below, just over a half of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with 
other potential impacts of ANPR, such as its potential to reduce the number of innocent 
people stopped by the police (59.8%), reassure the victims of crime (59.8%) and improve 
police response time to crimes (53.2%) - although about a third were not really sure that this 
would be the case. Respondents were also uncertain whether ANPR would increase road 
safety by reducing road traffic casualties and even more hesitant when it comes to ANPR’s 
non-discriminatory potential (a large percentage of respondents chose the neutral/’don’t 
know’ option, i.e. 37.7% and 45.4% respectively). Interestingly, further analysis indicates 
that those who knew about ANPR prior to the survey were slightly more likely to disagree 
that the victims of crime would be reassured. A weak but statistical significant relationship 
was found between the level of awareness of ANPR and perceptions regarding ANPR’s 
effectiveness in improving feelings of safety amongst victims240. This could suggest that 
respondents who already know about ANPR are slightly more sceptical about these issues, 
but the relationship is too weak to make strong claims on the bases of these correlations. 
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Furthermore, when asked about their perceptions regarding ANPR’s impact on criminal 
behaviour, the majority of respondents (58.6%) thought that offenders would be deterred 
from committing crimes in the areas covered by ANPR, but a higher proportion of 
respondents (78.7%) believed that offenders would not stop committing crimes altogether – 
they would just use different roads where there are no ANPR cameras; findings which mirror 
the assumptions following the rational choice theory and the phenomenon of displacement 
previously argued. Studies looking at perceptions of CCTV similarly found that one of the 
unintended consequences of CCTV is displacement of crime, generally to a different location 
where the cameras are not installed. Interestingly, it appears that the public seem to 
acknowledge displacement more nowadays than it used to over a decade ago. For example, 
the percentage of respondents who think that crime will be displaced as a result of CCTV 
goes from 30%241 to 62%242 and 79% in the current study. 
 
                                                 
241
 Squires and Measor (1996). 
242
 Skinns (2000). 
 188
Table 5.7 ANPR’s perceived and expected benefits 
 
With ANPR cameras on the streets of Leeds 
 
Agreed or 
strongly 
agreed 
 
Neither 
Agreed nor 
Disagreed 
 
Disagreed 
or strongly 
disagreed 
Police will be better equipped to track and identify criminals that 
use the roads 
92.0% 
(N=1415) 
5.2% 
(N=80) 
2.8% 
(N=43) 
Police will get helpful evidence for criminal investigations and 
convictions 
90.4% 
(N=1394) 
7.1% 
(N=109) 
2.5% 
(N=39) 
Offenders will still commit crimes, but will use different roads 
where there are no ANPR cameras 
78.6% 
(N=1201) 
16.1% 
(N=246) 
5.3% 
(N=81) 
Crime will be reduced 74.4% (N=1150) 
17.4% 
(N=269) 
8.2% 
(N=127) 
You will feel safer 73.2% (N=1134) 
20.4% 
(N=316) 
6.4% 
(N=99) 
The police will be less likely to stop innocent people 59.8% (N=918) 
27.3% 
(N=420) 
12.9% 
(N=198) 
Victims of crime will feel more reassured 59.8% (N=916) 
27.1% 
(N=415) 
13.1% 
(N=200) 
Offenders will be afraid to commit crimes in the area covered by 
ANPR cameras 
58.7% 
(N=904) 
22.4% 
(N=345) 
18.8% 
(N=290) 
Police will respond more quickly to crimes 53.1% (N=812) 
31.3% 
(N=479) 
15.5% 
(N=237) 
The possibility of police discriminating against minority ethnic 
groups will be reduced 
41.9% 
(N=643) 
45.5% 
(N=697) 
12.6% 
(N=193) 
Road traffic casualties will be reduced 40% (N=613) 
37.7% 
(N=578) 
22.3% 
(N=342) 
Source: Question ‘Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
Total number of respondents is 1573 
Rows do not necessarily sum to 1573, as reported frequencies exclude missing data 
 
 
5.6.2. ‘Open’ views about ANPR’s effectiveness 
Survey respondents were also given the opportunity to express any views or concerns they 
might have about ANPR through open-ended questions. About a third of respondents chose 
to write down their comments by highlighting issues already covered in the survey or 
bringing out others which were not. The focus group discussions expanded on these issues, 
examining the reasons behind people’s acceptability or opposition to ANPR and exploring 
the complexity of the issues involved in people’s perceptions of ANPR’s effectiveness in 
reducing crime and improving feelings of safety. 
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Confirming the quantitative results presented above, the qualitative analysis reveals that 
people perceive ANPR as a benefit to policing and community safety, although they have 
many concerns regarding ANPR’s actual effectiveness, potential limitations and its impact on 
civil liberties. On the positive side, respondents think that ‘ANPR is a good idea: the sooner, 
the better!’ They argue that anything that could reduce crime and make them feel safer is 
welcome. ANPR appears to be a good thing because ‘it is not a waste of time, as it helps the 
police to quickly identify and stop wanted people’ rather than randomly stopping innocent 
people. Below are some of respondents’ comments reflecting these views about ANPR: 
 
‘If it works, use it! The safer the streets, the better!’ 
 
‘ANPR makes me feel something is done to protect the community.’ 
 
‘It’s a brilliant idea! Even if ANPR is just used to check disqualified or uninsured drivers, it 
makes a difference and I feel safer while I am driving. If it’s used in other ways to catch 
criminals, it’s a bonus! Hope it’s brought into use as soon as possible!’ 
 
‘I totally agree with the police use of ANPR. Being the subject of a few burglaries and three 
attempted break ins, the more help the police have to bring criminals to justice, the better!’ 
 
There seems to be consensus amongst respondents from both the survey and the focus group 
sessions that ANPR could help the police to reduce crime through quicker identification and 
apprehension of offenders, better tracking and monitoring of dangerous offenders and better 
evidence for crime investigations. Respondents find ANPR particularly effective because it 
has the potential to pick up on cars which the police would not normally do, which is in line 
with police officers’ perceptions about ANPR. Some respondents also indicate that they are 
aware of high profile cases where ANPR was very helpful in providing evidence or checking 
alibis in serious crime investigations. 
 
‘ANPR could be very useful to trace people who have been missing […] or sex offenders or 
somebody that has skipped bail for example.’ 
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 ‘ANPR could provide evidence for crime investigations or prosecutions; the police are not 
always there when a crime occurs, a camera could be.’ 
 
Respondents believe that ANPR’s potential benefits extend to other crimes such as drug 
offences (particularly by targeting ‘taxi dealers’), dangerous driving particularly in residential 
areas or around schools (including the use of mobile phone at the wheel) or fly tipping. 
 
‘My husband used to be a PC in the 1960s and well remembers much happier and safer times 
on the streets of Leeds. We both feel strongly that any measure to tackle vehicle and street 
crime will never be enough, but should help’. 
 
‘No matter what the statistics say, crime is growing and becoming more dangerous, 
especially in council areas. These cameras would make a great difference to criminals, from 
underage drunken hooligans that smash up bus stops to drug dealers and takers, burglars 
etc’. 
 
5.6.3. ANPR’s potential to tackle non-insured driving 
There is a general agreement that ‘ANPR should be used to tackle illegal drivers, in 
particular those without insurance’. A high proportion of respondents seem to hold strong 
views against illegal drivers, particularly those driving with no insurance. These findings 
confirm previous research findings that there is public support for more action against driving 
offences243. Results from the postal survey indicate that the vast majority of respondents 
(94.2%) agree or strongly agree that it is important that ANPR cameras are used to catch 
drivers without a licence, tax or valid MOT and in particular without insurance. The 
qualitative results strongly support these views. The consensus from all groups is that driving 
without insurance is a real issue, particularly in West Yorkshire and they fully support ANPR 
if it could tackle this problem. Hence ANPR is perceived as helping towards safety because it 
identifies people without insurance or without licence. 
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 For example MORI findings for Motor Insurance Bureau (MIB) reported that 95% of drivers felt that driving 
without insurance was wrong and people should be prosecuted for it, whilst a survey conducted for Association 
of British Insurers (ABI) reported that 83% of motorists view driving without insurance as a serious offence 
(Greenaway, 2004). See also Kilner (2009). 
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‘The papers say approximately 25% of drivers in West Yorkshire and over 50% in Bradford 
are uninsured. If the police have let this get to such a serious level, then these cameras should 
be widely used to catch these people. Then the cost of insurance premiums will decrease […] 
We pay road tax, insurance, why should we pay for those who don’t? Why should they get 
away with it?’ 
 
5.6.4. Perceived benefits of ANPR and neighbourhood safety 
Further analysis was undertaken in order to determine if perceptions regarding ANPR’s 
benefits on crime and community safety are influenced by other factors such as experience or 
perceptions of crime or by socio-demographic characteristics of respondents. The results 
indicate that there is a slight tendency for those who perceive crime as a problem in their 
neighbourhood to be less likely to feel safe as a result of the police use of ANPR in Leeds or 
to think that crime or traffic casualties will be reduced. Actually, these respondents seem to 
be more likely to think that crime will not be reduced, it will just be displaced somewhere 
else. Weak but statistically significant correlations were identified between these variables244 
(see Table 5.8, Appendix 2). These relationships could indicate that respondents who 
perceive crime as a problem in their neighbourhood are less confident in or more negative 
towards crime prevention measures, including police ANPR cameras. This is consistent with 
findings from the group discussions indicating that participants who did not feel safe in their 
neighbourhood were less likely to be confident in the police and their ability to deal with 
crime and reassure the victims of crime. 
 
5.6.5. Perceived benefits of ANPR and victimisation 
Interestingly, no relationship was found between respondents’ perceptions regarding ANPR’s 
potential to reassure victims and being a victim of crime or anti-social behaviour. However, 
victims appear to be less likely than non-victims to believe that ANPR would be effective at 
making people feel safer, reduce crime, improve the police’s ability to track and identify 
offenders, providing useful evidence for convictions or reducing the number of road traffic 
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casualties in Leeds (see Table 5.9, Appendix 2). This is not surprising, as victims have been 
shown to be more sceptical about the benefits of police cameras, in particular CCTV245. 
 
5.6.6. Perceived benefits of ANPR by socio-demographic characteristics 
Perceptions about ANPR’s benefits differ across socio-demographic groups as well. The 
analysis reveals weak, but statistically significant relationships246 between views about 
ANPR’s effectiveness and gender, age, employment, housing, area of residence (ACORN) 
and ethnicity. Age appears to be the strongest predictor of views about ANPR’s potential 
benefits, in that the younger respondents were the least likely to believe that crime will be 
reduced or that offenders will be deterred from committing crimes in the areas covered by 
ANPR. Correspondingly, the older the respondents, the more likely they were to agree that 
ANPR will positively impact on police effectiveness, so that the police would respond more 
quickly to crimes, would better track and identify offenders and would stop fewer innocent 
people. Unsurprisingly, retired respondents appear more likely to agree with ANPR’s 
suggested benefits. Female respondents appeared to be more likely to believe in ANPR’s 
effectiveness in improving community safety than their male counterparts. Gender 
differences in opinion surface throughout, indicating that female respondents are less ‘anti-
ANPR’ and more confident in its impact on crime and safety. 
 
These findings mirror those from studies exploring public attitudes towards CCTV indicating 
that older and female respondents are more likely to perceive CCTV as effective in reducing 
crime and making people feel safer247. Interestingly, while 17-24 year old respondents appear 
to be the least confident in ANPR’s impact on crime reduction, respondents in the 25-44 age 
group are the least likely to believe that ANPR will make them feel safer, reassure the victims 
of crime, increase safety on the road or reduce the potential of discrimination against 
minority groups.  This disbelief could be explained by the fact that respondents in this age 
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group were most likely to have reported being victimised. For a breakdown of perceptions 
about ANPR’s benefits by age and gender see Tables 5.10 - 5.11, Appendix 2. 
 
Some statistically significant differences in opinion by ethnicity and housing also emerged 
but, as they do not correspond to large numbers of people in the sample, they should be 
interpreted with caution. For example respondents from a Black or Black British background 
seemed to be less likely to agree that the police will stop fewer innocent people. In contrast, 
there is a tendency for those living in rented accommodation from the Council or the Housing 
Association to have greater expectations regarding ANPR’s impact on crime; they appear to 
be more likely to agree that they will feel safer and reassured and that the police will do a 
better job as a result of ANPR (i.e. they will respond more quickly to crimes, they will reduce 
road traffic casualties and they will be less likely to discriminate against minority groups or 
stop innocent people). It looks like those living ‘hard pressed' ACORN areas have more 
confidence in the police or the use of cameras, although the correlations are too weak to have 
clear indications that this is the case. Not surprisingly then, respondents living in ‘urban 
prosperity’ ACORN area appear to be less optimistic about ANPR’s potential to reduce the 
number of police stops and be less ‘discriminatory’ against certain minorities. 
 
The demographic characteristics of respondents seem to have an impact on perceptions of 
participants in the focus group sessions as well, although the restricted number of respondents 
limits the validity of any relationship between these variables. The results are similar to those 
from the survey, in that there is a tendency for female older respondents to feel safer as a 
result of police surveillance in general and ANPR in particular. They reiterate that the more 
they know there is somebody watching behind a camera, the safer they feel. In contrast, 
respondents from a Black or Asian ethnic background appear less confident in ANPR’s 
ability to impact on crime or their safety. As will be argued next, these differences in opinion 
are even more accentuated when it comes to ANPR’s potential to impact on civil liberties. 
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5.7. Perceived concerns about ANPR 
Respondents were also presented with a list of views or concerns people might have 
regarding ANPR, or police surveillance cameras in general, some of which have appeared in 
newspapers or on TV. While survey respondents were asked to indicate their level of 
agreement with statements reflecting these issues, participants in the group sessions had little 
prompting, being encouraged thinking of the reasons behind any concerns they might have 
regarding ANPR. Results from both the quantitative and qualitative data cluster around the 
following themes: 
• Limitations to ANPR’s effectiveness in reducing crime and reassuring the public 
(counter-measures, ANPR’s visibility, police response) 
• Unintended consequences of ANPR 
• ANPR, the police and civil liberties: ‘Nothing to hide, nothing to fear’? 
• Trust in the police 
 
5.7.1. Counter-measures, displacement, limited evidence and misidentification 
Respondents expressed their doubts with regards to ANPR’s impact on crime and fear of 
crime, highlighting the main limitations of ANPR. The survey analysis indicates that the 
majority of respondents (83%) are mostly worried that ANPR would not be effective because 
of ‘counter-measures’ used by criminals to avoid being identified or stopped by the police, 
findings supported by the group discussions. Respondents in both the survey (78.6%) and the 
group discussions argue that it is very likely that ANPR cameras will create spatial and 
tactical displacement of crimes248, in that crimes will move to areas not covered by ANPR or 
other crimes will be committed instead (or in addition), such as car thefts for robberies, 
number plate thefts etc. The belief is that, as with CCTV, ANPR cannot cover all areas, 
streets, estates, it cannot be implemented everywhere. They fear that criminals would not be 
caught as a result, on the contrary, innocent citizens will be linked to crimes they have not 
committed. 
 
The potential misidentification and criminalisation of innocent people is perceived as one of 
the biggest disadvantages to ANPR, raising concerns about whether the technology alone is 
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believed that CCTV will displace crime (30% and 62% respectively). 
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sufficient to ensure offender detection and protect the innocent. These issues were discussed 
extensively in the group sessions, where respondents expressed their worries about the 
accuracy of the system, the quality of ANPR cameras and the relevance of the information 
stored on the databases used in conjunction with ANPR. It was felt quite strongly that ANPR 
has the potential to implicate innocent people and of particular concern was the notion of 
being ‘guilty by association’ if travelling alongside a suspect car. These associations are 
perceived as an infringement of people’s freedom of movement and privacy. 
 
There was a consensus amongst respondents that ‘ANPR is only as accurate as the 
information put on’ and they fear that once the mistake has been made, it is hard to prove 
one’s innocence and correct the error. People want the power to challenge the system if the 
information is incorrect. Unsurprisingly, respondents are also concerned that evidence is not 
sufficient to secure convictions if ANPR captures just number plates (58.3%) and there is 
uncertainty as to whether evidence from ANPR cameras could be misleading, as the highest 
proportion of respondents from the survey (47.2%) neither agreed nor disagreed with the 
statement raising this concern. That is why the quality and maintenance of the systems and 
the coverage and direction of the cameras are perceived as essential for ANPR to be effective. 
A respondent from the postal survey argues: 
 
‘ANPR must be reliable and in perfect condition […] Image quality appears to be a problem 
with CCTV cameras. A comprehensive robust ANPR system should be installed and this 
should cover blind spots as well.’ 
 
People further question ANPR’s effectiveness because they think ANPR is limited to cars, 
car crime and in particular to number plate identification. ANPR’s effectiveness relies on the 
person driving the vehicle to be the registered owner of it at a correct and valid address, 
which is not always the case. Respondents indicate that ANPR would work better if the 
cameras could identify the driver and the overall evidence generated by the systems was 
sufficient for conviction purposes. They believe that there should be something else in 
conjunction with the number plate to ensure a more accurate identification of drivers. Some 
of these concerns and suggestions are mirrored in the following quotations: 
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‘How can the police effectively use ANPR to track criminals if cameras only focus on registration, 
which more than likely will be bogus? What would the police use ANPR for? Is it about 
surveillance of cars or surveillance of people?’ 
 
‘Cameras cannot catch criminals, the police can. If the cameras assist them in any way, then the 
outcome has got to be positive. But realistically, ANPR cameras only track cars. Criminals are no 
doubt aware of this and would therefore find ways round this.’ 
 
‘ANPR is not sufficient to ensure convictions if the driver cannot be identified through 
photograph […] There is a need for good quality admissible evidence in Court.’ 
 
5.7.2. ANPR’s visibility: deterrence or detection? 
Many respondents in the survey (67%) felt that ANPR would only make people feel safe if 
they knew about them and would only act as a deterrent to crime if ANPR cameras, as well as 
outcomes were well publicised. In contrast, ANPR was thought to work in crime detection if 
criminals did not know about the cameras (64%), otherwise, crime will be displaced. Indeed 
most respondents (81.2%) think that the use of hidden cameras for crime prevention purposes 
is acceptable, while a high proportion (56.4%) consider that the presence of ANPR cameras 
should be advertised to the public. This ambivalence towards the visibility and implicit 
effectiveness of cameras is mirrored in the group discussions, where respondents support the 
use of hidden cameras for offender detection purposes, while endorsing the importance of the 
visibility of cameras for reassurance purposes. Although there are arguments for and against 
ANPR’s visibility, the right to know seems to be more important in people’s mind. The 
argument is that advertising the cameras to the public will help towards having a crime 
deterrent effect, but will also avoid resentment and suspicion of police intention. Below are 
some of their arguments: 
 
‘I am not aware of any guidelines or strategy issued with ANPR, so I cannot comment on how 
it is used. Surely overt and covert operations need to happen simultaneously for maximum 
impact, weighing up civil liberties – no easy balance!’ 
 
‘There is a difficult balance between reassuring the public (knowledge about ANPR) and 
tackling crime (criminals’ knowledge about ANPR).’ 
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Results from the focus groups highlight similar issues, indicating that ANPR would make 
people feel safer only under certain circumstances: 
 
‘It wouldn’t make me feel safer to walk around the streets of Leeds, but whilst driving, if I had 
an accident, then I would have the peace of mind that there was more of a chance that 
whoever crashed into me would be covered.’ 
 
‘If you know it’s there, is fine, if you don’t think it’s there and might be, it’s not reassuring, on 
the contrary, it’s a kind of Big Brother, but if you know that it’s there and what it’s for, I 
personally find it reassuring.’ 
 
People strongly believe that a high ANPR ‘profile’ together with a criminal justice system 
that supports punishment that fits the crime is the way to make ANPR work better. This is 
reflected in the following quotations: 
 
‘The biggest deterrent to crime whether it’s technology or any other is to think that you’re 
going to get caught.’ 
 
‘The reason for which many people don’t insure their cars is because the cost of insurance is 
greater than the penalty.’ 
 
5.7.3. ‘ANPR cameras are only justified if there is police monitoring and response’ 
The qualitative analysis further indicates that respondents strongly believe that ANPR’s 
effectiveness depends on how the police use the system. Respondents point out that for 
ANPR to be effective, there should be an appropriate policing strategy and effective response 
to ANPR: 
 
‘Although clever, ANPR’s coverage and response are questionable.’ 
 
 ‘It is the use of a system, not simply its installation which makes a difference. There is no use 
having the cameras if we don’t generate response. I live within 100m of 2 CCTV masts with 
controllable cameras and I doubt if they made any difference in reducing crime or anti-social 
behaviour in the area.’ 
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 ‘A camera cannot stop and arrest somebody. Immediate police action is reassuring.’ 
 
In order to effectively respond to ANPR, respondents highlight that appropriate resources 
should be dedicated to it to ensure a proactive deployment: 
 
‘A concentrated well resourced action plan should be implemented, starting with the areas of 
highest offence, to rid West Yorkshire streets of drivers who refuse to tax, insure and MOT 
their cars. I feel this is higher priority than car patrols seeking to catch motorists breaking 
the speed limit by a small margin for example.’ 
 
‘ANPR needs dedicated monitoring staff and police officers in order to be effective; so it does 
not take other police officers away from important duties.’ 
 
They argue that ANPR should not be static and permanent and a combination of fixed and 
mobile systems should be used to prevent spatial displacement, including the use of 
unmarked cars and hidden cameras. 
 
5.7.4. Unintended consequences of ANPR surveillance 
Although people appear to believe that police surveillance cameras in general and ANPR in 
particular play an important part in improving community safety, the consensus is that 
reliance on these cameras may lead to unintended consequences which long term might affect 
their effectiveness in preventing crime and reassuring the public. Most respondents fear that 
ANPR might be used as a substitute for more police on the beat. The argument is that this 
might impact on people’s confidence and trust in the police, as the contact and bond with the 
police will be diminished or lost. Another concern raised by respondents is that the police 
might become lazy and too reliant on the technology to do the job for them, which will have 
an overall impact on the police effectiveness to tackle crime and disorder. 
 
Some respondents worry that the increased use of cameras might lead to the causes of crime 
being ignored or to an erosion of feelings of responsibility within communities. These 
findings mirror those of Squires and Measor (1996) and Skinns (2000) who explored public 
perceptions about CCTV and indicated that 38% and 34% of their sample respectively 
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thought that the causes of crime would be disregarded as a result of CCTV. Similarly, Dixon 
et al. (2003) argued that, because public spaces are increasingly electronically surveilled, the 
public sense of social responsibility and natural surveillance are diminishing. The need for a 
more civic sense and social responsibilities within communities seems to be strongly 
acknowledged by respondents from both the survey and the focus groups in the current study. 
Some of these issues are reflected in the quotes below: 
 
‘… the problem with surveillance is that the greater proportion of the population is suffering 
because of a minority who do not pay their insurance or commit other offences. We should be 
educating, training and redeveloping a sense of civic responsibility. Surveillance is not going 
to change offender behaviour too much. You have to tackle the problem a different way. I 
think that with serious criminals, murderers, the technique might work and it is great to have: 
it is sensible and usable. But if you go lower down the scale I do not think we are going to 
solve the problem with people not paying their licence, maybe catch a few, but the problem 
will still be there. Surveillance highlights a problem, it does not provide a solution.’ 
 
‘I think that unfortunately we do need it, but I think the society will change eventually and 
hopefully will get to a point where we will realise that we live together and we have to be 
peaceful with each other. If you look at youth crime and criminal behaviour, it has all started 
long time ago within the homes, but family values have broken down. Can that be tackled 
through cameras?’ 
 
Other consequences either intended or unintended mentioned by many participants both in 
the survey and the group discussions refer to the potential police abuse by the system and the 
impact on people’s privacy. As will be argued next, respondents strongly feel that ANPR 
could be used for the wrong purpose (e.g. revenue or easy police targets) and that ANPR 
surveillance has the potential to lead to an erosion of civil liberties and a society where the 
blameworthiness is generalised to the entire population. 
 
5.7.5. Privacy vs. security: ‘Nothing to hide, nothing to fear?’ 
‘Nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ is a common argument in popular discourse about privacy, 
particularly when balancing privacy against security. The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) states in Article 12 (2) that: 
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‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.’ 
 
The 'nothing to hide, nothing to fear' argument erodes to a certain extent that right because it 
implies that people should be willing to reveal details about their everyday life which the law 
has no right to demand that they reveal. The danger is, however, as this becomes normalised 
into society, there is an increasing erosion of civil liberties. Interestingly, people are indeed 
willing to reveal their ‘privacy’ in the name of ‘security’. Studies exploring public 
perceptions about CCTV surveillance found strong support for the idea that if you are not a 
criminal then you should have nothing to hide from police cameras249. Emerging findings 
from the current study support this claim, as the vast majority of respondents from the postal 
survey (89%) feel that people who have nothing to hide have nothing to fear. Unsurprisingly, 
respondents indicated to be more worried about crime victimisation (51.5%) than loss of 
privacy (7.3%), while about 20% were worried about both or neither. As many as 81.2% of 
respondents from the survey agree or strongly agree that it is ok for the police to use hidden 
cameras, as long as it is done in the name of crime prevention. These findings are similar to 
those found by Dixon et al. (2003) in their study exploring attitudes towards public order 
measures, including CCTV, indicating that as many as 85% of respondents agree or strongly 
agree that ‘people who obey the law have nothing to fear from CCTV cameras’, while 78% 
think that only criminals have any reasons to be afraid of CCTV cameras250. 
 
While only a minority (13.6%) think that ANPR does represent an infringement of their civil 
liberties, a higher percentage of respondents were unsure if this was the case (27.2%). These 
findings are slightly lower than those previously reported in studies exploring public views 
about CCTV (see Figure 5.2 below). For example, Spriggs et al. (2005) found that 17% of 
their sample agreed or strongly agreed that the introduction of CCTV would be an invasion of 
people’s privacy, considerably lower than those found in Honess and Charman’s (1992) and 
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 Dixon et al. (2003). 
250Dixon et al. (2003). Ditton (2000) shown less support for this claim, with 53% of his sample agreeing that 
‘only criminals need to fear CCTV’. 
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Squires and Measor’s studies (1996) (36% and 31% respectively251) more than a decade 
earlier. This seems to indicate support to the hypothesis that over time the public has became 
less concerned about the impact of police cameras on their privacy. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Perceptions about CCTV’s and ANPR’s impact on privacy (1992-2008)* 
 
*CCTV 1 - 36% respondents agreed that ‘CCTV was an invasion of people’s privacy’ 
  CCTV 2 – 31% respondents ‘criticised CCTV on “civil liberties” grounds’ 
  CCTV 3 – 36% agreed that ‘CCTV will erode civil liberties’ 
  CCTV 4 – 17% agreed and strongly agreed that ‘CCTV cameras invade people’s privacy’ 
  CCTV 5 – 17% agreed or strongly agreed that ‘CCTV is an invasion of people’s privacy’ 
  CCTV 6 – 16% agreed or strongly agreed that ‘CCTV is an invasion of people’s privacy’ 
  ANPR 7 – 13.6% agreed or strongly agreed that ‘ANPR represent an infringement of civil liberties’ 
 
 
However, findings emerging from the qualitative data, in particular the focus group 
discussions, highlighted the complexity of the issues involved in people’s perceptions about 
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ANPR and civil liberties. They had greater concerns about ANPR’s impact on their privacy. 
Some respondents indicate some unease at being watched or tracked while travelling in a car. 
Article 13 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states that ‘everyone has 
the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state’. ANPR’s 
ability to track cars around the country undoubtedly impacts on people’s privacy (particularly 
their ‘locational’ privacy) and respondents picked up on this issue. Some perceive ANPR 
surveillance as a gradual erosion of civil liberties, a step further towards a 24/7 ‘surveillance 
society’, a ‘Big Brother’ state. They seem to agree with ANPR, but they fear that ‘next step’, 
the boundaries and limits of such technologies. One young respondent from the group 
discussions argues:  
 
‘[ANPR] is just the start of it. We are already being watched, recorded, listened to… Next it 
will be implanted chips or barcodes, who knows? First of all, CCTV was only in shops and 
things like that, now it’s everywhere. Then you realised they’ve put them on tops of roads and 
buildings. And we thought “Oh, my God, they are watching us all the time”. Now we are so 
used to CCTV, I don’t go down the road and think I am being watched anymore […] It’s sad 
that we got here and the government has to know where you are at all time. Nobody trusts you 
anymore.’ 
 
As discussed in the literature review, ANPR has the potential to bring us closer to a 
maximum surveillance society because of the expansion of blameworthiness to the entire 
population, the shift from individualisation to generalised suspicion252. ANPR ‘powers’ 
surpass those of CCTV systems, as ANPR can collect information on individuals on the basis 
of possible associations with known offenders or suspects, hence interest and suspicion are 
attached to individuals without them even being aware of it or without having done anything 
wrong. This is where the public’s views shift. They seem to agree with ‘general’ surveillance, 
being watched, even without being aware of it, but they have doubts regarding their details 
being stored on databases for no good reason. Of particular concern to participants is the 
accuracy, use, storage and security of this data. Respondents raise issues regarding data 
misuse, data storage, data loss, data sharing (particularly with agencies other than the police), 
with the greatest concern about the security of data held about them. This is unsurprising, 
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 Norris and McCahill (2006: 114). 
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given the recent highly publicised instances of data loss by government agencies which have 
put at risk the privacy and welfare of millions of law-abiding citizens. People have lost 
confidence in the government’s ability to address the crime problem on the one hand, and 
respect and protect people’s rights, on the other. 
 
‘I am worried that the information is misused. Lately sensitive information has been lost and 
personal information has got into the wrong hands. Mistakes happen and you could be put on 
a criminal list and have serious consequences.’ 
 
‘I am concerned that we are moving towards a society where you have to prove your 
innocence rather than believed innocent until proven guilty. I would probably be unable to 
account for my presence in an area that I frequented two years ago.’ 
 
The opinion is almost equally divided when it comes to respondents’ views about ANPR’s 
potential to ‘spy on people’ (39% of respondents from the survey disagree, 31% neither agree 
nor disagree and 30% agree with this argument). This indicates yet again that people have 
reservation about the police use of ANPR and civil liberties issues; it could be either because 
they have limited knowledge about ANPR and its capabilities, or they have limited 
confidence in the police to use ANPR appropriately and with respect to the public. As will be 
argued next, it seems that the more people lack trust in the police and the government in 
general, the more likely they are to have concerns about ANPR and its impact on civil 
liberties. 
 
5.7.6. Trust in the police  
The issue of trust in the police appears to be the key to perceptions about ANPR. Although a 
high proportion of survey respondents think that the police can be trusted to safeguard 
information gathered from the cameras and use it properly (58%) or to ensure that innocent 
people are not placed on police records and wrongly accused (52.6%), the majority feel that 
the police need to be regulated and monitored by an independent body of control (68.7%). 
These concerns are also expressed by respondents in the group discussions, who refer to the 
need for strict and appropriate controls and regulations and independent monitoring of the use 
of ANPR data to avoid breaches of Human Rights and Data Protection: 
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‘I support ANPR, but I think there should be an independent monitoring body/system in place 
to ensure that abuse of ANPR does not become a political football and that it remains for 
what it was designed, i.e. a crime prevention tool.’ 
 
Some respondents expressed further concerns about the potential misuse or abuse of the 
system, either for revenue purposes (43%) or in a discriminatory manner (22%). These 
worries are reflected in the group discussions, where some respondents felt that police 
officers might over-scrutinise particular groups, for example young people, ex-offenders, 
Asians or Black people without due cause and such a selection would be an infringement of 
civil liberties. There is consensus that ‘ANPR should be used for the right purpose and not for 
easy return on revenue or easy targets!’ Respondents seem to agree with crime prevention 
initiatives which demonstrate improvement of a practical nature, but they do not favour 
money making or easy targets driven initiatives (i.e. congestion charging, speeding or minor 
traffic offences). The quotations below reflect some of these views: 
 
‘ANPR is just another way of getting more money out of motorists! You get a £60 fine and 
three points on your licence for being a day late to the post office to buy your tax disc? 
Ridiculous! Change your priorities!’ 
 
‘Please don’t use ANPR to prosecute the general public for minor traffic offences such as 
being into a box junction or turning left too early across a bus lane. This shouldn’t happen in 
West Yorkshire, like in London.’ 
 
While people agree with ANPR, they argue that they should be informed about ANPR’s 
purposes and exact use in order to counter any negativity towards the technology and mistrust 
in the police. They feel that the police need to be clear about their objectives whilst using 
ANPR. A common view is that at the moment information about such local initiatives is not 
being made available to the public. People just hear about crime and shootings going up at 
national level, but nothing very specific, particularly at local level, where it matters most for 
their communities. One respondent from the group sessions argues: 
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‘I do not necessarily think there should be more scrutiny as to how the police are using their 
resources. Just an explanation of these things. I am only just thinking about this for the first 
time in my life. Nobody challenges you to think about these things. Ok, I do not agree with my 
information being stored if I am not a criminal, but if we have to go this way, then I would 
like to be confident that the way we are spending our money makes sense.’ 
 
Getting the message across to the public regarding the advantages and consequences of using 
ANPR cameras might improve feelings of safety and reassurance: 
 
‘If ANPR can have an impact on no insurance etc, yet there are so many cars without 
insurance nowadays, I would like to see more of these cars being stopped and impounded and 
make these drivers pay. I would like to see it working! This is the thing, you have got 
surveillance, but it has to come with action. It is a waste of money if you have all these 
systems and nothing happens!’ 
 
Findings emerging from the qualitative data indicate that respondents’ level of confidence in 
the police is low. Respondents believe that due to this lack of trust in the police, they are 
more likely to feel that ANPR will not be effective or will invade their privacy. It seems that 
expectations of the police have changed over time. ‘Whereas years ago my expectation was 
greater when the police were on the beat; I was expecting the crime to be solved, my 
expectation now is that it is highly unlikely that it is going to be solved’ argues a respondent 
in the group discussions. However, there is consensus that reassurance and trust could be 
improved if the police use ANPR (and any crime prevention technology) in a fair and (cost) 
effective manner, respecting and protecting people’s rights. ANPR needs to ‘prove’ itself 
before the public. People need to be reassured by the police that ANPR is used for crime 
prevention and not for undeclared or inappropriate purposes. Some of these arguments are 
reflected in the following quotations: 
 
‘It is about how much we trust our government: all the whys, the whos, the whats are all 
about our trust in the police and government institutions’ 
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‘I would like assurance and evidence that ANPR is used for catching criminals and not low 
level traffic violations [… ] you get suspicious that is more about raising revenue than 
anything else.’ 
 
As indicated above, people worry about the storage and security of personal data. It was said 
that faith could be restored if people knew that the data held on them was used solely for the 
purpose for which it was intended and was destroyed once no longer needed for that purpose. 
People would feel reassured if legislation was put in place to ensure an appropriate control 
and regulation of the use of ANPR. 
 
Another driver of confidence seems to lie in the ability of the criminal justice system to deal 
appropriately with crime, to issue penalties which fit the crime. Findings indicate reduced 
public tolerance towards offenders and appear to resent paying the extra cost or be subject to 
various intrusions for the sake of a minority (i.e. the offenders): 
 
‘It is unfair that innocent people have to pay the bill for other criminals.’ 
 
Respondents call for ‘fit for purpose’ punishment and less tolerance towards offenders: 
 
‘Make the punishment fit the crime. Penalties are not harsh enough; need to have higher fines 
for repeat offenders. Take ‘no insurance’ for example. If the fine is less than the insurance, 
then it is not a deterrent; young people would rather risk getting caught and fined for no 
insurance’ ‘Get the cars crushed!’ 
 
Other respondents indicate that more emphasis should be placed on prolific offenders and a 
Criminal Justice System which focuses on crime prevention rather than crime detection 
would be more reassuring: 
 
‘Cameras do not deter criminal activity, as they do not punish.’ 
 
‘Instead of dealing with crime by looking at the surface (cameras), the root of the problem 
needs to be tackled. Prevention is better than cure. People need to be made aware that each 
one of us is responsible in keeping crime down.’ 
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Many respondents in the survey and focus groups felt the need for better community policing 
in order to develop a positive relationship with the police based on mutual trust. This is 
linked to the view mentioned above that the police should be perceived as an agency helping 
law abiding citizens as well as dealing with offenders. The public think that the police are too 
driven by the government’s national agenda (i.e. to tackle terrorism) rather than by local 
circumstances and more focus should be placed on ensuring the safety of local communities. 
Respondents want to see a police force which is more locally orientated with more officers on 
the beat closely engaged with the communities. Cameras should be used in support of, not 
instead of police on the beat, which is the policing strategy most preferred by the public. 
More officers patrolling the streets need to be more available and in contact with the public to 
regain their trust.  
 
‘We need more police on the street, more contact with the community, more social integration 
and participation.’ 
 
‘Community police would be seen more helpful if they were able to knock on residents’ doors 
to find out what is going on on estates. Then residents would not be frightened to raise issues, 
name names and report crimes.’ 
 
‘I would like to see more police presence on the streets to deter crime and reassure the 
public. I am not sure if cameras have the same impact when it comes to reassurance.’ 
 
Table 5.12 below summarises respondents’ concerns with regards to the police use of ANPR. 
The table includes only responses from the postal survey. 
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Table 5.12 Most common concerns regarding the police use of ANPR (postal survey) 
 
‘What is your view on each of the following statements?’ 
 
Agree or 
strongly 
agree 
 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
 
Disagree or 
strongly 
disagree 
People who have nothing to hide have nothing to fear from police 
cameras 
88.9% 4.9% 6.2% 
Criminals steal cars, number plates or find other means to avoid 
detection with ANPR cameras 82.9% 14.7% 2.4% 
It’s ok for the police to use hidden cameras for crime prevention 81.2% 9.1% 9.7% 
Offenders will still commit crimes, but will use different roads 
where there are no ANPR cameras 78.6% 16.1% 5.3% 
The use of ANPR cameras needs to be regulated and monitored 
by an independent body of control 68.7% 21.2% 10.1% 
ANPR can only make people feel safer if people know about them 67% 19.9% 13.1% 
ANPR won’t help catch criminals if they know where these 
cameras are 
64.1% 21.6% 14.3% 
Evidence against criminals isn’t sufficient if ANPR captures just 
number plates 58.3% 29.8% 11.9% 
The police can be trusted to safeguard information gathered from 
cameras and use it properly 58.1% 27.9% 13.9% 
The police need to put up notices to advise the public about 
ANPR cameras 56.4% 15.3% 28.3% 
The police can be trusted to ensure that innocent people are not 
placed on police records and wrongly accused 52.6% 30.5% 17.0% 
ANPR cameras might be used to make money from penalty 
notices for minor driving offences, instead of focussing on crime 43.1% 27.7% 24.2% 
ANPR cameras might be used to spy on people 30.0% 30.7% 39.3% 
Evidence from ANPR cameras could be misleading 26.6% 47.2% 26.2% 
ANPR cameras might be used to target specific minority groups 
within the community 21.9% 31.7% 46.4% 
ANPR cameras represent an infringement of your civil liberties 13.6% 27.2% 59.2% 
Source: Question ‘Below is a list of views or concerns people might have regarding ANPR, or police 
video cameras in general, some of which have appeared in newspapers or on TV. Do you agree or 
disagree with them?’ 
Total number of respondents is 1573 
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5.7.7. Who is more likely to have concerns about ANPR and why? 
Previous research exploring public attitudes towards CCTV indicates that views about CCTV 
as an invasion of privacy are influenced by socio-demographic characteristics. For example, 
younger male respondents are more likely to be concerned about the impact of CCTV on 
individual rights253, findings mirrored in the current study. The analysis reveals weak, but 
statistically significant relationships between perceived concerns about ANPR and gender, 
age, ethnicity, employment, housing and respondents’ residential area (ACORN category). 
 
Female and older respondents (and unsurprisingly retired) appear less likely to be concerned 
about ANPR surveillance, whether overt or covert, and more likely to trust the police to use 
ANPR fairly and with respect to the public. In fact, older respondents were less likely to be 
concerned about ANPR’s potential infringement to their liberties. This is not because older 
people do not know what ANPR is; results from the survey indicate that younger respondents 
were less likely to know about ANPR than respondents in the other age groups. On the 
contrary, male and younger respondents tend to disagree more with the argument ‘nothing to 
hide, nothing to fear’ argument and with the police use of hidden cameras; they appear to 
have less confidence in the police and think that ANPR cameras might be used to spy on 
people. It seems that gender is a characteristic which consistently plays a role in shaping 
perceptions about ANPR. Results from both the survey and the group discussions indicate 
that there is a tendency for female respondents to be more confident in the police use of 
ANPR and its effectiveness in tackling crime and fear of crime, on the one hand, and less 
worried about ANPR’s impact on civil liberties on the other - although the female 
participants in the group discussions had more reservations about these issues. 
 
Women’s support for CCTV or in this case ANPR may relate to a greater fear of crime, or 
more trust in technology generally. Contact with the police as a suspect probably inversely 
relates to trust in the police, thus as women are generally more law abiding than men, then 
trust should be higher. Similarly, contact or expectations of the police as a victim could have 
an impact on trust in the police, particularly as men tend to be those more likely to report 
having been a victim of crime. Unsurprisingly, the current study indicates that there is a slight 
tendency for those who have been victimised to be more likely to disagree with the use of 
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hidden cameras for crime prevention purposes and to trust the police that ANPR will be used 
fairly and no innocent people will be placed on police records and wrongly accused. Victims 
also appear to be less confident in ANPR’s ability to reduce crime and fear of crime, which is 
in line with findings from studies looking at perceptions of CCTV showing that victims are 
generally more sceptical about the benefits of CCTV cameras254. 
 
Some statistically significant differences in opinion (about ANPR’s ‘disbenefits’) by ethnicity 
also emerged, although these were rather limited due to the small number of people in each 
category. It is worth mentioning, however, that Asian or Asian British respondents in 
particular appear more likely to strongly agree or agree that ANPR represents an 
infringement of their civil liberties (31.7%) or be neutral towards this argument (46.3%) than 
all other ethnic groups (e.g. 12.3% of White or White British respondents agree). These 
respondents are also slightly more likely to disagree with the ‘nothing to hide, nothing to 
fear’ argument255. Similarly, the Asian or Black respondents appear to be those more likely to 
think that ANPR cameras might be used to target specific minority groups within the 
community or that evidence from ANPR could be misleading. These results are mirrored in 
the group discussions, where there is a tendency for ethnic minority participants to think that 
the police discriminate against these groups. They argue that ANPR is acceptable as long as 
the police use it fairly and with respect to all members of our communities irrespective of 
their age, ethnicity or background. This is not surprising, since the introduction of the new 
anti-terror laws (starting with the Terrorism Act 2000) brought forward the potential of 
‘racial profiling’ against ethnic groups believed to be associated with Islam (i.e. Asians and 
people of Middle Eastern appearance), hence the likelihood of police disproportionately 
performing more stops and searches on these groups. Indeed evidence suggests that in 
2002/2003 Black and Asian people were four times more likely than White people to be 
stopped under these powers256. 
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 Cf. Section 95 Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System – 2003 (Home Office, 2004e). After the 
London bombings and new anti-terror legislation, the ratio increased further – it is argued that in London Asian 
and Black people were 12 times more likely to be stopped and searched than White people (Vikram Dodd, 2005 
The Guardian). 
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Following the London bombings in July 2005, the gap between the police and Muslim 
communities has widened even more. The introduction of new offences linked to terrorism, 
amended legislation increasing police stop and search powers and extending police powers to 
detain suspects after arrest for up to 28 days257 had widened the gap between Muslims and the 
police even more. Muslims might fear that the new ‘war on terror’ approach and the new 
powers given to the police would lead to more and more innocent Muslims being subject to 
more surveillance and police intervention because of a generalised suspicion of the entire 
Islamic population. 
 
Some statistically significant differences in opinion by housing and ACORN category 
emerged as well, but as in the case of ethnicity they should be interpreted with caution as 
these differences did not correspond to large numbers of people in the sample. Those living in 
accommodation from the Council or the Housing Association appear to be more confident 
that the police would use ANPR data appropriately, safely and with respect to people’s rights. 
This is unsurprising, as this group of respondents also appeared to have greater expectations 
regarding ANPR’s impact on crime and fear of crime. Maybe because these respondents are 
also more likely to perceive crime as a problem in their neighbourhood and accept any crime 
prevention measures – even if they do not have any proof of their effectiveness - in order to 
increase neighbourhood safety. In contrast, respondents living in ‘Urban Prosperity’ ACORN 
area are those most likely to agree that ANPR is an infringement of their civil liberties. This 
group of respondents are also the least confident in ANPR’s potential to reduce the number of 
police stops and equally target all groups in the community. Although statistically significant, 
the relationships between these variables are weak, so the results should be interpreted with 
caution. 
 
Perceived concerns about ANPR were correlated with perceptions about ANPR’s potential 
benefits. For example those who believed ANPR is an infringement of civil liberties were 
compared with those who responded to statements such as ‘With ANPR on the streets of 
Leeds, you will feel safer; crime will be reduced etc’. Low to moderate statistically 
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significant correlations between these variables were found. Not surprisingly, those who 
perceived ANPR as an infringement to their civil liberties were those less likely to believe in 
ANPR’s potential to reduce crime and fear of crime and reassure the victims of crime, 
findings in line with those of Honess and Charman (1992) who indicate that respondents with 
greater concerns about CCTV and civil liberties believed it was less effective in detecting and 
deterring crime. This group of respondents are, of course, those least confident in the police 
to use ANPR fairly and with respect to the public and more likely to be against the use of 
hidden cameras; they believe that ANPR should be clearly advertised to the public and the 
use of ANPR cameras should be regulated by an independent body of control. 
 
As argued before, trust in the police is the main factor driving perceptions about police 
surveillance in general and ANPR in particular. Those respondents who agree with the 
‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ argument are less likely to think of ANPR as an 
infringement of their civil liberties and more likely to trust the police to use covert 
surveillance cameras and to use ANPR appropriately. Not surprisingly, respondents who 
accept surveillance on the basis of ‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ are more likely to feel 
safe as a result of ANPR surveillance or to think that crime will be reduced through 
deterrence of offenders and more efficient and fair policing. This reinforces the argument 
above that, the more concerned about privacy people are, the least likely they are to trust the 
police and believe in ANPR’s positive impact on crime and fear of crime. For a detailed 
account of correlation coefficients and significance, see Tables 5.13-5.17, Appendix 2. 
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5.8. Overall support for ANPR in Leeds 
As a final measure of support for and acceptability of ANPR, all respondents were asked the 
degree to which they felt positive or negative about the introduction of ANPR cameras in 
Leeds. Similar to research looking into attitudes towards CCTV258, findings here show high 
levels of support for ANPR, as the majority of respondents from the survey (89%) were 
positive or very positive about the introduction of ANPR. Similar support is found in the 
group sessions, where around 85% of participants voted in favour of ANPR, although 
respondents here showed more reluctance towards ANPR, questioning certain aspects 
regarding the police use of these cameras and balancing issues regarding safety and privacy.  
The high level of support for ANPR amongst respondents from the survey (89%) and very 
low level of opposition (4.7%) influence the validity of statistical analysis looking at the 
impact of socio-demographic characteristics on respondents’ views. The number of 
respondents with a negative or very negative attitude towards ANPR is very small (N=71) - 
even smaller than the number of those who expressed ambivalence towards ANPR (N=94), 
hence the statistical differences between the groups are not necessarily revealing. As shown 
in Table 5.18 below, it appears that female, older and retired respondents are slightly more 
supportive than their counterparts, although the differences are not statistically significant. 
These findings reinforce those highlighted before in that female respondents come out as 
more confident in the police use of ANPR and less concerned about ANPR’s impact on civil 
liberties. 
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Table 5.18 Overall support for ANPR by socio-demographic characteristics and victimisation* 
 
Group 
Support 
% (N) in descending order 
Respondents aged 64+ 93.2 (480) 
Those who live in ‘Comfortably Off’ ACORN area 93.1 (394) 
Those who live in ‘Wealthy Achievers’ ACORN area 92.8 (180) 
Retired respondents 92.7 (581) 
Those renting Council accommodation 91.2 (186) 
Females 90.6 (701) 
Those living in ‘Urban Prosperity’ ACORN area 90.6 (77) 
Those living in ‘Hard Pressed’ ACORN area 90.2 (276) 
White or White British respondents 89.7 (1241) 
Those who own their property 89.7 (1021) 
Non-victims 89.3 (940) 
The unemployed 89.2 (33) 
Respondents aged 45-64 88.0(486) 
Those living in ‘Hard Pressed’ ACORN area 87.8 (108) 
Males 87.0 (593) 
Respondents aged 25-44 86.7 (319) 
Employed respondents 86.1 (525) 
Crime victims 86.1 (204) 
Respondents aged 17-24 85.7 (36) 
Students 85.2 (23) 
Asian or Asian British respondents 85.0 (34) 
Those renting private accommodation 78.4 (40) 
Mixed or Mixed British respondents 77.8 (7) 
Black or Black British respondents 73.7 (14) 
The sample 89.1 (1347) 
 
*The table indicates the proportion of respondents who are positive or very positive about the 
introduction of ANPR on the streets of Leeds 
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The overall support for ANPR was correlated with other variables, such as perceptions 
regarding ANPR ‘benefits’ and ‘disbenefits’. The analysis reveals a series of low to 
substantial statistically significant correlations between these variables (see Table 5.19, 
Appendix 2). Unsurprisingly, the strongest of these correlations indicate that, the more 
positive respondents feel about ANPR, the more likely they are to believe in ANPR’s benefits 
in reducing crime and improving feelings of safety. These respondents appear more likely to 
agree with the ‘nothing, to hide, nothing to fear’ argument and less likely to be concerned 
about the use of hidden cameras or any infringements to their civil liberties. Respondents 
with a positive attitude towards ANPR seem less doubtful about the ANPR outcomes and 
more confident in the police to use ANPR fairly and appropriately. No relationship was found 
between support for ANPR and victimisation or perceptions of crime in the neighbourhood. 
This could suggest that respondents’ overall attitude towards ANPR is more likely to be 
influenced by their level of trust in the police and their perceptions of safety, surveillance, 
privacy and policing in general rather than their personal experience of crime. However, as 
noted above, it would be unwise to make strong claims on the basis of these correlations 
because of the small number of people with negative opinions about ANPR. 
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5.9. Emerging issues 
Similar to previous research into perceptions about CCTV259, findings here indicate that the 
public is highly supportive of ANPR, with the majority of respondents (89%) from both the 
postal survey and group discussions being positive about it. The more positive respondents 
felt about ANPR, the more likely they were to believe in ANPR’s benefits in reducing crime 
and fear of crime. The value of ANPR is judged mainly in terms of better identification and 
detection of offenders in general and drivers without insurance in particular, findings in line 
with the theoretical assumptions about ANPR’s effectiveness outlined in the Literature 
review and police perceptions and experience of ANPR presented in the previous chapters. 
 
Relatively few respondents (13.5%) agreed or strongly agreed that ANPR represents an 
infringement of their civil liberties, lower than those previously reported in studies looking at 
perceptions about CCTV as an invasion of privacy. This could suggest that the more people 
have become accustomed to surveillance and are less likely to ‘mind’ it or be concerned 
about its impact on civil liberties. There is sufficient evidence to indicate that people prefer to 
give up their privacy in the name of security, although a false sense of security, as 
surveillance cameras do not necessarily make people safer or secure. The lack of significant 
opposition towards surveillance is likely to be influenced by the impression of a ‘risk’ society 
under constant threat, especially since the latest terrorist attacks on the Western world, with 
the government engaging in extensive surveillance and data mining260 in the name of national 
security and public safety. 
 
However, findings emerging from the qualitative data highlight the complexity of the issues 
involved in people’s perceptions about ANPR. Participants felt that on balance ANPR 
positives outweigh the negatives - although the latter are important and need to be 
considered. This ambivalence towards ANPR is also confirmed by the mixed response 
regarding the visibility of ANPR cameras. Responses are divided between those who do not 
mind the intrusion of hidden cameras for the sake of crime prevention and those who want 
the right to know if they are being watched261.  
                                                 
259
 Honess and Charman (1992), Skinns (2000), Spriggs et al. (2005). 
260
 Data mining involves analysing personal data to identify patterns of suspicious behaviour. 
261
 Results similar to those found by Dixon et al. (2003) and Spriggs et al. (2005). 
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It was strongly felt that the pressure to demonstrate the effectiveness of ANPR may lead to 
police officers (mis)using ANPR for the purpose of revenue or hitting ‘easy targets’. People’s 
concern was that government targets and statistics will drive a culture of ‘let’s get them for 
anything’ so as to add another result or justify the money spent installing ANPR systems. 
One respondent from the postal survey argues: 
 
‘It would be nice to think that ANPR cameras weren’t a modern day necessity, but sadly they 
are. My only major concern is that the police don’t use the information gathered sensibly. 
What I mean by that is that in the last decade the police and most government bodies seem to 
be managed around finances. If the cameras are used to catch and prosecute “proper 
criminals”, it’s great news, but if they are used to create revenue from working class people 
who have just by a small margin broke the law (i.e. forgot seat belt or did 34 mph in a 30 mph 
zone etc) then it is bad news!’ 
 
The potential misidentification and criminalisation of innocent people is perceived as one of 
the biggest disadvantages to ANPR, raising concerns whether the technology alone is 
sufficient not only to ensure offender detection but also to protect the innocent. There is 
additional concern whether the police will use ANPR correctly, fairly and with respect to the 
public. It appears these issues are related to the level of public confidence and trust in the 
police. Findings emerging from the qualitative data indicate that respondents’ level of 
confidence in the police is low. Due to this lack of trust in the police, respondents were more 
likely to have concerns about ANPR. 
 
Respondents are concerned that, by increasingly relying on surveillance technologies, we fail 
to see the bigger picture, alternatives and long term consequences: 
 
‘We want a society which is “social”, not “spied upon”. Police and community workers need 
to be out in the community, not watching screens. We want a sense of “belonging” to our 
community, caring, respecting and being involved; not let to “go to pot” until picked up for 
contravening some petty law or statute.’ 
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5.9.1. Factors influencing perceptions about ANPR 
Results show that perceptions about ANPR vary significantly by socio-demographic 
characteristics. Female older respondents for example appear more confident in ANPR’s 
impact on crime and safety and less likely to be worried about civil liberties issues than their 
counterparts. As argued above, women’s support for ANPR may relate to a greater fear of 
crime or trust in the police generally. As women are generally more law-abiding than men, 
there is less contact with the police as a suspect which could impact on levels of trust in the 
police. Similarly, contact with the police as a victim could influence trust in the police, 
particularly as men tend to be those more likely to report having been a victim of crime262. 
The analysis confirms this assumption, as victims appear less confident in the police use of 
ANPR. These results are in line with findings from studies looking at perceptions of CCTV 
showing that male younger respondents and victims are generally more sceptical about the 
benefits of CCTV cameras263. 
 
It has been shown that the level of acceptability of surveillance cameras, in particular CCTV, 
is also influenced by the methodology employed in the study, specifically the way questions 
are ordered in a survey. Ditton (1998) and Spriggs et al. (2005) argue that if questions about 
support for CCTV followed pro-CCTV statements or contextual questions about levels of 
crime in the area, the number of respondents in favour of CCTV can increase by as much as 
20%. The current study aimed to avoid these limitations by asking about overall support for 
the introduction of ANPR in Leeds before crime and anti-social behaviour in the 
neighbourhood. A mixture of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ statements preceded the question 
about support for ANPR, so that respondents would get a more comprehensive view about 
both benefits and concerns about ANPR before deciding how positive they would feel about 
the introduction of ANPR. 
 
Previous research into attitudes towards CCTV also indicates that support for expected 
effects of CCTV diminishes after its installation264, so CCTV appears more appealing in 
theory than in practice. Given that this is the first study exploring perceptions about ANPR, 
                                                 
262
 The British Crime Survey suggests that men are more likely to be the victim of a crime and the offender in a 
crime. See for example Kershaw et al. (2008). 
263
 Honess and Charman (1992), Bennett and Gelsthorpe (1996), Ditton (2000), Dixon et al (2003).  
264
 Skinns (2000) and Gill (2007). 
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such a comparison is not feasible. It would be, however, interesting to conduct a similar study 
at a later date to investigate whether expectations about ANPR’s impact on crime and safety 
have changed. As people become more aware of ANPR’s capabilities and possible outcomes, 
they might change their view with regards to ANPR’s effectiveness in crime prevention.  
 
Previous studies show that public attitudes to crime and the criminal justice system are 
influenced by the level of knowledge about these issues265. More specifically, public 
acceptance of CCTV is based on limited and partly inaccurate knowledge about its functions 
and capabilities266. Findings in the current study indicate that, although the majority of people 
indicate awareness of ANPR (i.e. 66%), they seem to have inadequate understanding of the 
aims and consequences of ANPR surveillance to make reasonable judgements about ANPR’s 
effectiveness in tackling crime. 
 
                                                 
265
 Roberts (1992, 2002), Hough (1996) and Hutton (2005). 
266
 Honess and Charman (1992: 25). 
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5.10. Recommendations 
As well as being asked about their knowledge and views regarding the police use of ANPR, 
participants in this study were encouraged to think of how the police might do things in the 
future to increase their confidence and sustain support for ANPR. A number of comments 
were useful and these were used to produce recommendations, which generally relate to how 
public perceptions can be changed through information provided by the police backed up by 
appropriate legislation and controls with regards to ANPR. Although the results reflect the 
views of the West Yorkshire public, the recommendations and implications for policy are 
transferrable to other police forces and ANPR nationally. 
 
Interestingly, some of the issues and recommendations emerging from this public opinion 
study overlap with those identified through the consultation with the police, which were 
presented in the previous chapter. The common issues are mainly concerned with improving 
the quality of ANPR systems and the intelligence used in conjunction with ANPR. The public 
appears to be highly concerned regarding potential misidentifications caused by technological 
errors and out of date ANPR intelligence, which might link innocent people to crimes they 
have not committed. It is believed that the police should undertake regular reviews with a 
view to identify and rectify these errors in order to increase the effectiveness of stops and 
searches and minimise disruption of law abiding citizens. Similar to the police, the public 
believe that the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) could contribute to 
minimising these ‘errors’ by adopting robust security measures with regards to number plates 
and a more effective vehicle registration system in the UK.   
 
Other recommendations emerging from the public consultation fall under the following three 
themes: 
 
5.10.1. Improving ANPR’s legal status 
It appears that the public will feel more confident in the police use of ANPR surveillance if 
the legislation with regards to ANPR were in line with latest developments and use. It would 
be beneficial if the government placed ANPR on a proper statutory basis, with clear 
regulations and an appropriate system of complaint aiming to protect both the public (from 
any infringement to their civil liberties) and the police or other crime prevention agencies 
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using ANPR technology (from malpractice which could undermine investigations and 
convictions). The ANPR regulations should be publicised in official government documents 
available to the public, making clear reference to purposes for ANPR use by the police and 
how citizens’ privacy and civil rights are protected. Safeguards and restrictions on ANPR 
data handling need to be carefully monitored. 
 
It is believed that the development of a clear ANPR Code of Practice would help ANPR users 
to understand their legal obligations and reassure the public about the safeguards in place. 
The ANPR Code of Practice would cover current practice, but also anticipate any arising 
issues due to the extension and development of ANPR systems in the UK. The Code would 
be subject to regular review (e.g. every 2 years) to include consultation with relevant parties 
(including the public) and new ANPR developments. It would be made public and clearly 
state its nature and objectives and the legislation that it complies with, while making clear 
reference to the extent of oversight of ANPR use in the UK (e.g. the Information 
Commissioner’s Office). The ANPR Code would address issues around the operation of 
ANPR systems in the UK and responsibilities of all users and specifications and issues 
regarding ANPR technology. It would make clear reference to data recording, retention and 
disclosure and strict Data Protection regulations. Most importantly, the ANPR Code of 
Practice would clearly specify how to deal with breaches of the Code, how data subjects can 
access information or make complaints and the means by which the public could be made 
aware of the Code. 
 
5.10.2. Increasing awareness and understanding of ANPR 
This chapter has argued that public understanding of ANPR is poor. There appears to be a 
certain disjunction between reality (police practice) and public perceptions with regards to 
ANPR surveillance. For example, respondents to the public opinion survey and focus groups 
think that ANPR technology is mainly used for raising revenue, with a focus on traffic 
enforcement and congestion charging. The previous chapter indicated that, although ANPR 
could be used for those purposes, these are not necessarily linked to police enforcement and 
there is generally more emphasis on crime detection and crime prevention (of more serious 
nature). Hence dispelling the myths surrounding ANPR would be a good first step towards 
improving the public’s perceptions about ANPR. More informed views about ANPR would 
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be beneficial to reassuring the public and improving confidence in the police use of such 
technologies. 
 
An ANPR publicity campaign with both citizen and offender focus could help towards 
increasing public awareness and confidence in the police use of ANPR and potentially reduce 
crime through changing offenders’ perceptions of risks and cost of crime. Positive messages 
regarding ANPR should be widely publicised, in particular local successes of ANPR, visible 
outcomes, for example ANPR helping towards reducing the number of uninsured drivers on 
the road, detecting serious/prolific offenders, stopping more criminals and less innocent 
people. Depending on feasibility and cost involved, this could be a targeted ANPR awareness 
campaign or could be part of a wider campaign of public reassurance with regards to the 
police267. Mechanisms would need to be put in place to evaluate the effects of the strategy.  
 
Thus the public could be reassured that ANPR helps the police detect and convict offenders, 
while offenders could be deterred from committing crimes in the areas covered by ANPR268. 
The offenders could be deterred through information about the risks of apprehension or 
prosecution as a result of ANPR, leading to crime prevention. Results from this study also 
indicate that the public would feel reassured and safer if they knew that ANPR was used in an 
area. Physically advertising/signposting an area covered by ANPR cameras is believed to 
reassure the public and would deter potential offenders. 
 
5.10.3. Empowering communities 
This chapter indicated that the public appreciate being consulted and have an input in the 
crime prevention strategies employed in their communities. A suggestion would be for the 
police and the local authority to use Citizen Panels/Groups who will try to ensure that ANPR 
is being used fairly and with respect to the public. Any issues emerging from meeting these 
                                                 
267
 While it is unclear whether improving satisfaction with the police use of ANPR will improve satisfaction 
with the police in general, additional resources put into an ANPR campaign should be carefully balanced against 
its benefits. However, previous research has shown that some crime prevention initiatives work better when 
there is more publicity about the initiative (Bowers and Johnson, 2005), hence an ANPR publicity campaign 
could help reduce crime through deterrence. 
268
 Crime rates could change because perceptions of risk change. The actual rates of detection do not need to 
increase, what is important is offenders’ actual perceptions of the risk of detection. The use of the media to 
highlight successful ANPR cases could give a false but raised perception of risk, even if real rates are not 
changing. 
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groups would be made public possibly through an established partnership with the local 
media. It would be beneficial if this consultation would be backed up by a robust complaint 
mechanism which will allow citizens to make confidential complaints about the police use of 
ANPR surveillance or related issues. Any complaints for alleged misuse or technological 
errors at a level below the Information Commissioner’s Office would be carefully 
investigated. 
 
 224
5.11. Concluding remarks 
The findings from this public opinion study generated new knowledge about ANPR’s image 
in the community and people’s perceptions of its effectiveness or any interference with 
privacy and human rights they identified. 
 
Results presented in this chapter indicate that the public are generally positive about the 
police use of ANPR, albeit with some reservations regarding privacy and data protection. The 
public can clearly see the short term and long term benefits from the police use of ANPR and 
they feel that on balance the positives outweigh the negatives, although this balance is 
important and needs careful monitoring. 
 
Public opinion seems to be inconsistent, ambivalent and influenced by various factors such as 
media reporting, the socio-political context, knowledge and experience of the subject, socio-
demographic characteristics of respondents or experience of crime and anti-social behaviour. 
All these factors are interconnected and impact on the way public opinion shifts from one 
side to another. Depending on where the emphasis lies, people’s priorities change. The 
balance between security and privacy leans more on the security side if the introduction of 
surveillance systems or other crime prevention follows high profile cases such as murders or 
terrorist attacks. The public favour privacy over security when personal data are misplaced or 
lost by the same governing bodies promoting safety and security. This chapter highlighted 
that where the public lack confidence that the technology is being used fairly and correctly, 
support for ANPR will suffer.  
 
Results presented in Chapters Four and Five reflected police and public perceptions about 
ANPR and explored ways in which ANPR could be improved as a policing and public 
reassurance tool. The following chapter goes beyond perceptions, experience and processes 
to investigate ANPR’s impact on crime. 
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Chapter Six: Results (III) 
(How) Can We Assess ANPR’s Impact on Crime? 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters have identified the main factors limiting ANPR’s potential 
effectiveness as a policing tool and highlighted ways in which these limitations could be 
addressed so that police practice could be enhanced. Chapter Five argued that some of the 
identified ANPR limitations could inhibit public confidence in the police use of such 
surveillance technologies and careful consideration should be given to balance the need for 
privacy and safety in order to reassure the public. Surprisingly, however, there was strong 
public support for ANPR and expectations that it could bring significant benefits to policing, 
reduce crime and the fear of crime. Consultation with the police mirrors these findings and 
highlights high expectations about ANPR’s potential to improve police effectiveness and its 
impact on crime reduction. 
 
However, perceptions, knowledge and experience of ANPR do not necessarily demonstrate a 
link between any of the factors identified as benefits to policing and the actual effectiveness 
of ANPR, particularly with regards to its impact on crime. As highlighted previously, 
although ANPR is a crime prevention surveillance technology widely used in the UK, little is 
known about the extent to which it actually impacts on crime and criminal behaviour. 
Research regarding ANPR’s effectiveness is limited to the measures based on the outputs of 
ANPR deployments with intercept teams (e.g. arrests, seizures, Fixed Penalty Notices). There 
is a clear need for a more in depth assessment regarding the impact of ANPR in disrupting 
criminal activity and reducing crime – and results from the consultation with the police 
confirm this. For example, there is a belief that the level of number plate theft in West 
Yorkshire has increased since the introduction of ANPR in the area. Similarly, there is a 
belief that ANPR had an important role in the overall reduction of vehicle theft, by improving 
the recovery of stolen vehicles. The whole rationale behind ANPR is to reduce crime, but to 
what extent is this true? The need for a thorough impact evaluation of ANPR is pressing, 
particularly given the current context of debates about the effectiveness or failure of the 
criminal justice system in dealing with crime and the increased demand for policy-related 
research aiming to identify 'what works' in crime prevention. 
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It was previously stated that the current study is not an impact evaluation of ANPR. The main 
objective of this thesis is not to answer whether ANPR reduces crime, rather to identify the 
processes underpinning the development of ANPR and identify both drivers and barriers to 
its effectiveness, with the aim to produce new and systematic knowledge which would have 
an impact on the improvement and development of ANPR. Indeed, the researcher has tried to 
reach beyond this purpose, exploring the extent to which traditional ways of measuring an 
intervention’s impact on crime could be applicable to new surveillance technologies such as 
ANPR. The aim was to explore the feasibility of such an approach and identify possible 
avenues and techniques to employ which could potentially demonstrate ANPR’s impact on 
crime and criminal behavior. Hence this chapter has two main objectives: to present the 
findings of a pilot study exploring changes in police recorded crime following the 
introduction of ANPR and to consider the extent to which these changes could be attributed 
to ANPR (by identifying the main challenges to the process of measuring ANPR’s impact on 
crime). 
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6.2. Research rationale 
The literature review argued that ‘opportunity’ theories provide some support for the 
hypotheses that ANPR has the potential to impact on crime by deterring/de-motivating 
potential offenders, or more likely by increasing the risks of detection to potential offenders. 
More specifically, ANPR could impact on crime by: 
• Reducing certain types of crime (e.g. theft of motor vehicles) in areas covered by 
ANPR and the vicinity (the diffusion of benefits); 
• Increasing certain types of crime as a result of avoidance techniques (e.g. theft of 
number plate) and  
• Displacing crime (e.g. change of location and time of crime, target, method and type 
of crime).  
 
The current study focused on the county of West Yorkshire, with particular emphasis on the 
district of Bradford, which comprised the most comprehensive ANPR system at the time, 
otherwise known as the ‘Big Fish’. The system was introduced in Bradford City Centre in the 
spring of 2004, pioneering the first network in the country (outside London) of fixed ANPR 
cameras linked into the existing CCTV network and placed strategically at locations around 
Bradford City Centre (aiming to create a ‘ring of steel’ effect). The cameras were enabled 
with ANPR software to capture all vehicles entering the City Centre of Bradford and 
instantaneously check the registration number against police databases. If a vehicle was 
wanted in connection with criminal activity, officers were immediately alerted269. 
 
The rationale behind the introduction of ANPR in Bradford was to reduce serious and volume 
crime in Bradford, in particular crime associated with the use or theft of motor vehicles. The 
expectation was that ANPR would achieve this by leading to more arrests and vehicles 
recovered as a result of more effective police interventions and investigations. The 
stakeholders involved in the development of ANPR in Bradford believed that the system 
would be a powerful tool to enable the gathering of information on the majority of vehicles 
entering the city centre for both immediate (real-time) police interventions and post-incident 
                                                 
269
 However, following the high number of alerts generated by the system within the first weeks of being active, 
it was decided to filter these alerts and bring to the attention of the police only vehicles currently recorded as 
stolen or those which are of significant interest to the police (i.e. vehicles linked to serious offence such as rape, 
abduction or murder). 
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investigations. The implementation of the ANPR system in Bradford was supported by media 
publicity, with the aim of deterring potential offenders and increasing public confidence270. 
West Yorkshire Police publicly stated the aims of the project and the benefits expected from 
the police use of ANPR in the area. 
 
Some of the benefits emerging from the police use of ANPR in Bradford, West Yorkshire 
have already been mentioned in the previous chapters, particularly with regards to ANPR’s 
input in serious crime enquiries, such as the investigation into the murder of PC Sharon 
Beshenivsky. But ANPR’s potential to impact on levels of crime has not previously been 
explored. 
 
Following the theoretical assumptions presented above and police strategy and practice with 
regards to ANPR in West Yorkshire, this pilot study aimed to assess whether there was a 
reduction in theft of motor vehicle, as originally intended, or an increase in the number of 
thefts of number plates, as rational choice theory and interviews with police officers would 
indicate. Proving a link between ANPR and any changes in crime rates is however not a 
straightforward process. As was previously argued, the methodology used to assign any of 
the changes in crime rates to ANPR is limited and raises further questions which future 
research into ANPR’s effectiveness would need to address. 
 
6.3. Crime data analysis in the current study 
The study used a quasi-experimental design, with before and after measures of crime in 
geographical areas identified as being covered by ANPR cameras (‘target’ areas) and, to a 
certain extent, in comparison ‘control’ areas (non-ANPR areas). Depending on the level of 
analysis, changes in police recorded crimes which were expected to be linked to ANPR (e.g. 
theft of motor vehicle and theft of number plate) were measured for a period of 23 months 
prior and post ANPR implementation. A full account of the methodology used in this study 
and its limitations is presented in Chapter Three of the thesis. For clarity of understanding of 
                                                 
270
 The Big Fish was one of the most publicised ANPR systems in the country and in particular in West 
Yorkshire because of the input in the investigation into the murder of PC Sharon Beshenivsky. Strong messages 
were used for deterrent benefits, such as: ‘The bottom line is that if a stolen vehicle comes into Bradford City 
Centre, we will know about it (West Yorkshire Police Press Release, 5th May 2004). 
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the results, information on the crime data analysis and the types of statistical tests used is 
outlined in the following sections. 
 
6.3.1. Types of crime 
As previously mentioned, the offence of ‘theft of motor vehicle’ (TOMV) was chosen 
because it is one of the crimes most commonly targeted by ANPR technology, being 
highlighted within the specified aims and objectives of the ANPR project (i.e. the aim of the 
project was to impact on this offence). The actual number of offences per month was large 
enough to permit analysis and measure changes in theft of motor vehicles in the target area 
and control area (see below). Theft of number plate offence was thought to be relevant 
because of counter-measures and the rational offender. The limitations attached to the 
analysis of this particular offence were highlighted above, particularly in terms of accuracy of 
the recorded crime data for this offence. The study paid attention to any changes in counts of 
theft of number plate offences at county level, rather than at district level – where the ANPR 
cameras were installed. It was hypothesised that, if the rational offender decides to steal 
number plates to avoid the ANPR cameras in the Bradford South area (target area), then they 
would not necessarily steal these number plates from vehicles in the Bradford South area. 
 
The difficulty of finding a suitable control for the target area and the limitations of police 
crime data used in the analysis acted as constraints in achieving a methodologically rigorous 
research design as defined by the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale. The intention was to 
take some steps to minimise the threats to internal validity by using ‘crime controls’ in 
addition to the ‘geographical controls’, e.g. crimes least expected to be influenced by ANPR 
like domestic violence and criminal damage. However, as will be shown later, no statistically 
significant percentage changes were identified between the target and control areas. 
Therefore the inclusion of ‘crime’ controls was no longer an option and the analysis was not 
included in the chapter. 
 
6.3.2. Areas of analysis 
As previously argued, identifying two entirely comparable areas or groups is an almost 
impossible task. This was the case in the current study, where it was difficult to identify a 
control area matching the target area. One of the limitations was that there was no official 
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record of the exact areas where ANPR was deployed in West Yorkshire or was there relevant 
information about the capacity of each system or the extent to which it was used at any 
particular time. It was very hard to collect evidence about the use of ANPR in practice – it 
appears that ANPR was present in all areas to varying extents, although there was an evident 
gap between the potential and the real use of ANPR. Results from the qualitative research 
presented in the previous chapters highlighted this problem. It was also difficult to compare 
the deployment of ANPR within different divisions, as they appeared to use different tactics 
and approaches to ANPR. For appropriate divisional comparisons, the research would have 
had to look beyond West Yorkshire and find comparable areas in other parts of England and 
Wales where ANPR was similarly implemented during the relevant period. The data was not 
available to the researcher and it was not therefore possible to identify such comparison areas 
for analysis – the previous chapters have highlighted inconsistencies in the implementation of 
ANPR within police forces in England and Wales and significant differences in infrastructure 
and approach to ANPR. 
 
Following consultation with West Yorkshire Police and the exploration of in-force 
documents with regards to the development of ANPR in West Yorkshire, it emerged that 
ANPR was not consistently used throughout the county within the timeframe for analysis, 
making it very difficult to pinpoint distinct areas completely free of ANPR. There is some 
evidence indicating that ANPR has been undertaken in West Yorkshire since the beginning of 
October 2002, but this was limited to the deployment of mobile ANPR systems (in particular 
laptops) and ad-hoc divisional ANPR activity. Bradford South Division appears to be the 
only one able to use CCTV in conjunction with ANPR in 2004 (the first comprehensive fixed 
ANPR system in West Yorkshire), with a consistent approach to responding to and 
investigating crimes identified through the system. In 2005, Leeds and Wakefield also 
introduced fixed ANPR systems which they could place ordinary CCTV through – although 
in terms of capacity and use, these did not match the Bradford South system. The exact date 
of their implementation could not be identified and the extent of their use could not be 
quantified. All the data from deployments prior to January 2008 had not been retained by 
West Yorkshire Police, so no information could be collected regarding the use of ANPR in 
the rest of West Yorkshire during this period. Between 2004 and 2006 (period of 
investigation), the police argue that the Big Fish ANPR system (24/7 fixed ANPR linked to 
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CCTV) in Bradford was the most comprehensive and most frequently used ANPR system in 
West Yorkshire271. Hence the area covered by these cameras was considered the most 
appropriate target area for a potential experiment. It was estimated that other ANPR 
deployments (in-car systems) were too sporadic/ad-hoc to have had a significant impact on 
crime. The target area was taken as the division/Basic Command Unit (BCU) boundary of the 
area covered by the Big Fish ANPR system, i.e. Bradford South Division. At district level, 
the target area was taken as the boundary of the entire district of Bradford. For the offence of 
theft of number plate, the county of West Yorkshire was considered the most appropriate 
target area in order to explore any changes in levels of crime in the period following the 
introduction of ANPR. 
 
Therefore, the analysis was conducted at two main levels in order to explore changes in crime 
levels post-ANPR: district and county level. To further investigate the extent to which these 
changes could be attributed to ANPR, a divisional level analysis was included, where 
changes in crime rates before and after ANPR in the target area were compared against 
changes in a control area. Table 6.1 below illustrates these levels of analysis and their 
corresponding types of crime, areas and periods under consideration: 
 
Table 6.1 Levels of analysis in the current study 
 
Level of 
analysis 
Type of crime 
Target 
area 
Control 
area 
Baseline 
period 
Post 
implementation 
period 
Division 
Theft of motor 
vehicle 
Bradford 
South 
Keighley 
Feb 2002 – 
Jan 2004 
Feb 2004 – 
Jan 2006 
District 
Theft of motor 
vehicle 
Bradford 
Feb 2002 – 
Jan 2004 
Feb 2004 – 
Jan 2006 
County Theft of number plate West Yorkshire 
Feb 2002 – 
Jan 2004 
Feb 2004 – 
Jan 2006 
 
 
                                                 
271
 The ANPR system in the Leeds City Centre appears to be the nearest in terms of comparison with the system 
in Bradford City Centre (with even bigger capacity), but as it was installed late 2007, it falls outside the scope of 
the current analysis. 
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6.3.3. Measuring change in crime rates 
The baseline conditions and changes in the targeted offences after the implementation of 
ANPR were analysed by calculating monthly and overall crime counts and rates, as well as 
percentage change. The analysis included individual-level police recorded crime data 
provided by West Yorkshire Police272 for theft of motor vehicle and theft of number plate in 
order to produce crime counts and identify temporal changes in the level of crime in the 
target and comparison areas. The crime counts were cross-checked against the 2001 Census, 
updated against the Office for National Statistics (ONS) mid-year population estimates273, to 
produce crime rates which were expressed as per 1000 population. Rates describe the number 
of crimes per target at risk. The question is, however, is the population the most appropriate 
denominator for vehicle theft or is it vehicles? There are of course limitations using 
residential populations to calculate crime rates, particularly when the crime under 
investigation is vehicle crime. Concentrations of vehicles could differ from concentrations of 
populations, but it is more problematic to produce estimates for vehicles. This study 
acknowledged this limitation and used residential population to generate crime rates for each 
area. This is the same methodology typically used in England and Wales crime statistics. 
 
The mean/average was reported for each area and crime type. The mean is a measure of 
central location and is equal to the sum of the individual values divided by the total number 
of values. The mean was used in the study to represent the typical number of offences 
occurring each month during different time periods. Based on the calculated mean values 
during the period under investigation, simple percentage changes in the average number of 
offences per month by area and crime type were estimated. This calculation compared the 
number of offences in the 23 months before and after ANPR was implemented. Percentage 
change is based on the difference between average monthly post-implementation figures and 
                                                 
272
 Data used for the purpose of this analysis is that on which a crime was recorded onto the West Yorkshire 
crime system, comprising the ‘date 1st crimed’ for the specified offences, which is the official time recorded by 
the police for a crime; that means the incident was reported, it was recorded and was classified as a crime. 
273
 Mid-year estimates are the official set of population estimates for the UK and constituent countries, 
consisting of annual published estimates from 1981 onwards. Additional supporting data published with the 
population estimates provide information about population change between the reference year and previous 
Mid-Year Population Estimates. Figures presented show the number of moves and the volume of movement per 
1000 population, both within the UK and internationally. Information available from: 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/about-statistics/methodology-and-quality/quality/qual-info-economic-social-and-bus-
stats/quality-reports-for-social-statistics/mid-year-population-estimates--mye-.pdf). A more recent update for 
2007 has been published, but not yet implemented into West Yorkshire Police for population statistics.  
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average monthly baseline figures. Temporal trends in crime are shown via graphs indicating 
monthly change of crime counts for a period of 23 months prior to and following the 
installation of ANPR. 
 
6.3.4. Statistical significance of change 
The data were first analysed to establish whether there was a normal distribution. This was 
carried out using the Shapiro-Wilk test, as there were between 12 and 48 pairs within the 
sample274. Results indicate that Shapiro-Wilk is greater than 0.01, therefore variables are not 
normally distributed. As the crime rates differed from a normal distribution, a non-parametric 
test was selected for analysis of these data. The Wilcoxon matched pairs signed-rank test is 
the non-parametric version of the paired Comparison T-test and is used for data from 
repeated measures and matched pairs designs. The Wilcoxon test was selected due to the 
nature of the data being studied (ordinal level of measurement) and because the data were 
abnormally distributed. The Wilcoxon test was run to obtain information about the size of the 
difference between the two members of a pair – in this case, to establish whether changes in 
crime levels between the baseline and post implementation periods were statistically 
significant in the control and comparison area. 
 
6.3.5. Measuring change relative to control area 
Estimates of the number of theft of motor vehicle prevented as a result of ANPR can be 
produced by posing the counter-factual, that is, what would have happened if theft of motor 
vehicle change in an area subject to intensive ANPR intervention (Bradford Big Fish ANPR) 
followed the trends in comparable areas without intensive ANPR activity? This type of 
analysis is fairly widely practised in evaluation studies275. Under this approach the expected 
number of theft of motor vehicle is generated by applying the theft of motor vehicle rate in 
the comparison area and changes in this over the evaluation time period, to the action area. 
The number of theft of motor vehicle prevented can then be valued in terms of how much has 
been saved as a result of intensive ANPR (Big Fish). 
 
                                                 
274
 Shapiro-Wilk test is generally used for samples < 50, whereas for samples 50+ the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
is typically used (de Vaus, 2002). 
275Tilley (2002); Johnson et al. (2004); Cummings (2006). 
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6.4. Results: theft of motor vehicle crime 
The research findings of this pilot study are broken down into two crimes - theft of motor 
vehicle and theft of number plate. 
 
A key question is whether the introduction of ANPR led to a reduction in the level of theft of 
motor vehicle crime in Bradford, which was one of its key objectives. Therefore, the analysis 
focused mainly on the Big Fish ANPR system in Bradford and changes in levels of crime in 
the areas covered by it after its introduction. Hence the target areas in this instance were 
Bradford South Division and Bradford District. Where possible, control areas have been 
identified in order to eliminate as far as possible other potential explanations of the effect. 
 
6.4.1. How has crime changed in the target area during the period of interest? 
As Figure 6.1 shows, there was a steep reduction in theft of motor vehicles in the period 
following the introduction of ANPR. When the data is aggregated across the entire district of 
Bradford, a reduction of 44% can be identified in the rates of theft of motor vehicles from the 
baseline to the post-implementation period. At divisional level, similar reductions were 
identified, with 39% fewer motor vehicle thefts in the two years after ANPR in Bradford. 
Thus the implementation of Big Fish ANPR coincided with an overall decrease in theft of 
motor vehicles in Bradford. But, as will be explained below, this reduction forms part of a 
longer term trend, thus is unlikely to be attributed to ANPR alone. 
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Figure 6.1 Theft of motor vehicle rate in Bradford District before and after the implementation 
of Big Fish ANPR System (rate per 10,000 population) 
 
 
 
6.4.2. How significant is the change? 
As a change has been identified, the next step is to explore whether the difference between 
these two periods shows a statistically significant reduction in crime rate. Two different 
techniques could be used to check this. Firstly, the direction of correlation - time vs. crime 
trend - to explore whether levels of crime change in association with time. Secondly, 
Wilcoxon test using average monthly rates for the period before vs. period after ANPR. 
 
The results indicate that there is a marked reduction in theft of motor vehicle crime over the 
entire period under investigation in Bradford South division. The correlation276 is negative 
indicating that, as time passes, crime goes down. The correlation is significant at the 0.01 
level (2-tailed). Wilcoxon Signed ranks statistical test indicate that the rate after the 
introduction of ANPR is significantly lower than before ANPR (p < .002). For more 
information regarding the results from statistical tests, see Appendix 3. 
                                                 
276
 In order to choose the appropriate type of statistical tests to be used, a normality test was first conducted 
using Shapiro-Wilk to explore whether there was a normal distribution. The test indicates that the distribution 
was not normal (p > .01), hence a bivariate correlation was used (Spearman’s Rho) and the Wilcoxon Signed 
ranks statistical test. 
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6.4.3. To what extent could these changes be attributed to ANPR? 
But what does the change tell us? The data indicate that crime is decreasing significantly, but 
it is unknown if ANPR have had any impact. There are a number of confounding factors that 
could have contributed to the identified changes in crime rates, regardless of ANPR. 
Moreover, as there is a clear indication that the trend started before ANPR, it could be the 
case that the changes are due to a factor other than ANPR. No matter how one looks at the 
data (from different time points), there is a continuation of an established trend. Given these 
considerations, the first option would be to stop the analysis here. However, the following 
section explores the challenges of investigating this further, assuming that the findings from 
part one of the analysis were different. In other words, what would be required to conduct 
such an analysis and what the likely challenges would be? 
 
First, we would have to investigate the counterfactual inference, which is what would have 
happened without the intervention, in this case, ANPR. In order to do this, a control area 
needs to be selected in order to compare change within an area which is expected to have 
received the intervention with change in a non-intervention area. As indicated in the 
methodology chapter of the thesis, this area has to be similar in all relevant respects to the 
target area (e.g. size, layout, socio-demographics, crime problems etc), with the exception of 
the presence of ANPR.  
 
However, identifying a comparable area was a difficult task. After the exploration of 
numerous options, it was estimated that the best pair for analysis would be Bradford South 
Division (target area) and Keighley Division (control area). The control area lay within the 
same district as the target area and exhibited similar characteristics to the target area. For the 
purpose of the experiment, the difference between the two areas was that the area covered by 
Bradford South division comprised a comprehensive 24/7 monitored ANPR-CCTV system 
(the Big Fish), while the area covered by Keighley division was estimated to be free of 
ANPR or having experienced very limited or ad-hoc mobile ANPR deployment within the 
timeframe of analysis277. 
 
                                                 
277
 Other options were also explored, for example using Bradford City Ward as a target area and Keighley 
Central Ward as the control area. But similar limitations were identified. 
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In order to check whether Keighley was a good control area for analysis, crime levels in 
Keighley divisions before ANPR were compared with crime levels in Bradford South 
division before ANPR. Wilcoxon278 Signed ranks statistical test indicate that Bradford South 
(target area) and Keighley divisions (control area) had significantly different crime rates 
before the introduction of Big Fish ANPR (p < .002). This highlights a further caveat to this 
analysis, as the control area is not as comparable with the target area as initially assumed. 
 
Table 6.2 below indicates that the average rate for theft of motor vehicle in the baseline 
period in the target area (Bradford South division) is 17.5, while in the post-implementation 
period this is 10.6. In the control area (Keighley division), the average rate for theft of motor 
vehicle in the baseline period is 7.7 and in the post-implementation period 4.5. When 
comparing the data from the target areas with data from the control areas, it emerges that 
there was a 39% reduction between the average baseline and post-implementation period in 
the target area (Bradford South Division), while there was a 41% reduction in the control area 
(Keighley Division). 
 
 
Table 6.2 Changes in theft of motor vehicle rates after the introduction of Big Fish ANPR 
 
Target area (Bradford South Division) Control area (Keighley Division) 
Baseline Post-implementation 
Change in 
Target 
Baseline 
Post-
implementation 
Change in 
Control 
17.5 10.6 -39% 7.7 4.5 -41% 
 
 
 
The Wilcoxon Signed ranks statistical test indicates that crime in the Bradford Division area 
is significantly lower after ANPR compared to before (p < .002), but this is also the case in 
the Keighley Division area (p < .002). This, combined with the fact that the decline in the 
control area was greater than in the target area, makes it unlikely that the decline in Bradford 
was due to ANPR. 
                                                 
278
 Shapiro-Wilk test for normality indicated that Bradford was not normal (p > .01) and Keighley was normal (p 
< .01), but because there was a mixture, a non-parametric test i.e. Wilcoxon was used (de Vaus, 2002). 
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This suggests that, if ANPR is having an impact, it is not reflected in the figures. That is 
probably because ANPR is but one small factor in the crime prevention landscape. More 
pronounced (than expected) changes in the control area could indicate that some other 
factor/variable influenced the change in both the control and target area or that there was a 
diffusion of benefits to areas outside the target area, including the control area. This could 
also be a result of the fact that the control area was not completely free of ANPR, and the 
effectiveness of the ANPR system in Bradford South (Big Fish) was not more effective than 
any (potential) mobile ANPR deployed within the control area (e.g. Keighley) within this 
timeframe. Also, as the trends appears to have already started before ANPR, it could be an 
indication that something else has generated the change, but ANPR could have had an 
influence only in sustaining the change. 
 
Therefore, the analysis has its limitations. The level of contamination was unknown and the 
differences between the two areas which could have had an impact on crime during the 
period under investigation were not taken into account. Not only that, but there is an 
indication that crime levels were significantly lower in the area covered by Keighley division 
than those in the Bradford South area before the implementation of ANPR, showing that the 
control area did not perfectly match the target area from a crime level position. However, 
these impediments are not specific to Bradford; the same would be encountered in other areas 
in West Yorkshire or in the UK. Ideally, there should be numerous control and target areas, 
but it was not feasible in this case. 
 
6.4.4. Measuring change relative to the control area 
To overcome these limitations, the best option would be to compare change in the target area 
relative to the control area. Firstly, the ratio of changes in the comparison area is calculated 
for the periods before and after ANPR. If the ratio is ‘1’, it means that crime is the same 
before and after the intervention (i.e. ANPR) in the control area (i.e. Keighley Division); if 
the ratio > ‘1’, it means that crime is going up, and of course if the ratio is < ‘1’, crime is 
going down. The ratio change here is 0.59, which shows that theft of motor vehicle crime is 
going down in the comparison area. 
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But what happens if the target area changes at the same pace as the control area (assuming 
that there was no ANPR in the first place)? In order to find out, there is a need to apply the 
ratio of change (0.59) to the total number of crimes in Bradford South division before ANPR. 
That gives the total number of expected crime of 2563. From here, there is a need to compare 
the number of crimes that actually happened (N=2658) to the expected number of crimes 
(N=2563). This results in 95 crimes more than would be expected (see Table 6.3 below).  
 
 
Table 6.3 Change relative to control area 
 
Keighley 
Before 
Keighley 
After 
Ratio of 
Change 
Bradford 
Before 
Bradford 
Expected 
Bradford 
Observed 
Difference/Crime 
"Created"* 
2864 1683 0.5876 4361 2563 2658 95 
 
*Created as opposed to reduced 
 
Therefore the analysis points to no crimes being ‘prevented’ as a result of ANPR. Although, 
given the problems with the comparison group and the number of potential factors that could 
have impacted on crime levels, these results are inconclusive and should be treated with 
caution. 
 
6.4.5. Detections of theft of motor vehicle crime 
It could also be argued that the decrease in theft of motor vehicle crime is likely to be a result 
of more efficient policing, in terms of increased detection rates. Detection rates for theft of 
motor vehicle in Bradford South and Keighley for the two years before and after the 
implementation of ANPR were therefore analysed (February 2002 – January 2006). Non 
parametric correlations279 (Spearman’s rho) indicate that there is a low to moderate reduction 
over time in detection rates for theft of motor vehicle. Results indicate that, before ANPR, 
detection was going down280; after ANPR, detection rates are slightly increasing281. Wilcoxon 
Signed ranks test indicates that the change in detection rates in Bradford South Division after 
the introduction of ANPR is not significant, the same for Keighley Division. Therefore the 
results are inconclusive. Although it appears to be a slight upward trend in detection rates 
                                                 
279
 A test of normality indicated that data were not normally distributed, hence non parametric correlations 
(Spearman’s rho) and Wilcoxon Signed ranks tests were used to explore changes in detection rates over time 
and their statistical significance. Emerging tables are presented in Appendix 3. 
280
 Moderate to substantial correlation, statistically significant at the 0.05 level, 2-tailed. 
281
 Low correlation, but not statistically significant. 
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after the introduction of ANPR, there are lots of fluctuations and the identified increase is not 
statistically significant and the timing does not appear to coincide with the introduction of 
Big Fish ANPR in Bradford. 
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6.5. Results: theft of number plate crime 
Another key question is whether the introduction of ANPR has coincided with a change to 
the level of theft of number plate offences, as one of the assumptions was that, due to the 
rational offender taking counter-measures, there might be an increase in this type of crime not 
only on Bradford, where ANPR was introduced at the time, but within the entire county of 
West Yorkshire. 
 
Table 6.4 below shows changes in the levels of theft of number plate offences in West 
Yorkshire two years after the introduction of Big Fish ANPR system in Bradford (February 
2004). 
 
 
Table 6.4 Theft of number plate offences following the introduction of Big Fish ANPR 
West Yorkshire County282 
 
Month 
Average baseline Average Post-implementation 
Change 
Crime count 
Rate per 10,000 
vehicles* 
Crime count 
Rate per 10,000 
vehicles 
Feb 138 1.36 123 1.27 -11% 
Mar 156 1.52 157 1.67 1% 
Apr 153 1.52 135 1.61 -12% 
May 136 1.35 136 1.48 0% 
Jun 129 1.27 127 1.25 -2% 
Jul 129 1.26 121 1.23 -6% 
Aug 159 1.57 137 1.58 -14% 
Sept 137 1.35 148 1.44 8% 
Oct 167 1.61 164 1.65 -2% 
Nov 148 1.44 154 1.45 4% 
Dec 146 1.42 145 1.26 -1% 
Jan 147 1.42 138 1.30 -6% 
*There were 1,055,000 vehicles registered in West Yorkshire in 2006 
 
 
Surprisingly, there was a small non-significant283 overall reduction of theft of number plate 
offences (3%) in West Yorkshire in the two years following the implementation of Big Fish 
                                                 
282
 As Theft of Number Plate is not a Home Office recordable offence, the figures were extracted by conducting 
a property search on West Yorkshire’s crime system (Corvus) in Property Sub Type. Duplicate reference 
numbers were removed and only ‘stolen’ plates were counted. 
283
 Wilcoxon Asymp.Sig (2-tailed) = .100 (p > .05). 
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ANPR, results which contradict the assumption that the introduction of ANPR in West 
Yorkshire has generated high rates of number plate theft. 
 
Interestingly, these results do not reflect the national trend showing an increase in rates for 
theft of number plate offence. British Crime Survey (BCS) data indicates that, nationally, the 
number of plate thefts has increased from 3 in every 10,000 motor vehicle owners 
interviewed in 2002/2003 to 10 in every 10,000 vehicle owners in 2004/05284. The results of a 
survey conducted by DVLA of 17 police forces in Great Britain indicate that the recorded 
crime estimate is even higher than that derived from the BCS - 15 recorded number plate 
thefts per 10,000 registered cars. This is unexpected as recorded police crime figures tend to 
underestimate crime victimisation because of under-reporting and recording, but it could be 
because police recorded crime data include theft from commercial vehicles, which are not 
covered by the BCS. This could also be the case as the police data include false reports or 
because the data are unreliable (difficulty of retrieving records of number plate thefts could 
under or over-estimate the problem285) or they might be recorded as something else (e.g. 
criminal damage, theft from motor vehicle etc). These results highlight the need for further 
research looking at theft of number plate incidents in West Yorkshire, but also nationally, to 
explore the difference between the emerging trends. 
 
                                                 
284
 Webb and Raykos (2006). 
285
 Consultation with West Yorkshire Police confirms this, highlighting that theft of number plate is an offence 
not easily identified in their crime recording systems. 
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6.6. Emerging issues and limitations 
This chapter provided the results of an analysis exploring changes in levels of crime after the 
implementation of ANPR in West Yorkshire, with particular emphasis on the district of 
Bradford. Results indicate that the introduction of Big Fish ANPR system in Bradford 
coincided with statistically significant reduction in theft of motor vehicle crime at division, 
district and county level. This is not to say, however, that ANPR was the drive behind these 
changes. When looked at more closely, changes in theft of motor vehicle crime were 
consistent across both target and control areas which provides support to the hypothesis that 
these changes were due to factors other than ANPR. 
 
The challenges involved in measuring the impact of ANPR on crime have been discussed in 
the introductory section of this chapter and at greater length in Chapter Three of the thesis. 
The main difficulty has been the inability to find adequate control groups. This has been 
compounded by the inability to collect comprehensive information on the timeline and 
capacity of ANPR projects within West Yorkshire, and the inability to explore and identify 
geographical areas outside West Yorkshire. The previous chapters of the thesis indicate that 
there is little understanding on how to use ANPR effectively and there is an ad-hoc approach 
to ANPR both in development and response (i.e. there are different ANPR systems developed 
and implemented at different times and locations). There is inconsistent data collection and 
the monitoring system in place to assess its outcomes is limited and irrelevant. All these 
factors make it difficult to be meaningful when it comes to effectiveness. 
 
It was also difficult to gather data on how the areas covered or targeted by ANPR compared 
to each other in terms of aims, objectives, funding levels and timing. It proved to be difficult 
to gather such data retrospectively. There were contradictions regarding the actual dates for 
the implementation of ANPR and little or no information regarding the extent to which 
ANPR was actually used in the timeframe for analysis. It was estimated that the most 
comprehensive ANPR system used within this timeframe was the ‘Big Fish’ ANPR 
implemented in Bradford in 2004, hence the choice to use Bradford as a control area within 
the study. It was highlighted that the comparison areas might have been ‘contaminated’, 
although the extent to which this was the case was unknown. As argued above, to minimise 
such validity threats, this pilot study adopted additional approaches, such as examining 
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change at different levels (intra divisions and within district) and employing statistics to 
explore the significance of these changes. 
 
But what does a change in crime rates tell us? An additional major difficulty faced by this 
research – and most studies exploring the impact on crime – is the ability to attribute change 
to the intervention under investigation. It would be inappropriate to attribute the identified 
changes in recorded crime figures to the implementation of ANPR. Questions about why 
crime trends are changing are very important, but also very hard to answer. In addition to the 
limitations to the experiment (e.g. the contaminated or inappropriate comparison areas), to 
fluctuations in recording crime, there are a variety of other factors that might cause changes 
in crime rates. All areas under investigation showed a statistically significant reduction in the 
levels of theft of motor vehicle crime, but not a greater reduction in the target areas than in 
the control areas. Hence it is unlikely that any impact was produced by ANPR alone and the 
reduction of crime could be attributed to other confounding factors, as would be suggested by 
the fact that the control and target areas experienced similar reductions in crime and that a 
downward trend in levels of theft of motor vehicle began before ANPR was installed both in 
Bradford and West Yorkshire.  
 
Changes in crime rates over time may be due to factors other than the introduction of ANPR. 
The crime reduction outcomes for example may have benefited from the contribution of 
concurrent high visibility operations including police officers or Police Community Support 
Officers (PCSOs), which would have occurred regardless of the deployment or use of ANPR 
technology. It could have been an effect of designing out crime interventions, changes in 
policies, changes in number of intake or release of prisoners. Many of these factors could lie 
beyond police interventions or even policing more broadly defined, for example non-crime 
orientated policy interventions such as urban regeneration (improved lighting in the city 
centre of Bradford for example286), socio-economic factors which could be local specific or 
national/international, such as the current recession (higher prices for petrol, high 
unemployment rates etc), changes in legislation regarding the number plates and number 
plates providers which are believed to have impacted on the level of theft of number plate 
offences and the number of cloned vehicles; improved security measures for vehicles, which 
                                                 
286
 Crawford et al. (2004).  
 245
is believed to have decreased the opportunities for theft of motor vehicle and have fuelled the 
increase of a new type of burglary (Hanoi-style) where, as a result of new vehicle designs, 
offenders have decided to break into people’s homes to steal the keys before making off in 
their vehicle. 
 
One can also argue that decreasing or increasing crime rates are linked to the efficiency of the 
criminal justice system in dealing with these crimes. For example, increased crime rates 
might have something to do with detection or conviction rates; if these are falling, offenders 
might be more willing to take criminal opportunities, as they perceive the risks of being 
caught and punished are lessened. However, results regarding the detection rates for theft of 
motor vehicle crime in Bradford are very inconclusive. The current study cannot establish to 
what extent the reduction in theft of motor vehicle crime is due to deterrence, detection rates 
or other factors. Further research and analysis will be needed to make such a correlation. 
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6.7. Concluding remarks 
This chapter argued that establishing a link between ANPR and crime is not a straightforward 
process. Not only because it is generally hard to establish such causal relationships (as argued 
above), but also because ANPR cannot be singled out as sole intervention in a given time-
frame or area. ANPR is a tool used in conjunction with other police interventions and is 
generally deployed as part of a wider crime reduction initiative; hence isolating the relative 
contribution of all individual factors is intrinsically problematic. Whilst unclear regarding 
which intervention contributed to which reduction, it would be more appropriate and practical 
to focus on how any such impact might have or could have been produced. As Pawson and 
Tilley (1997) would put it, which crime reduction mechanisms in operation through the 
deployment of ANPR might have triggered the specific beneficial outcomes?’  
 
It is important to measure ANPR’s impact on society and crime reduction, however the 
difficulties highlighted in this chapter reflect that this is a very difficult process and numbers 
do not necessarily tell us everything. This brings to light the strength of the qualitative data 
presented in the previous chapters; perceptions, experience, implementation and business 
processes are equally important in assessing the effectiveness of a crime prevention initiative. 
The experimental/quantitative approach tends to produce ‘descriptions of outcomes, rather 
than explanations of why programs work (or fail)287. A thorough evaluation needs to take into 
account the whys and hows of outcomes, the macro and micro social forces that influence 
outcomes, a context-mechanism-outcome pattern configuration (CMO configuration) which 
would enhance understanding of what works, for whom and in what circumstances and 
develop transferable lessons from research to policy and practice288. Many crime reduction 
initiatives have a short life cycle. Although there may be a substantial reduction in crime to 
begin with, this can fade over time, therefore sustaining the effect is the key element289. 
 
Although limited, the analysis included in this chapter is useful, as it contributed to 
knowledge into an area which has not been explored before. Links in the causal chain 
between the intervention and the outcome need to be further investigated290. There is 
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 Pawson and Tilley (1997: 30). 
288
 Pawson and Tilley (1997: 214-220); Sherman et al. (2002). 
289
 Tilley and Laycock (2002). 
290
 Farrington (2003: 54).  
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certainly a need for a more thorough examination of this subject, but such an analysis falls 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Further questions emerge such as: 
• How can ANPR’s impact on crime be measured? Measured against what? Is the 
experimental design an appropriate approach? Do we ask the right questions? 
• How do we detect change? What does it mean? To what extent can any identified 
changes in crime rates be attributed to ANPR? What else could account for these 
changes? 
• Is the change related to deterrence or detection or both? 
• What do offenders think of ANPR? Are they aware of it? Do they perceive ANPR as 
a threat? Does ANPR impact on offenders’ behaviour, modus operandi and journey to 
crime? 
• To what extent is crime displaced as a result of ANPR (e.g. geographical, temporal, 
tactical and functional displacement)? 
 
The message from this Chapter is that understanding the role and impact of new technologies 
such as ANPR goes far beyond the analysis of crime statistics. It requires a range of 
approaches to uncover the wider implications of its use including how ANPR is perceived by 
the police and local communities. In the final chapter these perspectives are brought together 
and directions for further research are discussed. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This thesis was improvement oriented. It sought to explore the benefits and limitations to 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) technology as perceived by the police and the 
public with a view to provide a clearer understanding of its role and use as a policing tool and 
inform existing practice and future policies. Although additional analysis was conducted to 
measure ANPR’s impact on crime, it should be noted that the intention of this research was 
not to conduct an outcome evaluation. Research findings presented in this thesis reflect police 
perceptions, knowledge and experience of ANPR, but do not necessarily demonstrate a link 
between any of the factors identified in the research process and the effectiveness of ANPR 
in reducing crime. 
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7.2.  Emerging issues 
The results presented in this thesis suggest that ANPR is a valuable policing tool. However, 
there is a strong indication that ANPR’s real potential is far from being realised in practice. 
Results point to a range of technical, organisational, political and cultural factors which 
appear to have led to recurrent disappointments in what has been delivered on the ground. 
The thesis illustrates the ad hoc way in which policy is often made especially when there are 
so many stakeholders and changing priorities. It has shown how complex is the process of 
putting policy into practice, particularly when it is not clear who owns the policy – local 
level, county force level, Home Office. There is an indication that there is top-down policy 
making with pressures to roll out ANPR and at the same time there is ad hoc local policy 
being generated from the mix of technology and local priorities. 
 
Given the strong case for ANPR argued in this thesis and the intrinsic limitations, what is 
then realistically possible? 
 
Following research into the views of the police and the public, the thesis has proposed ways 
in which ANPR could be improved both as a policing and a public reassurance tool. This 
research suggests that if police forces consider the recommendations presented in this thesis, 
ANPR would become a more efficient policing tool through a strong strategic approach from 
the ‘top’ which would influence motivation and commitment at the ‘bottom’, through more 
knowledge about ANPR’s potential and effectiveness and through information sharing and 
effective partnership work. Chapter Four argued that it would be beneficial if police forces 
shifted focus from developing the technology and the infrastructure - which appear to have 
improved in the last couple of years in terms of better coverage and functionality – to 
developing business processes and systems to enable ANPR to become an effective 
mainstream policing tool. In the context of the current economic climate there are, of course, 
political issues at stake in deciding which problems are priorities and what crime prevention 
tools should be used to address these problems with already overstretched resources. The 
thesis highlighted how complex it is to put policy into practice and the difficulty the police 
have, particularly at local level, to decide where to commit resources, at times of constantly 
shifting objectives and priorities dictated by the government.   
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Chapter Five argued that the public strongly support the police in using ANPR technology, 
but it also highlighted that, due to lack of knowledge and understanding of ANPR, public 
expectations with regards to ANPR effectiveness tend to be unrealistic. If the public expect 
ANPR to be so effective in catching criminals and reducing crime, then there is pressure for 
the police to meet these expectations. Thus it was argued that the public would benefit from 
better understanding of the technology and its capabilities. The thesis also highlighted that 
people are as much concerned about privacy as they are about safety and security. It was 
believed that support for ANPR would suffer if the public lacked confidence that the 
technology was being used correctly and with respect to their rights. Incorporating 
appropriate privacy protection within ANPR’s legal framework could be one way to boost 
public confidence; tangibly demonstrating that ANPR is effective in reducing crime and fit 
for purpose could be another. 
 
Finally, Chapter Six highlighted the difficulties in evaluating ANPR’s impact on crime. 
ANPR is not a usual crime prevention initiative and it is hard to isolate its impact. The 
discussion pointed to theoretical, methodological and policy obstacles to conducting a 
rigorous outcome evaluation with this regard. Nevertheless, the links in the causal chain 
between the ANPR and the stated outcomes need to be further investigated. The need for a 
thorough impact evaluation of ANPR is pressing, particularly given the current context of 
debates about the effectiveness or failure of the criminal justice system in dealing with crime 
and the increased demand for policy-related research aiming to identify 'what works' in crime 
prevention. 
 
Considering the gaps identified in the literature review, the thesis sought to explore in depth 
ANPR’s role and use as an investigative tool. Evidence emerging from the current research 
indicates that ANPR is a source of intelligence that has the potential to add considerable 
value to both post-incident investigations and proactive intelligence operations. Examples of 
operations where ANPR had a valuable input were presented in the thesis. It was argued that 
the police have a good appreciation of some of the benefits of ANPR in post-incident 
investigations, particularly in terms of its capability to: 
• Start new lines of enquiry and bring in new evidence into an investigation; 
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• Corroborate or challenge existing evidence and more specifically, alibis; undertake 
queries and searches which were not possible before, particularly in terms of tracing 
vehicles by exact location, time, date and sometimes direction of travel; 
• Narrow down the number of queries, suspects and witnesses; and 
• Save time in an investigation and facilitate the recovery and use of additional 
evidence (e.g. fingerprints, DNA, CCTV etc) crucial to the identification, arrest and 
prosecution of offenders. 
 
Specific benefits to proactive investigations and intelligence development were also 
identified, particularly in terms of ANPR’s potential to profile a suspect or a crime problem, 
facilitate a more efficient and cost effective deployment of officers and provide intelligence 
to enable the prediction of crime and early identification of threats.  
 
However, the thesis highlighted that police perceptions about ANPR’s role as an investigative 
tool are more likely to be based on their judgement about the potential rather than the 
realised benefits of ANPR. It was argued that the gap between ANPR’s perceived potential 
and current police practice is explained by the significant obstacles which need to be 
overcome before ANPR’s role as an investigative tool could be fulfilled. These include: 
• A focus on number plates and vehicles rather than individuals, which ultimately 
renders ANPR evidence disputable in a court of law; 
• A fragile and limited ANPR technology; 
• A reliance upon the accuracy of intelligence used in conjunction with ANPR (which 
was proved to be inadequate and out of date); 
• Limited or incompatible infrastructure and information technology; 
• Little understanding and expertise of ANPR; 
• Lack of commitment (both rank and file); 
• Lack of funding and resources; 
• ANPR labelled as a ‘traffic’ policing tool and 
• Limited information sharing and partnership work. 
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These are recurrent themes which appear to act as impediments to the effective use of ANPR 
within investigations and as a policing tool in general. 
 
The thesis suggests that implementing ‘non-traditional’ ways of policing is a challenging and 
slow process291. Improving ANPR’s effectiveness within crime investigations and 
intelligence development would necessitate cultural and operational changes within policing. 
For example, policy makers and practitioners alike need to have the right attitude and skills to 
enable the analysts to conduct extensive and exploratory data analysis and to enable a more 
‘proactive’ approach within policing. Police analysts typically produce patterns of crime to 
inform targeted enforcement and contribute to strategic tasking and coordination. It was 
argued that the full potential of ANPR in intelligence operations and investigations can only 
be achieved if ANPR intelligence is layered with other sources of intelligence, analysis which 
could help towards better understanding criminal behaviour and crime patterns. Inferences 
need to be drawn from all available intelligence (including ANPR) in order to inform tactical 
operations, in terms of ‘what’, ‘where’, ‘when’ and ‘who’ to target. The literature review has 
highlighted a series of theories relating to offending patterns, the role of opportunity in crime, 
displacement etc. ANPR intelligence could be used to test or develop these theories. ANPR 
evidence is just a piece of a puzzle, a small but significant contribution to the ‘who’, the 
‘where’, the ‘when’, the ‘why’, the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of an investigation. ANPR 
intelligence could be the missing link in the bigger picture of policing. 
 
However, implementing new ways to improve ANPR’s effectiveness as an investigative and 
an intelligence policing tool takes ANPR beyond its ‘stated’ and ‘legal’ intent. The thesis 
argued that, for ANPR to produce valuable evidence in post-incident investigations, there is a 
need for a more certain link between the number plate, the vehicle and the driver. The image 
of the vehicle and its occupants could be very important in the investigation of a kidnapping 
for example. But if this is extended to the entire driving population (which is assumed 
‘suspect’ in an investigation until proven otherwise), the journeys of possibly innocent people 
are analysed for the purpose of the investigation. While there is value of the image helping in 
crime investigations, capturing the image of drivers and passengers in a vehicle could also be 
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 This is in line with research conducted by Bullock, Erol and Tilley (2006), which argue that shifting from a 
reactive to a proactive approach within policing is a difficult process. 
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seen as very intrusive. This raises issues around the infringement of civil liberties particularly 
of those individuals whose vehicles do not generate ANPR hits, hence are, for what we know, 
law abiding citizens. Gathering, storing and analysing information on movements of innocent 
people could have significant value in a future investigation, the potential to solve undetected 
crime or identify unknown criminals, but is it the right thing to do? 
 
The impact on people’s privacy will be affected by the location of processing (local versus 
central), what information is stored and for how long, who has access to it and for what 
purpose. With the development of the National ANPR Data Centre (NADC) it is estimated 
that the journey of millions of motorists across Britain will be recorded every day, as they 
drive on motorways, main arterial roads or within city centres. The records of the number 
plates are to be kept for two years and the capacity could be extended to allow the data to be 
stored for up to five years. The aim is to generate intelligence for the police and MI5 to build 
up a picture of the movements of suspects or identify cars that could be connected to a crime. 
But this is in contrast with what the police typically say about ANPR. The tagline ‘ANPR 
tracks vehicles not people’ is not entirely accurate given the interest in linking the driver to 
the registered owner or persons wanted by the police and particularly where the image of the 
vehicle comprises the driver and the passengers. Storing the movements of innocent members 
of the public for up to five years could be perceived by many as an invasion of privacy. 
 
This is where ANPR moves a step forward. As argued in the Literature Review, ANPR has 
the potential to bring us closer to a ‘maximum surveillance’ society. ANPR is no longer about 
vehicles and number plates, but about individuals, their offending history or potential 
‘associates’. If such a scenario extends to the entire population, which then becomes subject 
to ANPR surveillance, strong concerns about infringement of civil liberties might be raised. 
As discussed in the literature review, a shift towards the management of risk (through 
enhanced surveillance, intelligence gathering, data collection and dissemination) has become 
an important function of the modern police. In this context, populations are seen as particular 
bearers of risks and surveillance systems gather information on the whole population rather 
than on suspects or known offenders. Everybody is a suspect; everybody is assumed guilty 
until proven otherwise. ANPR surveillance is such an example, as it collects and stores 
information on the entire driving population without any evidence of offending. ANPR 
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systems can collect information on individuals on the basis of possible association with 
known offenders or suspects; hence interest and suspicion are attached to individuals without 
them even being aware of it or without having done anything wrong. This discussion appears 
to be similar to the debate around the collection and storage of DNA samples for the entire 
population. If this is becoming a common trend within policing, are the necessary safeguards 
in place to protect citizens’ rights? Have the government, the police and the legislators 
considered the wider implications of such an approach? 
 
The data produced by the ANPR systems can, under the provision of the Data Protection Act 
1998, only be used for the purpose for which it was collected. The thesis argued that, if 
ANPR’s use expands beyond the initial stated objectives, then there is a need for new 
regulations and legislation. This is due to a so called ‘policy creep’. The policy ‘creeps’ 
partly as it is realised what the technology can do and partly as government/police priorities 
change. A centralised system such as the National ANPR Data Centre (NADC) invites new 
users and uses. If NADC become fully operational and effective in tracking people’s journeys 
across the country, there is more of a need for strong legislation to regulate such extended 
use. Although there are currently strict rules about who has access to what, the overall 
intrusiveness of the process does not diminish. As with most surveillance technologies, 
ANPR has developed at a faster pace that the legislation regulating its use. There are aspects 
that are still vague in particular with regards to the purpose of collecting information on 
entire driving populations or ways to notify the public of being under ANPR surveillance. 
Ensuring that the use of ANPR intelligence is strictly regulated is a first step towards 
legitimising ANPR and ensuring the protection of people’s rights. The legislation needs to be 
in line with the latest developments in the ANPR arena and its use by the police or partners.  
 
Further consultation with the public is also critical. People might be less supportive of ANPR 
if ANPR surveillance surpassed its stated intents and the information that has been collected 
for one limited purpose was gradually allowed to be used for other purposes. The thesis 
highlighted that people are currently happy about the police use of ANPR, but would they 
hold the same views if the situation changed? Results emerging from focus groups with the 
public and qualitative analysis indicate that people are as concerned about their privacy as 
they are about their security. There are concerns about the security of personal information 
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and the proportionality of its use. Recent examples of loss of ANPR data292 point to the need 
for great care in decisions about collecting information about the entire driving population. 
 
It might be possible to protect people’s safety and privacy without compromising one or 
another, as long as all stakeholders – the government, the police, technology providers, 
legislators and regulators – work together to ensure the technology fulfils this dual purpose. 
This process needs to incorporate appropriate legislation, extensive public consultation and 
outcome evaluation regarding ANPR to provide evidence that the technology is effective in 
reducing crime and fear of crime, fit for purpose and compliant with key privacy and data 
protection requirements. 
 
But is the loss of civil rights matched by the gains in catching criminals? The public argue 
that the loss of privacy might be acceptable worth if the use of such technologies would 
indeed be effective. The thesis argued that there is limited evidence regarding ANPR’s 
effectiveness in reducing crime. The question is, however, is reducing crime the only social 
good that we aspire for? At what cost are the public prepared to accept these measures? There 
is little emphasis on the deficits of such approaches, both in terms of privacy and the 
expenditure of public money. If an ANPR cost-benefit study is to be conducted, it needs to 
consider the costs to the community, including loss of privacy, as well as the benefits, 
although it should be acknowledged that both costs and benefits could be intangible and 
therefore difficult to quantify. Future evaluations need to consider ANPR’s impact on crime, 
fear of crime, as well as the wider socio-political and ethical implications of ANPR 
surveillance. 
                                                 
292
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7.3.  Research limitations and methodological reflections 
As with the majority of academic study, this research inevitably suffered from some 
methodological difficulties. Although the main research limitations have been highlighted 
within relevant sections of the thesis, three interesting points emerge. Firstly, it is important 
to highlight that the research presented in this thesis was undertaken against a backdrop of 
significant developments within the ANPR arena, both with regards to policy and practice. 
The methods utilised within the three years subject to investigation had to be adapted to cater 
for these changes. When the research commenced in early 2006, the police use of ANPR was 
very much ad-hoc and scattered across the UK and there was little information about ANPR’s 
role within policing. The early findings from the research were new and valuable, but three 
years and many interviews later, the situation changed. Some of the information emerging 
from the initial interviews became outdated. To overcome this limitation, additional hours 
were spent in the field and a systematic review of emerging documents was conducted to 
gather additional information about any emerging issues and developments. Moreover, a 
follow up electronic survey and a small number of interviews were conducted in 2009 to 
capture some of these changes and inform the research. The electronic survey had its 
limitations, as it was quantitative in nature and did not generate the depth of knowledge and 
understanding emerging from the initial set of face to face interviews. 
 
The thesis was largely qualitative in nature, exploring perceptions about ANPR’s role and 
usefulness as a policing tool and as a public reassurance tool. However, perceptions, 
knowledge and experience of ANPR do not necessarily demonstrate a link between any of the 
factors identified as benefits to policing and the effectiveness of ANPR in reducing crime, for 
example. To compensate for this gap, additional quantitative analysis was included to explore 
ANPR’s impact on crime - although it was made clear it was not intended to conduct an 
evaluation of ANPR’s impact on crime. The most appropriate available tool for such an 
analysis was found to be the quasi-experiment. It was concluded, however, that there were 
too many obstacles to obtaining a suitable comparison group that a quasi-experiment would 
not be feasible. Thus no definitive could be drawn regarding the effect of ANPR on crime, or 
its effect on displacement, and as there is no evidence of crime reduction, there is no point in 
measuring displacement. The analysis in Chapter Six demonstrated just how difficult it would 
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be to evaluate the impact of ANPR on crime rates in a methodologically rigorous way. It was 
argued that more consideration needs to be given to the methods used in the evaluation of 
crime prevention measures, particularly when the measures are not necessarily theoretically 
driven, as was the case with ANPR. The conclusion is, if we do try to analyse the benefits of 
ANPR in reducing crime, more research into what would be the right measurement tools and 
the right questions to ask is necessary. 
 
Finally, it could be argued that the overwhelming public support for ANPR questions the 
validity of results emerging from the public opinion survey. While a vast majority of 
respondents to the postal survey appear positive about ANPR (89%) with no worries about its 
potential impact on civil liberties (86%), the focus groups highlight the fragility of people’s 
views about this issue, showing that people are much more concerned about their rights than 
the postal survey appear to indicate. The lack of knowledge about this new emerging 
technology could have rendered people unrealistic or too positive about ANPR’s 
effectiveness in improving crime detection and crime reduction within their communities. 
Although the use of the postal survey provided some validity to the study particularly with 
regards to the generalisibility of findings, the researcher believes that using a self-completion 
questionnaire dominated by closed questions was probably not the best way to assess this 
topic. This puts in perspective the validity of certain research methods when measuring 
public opinion, particularly when it comes to new topics or the debate about privacy vs. 
security. With hindsight, the researcher would have used more qualitative data to generate the 
main results in this section. 
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7.4. Contributions to knowledge 
This research provides a baseline on how ANPR is used and how it is perceived by the police 
and the public in the first decade of the 21st Century. 
 
The current research was ‘exploratory’ as it aimed to develop understanding in an area which 
was under-researched and little understood. It was ‘descriptive’ as it sought to use this 
information to provide a more accurate picture of ANPR both locally and nationally, looking 
in detail at the police and the public’s view about its effectiveness in enhancing police 
activity and reassuring the public. It was, to some extent, ‘explanatory’ as it used and tested 
hypotheses (in light of the existing literature and the theory) to examine whether ANPR can 
have an impact on certain types of crime. The research could also be considered 
‘emancipatory’ as it had an ‘action’ perspective to it, looking at promoting change and 
improvement in the ANPR arena. 
 
The thesis has contributed to knowledge about the investigative potential of ANPR. Ways in 
which ANPR becomes a valuable tool in proactive and reactive investigations were 
highlighted, particularly ANPR’s potential as an inductive tool for identifying patterns of 
crime and criminal behaviour. This research is important for, not only, did it explore how 
police practice could be improved, but also, it flagged up some of the issues surrounding the 
measurement of ANPR’s impact on crime, pointing out the difficulties of conducting a 
rigorous outcome study. The analysis exploring ANPR’s impact on crime contributed to 
knowledge into an area which has not been explored before and highlighted important 
questions and areas for further work. Additionally, the thesis has brought significant 
contributions in the area of public perceptions of ANPR surveillance. The first of its kind, the 
public opinion study filled a gap in our understanding of the public’s view of ANPR cameras 
and surveillance and privacy issues in general. Bringing together police and public 
perceptions about ANPR, the thesis generated more understanding of the debate around 
privacy vs. security. One can argue that the debate in this thesis about how to effectively 
deliver crime prevention strategies while protecting people’s rights is transferrable to other 
policing tools. The findings of this research have relevance to other crime prevention and 
crime detection tools such as CCTV, facial recognition and DNA. 
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Given its ‘real world enquiry’ nature, this PhD study not only aimed to produce new 
knowledge, but also to have an applied use in relation to policy and practice. The policy 
implications of this thesis are important to note, as often researchers will concentrate on the 
criminological theory side, not realising that the added value of the work may be less about 
crime theory than about the policy/practice process. The practical contributions of the 
research are significant. Interim results were already used to inform ANPR practice and 
strategies at local and national policing level. For example, the police, ACPO and NPIA were 
provided with a systematic report reflecting the public’s views about ANPR. Papers were 
written in practitioners’ journals such as Jane’s Police Review and the National Community 
Safety Network (NCSN) News to disseminate results and emerging recommendations at 
national level. Emerging results influenced national ANPR stakeholders and policy makers to 
include more public consultation on this matter, as well as to decide against a proposal to use 
ANPR in conjunction with cameras for speed enforcement purposes. 
 
In addition to the applied nature of the research, this thesis also offers new theoretical insights 
into travelling distance to offending and intelligence-led policing – approaches which were 
highlighted in the literature review. The thesis argued that criminals appear to travel longer 
distances than initially thought, although more research is needed to explore the validity of 
this evidence. Crime does not have geographical boundaries, police forces do. Criminals 
travel in cars on roads which cross forces’ borders. The implications for policing practice are 
significant. The thesis highlighted a gap in linking up crime intelligence between police 
forces. Linking and analysing intelligence on criminals who travel beyond force boundaries 
would help the police solve more crime and possibly detect repeat or serious offenders. The 
use of ANPR intelligence would be very useful to track the movements of these ‘travelling’ 
criminals. However, this is not a straightforward process. Establishing an effective 
‘proactive’ inter-forces approach challenges established policing practice and requires a 
cultural change, effective information sharing and partnership work, as well as new systems 
and resources in place, which is a slow and expensive process. 
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7.5. Areas of further research 
As previously argued, the police use of ANPR is an area that has been under researched 
within the field of criminology. This thesis has attempted to address some of the gaps 
identified, focusing on ANPR’s role as an investigative policing tool and a public reassurance 
tool. Through the course of this thesis a number of potential avenues for future research, both 
for academics and practitioners (the police) have become apparent. 
 
It was argued, for example, that one evident direction of future research is an impact 
evaluation of ANPR. The thesis highlighted the importance of demonstrating ANPR’s 
effectiveness in reducing crime and fear of crime, but argued that evaluators need to be aware 
of the impediments to measuring such an initiative. Future research has to acknowledge 
methodological and cultural limitations. Studies aimed at answering difficult questions about 
ANPR’s effectiveness as a policing or crime prevention tool do not fit easily with the police’s 
culture to place primary importance on the achievement of narrow targets, measured by basic 
statistical indicators. The research tradition within British policing is not strong293, as policing 
is typically rooted in common sense and experience. Evidence-based policing is typically 
perceived by officers as an academic, non-practical exercise. Of course that in depth research 
and analysis can appear slow and difficult compared with short term targets and time scales 
required in operational policing. But it would be beneficial if the police were more open 
about research and analysis to identify and investigate crime issues as they emerge294. 
 
In an uncharted area of academic study, this thesis provides a starting point for further 
research into ANPR’s potential impact on offender behaviour (e.g. modus operandi, journey 
to crime, types of crime) and displacement. The researcher has already started a collaborative 
study with West Yorkshire Police, exploring further avenues to measure ANPR’s impact on 
crime (including displacement) and criminal behaviour (changes amongst persistent 
offenders). 
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 It was also argued that the police would benefit from further research in order to measure the nature and 
extent of the inaccuracies on ANPR hotlists and to identify best ways to improve the quality of intelligence 
placed on these hotlists. 
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The thesis also argued that future research should recognise and further investigate public 
perceptions about ANPR and the emergence of more ‘intrusive’ surveillance technologies. 
Further research that builds upon the current study should be commissioned in West 
Yorkshire and beyond to understand what the public considers to be legitimate levels of 
surveillance and the factors that drive up public confidence. The aim would be not only to 
improve understanding of public’s perceptions about ANPR surveillance and address gaps in 
research, but also to determine if levels of confidence in the police use of ANPR change over 
time295.The thesis argued that it would be beneficial if these studies were more qualitative in 
nature, involving public forums, focus groups and interviews. Emphasis should be placed on 
including victims of crime, offenders, ethnic minority groups (particularly Islamic 
communities), young people and people living in Urban Prosperity ACORN areas – as these 
groups appear to be less likely to participate in research or more likely to have divergent 
views.  
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measured, support for effects of CCTV tends to diminish after its installation (Skinns, 2000; Gill, 2007). 
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7.6. Final comments 
Despite the cautious tone of some of these conclusions, it is important not to forget the 
benefits found from the police use of ANPR and that some of its elements have not only 
produced useful research results but spawned new thinking and new practice initiatives. Not 
all policing tools can necessarily cover all aspects of crime reduction and community safety, 
so maybe would it be more beneficial to concentrate on a specific area where there is 
evidence of effectiveness? ANPR’s investigative potential is its key strength and the police 
should concentrate on improving ANPR in this area as a primary objective and reflect this in 
future ANPR strategies. Maybe the national policing strategy for ANPR should place less 
emphasis on ‘general crime reduction’ and more on the use of ANPR in investigations and 
solving crimes. 
 
The limitations identified throughout this thesis (some of which limited the validity of 
identified inferences from the results) does not mean the original objectives of the study have 
been unmet. Indeed, these were satisfied as the research provided exploratory value and 
contribution to the understanding of ANPR’s role as a policing and public reassurance tool 
and the implications for policy and practice. The study objectives have been addressed and 
further areas of study have been identified.  
 
The thesis throws a new light on the impact of a new technology and the associated 
development of policy and practice. In some ways the research presented here could probably 
be used to develop some more general points about this in other policing departments like 
Forensics or within fields outside the police, like Health. 
 
The area of contemporary debate about liberty and security is a key element of this research. 
It is in the context of this debate that policy is made and adapted and practice is initiated and 
evolves. This thesis started with a note of concern about the wider implications of ANPR 
surveillance and the impact on civil liberties. It has been argued that ANPR has the potential 
to bring us closer to a ‘maximum surveillance’ society. However, whilst these concerns 
remain we should not yet be resigned to technological determinism. A myriad of technical, 
operational, governance and institutional problems hamper its realisation. The potential, 
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however, is ever-present in the technology and if function creep does occur, ANPR will fulfil 
this potential. 
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Appendix 1 – Correspondence and research tools (Chapter Three) 
 
Invitation to Interview (Police officers and staff) 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
 
12.01.07 
 
 
ANPR and Policing: The Role of ANPR in Post-incident Investigations 
 
Invite Letter to Interview 
 
 
I am a PhD student from the Applied Criminology Centre at the University of Huddersfield. My 
studentship was awarded in April 2006 by the University of Huddersfield in partnership with West 
Yorkshire Police.  
 
I would like to invite you to take part in an interview as part of my PhD research on Automatic Number 
Plate Recognition Systems (ANPR) and their role in post-incident investigations. Before you decide 
whether to get involved in the study, I would like to explain why this survey is being carried out and 
what the interview will involve.  
 
Purpose of the survey: This interview will ask you about your opinions concerning ANPR technology 
and its use by the police, with particular emphasis on ANPR’s role and potential in post-incident 
investigations. From this study I hope to identify not only the current benefits of using ANPR as a 
policing tool, but also potential future uses of the technology which are currently not being exploited 
(i.e. missed opportunities). Hopefully, the results from the research will identify best practice and 
inform policy to enhance police effectiveness in crime detection and prevention. For more information 
on this project, please see the document attached at the end of this letter. 
  
Why have you been chosen? You have been selected because I am interested in the views of all Police 
Officers who have been nominated ANPR champions for each force in the UK. 
 
Do you have to take part? The participation in this research study is not compulsory. However, if you 
agree to take part, you are free to end the interview at any point without giving any reason. If you do 
take part, you will be asked to sign an agreement form giving your consent for the interview to take 
place (see below). 
 
What does the study involve? The study involves a one off interview with me. The interview should last 
about 30 minutes. I would ideally like to tape record the interview to be able to reflect your views and 
experiences more accurately, but if you would prefer otherwise, I would be happy to take notes instead. 
You can refuse to answer any sensitive questions and you can bring up new subjects during the 
interview that you think are relevant.  
 
Confidentiality: I would like to reassure you that your answers will be treated in the strictest 
confidence, i.e. your name and address will not be recorded or disclosed to any third party – any 
information you provide will not be traced back to you. I guarantee that only I will see and hear your 
answers. Your agreement form will be kept in a locked cabinet. The audio tape will be destroyed once 
the transcriptions are completed. 
 
If you decide to be interviewed, Thank You in advance for your help. Your assistance is very much 
appreciated and useful. I believe that consulting you on this matter is of great importance and I hope 
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that the results of this study will play a role in informing future policies regarding ANPR and its use by 
the police. 
 
Please let me know if you are interested in taking part. If you do, I would appreciate if you could send 
me the dates and times which would be most suitable for you (between January and August 2007). 
 
 
If you have any questions about this research study, please feel free to contact me. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
Alina Haines 
Contact details … 
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Information Sheet: background information research study 
  
The Role of ANPR in Post-Incident Investigations 
 
A three year’ research studentship was awarded in April 2006 by the University of Huddersfield in 
partnership with West Yorkshire Police. The research sets out to assess ANPR’s potential to enhance 
police effectiveness, with particular emphasis on the impact that ANPR systems can have in post-
incident investigations. 
 
Importance of ANPR research 
Previous research indicates that ANPR is an effective policing tool (PA Consulting, 2004). The use of 
ANPR technology, combined with conventional policing, has proven to have noteworthy advantages in 
dealing with crime by increasing detection and conviction rates, raising the number of offences brought 
to justice, improving safety on the road, tackling volume crime and deterring terrorism. ANPR is also 
considered to be a useful means of collecting information and improving police intelligence on known 
criminals and monitoring potentially risky populations. ANPR is already seen by the police as a unique 
and valuable tool with the ability ‘to impact positively in an intelligence led and proactive basis on 
every key area of police business’ (ACPO, 2005).  
 
However, a major gap in our understanding of the value of ANPR systems is in relation to their role in 
post-incident investigations. Existing research is limited to ANPR systems deployed with intercept 
teams as an immediate response to previously undetected criminal activity. But not enough is known 
about the effectiveness of ANPR in preventing, responding to and investigating crime. Although 
promising, the positive results regarding ANPR originate from the one published evaluation or other 
police reports which mention ANPR’s benefits. These studies do not shed light on the mechanisms 
through which ANPR intelligence influences the outcomes of post-incident investigations.  
 
While ANPR could become an invaluable policing tool in the cost-effective and timely investigation of 
crimes, more research is needed to inform good practice within police forces. The need for research and 
evaluation is also in line with the government’s demands for evidence-based policies. The ‘what 
works’ approach (Cabinet Office, 1999;  Blunkett , 2000)  involves making ‘better use of evidence and 
research in policy making and better focus on policies that will deliver long term goals’. 
 
This study will examine the role of ANPR systems in Post-incident Investigations, the ethical 
implications of the use of ANPR and the public’s perceptions about what it does and how it is 
deployed.  
 
Aims and objectives of the study 
The overall aim of the study is to generate new knowledge about the ways in which ANPR is used by 
the police, with particular emphasis on ANPR’s impact in post-incident investigations.  
More specific objectives include: 
A. Identifying the opportunities presented by ANPR; 
B. Examining how the police use ANPR in post incident investigations; 
C. Investigating the extent to which opportunities presented by ANPR data are fully exploited; 
D. Assessing the impact of ANPR on investigations and other policing activities; 
E. Exploring the public’s perceptions of ANPR; 
F. Exploring the ethical implications of ANPR; 
G. Exploring the future direction of ANPR within policing. 
 
Methodology 
In order to explore these objectives, a variety of methods will be employed: 
• Literature review of research and theory concerning policing, CCTV and ANPR. This also 
involves Police literature, HMIC reviews and ACPO documents. Literature on ethics of ANPR 
and public attitudes towards policing will also be reviewed. 
• Research Observation. This involves shadowing ANPR practitioners, attending workshops, 
conferences and seminars on ANPR and related topics. 
• Face to face Interviews with police officers and police staff involved with ANPR both at an 
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operational and a strategic level. This survey will explore existing use of ANPR, perceptions 
about its potential use and any associated obstacles to realising its full potential. Particular 
attention will be paid to ANPR’s role in post-incident investigations. 
• Thematic Focus Groups. These will be convened to explore the use of ANPR in the 
investigation of different category of incidents. 
• Case Studies. A number of case studies of investigations that have utilised ANPR technology 
will be analysed to identify advantages and opportunities presented by ANPR in the 
investigation and detection of serious offenders. 
• Documentary analysis of police records and other relevant material. The analysis will 
identify the impact that ANPR has in detecting and convicting offenders. 
• Statistical Analysis of ANPR generated data. Same as above this analysis will identify the 
extent to which ANPR has an impact on detection rates. 
• Public Opinion Survey. The survey will be undertaken to elicit the community’s views of the 
efficacy of ANPR systems and their acceptability. 
• Research Synthesis (Triangulation). This process involves bringing together the various 
strands of the study to identify the role of ANPR in post-incident investigations and to 
produce recommendations for its more effective use in the future. 
• Focus Groups (Distillation of policy recommendations). This comprises an analysis of the 
action implications of the research findings through interaction and consultation with 
practitioners and policy makers from West Yorkshire Police. The purpose is to produce 
‘realistic’ recommendations for future ANPR through a thorough analysis of the actual 
feasibility of change.  
 
The intended outcomes of this study are: 
• The production of a PhD thesis extending knowledge about the role of ANPR data in post-
incident investigations; 
• Recommendations and guidelines for the wider use of ANPR systems in post-incident 
investigations; 
• Conference presentations and dissemination of results; 
• A minimum of three peer reviewed publications and 
• An external funding application for further exploration of themes identified in research. 
 
Collaborative Studentship and other links 
This research studentship will be undertaken in collaboration with West Yorkshire Police but will 
involve establishing links with a number of national bodies including the Home Office, Police 
Standards Unit, ACPO and the Narrowing the Justice Gap Action Team. Regional and local links will 
include the crime reduction team at Government Office Yorkshire and Humberside, Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Partnerships, and Local Criminal Justice Boards.  
 
ANPR National Profile 
An important part of this research involves a comparative study between police practice in West 
Yorkshire and other British forces. It is hoped that this comparative analysis will complement the main 
focus of this research study, through identifying new perspectives and generating valuable knowledge 
for the police regarding its effectiveness.  
 
If you would like further details or wish to participate in this research, please contact Alina Haines at 
address below […] 
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Consent Form: Interviews police officers and staff 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
 
Title of the project: ANPR and Policing: The Role of ANPR in Post-incident Investigations 
 
 
 
1. I agree to be interviewed and take part in the study  
 
 
2. The purpose of the research has been explained to me and I have had the opportunity to ask 
questions  
 
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving any reason  
 
 
4. I understand that information from the interview will be treated confidentially  
 
 
5. I agree that quotes from the interview may be used in the dissemination of the results of this 
study, as long as these are anonymised  
 
 
Date: 
 
Name: 
 
Police Force: 
 
Title: 
 
Signature: 
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Indicative Interview Schedule 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANPR and Policing: The Role of ANPR in Post-incident Investigations 
 
Note for interviewer: Prior to interview, reiterate nature and purpose of research; briefly explain the 
structure of the interview and questions; ensure confidentiality; make sure consent form is completed 
and signed before the interview starts. 
 
Note for interviewer/interviewee: Questions are indicative. Respondent’s role in relation to ANPR 
will influence the way in which the following questions are addressed 
 
1. Could you please briefly describe what you do? [e.g. What is your title, what are your 
responsibilities and your role in relation to ANPR? How long have you been involved with ANPR?] 
…. 
 
2. Could you briefly describe the development and use of ANPR in your force? [e.g. What was 
ANPR used for to start with? How is ANPR used at present? What ANPR sites do you have? What are 
the advantages/disadvantages of mobile over fixed sites? What type of offences do you target when you 
deploy ANPR? Why? How do you prioritise responses to ANPR hits?] 
…. 
 
3. Could you tell me about how ANPR is used in post incident investigations? [e.g. To what extent 
do you use ANPR as a reactive tool in the crime investigation process? Are investigating officers in 
your force aware of ANPR and its potential? How were investigations conducted before ANPR? What 
does ANPR bring to the investigation? What are the advantages? What are the limitations at this 
stage?] 
 
4. Could you please give me an example of when ANPR was used in a post incident investigation? 
[e.g. How did you use ANPR? How effective was ANPR in solving the case? Why?] 
… 
 
5. If you do not use ANPR in post-incident investigations at this stage, could you please tell me 
your opinions about ANPR’s potential to be used as an investigative tool? [e.g. What are the 
advantages? Limitations?] 
…. 
 
6. Does your force use ANPR evidence in court proceedings? If yes, do you think the ANPR 
evidence is conclusive? Does it help in clearing up offences? Does it influence the police interrogation 
of suspects? How? Is ANPR evidence disclosed to suspects?] 
…. 
 
7. Do you think ANPR represents a cost effective use of police resources? [e.g. Does it increase 
clear up rates? Why do you think that? 
…. 
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8. What do you think are the main impediments to the use of ANPR? [e.g. technological 
drawbacks; resources; political issues] What do you think can be done to tackle this problem? 
…. 
 
9. What do you think can be done to improve ANPR’s effectiveness in the investigation of crime? 
And as a policing tool in general? 
…. 
 
10. Do you think ANPR has any undesirable consequences/impact on police practice? What? 
…. 
 
11. Is there resistance from the police (the rank and file) to embrace ANPR technology? 
…. 
 
12. How do you think ANPR will be used in 5 years’ time/in the future? [both the local and the 
national picture] Will new technologies render ANPR obsolete? 
…. 
 
13. Is there anything else you would like to say about ANPR that I haven’t covered in the 
interview? 
…. 
 
Thank you! 
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Invitation to Electronic Survey (West Yorkshire Police) and Completion Instructions 
 
ANPR IN CRIME INVESTIGATIONS SURVEY (OCT 2007) 
 
On behalf of Chief Superintendent … 
 
We are presently working with Huddersfield University to research the potential benefits of ANPR to 
criminal investigations with a view to identify areas for improvement regarding the use of ANPR 
within West Yorkshire Police. I know that use of ANPR varies across the Force and in its use as an 
investigation tool, and this survey is looking to assess where we presently stand.  
 
We are seeking your opinions about the use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition Systems (ANPR) 
within West Yorkshire and the role of this technology in crime investigations. The ANPR questionnaire 
is being distributed to relevant police officers and police staff within the force who are, or could be, 
using ANPR at an operational, strategic or analytical level.  
 
No specialist knowledge is required to complete this questionnaire. We are interested only in collecting 
your views about ANPR, not testing your knowledge on this subject. We assure you that the 
questionnaire is completely anonymous. The answers you give cannot be traced back to you. 
 
Your assistance is very much appreciated and useful. We acknowledge the importance of consulting 
you on this matter and we aim to use the results from this survey to inform future policies and 
developments regarding ANPR and enhance police effectiveness in West Yorkshire. 
 
Instructions for completion can be found below. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. 
 
Completion Instructions 
 
Click on the ANPR Questionnaire link below to access the questionnaire. You can use the mouse or the 
tab key to move to the next question. Use arrow keys to move between choices in the same question. 
Use space bar or the mouse to check or uncheck a box. 
 
The Questionnaire will be available for completion between 15th October and 26th October 2007. 
 
There is a combination of closed and open questions. With the closed questions you just select the 
answer it suits you best. If you prefer not to answer a particular question please leave it blank. With the 
open questions, please feel free to express your opinions by typing them in the space provided next to 
the question. 
 
Finally, please press the submit button to complete the process. 
 
Contact Details 
 
If you have any questions about this survey, please contact Alina Haines […] 
 
Link to ANPR Questionnaire: […] 
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Electronic Survey Questionnaire (West Yorkshire Police) 
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Public Opinion Survey: the Questionnaire 
 
 
ANPR Police Cameras: A Public Opinion Survey in Leeds, West Yorkshire 
 
 
We want to find out what you think about the police use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) Systems. ANPR 
cameras relate to vehicle registration numbers and are different to the usual CCTV cameras found in shops, banks etc. 
These cameras read number plates and take pictures of every passing car and automatically flag up vehicles or people 
wanted by the police. Please complete the questionnaire below by ticking the relevant boxes. Remember, the questionnaire 
is strictly confidential. Your opinions matter to ensure a safe but fair approach to community safety and crime prevention 
in West Yorkshire. Please read the information provided in the enclosed letter before completing the questionnaire. 
 
1. Were you aware of ANPR cameras before receiving this questionnaire?  
 
Yes  No  [If no, go to question 3] 
 
2. If you already knew about ANPR, where did you first find out about it? 
 
Billboard  Merchandise (e.g. key rings)  Posters/leaflets  
Internet  Newspaper – national/local   Other notices (parking, petrol stations) 
 
Radio   Peers, friends, family etc  
TV  Police notices (marked cars or vans)   
Other     [Specify]       
 
 
3. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
 
With ANPR cameras on the streets of Leeds: Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor  
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
You will feel safer      
Crime will be reduced      
Offenders will be afraid to commit crimes in the area 
covered by ANPR cameras      
Offenders will still commit crimes, but will use different 
roads where there are no ANPR cameras      
Police will respond more quickly to crimes      
Police will be better equipped to track and identify 
criminals that use the roads      
Police will get helpful evidence for criminal investigations 
and convictions      
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Road traffic casualties will be reduced      
The possibility of police discriminating against minority 
ethnic groups will be reduced      
Victims of crime will feel more reassured      
The police will be less likely to stop innocent people      
 
4. Below is a list of views or concerns people might have regarding ANPR or police video cameras in general, some of 
which have appeared in newspapers or on TV. Do you agree or disagree with them? 
 
What is your view on each of the following statements? Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor  
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
People who have nothing to hide have nothing to fear from 
police cameras      
It’s ok for the police to use hidden cameras for crime 
prevention      
The police can be trusted to safeguard information 
gathered from cameras and use it properly      
The police can be trusted to ensure that innocent people are 
not placed on police records and wrongly accused      
The police need to put up notices to advise the public about 
ANPR cameras       
It is important that ANPR cameras are used to catch 
drivers without a licence, insurance, tax or valid MOT      
The use of ANPR cameras needs to be regulated and 
monitored by an independent body of control      
Some concerns … 
ANPR can only make people feel safer if people know 
about them      
ANPR won’t help catch criminals if they know where 
these cameras are      
Evidence from ANPR cameras could be misleading      
Evidence against criminals isn’t sufficient if ANPR 
captures just number plates      
Criminals steal cars, number plates or find other means to 
avoid detection with ANPR cameras      
ANPR cameras might be used to target specific minority 
groups within the community      
ANPR cameras might be used to make money from 
penalty notices for minor driving offences, instead of 
focussing on crime 
     
ANPR cameras might be used to spy on people      
ANPR cameras represents an infringement of your civil 
liberties      
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5. In general, would you say you are more worried about invasion of your privacy or being a victim of crime? 
 
Invasion of privacy  Crime victimisation  Both privacy and victimisation  Neither  
 
6. Do you have other concerns about the police use of ANPR cameras? 
 
Yes    No    Don’t know   
  
[If yes, please write them below] 
      
 
7. Overall, what is your attitude to the presence of ANPR cameras on the streets of Leeds? 
 
Very positive  Positive  No opinion  Negative  Very negative  
 
8. In general, would you say that crime is common place in your neighbourhood? 
 
Strongly agree   Agree  Neither agree nor disagree  Disagree  Strongly disagree  
 
 
9. In general, would you say that anti-social behaviour is common place in your neighbourhood? 
 
Strongly agree   Agree  Neither agree nor disagree  Disagree  Strongly disagree  
 
 
10. Are you aware of any of these crimes and/or incidents taking place in your neighbourhood over the past 12 
months?  
 
Yes   No   [If no, go to question 12] 
 
11. What do you think are the three biggest 
problems in your neighbourhood? 
Tick up to 
3 boxes 
12. Have you been a victim of crime in the last 12 
months?       Yes  No  
 
If yes, of which of the following have you been a victim? 
[Tick as many boxes as apply] 
Anti-social behaviour   
Burglary   
Criminal damage   
Drug use and drug dealing   
Fraud or identify theft   
Other kinds of theft   
Robbery   
Sexual assault   
Theft of vehicle   
Theft from vehicle (including stolen plates)   
Violence/assault   
Other crime/incident   
[please specify]       
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13. What is your view on each of the following statements? 
 
My neighbourhood needs: Strongly Agree Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor  
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
More patrols by marked police vehicles      
More foot patrols by police officers      
More foot patrols by Police Community Support 
Officers      
More Police cameras (CCTV and ANPR)      
More street lighting      
More Community Wardens      
More burglar alarms, locks or other security systems      
Other  [Please specify]:       
 
 
     
 
About you … 
 
Please note that this information will NOT be used to identify you as an individual, but to monitor differences in 
opinion between groups of people 
 
Are you …? Male   Female  
 
How old are you?  17-24   25-44   45-64   65+  
 
Which ethnic group would you say you belong to? 
 
Asian or Asian British  Black or Black British  Mixed or Mixed British  
White or White British  Other Ethnic Group   
 
What is your employment status? 
 
Employed  Self-employed  Unemployed  Retired  
Student  
 
Domestic manager 
(e.g. housewife)  Voluntary worker  Other  
 
What is your residential status/housing tenure? 
 
Owner  Renting Council House  Renting Housing Association  
Renting Private  Shared accommodation  Other  
 
About your driving … 
 
Please indicate whether you own and/or drive a vehicle [Tick all that apply] 
 
I drive a car or vehicle that I own  I drive a company or hired car/vehicle  
I drive a car/vehicle belonging to someone I know  I don’t drive  
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If you have further comments or suggestions about the police use of ANPR in general, please write them below: 
      
 
THANK YOU for taking the time to complete this questionnaire! Please now return it using the pre paid 
envelope provided. No stamp is required. 
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Covering letter to the Public Opinion Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANPR POLICE CAMERAS: HAVE YOUR SAY! 
 
  
 
Tell us what you think and you enter a FREE PRIZE DRAW! 
 
1st PRIZE: IPod Nano or £100 M&S vouchers 
2nd Prize: IPod Shuffle or £50 M&S vouchers - 3rd Prize: £20 M&S vouchers 
 
 
This is an independent survey carried out by the University of Huddersfield and West Yorkshire Police 
regarding the police use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition Systems (ANPR). We want to know 
what the people of Leeds think of these cameras, so we would be very grateful if you could complete the 
enclosed questionnaire. 
 
Did you know … 
 
… what ANPR is? 
• ANPR is a surveillance technology that reads a vehicle’s number plate and then checks it automatically 
against police information to identify vehicles and people wanted by the police. 
 
… how it works? 
• ANPR systems work with cameras which can be placed in police vehicles or could be fixed to existing 
CCTV cameras 
• Unlike usual CCTV, ANPR cameras are placed on roads where vehicles can be monitored through 
their number plate 
• ANPR cameras are not speed cameras 
• Pictures of both the number plate and the car are taken  
 
… what do the police use ANPR for? 
• The police say that they use ANPR to reduce vehicle thefts, burglary and crime in general, but also to 
identify drivers without a licence and vehicles that are unregistered, untaxed, uninsured or without a 
valid MOT 
• The police also use ANPR for more serious crimes, such as terrorism, murder, kidnapping and violent 
offences 
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… what do the police do with ANPR information? 
• Track vehicle movements identifying wanted cars or known offenders 
• Collect evidence for criminal investigations 
• Store the information from 90 days for images to 2 years for number plates 
 
… anything about ANPR in West Yorkshire? 
• West Yorkshire Police have used ANPR since the late 90’s across the whole county 
• The biggest systems of fixed ANPR cameras in West Yorkshire are in Leeds (recently installed, 2007) 
and Bradford City Centre (since 2004) 
 
 
Your name and address have been selected at random to take part in this survey, as it is important that we hear 
from all sections of the community. We would like to reassure you that your answers will be treated 
confidentially, i.e. your name and address will not be recorded or disclosed to any third party. 
 
This questionnaire should take no longer than 10 minutes to complete. If you send it by 24th February 2008, you 
will be entered into the free prize draw. If you wish to be entered in the free prize draw please complete the 
separate sheet enclosed including your choice of prize and your name and address and send it back with the 
completed questionnaire – so that we can contact you if you win. Once received, this will be separated from the 
questionnaire so no link between yourself and the questionnaire can be made. If you don’t wish to be entered 
into the prize draw, please send the questionnaire no later than 28th February. 
 
Please return the completed questionnaire in the prepaid envelope provided. There is no need to attach a stamp!  
 
Thank you in advance for your help. Your assistance is very much appreciated and useful. It is important to 
consult the public on crime prevention and policing matters and we hope that the results of this survey will play 
a role in the policing and well being of your community. The results of the survey will be made public and 
published in relevant journals. 
 
If you have any questions about this survey, please feel free to contact me. 
 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Alina Haines […] 
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Free Prize Draw Entry and Data Protection Statement 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
FREE PRIZE DRAW! 
 
Please tick the box corresponding to the prize of your choice: 
 
IPod     M&S vouchers  
 
 
 
YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS – STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL 
 
 
If you are interested in entering the free prize draw, we need your contact details in order to be able to award the 
prizes.  
 
Data Protection Statement: All information will be treated in strict confidence and used only on this occasion 
for the purpose of the prize draw. This sheet will be separated from the questionnaire the moment the envelope 
is opened and will be kept separately. No connection between your name and your questionnaire will be 
possible.  Once the prize has been awarded, this paper will be shredded immediately.  
 
 
Please complete in capitals: 
 
 
YOUR NAME: 
 
 
 
 
ADDRESS: 
 
 
 
 
 
POSTCODE: 
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Indicative Script for Focus Groups with the Public 
   
NOTE: This script provides a guide for the focus group and wherever possible the moderator will seek to keep 
questions in order. However, feedback from the audience may require them to adjust the nature of the questions 
and the sequence of questioning. 
 
Section 1 Introduction       5 mins  
 
• Welcome, thanks and introductions. 
• Some information about focus group sessions: 
o Everything you say is confidential 
o There are no right or wrong answers 
o Please do not talk over each other – but feel free to make comments or opinions in 
response to other people’s points  
o I would like to record this – any objections? 
o The group should last for 90 minutes. 
o You have the right to leave at any time.  
o Mention refreshments/ toilets etc. 
 
Section 2  Attitudes to surveillance and Awareness of ANPR 10 mins 
 
1. What do you understand the term ‘surveillance’ to mean? 
 
PROMPT: CAMERAS, BIG BROTHER ETC… 
 
Why? How safe do you generally feel in your local area?  
 
2. How does this make you feel? 
 
MODERATOR TO ENCOURAGE BOTH SIDES OF ARGUMENT. E.G. FEELINGS OF BIG BROTHER 
SOCIETY VS. FEELINGS OF SAFETY. 
 
3. Have you ever heard of the term ANPR – Automatic Number Plate Recognition? 
 
4. What do you think this is?   
 
MODERATOR TO EXPLORE REACTION TO ANPR 
 
MODERATOR TO EXPLAIN ANPR IN MORE DETAIL: 
 
Explain the topic – ANPR -  general description of police use of ANPR, nothing specific; i.e. video cameras 
used for crime prevention purposes; cameras can read vehicle number plates etc; 
 
5. Now that we know a bit more about the background of ANPR, how do you feel about it and its 
potential use? Are you in favour or against it? (Get a show of hands to compare against the end) 
 
Why? Anyone else?  
 
 
Section 3 Use of ANPR      20 mins     
6. What do you think the police use ANPR for? [identify main uses] 
 
7. What do you think it should be used for? 
 
Positives / Negatives 
 
[prompt: For minor offences such as no insurance, tax, licence, MOT; speeding? For more serious crimes such 
as burglary, robbery, murder etc? For all crimes/everything?] 
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[prompt: if the answer is ‘no insurance’ for example, ask ‘Do you think that’s the best policing method to tackle 
it?] 
 
8. Some people might have issues around trusting the police to only use ANPR for this purpose. What 
would your thoughts be on this issue? 
 
[prompt: What sort of thing they might use it for that you don’t approve of/not happy with? Why?] 
[prompt: trust the police to use this information correctly and appropriately? Do you trust the technology?] 
 
 
Section 4 Invasions of privacy & ANPR    20  mins 
 
 
9. What do you think the term invasion of privacy means? Give me some examples. 
 
10. Would you consider ANPR to be an invasion of privacy, or not?  
Why? Reasons, what do other people think?  
 
[Identify concerns, if any] 
 
11. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the Police using ANPR for crime prevention 
purposes?  
 
 
12. What are your thoughts about the visibility of the cameras? Do you think you should be able to see 
them openly or should they be covered?  
[prompt: Should the cameras be overt or covert? Why?] 
 
13. So thinking overall, do the positives of ANPR outweigh the negatives or vice versa?  
 
[outweigh negatives vs. positives] 
 
 
Section 5 Discrimination and ANPR    10 mins 
 
 
14. Some people might be concerned that ANPR could be used unfairly against certain sections of 
society, or different groups?   
 
Why do you think this might be?  
 
If anyone agrees this is an issue, ask  Which groups might be targeted and why? 
 
[prompt: ethnic minorities, young people, ex-offenders, drivers] [Why?] 
 
 
Section 6 Overall opinion about the police use of ANPR 15 mins 
 
15. Now we had the chance to discuss some of the issues regarding the police use of ANPR, I’d like to 
ask you again whether you are in favour or against ANPR? (Test from Q5) – get a show of hands for 
numbers.  
 
 [prompt: if opinion changed, why?] 
 
a. Why are you opposed to its use?  
 
[prompt: is it a ‘civil liberties’ or ‘privacy’ issue or incompetence/preference for other policing method?) 
 
b. Why do you feel that it is a good thing?  
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[prompt: Reassurance, safety] 
 
Section 7 FINALLY…      10 mins  
 
 
MODERATOR TO SUM UP ARGUMENTS SO FAR… 
 
We are now at the end of our time, is there anything else anyone would like to add? 
 
Thank, reassure about confidentiality and Close. 
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Invitation to Focus Groups (Police officers and staff West Yorkshire Police) 
 
 
Letter 
 
On behalf of Chiefs Superintendents … 
 
Re: ANPR’s Role within West Yorkshire Police: Intelligence, Investigation and Response 
 
We are presently working with the University of Huddersfield to research the potential benefits of ANPR in 
intelligence gathering, crime investigations and response to criminality with a view to identify impediments and 
areas for improvement. Alina Haines, who is the PhD candidate working with us, is being supported by the 
force to organise three focus groups/workshops to explore these issues. We aim to use the results from these 
focus groups to inform future policies and developments regarding ANPR and enhance police effectiveness. 
 
The workshops will have specific focus and will be conducted as follows: 
1. ‘Response to ANPR’ - 20th June (10am-1pm), Carr Gate, OSD, Wakefield 
2. ‘ANPR in Crime Investigations’- 23rd June (10.30am - 2pm) Carr Gate, OSD, Wakefield 
3. ‘ANPR Intelligence’ - 25th June (9am -12) - Headquarters, Admin 4, Floor 6, Conference Room, 
Wakefield. 
 
The groups will involve 12-14 respondents representing a mixture of police officers and staff of different ranks 
and from different divisions/departments within the force. 
 
Aim of the focus groups: Explore ANPR’s current position and role within West Yorkshire Police and the way 
forward. More specific objectives: 
• Assess the potential benefits presented by ANPR in intelligence gathering, crime investigations and 
response 
• Identify actions to achieve the full potential of ANPR 
• Identify impediments in achieving these actions 
• Formulate a realistic action plan (i.e. identify actions and outcomes to be taken to ensure benefits are 
realised) 
 
Please note that the group discussions will be confidential in that your name will not be mentioned in the results 
or disclosed to any third party. There is no need to prepare for these group sessions. It is about sharing your 
opinions and suggestions on the subject. It should be an interesting and enjoyable experience. Refreshments and 
lunch will be provided.  
 
If you are not available on this day, I would really appreciate if you could suggest somebody else that could take 
your place. 
 
Regards, 
Alina Haines 
Contact details […] 
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Example of Focus Group Script (West Yorkshire Police) 
 
 ‘ANPR in Crime Investigations’ Focus Group 
 
This script provides a guide for the focus group and wherever possible the moderator will seek to keep questions 
in order. However, feedback from the audience may require him/her to adjust the nature of the questions and the 
sequence of questioning. 
 
Section 1 Introduction & housekeeping [15 min]  
 
Alina: Welcome & thank you all for attending. Explain rationale for workshop: West Yorkshire Police are 
presently working with the University of Huddersfield to research the potential benefits of ANPR in intelligence 
gathering, crime investigations and response to criminality with a view to identify impediments and areas for 
improvement. 
 
I am being supported by the force to consult with WY police officers and police staff on ANPR role and 
potential within WY Police. This is not about your knowledge of ANPR, rather your opinions about how it is 
used and how it should be used more effectively. The results from these focus groups will be used to produce 
recommendations which will inform the force strategy and future developments regarding ANPR’s within West 
Yorkshire Police (Via WYP ANPR Steering Group, Command Team Paper). 
 
Introduce other moderators and explain focus groups as above. 
 
1. First of all, can we go around the group and briefly introduce yourselves? 
 
Section 2  ANPR in Crime Investigations: the current picture [20 - 30 min] 
 
1. Do you currently use ANPR in your area of work? Is yes, how do you use it? [To what extent is it used? 
Are investigators aware of it and know how to use it?] 
 
2. What do you think are the current benefits of using ANPR in this way? [As opposed to not using it; 
Prompt: Identify the way in which ANPR helped in key investigations (make note of main benefits); explore 
how investigators would have done it differently, looking back, before ANPR; moderator to keep discussion to 
current benefits that are achieved at present, NOT achievable] 
 
Section 3 Achieving ANPR’s full potential [30 - 40 min]     
 
1. What do you think are the main factors that limit ANPR’s potential in the crime investigation process? 
[Prompt: e.g. limited resources, technological issues, system to complicated to operate; poor quality of 
intelligence on databases/hotlists; training needs] Moderator to make a list of main impediments and rank 
 
2. What changes would you suggest to make the most out of ANPR? (both in terms of how investigations are 
conducted and what ANPR can provide investigators with) 
[Prompt: Refer to limitations identified above, i.e. if technological issues were identified, then ask ‘In your 
opinion, what improvements can be made in terms of quality of ANPR systems?’ Include both ANPR kit and 
back office (VENOM); what would they like the system to provide them with in terms of capabilities, searching, 
identification etc] 
[Prompt other: if other issues identified, explore further, as above – ask their opinion about what would they 
do to make it better etc] 
 
BREAK LUNCH 12 noon [30 min] 
 
Section 4 Realistic Action Plan [30  min] 
 
Which REALISTIC actions can be taken in order to achieve ANPR’s full potential? [Moderator to refer to 
existing and possible benefits identified above; reiterate that they need to be feasible/realistic]  
 
Section 5 Other issues [20-30  min] 
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1. In your opinion, what is the best way to tackle cross-border crime? 
[Prompt: Think of a case scenario where investigation crosses division border, force border, organisation 
boundaries etc. Moderator to explore any partnership work and information sharing protocols, i.e. within the 
force, i.e. between divisions/ departments; with the local authority, the private sector; other police forces etc. 
What is current practice? Is it effective? Why? What should be done to improve this?] 
 
2. What is your opinion regarding the use of ANPR evidence in courts? 
[Prompt: Have you used ANPR evidence in courts? What was the outcome? Are you aware of any national or 
force guidelines regarding evidence and disclosure procedures? If there is such guidance, what do you think 
about it? Can it be improved?] 
 
3. What is your view on the future of ANPR within West Yorkshire Police? [Prompt: Which 
division/department should ANPR be part of? Why? Who should be responsible for ANPR within the force? 
What do you think it could be done to boost ANPR’s image at force level?] 
 
 
Section 6 Finally [10-15 min]  
 
MODERATOR TO SUM UP ARGUMENTS SO FAR … 
 
Does anyone have anything more they would like to add? 
 
Session closure; thanks and highlight expected benefits from the study 
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Example of Interview Schedule ANPR Stakeholders 
 
Interview ACPO ANPR 
 
Purpose of interview: This interview will ask you about your opinions concerning ANPR’s role and use within 
policing, with particular emphasis on national ANPR developments, guidelines and regulations, strategies and 
policies and ACPO’s role in the process. I believe that consulting you on this matter is of great importance and I 
hope that the results of this study will play a role in informing future policies regarding ANPR and its use by the 
police. 
 
Duration, confidentiality and consent: The interview should last no longer than an hour. I would ideally like 
to tape record the interview to be able to reflect your views and experiences more accurately, but if you would 
prefer otherwise, I would be happy to take notes instead. You can refuse to answer any questions and you can 
bring up new subjects during the interview that you think are relevant. I would also like to reassure you that 
your answers will be treated in the strictest confidence, i.e. your name will not be recorded or disclosed to any 
third party and any information you provide will not be traced back to you. 
 
Consent form (attached): to be signed before the interview 
 
1. Could you please briefly describe your current role in relation to ANPR? 
 
2. Last year, I conducted interviews in various police forces in the UK and identified some of the main 
limitations to the effective use of ANPR within policing. The technology around ANPR was viewed as the main 
drawback, both in terms of ANPR kit (which doesn’t always ‘do what it says on the tin’) and the versions of the 
BOF (i.e. not working properly, not user friendly etc). What is your view on this? Are you aware of any 
national guidelines that providers of ANPR technology need to comply with? Have the difficulties with 
the BOF 2 been resolved?  
 
3 From my interviews I gathered that there are significant differences in the regulation and working practices of 
ANPR across England and Wales. What can you tell me about the current national regulations of the use of 
ANPR within policing? Aside from the formal controls established by the Data Protection Act, what other 
controls, whether formal or informal (codes of practice) are in place with regards to ANPR? Who is 
responsible for their development? 
 
4 It also appears that there is some confusion regarding the use of ANPR evidence in courts, disclosure 
procedures etc. What is being done nationally to ensure that ANPR evidence is accepted by the courts in 
order to secure convictions? Are there nationally recognised guidelines that all police forces adhere to? If 
there is such guidance, could you tell me more about it? Can it be improved? Who is responsible for it?  
 
5. Most interviewees have expressed their concerns that ANPR is not taken seriously by senior police officers 
and it is not part of mainstream policing or central infrastructure, hence there are financial concerns about its 
sustainability. What do you think it could be done nationally to boost ANPR’s image at force level? 
 
6. Part of my study was to explore the public’s perceptions of ANPR, including their support for the introduction 
of ANPR, their views on its effectiveness as a crime prevention tool and any concerns about civil liberties and 
breaches of human rights. Results from my research indicate that the public are concerned about data misuse, 
technological errors and in particular Data protection. The public wants to be reassured that the data is safe 
and they need to know how it’s used and what it’s used for (‘Fit for purpose’). Similar concerns have been 
expressed by the Information Commissioner’s Office and civil liberties interests groups. Could you please tell 
me what safeguards are in place nationally to ensure that ANPR complies with ethical and legal norms? 
Do you think there is a need for further regulation? Is there anything that could be done nationally to 
increase the public’s confidence in the use of technologies such as ANPR? 
 
7. The ANPR Strategy for the Police Service 2007-2010 speaks of primary aims of reducing crime and 
terrorism, increasing the number of OBTJ, reducing road traffic casualties, making the public feel safer and 
more confident in the police service, making more efficient use of police resources. Are you aware of any 
evaluations or monitoring which assesses the impact of ANPR on these targets? 
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8. One of the key developments was the development of the NADC (National ANPR Centre) to enable the 
storage of data nationally and enable analysis for intelligence and crime investigation purposes. Has this 
proved to be a useful development in practice? If yes, details. If not, why not? You previously talked 
about challenges regarding the future NADC sustainability, do you have ideas on how to positively deal 
with this? 
 
9. What is NADC’s role to make sense of all the information that it stores? Is it for forces individually to 
help with investigating serious crimes or does it have a national role as well? (i.e. national picture, 
criminal networks, links with terrorism, SOCA etc) Is there an analyst role within the centre exploring 
and linking the data nationally? 
 
10. What role do you think the Home Office, NPIA or other government bodies should have with regards 
to ANPR? Who is responsible for ANPR nationally? 
 
11. In your opinion, how has the national ANPR picture changed compared to 2 years ago? How do you 
see future developments of ANPR in 2 years time and beyond? 
 
Anything else? THANK YOU!!! 
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Appendix 2 – Additional tables and figures (Chapter Five) 
 
Table 5.1 Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents from the postal survey 
Gender  Frequency % Sample % Leeds 2001 Census* 
 Male 712 47.0 48.3 
 Female 802 53.0 51.7 
Age  Frequency % Sample % Leeds Population 
 17-24 47 28.1 42.7** 
 25-44 384 
 45-64 567 36.9 22 
 65+ 537 35.0 15.3 
Ethnicity  Frequency % Sample % Leeds Population 
 Asian or Asian British 41 2.6 4.5 
 Black or Black British 22 1.4 1.4 
 Mixed or Mixed British 10 0.6 1.3 
 White or White British 1435 91.2 91.8 
 Other Ethnic Group 13 0.8 0.8 
Employment  Frequency % Sample % Leeds Population 
 Employed 633 40.2 58.9 
 Self-Employed 95 6.0 
 Unemployed 40 2.5 3.3 
 Retired 655 41.6 13.2 
 Student 30 1.9 10.7 
 Domestic Manager 44 2.8 5.5 
 Voluntary Worker 7 0.4 No comparison 
 Other 34 2.2 8.4 
Housing  Frequency % Sample % Leeds Households*** 
 Owner 1184 75.3 62 
 Renting - Council House 209 13.3 
25 
 
Renting - Housing 
Association 49 3.1 
 Renting - Private 52 3.3 10 
 Shared Accommodation 13 0.8 1 
 Other 37 2.4 No comparison 
Vehicle 
ownership  Frequency % Sample Households**** 
 Vehicle owner 1018 64.7 65.5 
* As not all demographic criteria are the same, comparisons were made where appropriate 
** Percentage includes 16 year olds as well 
*** Leeds households were estimated at 301,614 in 2001 (Census) 
**** Percentage of households in Leeds with one or more cars or vans 
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Table 5.2 Respondents from postal survey per ward (Leeds district)* 
No Wards Frequency %Sample %Leeds Households %Difference 
1 Adel and Wharfedale 43 3.7 2.8 -0.9 
2 Alwoodley 44 3.8 3.2 -0.6 
3 Ardsley and Robin Hood 44 3.8 2.8 -1.0 
4 Armley 39 3.4 3.5 0.2 
5 Beeston and Holbeck 39 3.4 3.4 0.0 
6 Bramley and Stanningley 2 0.2 3.1 2.9** 
7 Burmantofts and Richmond Hill 26 2.2 3.4 1.1 
8 Calverley and Farsley 61 5.3 3.1 -2.2** 
9 Chapel Allerton 29 2.5 3.0 0.5 
10 City and Hunslet 17 1.5 3.4 1.9** 
11 Crossgates and Whinmoor 50 4.3 3.2 -1.1 
12 Farnley and Wortley 53 4.6 3.2 -1.4 
13 Garforth and Swillington 38 3.3 2.7 -0.6 
14 Gipton and Harehills 32 2.8 3.5 0.8 
15 Guiseley and Rawdon 37 3.2 2.9 -0.3 
16 Harewood 38 3.3 2.4 -0.8 
17 Headingley 5 0.4 2.5 2.1** 
18 Horsforth 34 2.9 2.9 0.0 
19 Hyde Park and Woodhouse 14 1.2 3.0 1.8** 
20 Killingbeck and Seacroft 40 3.5 3.4 0.0 
21 Kippax and Methley 44 3.8 2.7 -1.1 
22 Kirkstall 30 2.6 3.0 0.4 
23 Middleton Park 43 3.7 3.4 -0.4 
24 Moortown 35 3.0 3.0 0.0 
25 Morley North 32 2.8 2.9 0.2 
26 Morley South 42 3.6 2.9 -0.8 
27 Otley and Yeadon 34 2.9 3.2 0.3 
28 Pudsey 43 3.7 3.0 -0.7 
29 Rothwell 42 3.6 2.8 -0.8 
30 Roundhay 31 2.7 3.0 0.3 
31 Temple Newsam 37 3.2 2.9 -0.3 
32 Weetwood 28 2.4 3.2 0.7 
33 Wetherby 30 2.6 2.6 0.0 
 Total 1156 100 100  
*Table comprises all respondents who have provided correct information regarding their address (postcode). 
These account for 1,156 Leeds addresses 
**Although these appear to be unrepresentative, the difference is not significant (Sample t-test) 
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Figure 5.1 Geographical representation of respondents Leeds district 
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Table 5.3 The ACORN distribution of respondents’ postcodes from postal survey against the 
ACORN distribution of Leeds population 
ACORN Category N (%) Survey 
% 
Leeds  ACORN Group 
N (%) 
Survey 
% 
Leeds 
1 Wealthy Achievers 199 (12.7) 15.4 
A Wealthy Executives 64 (4.1) 6.3 
B Affluent Greys 40 (2.5) 1.8 
C Flourishing Families 95 (6.0) 7.3 
 2 Urban Prosperity 88 (5.6) 13.3 
D Prosperous Professionals 48 (3.1) 4.0 
E Educated Urbanities 18 (1.1) 4.0 
F Aspiring Singles 22 (1.4) 5.3 
 3 Comfortably Off 436 (27.7) 28.5 
G Starting Out 41 (2.6) 3.4 
H Secure Families 255 (16.2) 17.3 
I Settled Suburbia 100 (6.4) 5.6 
J Prudent Pensioners 40 (2.5) 2.2 
 4 Moderate Means 135 (8.6) 13.9 
K Asian Communities 13 (0.8) 2.2 
L Post-Industrial Families 27 (1.7) 3.0 
M Blue-collar Roots 95 (6.0) 8.7 
 5 Hard Pressed 313 (19.9) 28.3 
N Struggling Families 183 (11.6) 17.4 
O Burdened Singles 89 (5.7) 7.4 
P High-Rise Hardship 36 (2.3) 2.9 
Q Inner City Adversity 5 (0.3) 0.7 
 Unclassified 4 (0.3) 0.8 U Unclassified 4 (0.3) 0.8 
  
Missing 398 (25.3) -  Missing 398 (25.3) - 
Total 1573 (100) 100*  Total 1573 (100) 100* 
*Figures have been rounded to one decimal place; therefore not all totals equal 100% 
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Table 5.4 Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents from the focus groups 
Characteristics 
Frequency 
Mixed Group 1 Mixed Group 2 Young People’s Group* 
Gender     
 Male 3 4 3 
 Female 6 7 7 
Age     
 <16 n/a n/a 3 
 16-24 3 2 7 
 25-44 2 3 n/a 
 45-64 2 3 n/a 
 65+ 2 3 n/a 
 Ethnicity     
 Asian or Asian British 1 1 
Various 
 Black or Black British 1 1 
 
Mixed or Mixed 
British - - 
 White or White British 7 9 
 Other Ethnic Group - - 
 Other - - 
Total  9 11 10 
*Full demographics of young people’s group were not available 
312 
 
Table 5.6 Victimisation by socio-demographic characteristics 
Socio-demographics 
Victims Non victims 
% of Total % within 
category 
% of 
Total 
% within 
victimisation 
% of 
Total 
Gender Male 20.3 (N=125) 9.7 
79.7 
(N=491) 38.3 
100.0 
(N=616) 
 Female 16.2 (N=108) 8.4 
83.8 
(N=559) 43.6 
100.0 
(N=667) 
Age 17-24 24.3 (N=9) 0.7 
75.7 
(N=28) 2.1 
100.0 
(N=37) 
 25-44 27.4 (N=90) 6.9 
72.6 
(N=238) 18.3 
100.0 
(N=328) 
 45-64 19.6 (N=96) 7.4 
80.4 
(N=394) 30.2 
100.0 
(N=490) 
 65+ 9.2 (N=41) 3.1 
90.8 
(N=407) 31.2 
100.0 
(N=448) 
Ethnicity Asian or Asian British 20.0 (N=6) 0.4 
80.0 
(N=24) 1.8 
100.0 
(N=30) 
 Black or Black British 16.7 (N=3) 0.2 
83.3 
(N=15) 1.1 
100.0 
(N=18) 
 Mixed or Mixed British 44.4 (N=4) 0.3 
55.6 
(N=5) 0.4 
100.0 
(N=9) 
 White or White British 17.8 (N=219) 16.4 
82.2 
(N=1011) 75.7 
100.0 
(N=1230) 
 Other Ethnic Group 37.5 (N=3) 0.2 
62.5 
(N=5) 0.4 
100.0 
(N=8) 
Employment Employed 23.0 (N=125) 9.4 
77.0 
(N=418) 31.3 
100.0 
(N=543) 
 Self-Employed 24.7 (N=20) 1.5 
75.3 
(N=61) 4.6 
100.0 
(N=81) 
 Unemployed 22.2 (N=8) 0.6 
77.8 
(N=28) 2.1 
100.0 
(N=36) 
 Retired 10.6 (N=59) 4.4 
89.4 
(N=496) 37.2 
100.0 
(N=555) 
 Student 20.0 (N=5) 0.4 
80.0 
(N=20) 1.5 
100.0 
(N=25) 
 Domestic Manager 26.3 (N=10) 0.7 
73.7 
(N=28) 2.1 
100.0 
(N=38) 
 Other 36.0 (N=9) 0.7 
64.0 
(N=16) 1.2 
100.0 
(N=25) 
Housing Owner 16.1 (N=163) 12.2 
83.9 
(N=850) 63.7 
100.0 
(N=1013) 
 Renting - Council House 30.3 (N=50) 3.7 
69.7 
(N=115) 8.6 
100.0 
(N=165) 
 
Renting - Housing 
Association 
15.2 
(N=7) 0.5 
84.8 
(N=39) 2.9 
100.0 
(N=46) 
 Renting - Private 22.0 (N=11) 0.8 
78.0 
(N=39) 2.9 
100.0 
(N=50) 
 Shared Accommodation 27.3 (N=3) 0.2 
72.7 
(N=8) 0.6 
100.0 
(N=11) 
 Other 17.9 (N=5) 0.4 
82.1 
(N=23) 1.7 
100.0 
(N=28) 
ACORN 
Category Comfortably Off 
16.5 
(N=61) 4.6 
83.5 
(N=308) 23.1 
100.0 
(N=37) 
 Hard Pressed 22.6 (N=58) 4.3 
77.4 
(N=199) 14.9 
100.0 
(N=257) 
 Modest Means 21.6 (N=25) 01.97 
78.4 
(N=91) 6.8 
100.0 
(N=116) 
 Urban Prosperity 23.4 (N=18) 1.3 
76.6 
(N=59) 4.4 
100.0 
(N=77) 
 Wealthy Achievers 13.1 (N=23) 1.7 
86.9 
(N=152) 18.3 
100.0 
(N=175) 
 
Total (without missing 
values, N=238) N=242 15.4 N=1093 69.5 
84.9 
(N=1335) 
 Total (valid percent) n/a 18.1 n/a 81.9 100 (N=1573) 
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Table 5.8 Correlations: Concerns about crime in the neighbourhood against perceptions 
regarding ANPR benefits* 
      CrimeConcern FeelSafer 
Spearman's rho Crime is a concern Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.083(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .001 
    N 1506 1482 
  
ANPR will improve 
feelings of safety Correlation Coefficient -.083(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .001 . 
    N 1482 1549 
      CrimeConcern ReduceCrime 
Spearman's rho Crime is a concern Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.073(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .005 
    N 1506 1480 
  
ANPR will reduce 
crime Correlation Coefficient -.073(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .005 . 
    N 1480 1546 
      CrimeConcern DisplaceCrime 
Spearman's rho Crime is a concern Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .069(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .008 
    N 1506 1465 
  
ANPR will displace 
crime Correlation Coefficient .069(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .008 . 
    N 1465 1528 
      CrimeConcern RTC 
Spearman's rho Crime is a concern Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.096(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1506 1470 
  
ANPR will reduce 
RTC*** Correlation Coefficient -.096(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1470 1533 
       CrimeConcern Discrimination 
Spearman's rho Crime is a concern Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.092(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1506 1468 
  Less discrimination Correlation Coefficient -.092(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1468 1533 
* Table above shows weak or very weak correlations between perceptions of crime in the neighbourhood and 
perceptions about ANPR’s potential benefits 
(**) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*** RTC stands for Road Traffic Casualties 
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Table 5.9 Perceived benefits of ANPR by victimisation 
ANPR Benefit 
Victimisation 
No Yes Total 
Improve feelings of safety 
Disagree (%, n) 5.6 (60) 10.1 (24)** 6.4 (84) 
Neutral (%, n) 20.2 (218) 24.5 (58) 21.0 (276) 
Agree (%, n) 74.3 (802) 65.4 (155) 72.7 (957) 
Total (%, n) 100.0 (1080) 100.0 (237) 100.0 (1317) 
Reduce crime 
Disagree (%, n) 7.4 (80) 13.0 (31)* 8.5 (111) 
Neutral (%, n) 17.7 (190) 19.7 (47) 18.1 (237) 
Agree (%, n) 74.9 (805) 67.2 (160) 73.5 (965) 
Total (%, n) 100.0 (1075) 100.0 (238) 100.0 (1313) 
Improve offender tracking 
and identification 
Disagree (%, n) 2.2 (23) 6.3 (15)** 2.9 (38) 
Neutral (%, n) 5.2 (55) 5.0 (12) 5.1 (67) 
Agree (%, n) 92.7 (989) 88.7 (211) 92.0 (1200) 
Total (%, n) 100.0 (1067) 100.0 (238) 100.0 (1305) 
Provide useful evidence 
Disagree (%, n) 1.5 (16) 5.0 (12)** 2.1 (28) 
Neutral (%, n) 7.6 (81) 6.3 (15) 7.3 (96) 
Agree (%, n) 90.9 (974) 88.7 (211) 90.5 (1185) 
Total (%, n) 100.0 (1071) 100.0 (238) 100.0 (1309) 
Improve road safety 
Disagree (%, n) 20.8 (221) 30.3 (72)** 22.5 (293) 
Neutral (%, n) 38.6 (411) 34.9 (83) 37.9 (494) 
Agree (%, n) 40.7 (433) 34.9 (83) 39.6 (516) 
Total (%, n) 100.0 (1065) 100.0 (238) 100.0 (1303) 
*Significant at the .01 level 
**Significant at the .001 level 
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Table 5.10 Perceived benefits of ANPR by Age 
Potential ANPR’s benefits 
Age of respondents who agreed or strongly agreed 
with benefits (%, n) Relationship 
(Cramer’s V) 17-24 25-44 45-64 65+ Total 
Improve offender tracking and 
identification 85.1 (40) 88.8 (334) 90.1 (501) 97.1 (508) 
92.1 
(1383) .104 (**) 
Provide useful criminal evidence 86.7 (39) 89.1 (335) 89.4 (498) 93.2 (490) 90.6 (1362) ns 
Displace crime 73.3 (33) 75.5 (284) 77.3 (428) 82.8 (428) 78.6 (1173) ns 
Reduce crime 65.2 (30) 65.7 (251) 74.6 (418) 82.0 (428) 74.6 (1127) .110 (**) 
Increase feelings of safety 63.8 (30) 59.7 (228) 71.5 (401) 86.4 (452) 73.4 (1111) .169 (**) 
Reassure victims 59.6 (28) 48.0 (181) 58.1 (319) 70.5 (368) 59.9 (896) .128 (**) 
Reduce number of police stops 42.6 (20) 47.6 (179) 59.1 (329) 70.6 (367) 59.7 (895) .144 (**) 
Deter offenders 55.3 (26) 51.5 (194) 55.3 (307) 68.2 (358) 58.8 (885) .112 (**) 
Improve police response time 45.7 (21) 46.1 (173) 49.2 (273) 63.2 (327) 53.2 (794) .113 (**) 
Reduce likelihood of discrimination 38.3 (18) 30.4 (115) 42.2 (233) 50.0 (260) 41.8 (626) .125 (**) 
Improve road safety 33.3 (15) 28.4 (106) 34.6 (193) 54.1 (283) 39.9 (597) .169 (**) 
The coefficient indicates the strength of the relationship 
All relationships are weak, but statistically significant 
*Significant at the .01 level 
**Significant at the.001 level 
ns = not significant 
 
Table 5.11 Perceived benefits of ANPR by Gender 
Potential ANPR’s benefits 
Sex of respondents who agreed or 
strongly agreed with benefits (%, n) 
Relationship 
(Cramer’s 
V) Male Female Total 
Improve offender tracking and 
identification 
90.7 (637) 93.1 (726) 92.0 (1363) ns 
Provide useful criminal evidence 89.3 (624) 91.3 (718) 90.4 (1342) ns 
Displace crime 77.4 (539) 79.9 (621) 78.8 (1160) ns 
Reduce crime 73.8 (519) 74.7 (589) 74.3 (1108) ns 
Increase feelings of safety 68.9 (484) 76.7 (606) 73.1 (1090) .093 (**) 
Reassure victims 52.9 (368) 65.1 (508) 59.4 (876) .145 (**) 
Reduce number of police stops 54.4 (378) 64.2 (503) 59.6 (881) .120 (**) 
Deter offenders 57.3 (398) 60.3 (475) 58.9 (873) ns 
Improve police response time 47.8 (331) 57.5 (449) 53.0 (780) .121 (**) 
Reduce likelihood of discrimination 39.1 (272) 43.7 (341) 41.5 (613) .093 (**) 
Improve road safety 35.7 (249) 42.7 (333) 39.4 (582) .134 (**) 
The coefficient indicates the strength of the relationship 
All relationships are weak, but statistically significant 
*Significant at the .01 level 
**Significant at the .001 level 
ns = not significant 
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Table 5.13 Perceived concerns about ANPR by Gender 
Potential concerns 
Sex of respondents who agreed or 
strongly agreed with arguments (%, n) 
Relationship 
(Cramer’s 
V) Male Female Total 
Nothing to hide, nothing to fear 85.5 (597) 91.6 (722) 88.8 (1319) .105** 
Covert surveillance 78.0 (545) 84.0 (653) 81.2 (1198) .080** 
Police can be trusted to handle ANPR data 53.5 (375) 62.2 (479) 58.1 (854) .142** 
Police can be trusted to protect innocent 
people’s rights 
47.8 (332) 56.3 (437) 52.3 (769) 
.130** 
ANPR should be advertised to the public 51.6 (356) 60.2 (468) 56.2 (824) .102** 
Independent monitoring 66.5 (462) 70.3 (543) 68.5 (1005) ns 
Awareness of ANPR cameras helps fear of 
crime 
63.5 (441) 69.4 (540) 66.6 (981) ns 
Awareness of ANPR cameras doesn’t help 
offender detection 
62.3 (433) 65.0 (504) 63.7 (937) ns 
ANPR evidence, misleading 26.2 (183) 26.6 (205) 26.4 (388) ns 
Number plates are insufficient evidence 60.1 (420) 57.1 (444) 58.5 (864) ns 
Counter-measures 84.8 (587) 81.1 (625) 82.8 (1212) ns 
ANPR discrimination 21.1 (148) 22.1 (169) 21.6 (317) ns 
ANPR, a revenue making tool 52.1 (362) 45.0 (349) 48.3 (711) ns 
ANPR, a spying tool 34.4 (241) 26.0 (202) 30.0 (443) .091** 
ANPR, an infringement of civil liberties 16.1 (112) 11.5 (89) 13.7 (201) .ns 
The coefficient indicates the strength of the relationship. 
All relationships are weak or very weak, but statistically significant 
*Significant at the .01 level 
**Significant at the .001 level 
ns = not significant 
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Table 5.14 Perceived concerns about ANPR by Age 
Potential ANPR’s benefits 
Age of respondents who agreed or strongly agreed 
with benefits (%, n) Relationship 
(Cramer’s V) 17-24 25-44 45-64 65+ Total 
Nothing to hide, nothing to fear 87.0 (40) 83.2 (311) 87.5 (491) 94.7 (498) 88.9 (1340) .108 (**) 
Covert surveillance 65.2 (30) 76.3 (287) 79.6 (440) 88.9 (464) 81.6 (1221) .126 (**) 
Police can be trusted to handle ANPR 
data 54.3 (25) 56.9 (214) 54.3 (300) 64.4 (334) 58.5 (873) .108 (**) 
Police can be trusted to protect 
innocent people’s rights 37.8 (17) 47.9 (181) 52.2 (292) 58.7 (299) 52.9 (789) .110 (**) 
ANPR should be advertised to the 
public 82.6 (38) 57.8 (216) 56.1 (312) 52.4 (269) 56.1 (835) .088 (**) 
Independent monitoring 76.1 (35) 73.2 (271) 67.9 (376) 66.0 (339) 68.8 (1021) ns 
Awareness of ANPR cameras helps 
fear of crime 73.9 (34) 64.1 (241) 65.4 (359) 70.5 (366) 
67.1 
(1000) ns 
Awareness of ANPR cameras doesn’t 
help offender detection 61.4 (27) 62.8 (238) 61.7 (338) 68.0 (351) 64.2 (954) ns 
ANPR evidence, misleading 37.0 (17) 25.1 (94) 27.8 (154) 25.0 (128) 26.4 (393) ns 
Number plates are insufficient 
evidence 43.2 (19) 55.9 (212) 59.2 (327) 61.2 (317) 58.6 (875) ns 
Counter-measures 77.8 (35) 78.6 (297) 84.1 (459) 85.7 (438) 83.0 (1229) ns 
ANPR discrimination 24.4 (11) 16.0 (60) 20.2 (111) 26.8 (138) 21.5 (320) .084 (**) 
ANPR, a revenue making tool 52.3 (23) 55.2 (207) 47.5 (263) 42.8 (222) 47.9 (715) ns 
ANPR, a spying tool 28.3 (13) 31.7 (120) 30.2 (168) 28.0 (145) 29.8 (446) ns 
ANPR, an infringement of civil 
liberties 28.3 (13) 16.4 (62) 12.3 (68) 10.7 (55) 13.3 (198) .085 (**) 
The coefficient indicates the strength of the relationship 
All relationships are weak or very weak, but statistically significant 
*Significant at the .01 level 
**Significant at the .001 level 
ns = not significant 
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Table 5.15 Perceived concerns about ANPR by Victimisation 
Potential ANPR’s benefits 
Respondents who agreed or strongly 
agreed with benefits (%, n) 
Relationship 
(Cramer’s 
V) Victims Non-victims Total 
Nothing to hide, nothing to fear 85.7 (203) 89.6 (960) 88.8 (1163) ns 
Covert surveillance 78.3 (184) 82.0 (876) 81.4 (1060) .092 (**) 
Police can be trusted to handle ANPR data 52.7 (125) 59.5 (629) 58.2 (754) ns 
Police can be trusted to protect innocent 
people’s rights 
45.8 (109) 54.1 (572) 52.5 (681) 
.088 (**) 
ANPR should be advertised to the public 54.0 (128) 56.0 (592) 55.6 (720) ns 
Independent monitoring 74.4 (177) 68.2 (719) 69.3 (896) ns 
Awareness of ANPR cameras helps fear of 
crime 
65.5 (156) 66.8 (706) 66.6 (862) ns 
Awareness of ANPR cameras doesn’t help 
offender detection 
64.4 (152) 63.6 (671) 63.7 (823) ns 
ANPR evidence, misleading 29.2 (70) 26.5 (278) 27.0 (348) ns 
Number plates are insufficient evidence 63.8 (152) 57.3 (605) 58.4 (757) ns 
Counter-measures 85.5 (201) 82.2 (861) 82.8 (1062) ns 
ANPR discrimination 21.3 (50) 21.8 (230) 21.7 (280) ns 
ANPR, a revenue making tool 54.2 (130) 46.9 (497) 48.2 (627) ns 
ANPR, a spying tool 32.2 (77) 28.8 (308) 29.4 (385) ns 
ANPR, an infringement of civil liberties 12.7 (30) 13.5 (143) 13.3 (173) ns 
The coefficient indicates the strength of the relationship 
All relationships are weak, but statistically significant 
*Significant at the .01 level 
**Significant at the .001 level 
ns = not significant 
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Table 16 Correlations: ANPR as an infringement of civil liberties against perceptions about ANPR’s benefits and disbenefits 
      Infringement Feel safer 
Spearman's rho Infringement Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .243(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1528 1504 
  Feel safer Correlation Coefficient .243(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1504 1549 
      Infringement Reduce crime 
Spearman's rho Infringement Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .248(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1528 1505 
  Reduce crime Correlation Coefficient .248(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1505 1546 
      Infringement Less discrimination 
Spearman's rho Infringement Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .159(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1528 1493 
  Less discrimination Correlation Coefficient .159(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1493 1533 
      Infringement Victim reassurance 
Spearman's rho Infringement Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .178(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1528 1491 
  Victim reassurance Correlation Coefficient .178(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1491 1531 
       Infringement Less stops 
Spearman's rho Infringement Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .235(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1528 1498 
  Less stops Correlation Coefficient .235(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1498 1536 
     Infringement Covert surveillance 
Spearman's rho Infringement Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .312(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1528 1497 
  Covert surveillance Correlation Coefficient .312(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1497 1533 
       Infringement Trust police data 
Spearman's rho Infringement Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .302(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1528 1492 
  Trust police data Correlation Coefficient .302(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1492 1528 
      Infringement Trust police fair 
Spearman's rho Infringement Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .262(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1528 1492 
  Trust police fair Correlation Coefficient .262(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1492 1527 
      Infringement ANPR public 
Spearman's rho Infringement Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.237(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1528 1489 
  ANPR public Correlation Coefficient -.237(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1489 1523 
       Infringement Independent control 
Spearman's rho Infringement Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.219(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1528 1488 
  Independent control Correlation Coefficient -.219(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1488 1521 
       Infringement Covert surveillance 
 (**) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 5.16 Correlations: ‘Nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ against perceptions about ANPR’s benefits 
      Nothing to hide Feel safer 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .397(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1521 
  Feel safer Correlation Coefficient .397(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1521 1549 
      Nothing to hide Reduce crime 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .293(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1518 
  Reduce crime Correlation Coefficient .293(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1518 1546 
      Nothing to hide Deterrence 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .245(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1511 
  Deterrence Correlation Coefficient .245(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1511 1539 
      Nothing to hide Quicker police 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .297(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1499 
  Quicker police Correlation Coefficient .297(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1499 1528 
       Nothing to hide Better tracking 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .290(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1508 
  Better tracking Correlation Coefficient .290(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1508 1538 
     Nothing to hide Useful evidence 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .299(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1513 
  Useful evidence Correlation Coefficient .299(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1513 1542 
       Nothing to hide Road safety 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .280(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1503 
  Road safety Correlation Coefficient .280(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1503 1533 
      Nothing to hide Trust police fair 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .262(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1528 1492 
  Trust police fair Correlation Coefficient .262(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1492 1527 
      Nothing to hide Less discrimination 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .257(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1504 
  Less discrimination Correlation Coefficient .257(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1504 1533 
       Nothing to hide Victim reassurance 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .322(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1502 
  Victim reassurance Correlation Coefficient .322(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1502 1531 
       Infringement Covert surveillance 
     Nothing to hide Less stops 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .353(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1509 
  Less stops Correlation Coefficient .353(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1509 1536 
 (**) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 5.17 Correlations: ‘Nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ against concerns about ANPR 
      Nothing to hide Covert surveillance 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .408(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1509 
  Covert surveillance Correlation Coefficient .408(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1509 1533 
      Nothing to hide Trust police data 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .412(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1502 
  Trust police data Correlation Coefficient .412(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1502 1528 
      Nothing to hide Trust police fair 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .382(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1501 
  Trust police fair Correlation Coefficient .382(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1501 1527 
      Nothing to hide Independent control 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.123(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1496 
  Independent control Correlation Coefficient -.123(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1496 1521 
       Nothing to hide Spy people 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .261(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1505 
  Spy people Correlation Coefficient .261(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1505 1532 
     Nothing to hide Infringement 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .327(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1543 1501 
  Infringement Correlation Coefficient .327(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1528 1542 
 (**) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Table 5.19 Correlations: Overall support for ANPR against other perceptions about ANPR 
      Support Nothing to hide 
Spearman's rho Support Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .443(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1512 1487 
  Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient .443(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1487 1543 
      Support Feel safer 
Spearman's rho Support Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .435(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1512 1489 
  Feel safer Correlation Coefficient .435(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1489 1549 
      Support Covert surveillance 
Spearman's rho Support Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .406(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1512 1477 
  Covert surveillance Correlation Coefficient .406(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1477 1533 
      Support Reduce crime 
Spearman's rho Support Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .395(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1512 1489 
  Reduce crime Correlation Coefficient .395(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1489 1546 
       Support Infringement 
Spearman's rho Support Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .378(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1512 1470 
  Infringement Correlation Coefficient .378(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1470 1528 
     Support Better tracking 
Spearman's rho Support Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .350(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1512 1479 
  Better tracking Correlation Coefficient .350(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1479 1538 
     Nothing to hide Trust police data 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .335(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1512 1473 
  Trust police data Correlation Coefficient .335(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1473 1528 
      Nothing to hide Victim reassurance 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .330(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1512 1473 
  Victim reassurance Correlation Coefficient .330(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1473 1531 
      Nothing to hide Less stops 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .322(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1512 1478 
  Less stops Correlation Coefficient .322(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1478 1536 
      Nothing to hide Trust police fair 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .298(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1512 1470 
  Trust police fair Correlation Coefficient .298(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1470 1527 
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       Nothing to hide Quicker police 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .278(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1512 1469 
  Quicker police Correlation Coefficient .278(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1469 1528 
     Nothing to hide Less discrimination 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .264(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1512 1476 
  Less discrimination Correlation Coefficient .264(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1476 1533 
     Nothing to hide Deterrence 
Spearman's rho Nothing to hide Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .263(**) 
    Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
    N 1512 1478 
  Deterrence Correlation Coefficient .263(**) 1.000 
    Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
    N 1478 1539 
 (**) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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Appendix 3 – Statistical results (Chapter Six) 
 
Theft of motor vehicle offence 
 
Test for normality: Are data normally distributed? 
The test shows that Bradford South (target area) is not ‘normal’, while Keighley (control area) is 
‘normal’. As there is mixture, use non-parametric test i.e. Wilcoxon 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
bradford_south_before 12 85.7% 2 14.3% 14 100.0% 
bradford_south_after 12 85.7% 2 14.3% 14 100.0% 
keighley_before 12 85.7% 2 14.3% 14 100.0% 
keighley_after 12 85.7% 2 14.3% 14 100.0% 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
bradford_south_before .206 12 .170 .931 12 .386 
bradford_south_after .263 12 .021 .869 12 .064 
keighley_before .323 12 .001 .780 12 .006 
keighley_after .354 12 .000 .732 12 .002 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
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Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test: Do Bradford South (target area) and Keighley (control area) have 
similar crime rates before ANPR? 
No, they are significantly different 
 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
keighley_before - 
bradford_south_before 
Negative Ranks 12a 6.50 78.00 
Positive Ranks 0b .00 .00 
Ties 0c   
Total 12   
a. keighley_before < bradford_south_before 
b. keighley_before > bradford_south_before 
c. keighley_before = bradford_south_before 
 
 
Test Statisticsb 
 
keighley_before 
- 
bradford_south_
before 
Z -3.077a 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .002 
a. Based on positive ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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 Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test: Is crime significantly lower in Bradford South (target area) after 
ANPR? 
Yes 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
bradford_south_after - 
bradford_south_before 
Negative Ranks 12a 6.50 78.00 
Positive Ranks 0b .00 .00 
Ties 0c   
Total 12   
a. bradford_south_after < bradford_south_before 
b. bradford_south_after > bradford_south_before 
c. bradford_south_after = bradford_south_before 
 
 
Test Statisticsb 
 
bradford_south_
after - 
bradford_south_
before 
Z -3.075a 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .002 
a. Based on positive ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test: Is crime significantly lower in Keighley (control area)? 
Yes 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
keighley_after - 
keighley_before 
Negative Ranks 12a 6.50 78.00 
Positive Ranks 0b .00 .00 
Ties 0c   
Total 12   
a. keighley_after < keighley_before 
b. keighley_after > keighley_before 
c. keighley_after = keighley_before 
 
 
Test Statisticsb 
 
keighley_after - 
keighley_before 
Z -3.108a 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .002 
a. Based on positive ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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Correlations 
 
Nonparametric Correlations - Entire period under investigation (Feb 02 - Jan 06) 
 
 Time Bradford Keighley West Yorkshire 
Spearman's rho Time Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.846** -.884** -.973** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 .000 
N 48 48 48 48 
Bradford Correlation Coefficient -.846** 1.000 .838** .888** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .000 .000 
N 48 48 48 48 
Keighley Correlation Coefficient -.884** .838** 1.000 .892** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 . .000 
N 48 48 48 48 
West Yorkshire Correlation Coefficient -.973** .888** .892** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 . 
N 48 48 48 48 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Nonparametric Correlations - Before ANPR (Feb 02 - Jan 04) 
 
Correlations 
 Time Bradford Keighley 
Spearman's rho Time Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.695** -.721** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .000 
N 24 24 24 
Bradford Correlation Coefficient -.695** 1.000 .569** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .004 
N 24 24 24 
Keighley Correlation Coefficient -.721** .569** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .004 . 
N 24 24 24 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Nonparametric Correlations - After ANPR (Feb 04 - Jan 06) 
 
 
Correlations 
 Time Bradford Keighley 
Spearman's rho Time Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.576** -.571** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .003 .004 
N 24 24 24 
Bradford Correlation Coefficient -.576** 1.000 .574** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 . .003 
N 24 24 24 
Keighley Correlation Coefficient -.571** .574** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .003 . 
N 24 24 24 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Detection of theft of motor vehicle 
 
 
Test of normality: are data normally distributed? 
Not normal, therefore use Wilcoxon test 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
B_Before 12 100.0% 0 .0% 12 100.0% 
B_AFter 12 100.0% 0 .0% 12 100.0% 
K_Before 12 100.0% 0 .0% 12 100.0% 
K_After 12 100.0% 0 .0% 12 100.0% 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
B_Before .126 12 .200* .958 12 .760 
B_AFter .126 12 .200* .957 12 .746 
K_Before .204 12 .178 .922 12 .300 
K_After .135 12 .200* .977 12 .969 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
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Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test: Are detections for TOMV significantly lower in Bradford South? 
The change is not significant 
 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
B_AFter - B_Before Negative Ranks 7a 7.57 53.00 
Positive Ranks 5b 5.00 25.00 
Ties 0c   
Total 12   
a. B_AFter < B_Before 
b. B_AFter > B_Before 
c. B_AFter = B_Before 
 
 
Test Statisticsb 
 
B_AFter - 
B_Before 
Z -1.098a 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .272 
a. Based on positive ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test: Are detections for TOMV significantly lower in Keighley? 
The change is not significant 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
K_After - K_Before Negative Ranks 8a 7.56 60.50 
Positive Ranks 4b 4.38 17.50 
Ties 0c   
Total 12   
a. K_After < K_Before 
b. K_After > K_Before 
c. K_After = K_Before 
 
 
Test Statisticsb 
 
K_After - 
K_Before 
Z -1.687a 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .092 
a. Based on positive ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
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Theft of number plates (TONP) 
 
Test of normality: are data normally distributed? 
No 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Before 12 100.0% 0 .0% 12 100.0% 
After 12 100.0% 0 .0% 12 100.0% 
 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
Before .148 12 .200* .959 12 .773 
After .154 12 .200* .963 12 .821 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction 
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance. 
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Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test: Is the change significant? 
No 
 
Ranks 
 N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
After - Before Negative Ranks 8a 6.44 51.50 
Positive Ranks 3b 4.83 14.50 
Ties 1c   
Total 12   
a. After < Before 
b. After > Before 
c. After = Before 
 
 
 
Test Statisticsb 
 After - Before 
Z -1.646a 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .100 
a. Based on positive ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
